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The aim of this dissertation is to provide 
a comprehensive analysis of how British merchant banks organ-- 
i se and approach contested bids ; ithin the institutional 
framework of the City. 
To this end., a number of exploratory hypo- 
theses were derived from a pilot study with five merchant 
banks in the City as well as discussions with the project- 
super: Tisor. Interviewe were the carried out w i"- 10 i eadin ; 
UK mcrchor - banks belonging to either the Acceptin or Issue n 
houses associations regarding their role, organisational strnc"-- 
ture, approaches to bidding and defensive issues related t0 
contested b: ýds. The main perceptions and empirical i'i Y. d 
. 
ngs. 
from this major survey are then compared with results o 
analysis of 30 c Gso studies spanning the 1979-81 pe: ci i (. skip. - 
ported by anal sý.. s of another 10 cases with respect to some 
issues)and the results are then discussed and analysed in 
chapters 8 and 9. 
. 
To obtain an overview: of how self- 
regulation prescribos bid behaviour and practices, interviews 
were also held with various City bodies. 
Volume 1 of this dissertation is divided 
into 5 parts. Part i outlines the research objectives, me- 
thodology and literature survey. Part II then examines the 
results of a survey of opinion of merchant bankers. In Part 
III, main results of the literature survey and merchant bank-- 
ing field work are compared with evidence derived 
. 
from the 
case studies. Important research findings pertaining to 
organisational structure of leading UK merchant banks, 
approaches to strategies and related issues are then identi- 
fied and highli 
, 
heed. Contemporary takeover issues which 
became apparent during this research project are then analysed 
an , i, ssib?. e : ý: ý'crms ý. n estýd (Pa,:. L The ..:: ýý. section 
i 
, 
e, 'art V considers sc_::, current- trend; in 
and 'nom' 7 tz : hing to 
or, 
XXVlI 
ai: eo'i PI'S in the 1980s. In the discussion, details of 'bc)4I 
the survey of merchant banking and tho 40 case studies are 
used to illustrate the main trends. 
Volume 2, which is not to be generally 
available to readers gives a cross section of'transcripts of 
the interviews held with more than 90 merchent bankers, stock- 
brokers, takeover specialists, American investment bankers, 
merchant banking analysts, authors, foreign wer_ chant bankers, 
officials of self-regulatory bodies as well as relevant 
financial and non-financial data of the merchant banks inter- 
viewed during this survey, 
Findings of this study are numerous and. 
it has d er_iunstrated the fact that UK merchant banks approach- 
ed their takeover assignments through team work ith a mi nirn-- 
mum of 2, a favoured norm of 3 and the maximum team size is 
dependent on the size, time factor and complexity of the 
transaction itself. Their approach to contested bids which 
are invariably multi-disciplinary and complicated should 
not be viewed purely from the financial perspective alone. 
In both bidding and defending capacities, the merchant týari- 
hers subscribe to the hypotheses that while there are general 
financial and non-financial principles guiding their approa- 
ches, flexibility and creativity are essential. Although 
the bidder has more control over timing in 6pringing the 
takeover Did, however, the findings of this survey have 
shown that in a tair n. umber_ of " cases, this factor [nay not 
always favour the buyer because of the emergence of rival 
bidders. *Moreover 
. 
timing is but one element of a bidding/ 
offensive strategy. 
In essence $ the defensive posture is 
necessarily a response appropriate to the offensive st. - ate`ry_ 
The share o nershi_p structure of the defending co: lapafl plays 
a crucial role in the final outcome of the bids uanc: L Eliv 
the :; erchant; banks perceive that, it is relatively easier to 
des end 'a, client when '. her: e aý, e no institutional Ihoi dens I, i. ez 
, 
st -s ; ýr ý, ý c . *. 
-- 
when n he ownership ? spread s'mc r the 
,; J. 1 1n 'st rs 
- 
xviII 
- 
are thought to be more loyal to their boards. This is nar- 
ticul. arly important, for the lain defensive thrust is ort 
an appeal to shareholders' loyalty. This is but one aspect 
of defensive strategies for, although the literature of cor- 
porate finance tends to dwell on. only a few defensive strafe 
gies, this st-udy'finds that their range is wide. 
Another import-ant finding was the fact 
that UK : teckbrokers (as agents) work very closely with the 
merchant banks ('as principals) in advising on contested bids. 
The former are normally consulted for their market expertise. 
One of the leading stockbroking firms interviewed served 8 
of the '!? 
. 
LC (Accepting Houses Committee) members. Owing 
to this special relationship between these two types of IL. J_,. Ian_ 
cial institutions and possibly their lack of financial power 
comparable to that of the merchant banks, the stockbrokers 
är e genera_lýr constrained fr om act isaä pr inc pa i ad v se. c- s 
in takeover situations. However, with the impending; struo, 
tural changes ?n the sto kb oking 'ß us ý. ness in the mi 
. 
A980 
, 
there is a possiU äit: y that 
. 
of hei. ' the merchant bank. or f tcc: C 
broking firm assuming dual capacity, 
Finally, UK merchant banks in the 119803 
will be characterised by a trend towards congiomeracy and the 
development of fee-based international merchant banking acti- 
vities especial:! y in the USA and. the Asia/Pacific Yreg: ions in 
view of the constriction and competition in domestic corpor- 
ate financial advisory activities. 
r 
I AT 
This study endeavours to knit together 
two quite distinct but related components viz., merchant bank- 
ing and corporate acquisitions. From the literature survey 
and wide reading on this subject, it became clear that both 
terns are rather ambiguous and they generally give rise to 
confusioll. Thus, before proceeding further, it is" cr it i.: ß. 1.1 r 
Ü 
important to clarify both terms as used in the context of this 
study. 
Of the two terms mentioned, ' uioxých t ai 
banking' is the more i iimrecise. The late Sit Edward Reid 
cautioned against taking a purist approach to defining its 
meaning because the tern, "'merchant banking' s sometimes 
-app-- 
lied to banks who are not merchants, sometimes to merchants 
who arä be:, -1-1. s and sc'mmmetimes f"c; :, ou es who are neither 
c3oc s llc); 
pretend to prbffer'äny precise definition to an age-old enigma 
but rather, attempts to delineate the criteria for the se? ec-- 
tion of merchant banks to represent the population 
_sample, 
The criteria cie. iineating the term, 3 merchant bank' in the con- 
text of-this study are: 
1) The merchant bank must be in the UK, 
2) The merchant bank must be based in London, 
3) It must either belong to the Accepting Houses 
Committee or she Issuing souses ý'ý sociation, and 
finally, 
4) It must have a corporate finance division deal- 
ing with corporate f nancial advisory services 
including mergers and acquisitions. 
The term, 'rtakeOver, u is ire tz nii 
sed in vo''^v äi,:. '_ýý"':.. ý. i : ri v: ä ýý.:; li and iiac: ltlisi liion" 
Ln this 
Si-? 
_- 
Ed; ar i :: 'eid. "T. he =', cle of : ion char_ gin'-. s 
'ý.:.. 
_i 
.. 
o It ho 
. 
Li...; Lt 
. 
Z. äv:. Ul ý'7ürSz vý liý- 
_ 
: ýJý"' 1 ýI ýLiS 
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_. 
5'XY 
LýLL{ti'" isU'yý'.. 'ý't 'ý . ý1LL11ii fiiiý. . ý. 'i1ý:. J. 'tti a0-11, U. L' ýi3i:.. 
rnennrrh ; 
ä_ r(? i. i nPt: inn ic £i PPWn hpi: wFnti. t a}; ý? cýv:? v i' nilti. 1 hF- 
ve1'+ýý ' t;; ýrbQj '" Nccordix t: o thu LieuIlsed Dealer st Rules, 
a takeoveri' may be defined as a transaction or series of 
transactions whereby a person (individual, group of indivi- 
duals or company) acquires control over the assets of a com- 
pany, either directly by becoming the owner of those assets 
or indirectly by obtaining control of the management of the 
company. 
On the other hand., 1.4oinherg et. aln defines 
"merger" as an arrangement whereby the assets of the two com- 
panies becomes vested in, or under the control of one company 
(which may or may not be one of the original two companies), 
which has as its shareholders all, or' substantially all, the 
shareholders ; of the two companies.. A nierger is effected by 
41_e shareholder of one or both of the merging companies ex-. 
changing their shares (either voluntarily or as a result of a 
legal operation)or shares in the other or a third company. 
The dis tinc tioni between a over, and a =merger ' is that in 
a takeover, the direct or indirect control over the assets of 
the acquired company nasses to the acquirer; in a merger, the 
shareholding in the combined enterprise will be apportioned 
between the shareholders/investors of the two business enti- 
ties. * 
A contested takeover in the context of his 
study is defined as a situation where the biddee company 
actively resisted an attempt by the buyer (bidder) to ac; eire 
corporate control on the grounds of price or independence. 
. 
iieLTir.: eý ei;. R1c y.. c. ' !! LOndorE. Sweet 
1. L_, : ýt-. 
_i ! t' 
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ABC = Accepting Houses. Committee 
C. A. = Companies Act 
csi = Council for the Securities Industry 
CGT = Cap 
_tal Gains Tax C. F. = Corporate Finance 
C, B. = Clearing Banks (Clearers) 
DoT = Department of Trade 
EGN = Emergency General Meeting 
EPS = Earnings Per Share. 
FMB = Foreign Merchant Bank (encoded) 
F. T. = Financial Times 
HKSB = Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation 
IHA = issuing Houses Association 
ISC = Institutional Shareholders Committee 
IPC 
= 
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on 
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LSE 
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London Stock Exchange 
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= 
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M&A 
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Merger & Acquisition 
M. B. 
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Merchant Bank (encored) 
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CHAPTER 'I 
OBJECTIVES, 
,; r-IHODOLO Y AND PROCEDURE S 
p Back ; round and Broad Objectives 
In the UK, because of the unique set of histo- 
rical factors governing the growth of 
, 
'nglish merchant banks, 
today, trey still exercise a prominent role in the City of 
London, the country as well as on the global scale where thy 
have their overseas operations. In general, contested vier. 
-- 
gers and t: asecvers in the UK involve merchant banks acting in 
their capacity as financial advisers to both acquiring and 
defending companies, Iloy; ever, academic research and li : era-- 
i, Üw 
.. 
J. Gä. iý (hi this L artl. l: li } z- Stil. ' i .v 
acti viti. es is slight although there have been some a. U tcm-CN ; 
by writers like Moon (1971)(19), rnfield ('196 )( ), Pro r 
is tiering (1979)(22) and Weinberg (1979)(28) to bride this 
Sap. (see the review of literature in chapter 2). This may 
vooaaly be explained by the various constraints 
. 
faciI 'the 
would be res; archer from undertaking this task, namely: 
.) While managerial and academic texts on mergers 
and ta'Keovers are quite extensive, published 
data on merchant bankin and their work on com- 
pany takeovers is deficient owing to the fact- 
; teat merchant in general. is a' closed 
door' industry and the bankers in the City ore 
normally tight-lipped about their activities 
and so there is very little publication by the 
practitjoners. 
tpof t; rýý-s z; ýý, atiz, 
ii) Contested oý. fIez "a, uric. e subject, ie 'c 
are incl i nevi to rye hi ly controve! ial du co 
the incense resistance put up by the tur et 
ii a is i. i?: efJi:?: idei ce as iii tIiS 
-2- 
the modus o,. eiandi_ adopted by both parties 
. 
iii) Secrecy is important oecause of tactical con-- 
sic. elations and sensitivity of price related 
information. 
iv) fore important still, there are many complex 
rules and regulations governing the conduct 
and practices of takeovers supervised by City 
bodies ranging from the Takeover Panel (TF) 
to the Council for the Securities Industry 
(CSI). The regulations and operations of 
these non--statutory institutions are generally 
not well known to non-CiVy professionals. 
v) There is a lack of relevant data in business 
schools and public libraries on actual bid 
documentation due to its restricted publica- 
tion and circulation. 
I'e chaps for these x-easOrthe the empirical 
research work in the UIC has been orientated mostly to tho 
financial aspects, managerial approach and economic perfor- 
mince related to mer drs and takeovers. Thus, very li ttl 
attention was paid to the approaches adopted by the financial 
advisers (i. e. the merchant banks) in structuring and connduc- 
ting takeovers on behalf of their corporate clients apart 
from the conference organised by the "Financial j_iT, '_jeS" in 
16? on this matter which attracted the participation of a 
few leading houses as well as providing the non-merchant 
banking practitioner with a rare insight into how some mer- 
chant banks proceeded with their takeover assi. ; nments. All 
extensive literature search has failed to uncover works of 
sz filer nature. ýo , the aims of this study are: 
1) 
" 
To fill the Cap in this lightly researched 
area of company takeovers. The main thrust 
is to examine hog merchant hanks organise 
themselves in connection with contested bid 
situations and the factors influencing their 
decision-ulan g on :. ey i--sues of b_Lddi n. ' and 
defence. 
-3- 
Yo°. tamine ho-: self 
--re`", U 
_: 
tory f 
prescribes or C_: ont: r, iins the conduct and 
practices or i'i ng, 11 cial ao. visers : gin contested. 
deals, This aspect is often -nvep"Iected by 
other researchers. 
3) To develop a conceptualised fra:, l ework to 
explain the bidding and defensive strafe-- 
gies adopted by financial advisers in con- 
tested takeovers. 
4) To explain how the internal organisation 
within merchant banks deals with contested 
bids. 
1.1 Broad Hypotheses Lra. e; n from Literature and Discussions as 
Initial Focus of Stuff 
In part cülär, this research is adere , sad to 
ce-r"tain key questions : 
-- 
a) How do merchant banks or anise their cor- 
porate advisory functions pertaining to 
contested bids and to c..: hat extent are c--r. "- 
Lain features common to London merchant 
banks? 
b) In vier: or the importance or reputation o 
merchant banking, what factors influence 
their. client selection pröcess 
c) Having been given the aria: date to acquire a 
biddee company, ho;; noes the merchant banker 
does about the acquisition task? What 
tactical, qualitative and non-qualitative 
factors influence the bidding strategies 
like timing, appropriate terms of conside- 
ration, bid premium level and advanced pul- 
chase of the biddee's equity holding ý 
;; hat u. dvanta ; es zand ; ns tituti_onal constraints 
dc ccr ý. iýc tt; n rcrchcýn!. ),. n,, - °sf; a'Licy rc_ üýn f113 
-4- 
aparc) -_ch to -ßäe boas d o: ý; he äýýC: iidä. tß co:. ýa zy 
i:. L1 C, L 
i Us ky 
. 70 1 ders ? 
! ` '.? t i' e^L1_'1. sised in :"d circular-- 
14hß? to. is ; t0-0.3 influence the successful outcome of 
a contested bid? 
f) Ho\; do merchant D: c. nlcs view some of the deferisive 
strategies advocated by the literature of corpo-- 
rate finance? 
Üj How are profit forecasts used in d ; fence and 
what difficulties and problems confront the mer- 
chant banks regarding this issues especially 
deviant forecasts and litigations brought against 
them by dissatisfied clients? 
h) Do merchant. banks and 
or comrete in the bak 
merchant bankers vie: 
-; 
City who are involved 
in conteste deals-? 
stockbrokers collaborate 
Cover business? Y'pow do the 
other prof essional s in the 
, "i1 bh them in `. 'a riOUs cie(rees 
i) What are the main attributes which enable merchant 
hanks to retain their supremacy as merger and 
takeover specialists ? 
Because the literature on the subject of 
con i us I, od bids is limited, 
-it was necessary to focus this 
study initially by means of only very general h;; potheses. 
These were based in part on observations, - discussions and. 
a pilot study, viz: 
_ 
a) That, within a merchant bank, advice and guidance 
to its C-1-fonts is undertaken by a tear' of specia- 
lists rather than an individual. 
b) That for contested bids, merchant banks in general. 
consider timing to be a crucal_ element in their 
acquisition planning. 
C' '! 'h 
.t iüer char' 
ban: ý-S T)CrCF`J. VF t h., t t. 'ricy do not 
-, --e ý bSl- 
1 
1 
-5- 
ci) That in general, 
..: Lrchant banks favour soli. 
citing the prior rocommendation from the 
board of directors of the biddee co; n an_;; be-- 
foro the announcement of formal bids. 
e) That although the literature of corporate 
finance tends to be restrictive or confine 
itself to a subset of defensive strategies, 
in reality, financial advisers tend to adopt 
a multitude of defensive tactical manoeuvres 
and counter--measures in the defence of their 
clients. 
f) That, in the rendering of corporate advisory 
services to their clients, merchant banks. 
perceive that they can provide more ei ricient-- 
ly such integrated in-house specialist ser- 
vices relating to takeovers vis-a-vis other 
professional advisers like stockbrokers, 
corporate lawyers, etc. 
". 2 The Concept of ! +`our inter-Related Phases 
The main thrust of this study hinges cru- 
cially on the concept of 4 inter-r ei a: ted phases: 
1) of merchant bankers. 
2) of stockbrokers. 
3) of case studies in a3 year period. 
4) in-depth studies to capture the more 
unique and creative aspects of a contested 
bid. 
This approach ailöws comparison of percep- 
tions revealed by (1) and (2) i. e. the merchant banks and 
stockbrokers and the interpretative frames are then compared 
with those of (3) and (4) i. e. the two groups of case studies 
as ilius x ate , ore clearly in the schematic Dia 
, 
rar. 1.0 on 
the next page. 
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SEOO? 
_; D ;. RY (SUPFOPFIVE) 
IIIerchant (1) <- 
-- ---Stockbrokers (2) Banks 
i Case Case 
(ý) iStudies e-ý . _. -- , Studies (4) I(Group 1)1 (Group 2) 
Dia r rn_'i ©: The Concept of Four Inter--related Phases 
Fundamentally, the objective is to create two 
major interpretative frames ('i) and (3) for comparison 
supported by -'U-'L-Heir respective ancillary frames i. e. the 
stockbroking survey (2) and group two case studies (4). 
These two smaller frames have to be incorporated into this 
study (the reason will become apparent later) because 
firstly, stockbrokers act as supportive service as agents 
in takeover transactions and hence there if-, a need to 
discover the nature of its :, corking relationship with the 
City's merchant banks. Secondly, from the findings of ('1) 
and (2), it was felt that the explanatory process would be 
complete i: f ire. 
-depth studies i. e. (4) were additionally 
incorporated to capture the ,: lor. e unique and creative dinren- 
sions of a contested takeover. 
(,. ) Phase 1: Methodolo£, y Adopted in the Survey; of Merchant 
Bankers 
i) The Sample Frame 
In selecting the sample- frame of merchant banks 
for this survey, the faci; that the term "merchant bank" 
lacks precise definition should be underlined. Another 
unique aspect of UK merchant banking is that it is a rela-- 
tively :,; alb. community (ioiainated by a fed big names like 
Kicinwor't Blenson, IMorgan Grenifell, Lazards, i. a. l'i)ur s, Iý 1I 
and S, 
"ciu'oder : iagg. An extensive review 
_7_ 
of erchant 
. 
o, a11. ki. n 1. ttorat i önd oý, he r pizbli. s: ned sources, 
for example, the financial media suf ests i, hatc bid activities 
are conducted mainly by the corporate finance divisions of 
the various houses belonging to the E! cce ting houses Commit- 
tee. This small number of merchant banks ire London at the 
same time serves a very large cross--section of the 3,000 
listed companies in the London Stock Exchange. The con- 
centration of this 'wholesale' banking business in the hands 
of a few banking institutions is reflected in the choice of 
merchant banks by a large cross-section of leading U IC com- 
panies (700 as constituted in the survey). With the excep- 
tion of Noble Grossart, which is a Scottish nt bank, 
the 19 merchant banks nominated in Table 1.0 on the next 
page constituted a substantial proportion of the sample 
selected for this study. 
For. this research, the criteria for iden-- 
tifying and demarcating 'the sample frame is derived from 
these sources: 
i) The Banker periodical. 
2) Crawiord's Directory of City Connections. 
The City Directory. 
4) The "Financial Times. " 
5) The pilot survey. 
From the above sources, 30 UK merchant 
banks were identified as appropriate subjects for this 
study on-the followinG basis: 
a) The merchant bank mus''. be UK incorporated 
and London-based, 
b) It must either belong to the Accepting 
Houses Committee or the Issuing Houses 
Association or, 
Cý T ti i tust e an open af: in g subsidiary oa 
British clearing or overseas bank, 
d 
It 
It must have a corporal : ý'inýulce div. sion- 
, 
iea iron. with ii: lorgers and acquisitions and 
L 
-- 
Table 1.0: The Top Twenty Merchant Bank Ranking As 
Advisers by 700 UK Companies 
M ERCHANT BANK 'ACCEPTING HOUSES BA- 
s , -. -LANCE SHEET 
12 W22. 
1) Schroder Wagg , 1,543 
2) Hill Samuel 1,303 
3) S. G. Warburg 764+ 
4) Morgan Grenfell 1,048 
5) Kleinwort Benson 1,603 
6) Lazard Brothers 641 
7) Baring Brothers 386 
8 N. M. Rothschii ld & Co. 527 
9) Hambros 1,423 
10) Samuel Montagu 1,156 
11) Robert Fleming n/a 
12) County Bank n/a 
13) Charterhouse Japhet 152- 
14) Singer & Friedlander 241 
15) ICFC Corporate Finance n/a 
16) Keyser Ullmann n/a 
17) Rea Brothers 93 
18 J Noble. Grossart* n/a 
19) Brown' Shipley 221 
20) Barclays Merchant Bank, n/a 
Scottish merchant bank 
Table adapted from, "Investors Chronicle Surn eü 
31st August, 1979, pp784=555, 
Table 
-1.1: The Comparison of Merchant Banking Category 
Against its Principal Professional affiliation 
Merchant Banking % of Total l Total No. In jSelected Banksl 
category Selec- selected l as % of 
ted ! affiliation affiliation 
ccepting housesi 1 7 17 
ssuing houses* 9 30 42 21 
Clearer-owned 4' 13 4 100 
Total. 30 105 i 31 
`Note: There are altogether 65 members in the Issuing Houses 
Association (IEA) out of which 17 members " ai so belong 
to the Accepting Houses Committee (AHO). 
_9- 
finally, 
e) It must tJO visible as a merchant bank in 
reports by i, he leadinG financial media. 
Table 1.1 on the previous pane lists details 
of these merchant banks categorised according to their 
professional banking-affiliations. The relatively "loi-i" 
percentage (21%) representation from the Issuing Houses 
Association is slightly misleading because all the Accep- 
ting Houses members are automatic members of the'Issuing 
Houses Association as well. If these were to be reclassi. 
- 
fied as the Issuing Houses members, the level pof Issuing 
Houses representation would accelerate to 47%. An 
additional factor to be taken into account, is that', merry of 
the 65 Issuing Houses Association : r, embers do not meet the 
criteria listed, and hence, they '. fiere excluded from the 
survey. In view of the small. number constituting the 
sample frame, it iv,, as decided that all the 30 merchant banks 
meeting the criteria delimited should be incorporated in 
this study. 
(: ii) of Questionnaire 
The use of ma led questionnaire no: c; ally- 
restricts the quality or depth of information and quantity 
that can be extracted and the response rate may be loci. 
In view of the fact that the merchant banking population 
size is. uniquely small owing to the nature of the i. ndust; ry, 
a low response would certainly compound the problems con- 
fronted with a study of this nature. Furthermore, accor 
ding to Erdost 
, 
i-loser and Galton2 
, 
mailed questionnaires 
are inappropriate when. 
- 
i) the questionnaire is too long 
2) the questionnaire is -toD difficult. 
I. Erdo , i'o_Ge s 
"Pro i SS1. OIlc^I. r ai. Surveys j US i,. T(; Gj2 al., 
o ý3. also. c, -, 
-r 
F. v ^; L1I'Vt,, 1`tfý, 
-lOi3 J. 71 
Social I2ý' See 1e 
- 
0^iy fc 
.L 
on1' OXlý I; iii: ci:. 
- 
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3) the information required is con 
4) the available budget is inadequate, and 
;) the available time is insufficient. 
With hindsight gained from the pilot sur-- 
vey, it was decided that the shortcomings associated w,, 
_ith 
questionnaire could be minimised by adopting e , iuestion- 
naire and personal interview approach. 
(iii) The Pilot Survey 
-Five interviews were conducted in a 
plot survey to provide the researcher with ön initial 
sight into the intricacies of merchant bmnkino and. also to 
famili: urise _. him with the subject m aster. Tn additi o: 1 to 
the more general discussion, the intervie. ýlees commented 
on the weaknesses of the draft questionnaire and gave cons"- 
truct. 
-i. ve suggestions on the forma i, iosf; likely to solicit 
the information needed. Details of those interviewed in 
; he pilot study are listed in Table 1.2 below: 
Table I. 2 : TJ'he Pilot Stud Desip; aatcd by Banking 
'1'L2e, Number & Professional Status of Resc:; ondoni, s 
}3 NKING TYPE NUi. BER PROFESSIONAL STATUS 
rah r: igr. "chant bank morchant ban =_er 
British merchant bank I director 
British clearing bank 1. ' director 
can : bank I dead (loans division) Par IJiý3. i as verb bank 1 1 ctl ei' c ecu dive 
__ _ _ý _ 
(iv) Redesign of Questionnaire to Use Open--ended Questions [,,? ore 
Prom the pilot study, it bocamoo apparent 
1; Zat ; 
- 
11 
- 
'i) ,:! lose-ended cpzestz ons and ý re-conceý ved ' 
ONon-onded Quoütions solicii, 8d. ti3.. s 12r 
ticipati on and a fuller coi muni ca ion of 
relevant information. 
Oý: en-ended questions >_ idii an inf ozii al, 3) th 
interview permit bed the interviewees to 
choose more fully the aspects they thought 
i:: li>ortant, 
(v) Ref erence to (ý s ýionnaire Structure End loppendi- 
The questionnaire was divided into 5 sections, 
viz., organisational structure, bidding strategies, defen- 
sive strategies, profit forecasts and. general questions 
. 
arranged in a sequential basis so that one se ct; i. oII £oll oWS 
through the logic of the participant's response to previous 
sect ions. Basically, the questionnaire design was e ffec-- 
ted through a series. of stews. Initially, a draft cues-- 
tionna. ire was produced. with the assistance of the p ojeci: 
S upervisor". This was then circulated and tested with the 
respondents of the pilot study, As a result of co::. nents 
and feedback, a revised questionnaire was then drafted. 
Owing to the very positive and encouraging rssuonse re- 
ceived from she first Group of pa=ti c. pants, tree results 
were then analysed and where there appears to be ambigui- 
ties, certain questions were deleted or redesigned and 
some additional auestions were inserted to add More depth 
to the whole survey itself. A specimen copy of the 
questionnaire is incorporated in Appendix Table C. 1. 
(vi} Accoss to Respondents 
aj Method 
In Vi Pt', of ýl1e ; hical concert ration of f he 
murChant banks in the Citys i: i1 F3 1'FSUCI1Cient s ', 'ere contacted 
C: )_L! 1: )L' iy r; 1 , J_ 1 oc i. hone. Once an 
12 
_ 
i 
the in tez: Lieg , -. -as held at iho Premise of the merchant bank 
concerned. 
bj 2-es oase Rate 
It was anticipated al the outset of the 
research that many merchant banks might decline to be in- 
terviewed owing to: 
a) the secrecy of merchant banking in 
general. 
b) the sentivity and confidentiality sur- 
rounding contested bids, and, 
c) the nature of the research topic itself. 
However, in the event, all houses appro-. 
nehoc3 took I), -art in the survey The reasons 
_for this 
abnormal response rate may be attributable t o: 
i Contact And Accossibi1it, 
Access to the participants was probably 
improved because personal contacts were frequently used in 
the initial approach. Thus, the approach was: 
'1) by direct approach to the institutions. 
2) via contacts of the Business School. 
3) via personal contacts in the City 
4) via contacts of. the project supervisor. 
. 
Timing and Line of Approach Adopted 
1) The timing of the project in relation to the 
interests generated regarding the 'Nilson 
Committee's investigation into the financial 
activities of the City. 
2) the nercei. ve d praetie; t1 VBiUe? Of this s uddy, 
The paucity of proicc+ts carried out 
- 
13 
- 
on this aspect of ; nerd uni ng. 
4) The research oT. 'ientation, i. e. i ocusin , on ho vi 
merchant ban'V,. s conduct takeovers rather than 
on the economic rationale or profitability of 
Tiergers, an area woll covered by emapirical 
research,. 
In the early part of the survey, two 
merchant banks declined to participate in this programme 
but gave their full co-operation later following the inter- 
vention of other contacts and a fuller staterent on the 
potential value of the research. This brought the response 
rate to 100 ', as illustrated in Table 1.3 on the next page. 
(vii) Method of Collec-cin , Inf_or{ atiion in interviews 
Most merchant banks were prepared 
to meet for a session of about two hours each (the shortest 
being an hour, the longest, 3yz hours). Th, respondents 
were asked if they would agree to the interviews beim, 
taped to save time and assurance ; wore given to all partic7 
-- 
pants that once transcribed, the tapes will immediately be 
destroyed. This request was most readily granted. in almost 
all. instances (with the exception of 3 merchant. banks). 
The interview took a semi--structured forni in which the re-- 
searcher approached the questions in a sequence which fol- 
lowed most naturally the line of the ans, 1ýers to avoid 
disrupting the flow and thought of the interviewee More :. har. 
necessary. 
ýý1 1 EricoÜ. 1n_O1 alLesp0Ii1ses tG llrotecti Confide at ß_a1 i 
Conf d ent iaii ty of infor n. tioil collected 
dul-. n ; the into view 
-is 
im, 
- ortaii-i, because o, ', ', 
: c: '; li'"C'<-l an". ?. fl 2i ': aC'? "lE :1 to 
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MERCHANT BANK 
encoded 
i1st RESPONDENT 2nd RESPONDENT 
NBI di recto ir 
- 
MB2 director 
- 
MB3 
. 
ex-chairman director 
MB4 head 
- 
MB5 manager 
- 
MB6 director 
- 
NB? executive 
- -- 
MB8 director director. ' 
MB9 head 
- 
MB10 manager. 
- 
MB11 manager 
- MBI2 vice-chairman 
- 
NB13 manager director 
MB14 director 
- 
MB15 mana er 
- 
MBI6 director 
- 
MB1? director 
-- 
MBI8 director 
- 
MB19 director 
- 
MB20 head I director 
MB21 director 
PIB22 director director 
MB23 director 
- 
MB24 manager 
MB25 
_ vice-chairan head 
MB26 head. 
- 
MB27 director manager 
MB28 head manager 
MB29 director 
- 
MB30 ex-chairman director 
Sub-total. 36 
Grand total 39 
Table 1.3: The 30 Major UK Merchant Barks involve. In 
This Study & the Professional Status of the 
Respondents Interviewed. 
- 
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corporate reputation, 
b) the confideiz; iality surrounding; certain me- 
chanics of contelsted bids, 
c) the need to comply V, rith the wishes of the 
majority of the respondents or secrecy and 
a nonyrcit; y 
, 
and, 
d) the high rankin status oý :: any of the parti-- 
cipants ranging from vice--chairmen of leading 
houses to senior officials of professional 
and self-regulatory bodies. 
Consequently, the names of merchant banks 
and other respondents interviewed have been classified by 
use of a coding system, details of which are available only 
to the project supervisor and the external examiner. ' äis 
code is used throughout volume Io the dissertation wni_ch 
he thesis. Volume 2 contains the main substance of t 
which embraces essentially other merchant banking and tech- 
nical : 1;; to on bids and selective transcripts 02 l nterViews 
is not encoded in order to facilitate easy reading and 
quick cross-references for the three individuals conceri.? e-d. 
Thus, after much deliberation, in vi e. ", oä the circuiiistances 
described, it has been decided that a strict embargo on 
accessibility to this volume should be imposed. 
(B) Phase 2: I"1ethodolo y Adopted. in the SurveZ of Stockbrokers 
(i) Choice of Sa:; lple Frame 
As a secondary objective of this study is 
to discern the degree -o1' collaboration or competition 
principally between the merchant banks and the stockbroking 
community in advising contested bids, it was decided to in- 
corporate a small sample of stocKhroker. s as an ancillary 
extension of tale main. ýiier'Ci1ý;. Ilt bai: kin; survey. the 10 
stockbroki. i vý ? ir: iiz ["iero r andoml ;jS e1cct ý-d i rom the ýý:: ý. ty 
- 
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Directory" and the de Gaits of the s apus of Iahe 
part ici )ants are listed in 'f'able 1.4- below: 
Tablo 1.4 : Professional Status of Res. )oncient I nterviE : ecL 
from both the Merchant Ben'kin. Stockbro_kiin, 
- 
Surveys 
, -CHANT BANKS 
-0 
CKBROK 
. _. _.. -- 
'side of 7 Stock- Respon-" To tat respon- ilo. total broker , 
-es>ondert I dent inter- dents sa. iplo iý.. !tv (encoded 2 ie ed, 
Head (C. F. ) 6 17 stk I head (c.: L 
.) mart ner_ 2 
Directors 19 54 
I t  
2 partner 'i 
istk 3 head (c. f. ) 1 
Managers 8 23 stk 4 analy st partner 2 
Executives 26`, tk 5p rtner tlý 6 partner 
41 
stk 7 
-- 
! Partner `i 
stlý 8-t partner (stº_. 9- partner 'I 
stk10 head c. f. ) 
Total 1 55 100 oi; 3.1 4y8 '12 ~'ý? 
v.? s = corpora. e finance 
ii) Design of S rocKbrokinc; C)ueý ciionnazre 
- 
The approach and methodology of the clue; s- 
tionnaire design for the stockbroking f-i rms chosen for this 
survey were very similar to those adopted for the merchant 
banking survey. In essence, tie questions adhere very 
closely to-that of the merchant banking study but focus d 
selectively on areas designed to elicit data on the r: ela- 
tionship aspects of both types of financial institutions 
(iii) Pilot SiudZ 
With the aid of this questionnaire, a 
pilot study was held with two of the 10 stockbroking firms, 
Lillewwise, the respondents commented on the draft question- 
: iaire and gave their cons itructj e suE, 6, esdo ;s on the i"orma ue 
- 
. 
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(j V) e dosi "'TI to Use 0 -o rr -. en e cl u ýý ss _i ýr 
From the pilot study, Some of the 
questions were redesigned and in essence, o en--enlded ques- 
tions constituted the main feature in the actual que tion- 
na: ir. eo 
(v) Reference to Structure and Appendix 
Unlike the mevchamt banking survey, 
the questions wore not divided into sections but followed 
the same format in which the questions were a_rrangedz in a 
sequeiitial basis. A specimen copy of the quo-. t.. onnair e 
is incorporated in Appendix Table 0.2. 
(vi) Access to Respondents 
a) I ethod 
The fact that all the stockbroking 
firms chosen for this survey here also located in the 
greatly facilitated accessibility to them. The respon-- 
dents were contacted either by phone or mail and once an 
appointment was fixed, the inLervieai was held at the prer_ ises 
of the brok-ins firm concerned. 
b) Response Rate 
The intevviews with the 10 stockbro- 
king firms also achieved a 100% response rate. The 
possible reasons for this achievement are also similar 
to those attributed to the success rate of the merchant 
banking survey itself. 
(vii) Method of Co11ec t; inpý Information in Intorvie; 'ts 
i': ost s tockorokers were at ien; b]. e to an 
interview of slightly over an hour. Interviews were 
also "; aped : rx (; h he :; ýýlue ýý: u. ' 
.;.: tees E; 
i. 
'o11 i; o i; ýlf: 
.: 
es pon-" 
don vi. 
- 
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di, , )ýS. ýcýnses i-o "-c eGt -onfide. i 
Like the main survey, the naie of the stock- 
cro;. i ng, firms have been classified by ;: lie ue of a coding 
system, details of which are only available to the project 
supervisor and the examiner. Coding was also resorted to 
in this particular instance because of confidentiality of 
information acquired and also the fact that most of the. 
stockbrokers interviewed work very closely with the mer- 
char: t banking community selected for this study. 
(Cý Phase 3: Case Studies in a3 Year PariodIGroup_lj 
" Choice of Sample Frame 
In order to allow the comparison of percep- 
tions derived from the interpretatiVe frames revealed by 
Phase I (the merchant banking study), two Groups of case 
studies were compiled. In the process of the compilation 
of these case stuidies, it should be noted that precise 
figure: relating to annual number of contested bids are 
difficult to obtain as most of the official publications 
do not reflect a breakdown of the types of mergers and 
acquisitions. This difficulty is compounded further by 
the fact that in some instances, contested bids may become 
recommended mergers. The most reliable source i. e. the 
annual report of the Takeover Panel also fails to reflect 
the breakdot"m. of acquisition data. So, in order to iden- 
tify and delimit the approximate sample frame of contested 
bids in the UK, the researcher extracted data on this sub- 
ject from the "Financial Times'' and the "Investors vhroni-- 
cle". In all, 75 contested bids spanning a3 year 
period. (com Fencing in August 1973 and terminating in : Iusust 
1981) were identified. From this number, a random sam lb 
of 40 cases of contested takeovers was drawn (see Table '1.5`) 
ropresentin j. 3 of the population identified were chosen 
to constitute the sample size. 
- 
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Table 1.5 ; Sample 
-& Population Sizes of Contested Bids 
CASE CASE SA, 
--, FG i PO 
YEAR STUDIES ! STUDIES SIZE TION 
(i&TFHOD T METHOD 2 =2 ! s? ss NQ 
, L 110. F No. f J 
AUG 19; 8/laug 1979 I 12 0 "12 21 
Aug 1 X79/Aug 1980 12 2 14 
i 
24 
Au I 9Cýý/tLun 
t93 II 
6 8 
'l L-^ ( 30 
Total 30 110 40 `I5 ! 
(D) 'chase 4: Case Studies (Group 2) 
These 10 case studies were also derived 
from the 75 contested bids (the total population size) which 
spanned the same three year period. The need to create a 
smaller group of case studies with a slightly different 
orientation arises as a result of new perceptions gained 
from the field work conducted with financial advisers as 
well as consistent monitoring of contested bids over the 
research period. According to the majority of ihc' rron=- 
dents, each contested bid is unique and the approach devolopod. 
'depends exactly upon situational factors rather than a rigid 
set of principles. This merchant banking philosophy ei., er- 
ges very distinctly from the sunmiari. sed comments highlighted 
in both volumes of the dissertation. Thus, a cluster of 
10 case studies spanning the same period were randomly 
selected to reinforce this salient hypothesis. So, instead 
of sieving through these cases for qualitative and quanti- 
tative data, the 4e prime focus here is to highlight the dis- 
tinctive innovative features characteri. si n each transaction 
with regards to either acquisition strategies, defensive 
strategies or a combination of both and Who underlying c} r-- 
cunstances favouring the adoption of the appropriate strate- 
gies and tactical moves. 
1.3 Outline of the St , c-es of Re earchý ý- Sril nary 
In essence, i: hex"c were 5 stases related 
to 1niä reseal c i: 
20 
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(i) Literature Survey. 
Academic, managerial texts, cuttings 
from the financial press, for instance, the "Finan- 
cial Times, " and other macro-economic data were 
collected and compiled. 
(ii ) Pilot Sur 
held with were Preliminary 
. 
interviews 
some foreign merchant banks and a British clearing 
bank to gain an initial insight into merchant bank- 
ing industry and corporate finance advisory services 
to enable the formulation of some initial research 
hypotheses. 
(iii) Survey of Merchant Banks (30) 
Interviews were undertaken with key mbr-- 
chan t bankers of 30 houses in the City to Obtsi_A Q. 
Formation on corporate finance or; anisati or! e and 
salient issues in approach to bidding and defensive 
activities. As a result, this survey identified 
beliefs/perceptions widely held amongst the merchant 
banking community in London. These beliefs were 
compared with observed realities z,. e., the 2 groups 
of case studies. 
(iv) An Analysis of 40 Case Studies 
40 case studies were created and analysed 
to determine whether the beliefs and views expressed 
by the merchant bankers in stage (iii) were r-ef". ec- 
ted in merchant banking behaviour during contested 
takeovers. 
(v) The stab1ZJ tilg : of AY , fý alr aß. 1 r1r 
The 'ý results of vie 2-1 Sui-'v E. 'Tä : eI'r' then 
drawn upon to produce an integrated 
- 
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Electing key behavourial patterns "nd practices of IV-11-40 
City merchant cankers in contested bids. 
1.4 Classification of Responses According; to Frequencies of 
Expressions & Summarised Comments 
As stated earlier, many of the ques- 
tions in the survey of merchant bankers' as well as stock- 
brokers were open-ended giving the interviewees an op_por-- 
tunity to elaborate. This approach proved rewarding for 
it revealed beliefs that would not always have been elici- 
ted by close-ended questions. The responses were then 
classified into: 
a) Categories according to frequencies of expres- 
sion. 
b) Summarised coazents,. for example, "'What we do 
is to constitute each team of 3 under a direc- 
tor for a particular client.. ö(the response to 
the question on team approach provided by a 
merchant banker). 
-Thus (a) provided a basis for both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis while (Q) ensured 
that the full meaning of the key answers was retained. 
1.5 Research Constraints and Ramifications On Approach 
This study is a submission for a doc- 
toral dissertation and he researcher faces the £oI? o' nc 
constraints: 
- 
- 
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1 AFibiguities related to the concepts of merchant 
banking and takeover. 
2) Lack of sufficient data in the areas chosen for 
research and hence nerd data had to be created and 
tested. 
3) Time constraint. The pilot study and the main 
field survey involved interviews with more than 85 
participants ranging from vice-chairmen of promi- 
nent merchant banks to senior civil servants. This 
took about I year. due to the large number of res- 
pondents and the need to transcribe the recorded 
interviews and arrange, code and classify the data 
received, 
4) The case studies made a heavy demand on time. 
Press cuttings were assembled and other document__ 
collected as each case was followed through from 
its inception to its conclusion. Wherever possi- 
ble, the complete documentation associated with 
each case study was collected. This entailed nu- 
merous journeys and phone calls from the Business 
School to the merchant banking premises to collect 
the relevant circulars concerned. in some instars- 
ces, where information could not be obtained in. 
other ways, it was kindly supplied by the merchant 
bankers themselves and the specialist libraries of 
some of the leading houses. All in, the collec- 
tion and compilation of 40 case studies involving 
80 companies took a full man year. 
5) Funding constraint. The researcher is a private 
overseas poStgr;; duave student'', and '-ravel expenses 
linked with the field work, procurement of a cas- 
sette-recorder and numerous taping cassettes as 
well as the higher imposition of post3radua-t= fees 
for foreign students constitute severe fumd: in 
constraints or the researcher 
- 
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To a large extent then, the result-nt 
approach adopted is a consequence of these mixture of 
factors. 
1.6 Secondary Interviews With 10 Merchant Banks 
Analysis of the data collected during 
survey of merchant bankers raised further questions. 
Fortunately, as some of the respondents interviewed du- 
ring the first meeting had expressed their willingness 
to participate in a second iutervi eCz if the need arose, 
a second meeting was then set up with 10 merchant banks. 
For the second merchant banking survey, no questionnaire 
was used but the questions were raised in an informal 
discussion. 
1.7 Interviews With Other Specialists in the City 
In tandem with the merchant banking sur--- 
vey, interviews were also held with other professionals 
and specialists in the City like American investment 
bankers, leading merchant banking analysts, takeover 
specialists, merger broker, management consultant, 
accountants, authDrs on merchant banking, etc. 1to enable 
the researcher to gain an overview of this complex re- 
search area. Rather than structured formal.. approach, 
informal discussions were held with all these profes- 
sionals (see Tablesp1.6 and 1.7 on page 2k). Additio- 
nally, the abridged transcripts of the interviews held 
with some of these participants are incorporated in Vo- 
lume 2 of 
-24-- 
Tabe i. 6: Gther Financial Advisers Interviewed Classified by 
Business, F? ofess'onal ätatas x TZnt:: ber 
BUSINESS OCCUPATIONAL STATUS NUINiBER 
Stockar o11ing firm u mer. chant banking analysts 2 
Legal firm corporate lawyer 
.1 Accounting firm accountants 2 
University legal expert 'i 
Management consultants divisional director 2 
Market research firm director 1 
Merger broking firm chairman 1 
Licenced dealer chairman '! # 
Grand Total 
Table 1.7: Total Number, Types of Institutions, Prof essio-- 
nals & Number of Respondents Interviewed 
Institutions lc. of Par_- 
Category or profes- ticipants Question- 
° sionals (No. interv-ewed Haire 
Foreign merchant 
banks 
Stockbrokers and 
'3 
analysts 
other professionals 
al ex ert (e 1e 8 
. 
g. g p 
Se1I--e6ulatory 
1 
t 
- bodiees 
Professional bo- 1 2 
_ dies 
Takeover specia- 3 3 lists 
Authors on merchant 
banking 3 A 
Sub-toga (A) ,w 33 3 
UK nercnani an ing 
_ 
survey 
30 39 
. _. . __ _i Pilot study (mer- 5 5 
- chant banking 
Sub-total (B) 1 ä5 ý 4 GRAND TOTAL"(A)+(B 68 ý 87 2 
*_Due to double counting, this category is excluded 
from the aggregation. 
dirt tp1` 
_onerai ° 
. 
71 rector- 
-me--alfox 1 
_ý 2 
Table 1.8: Types of Self-Regulatory, Quasi-Judicial & 
wes i onal Bodies & Status of Participants Interviewed 
- 
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1.8 Regulatory Bodies 
Furthermore, to obtain a more balanced view 
of the regulations relating to acquisition conduct and 
practices, interviews were also conducted with very sen- 
ior officials and executives of the various quasi- 
judicial bodies in the City (see Table 1.8 on page 24). 
1.9 Takeovear Specialists 
During the course of the survey, the names 
of a few prominent merchant bankers were frequently c ted 
by their colleagues. They seemed to be acknowledged as 
experts in devising both offensive and defensive strate- 
gies. As a result, interviews were held with some of 
er- those mentioned and the abridged transcript of the in' 
viefit with one of them can be found in Chapter Volume 
2. It should be pointed out that the selection of mer- 
ch2nt bankers under this category is subjective rather 
than objective and the broad criteria in which they were 
chosen are: 
1. ) The association of their names with promi- 
nent cases of contested bids. 
2) Their individual standing and reputation in 
the merchant banking community in U1. 
3) The exposure given to them by the leading 
financial media. 
1.10 The Methodo'ýo y of Data Evaluation 
From the outset; it was realised ho. -, the 
numb er ný` nhn', t bank" and case studies ä= ýi: i, v ü fo 
- 
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this research would be small (less than or equal to 30) 
owing to the size of the merchant banking community and 
reletively limited number of contested bids respectively. 
It was particularly gratifying, therefore, that all of the 
merchant banks finally gave interviews and. the stockbro- 
kers approached did likewise. A 100% response was thus 
attained in both sets of field work. Since the whole 
population of merchant banks was covered, it 
..,, 
as unneces- 
sary to use the usual statistical techniques for determi- 
ning whether the sample statistically significantly re- 
presented the population. 
However, at various stages, the signi- 
ficance of differences between subsets of merchant banks 
is tested, and 2 statistical tests were used for this purl 
pose. IThe first was the Chi-Square Test, which measures 
the discrepancy between observed and theoretical frequen- 
cies, gives-us a rough test for significance of the rela- 
tionship. With a Chi-Square test, we test the hypothesis 
that the principles of classification are independent. If 
the hypothesis is rejected at a certain level of signifi- 
cance, then we- can conclude there is a meaningful or posi- 
tive linkage between the 2 variables. 
Secondly, where differences in percen- 
tages or proportions were involved, the activity sanpling 
formula was used, this test being based on the Binomial 
distribution. 
At various stages of the analysis, 
data were correlated. Because of doubts as to the norma- 
lity of the underlying distributions, it was decided not 
to use Pearson's Product-Moment Coefficient, but instead, 
to use Spearman's Rank Correlation-Coefficient. This 
specific statistical tool is a measure of the correlation 
that exists between 2 set of ra-al sia measure of the de- 
gree ot°. association between vile 'v ar l ab es that e ould 
not have been able to calculate otherwise. 
27 M 
The significance level selected through-- 
out, 
-was the 5% level, the figure most commonly used in 
statistical testing. No matter which correlational 
techniques was used, both have certain common character- 
istics. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.0 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to present the 
main literature on the way in which UK merchant banks pro- 
ceed to conduct contested bids within a. prescribed self- 
regulatory system. This literature nah be divided into 
2 distinct but related categories, merchant banking and 
corporate acquisitions or takeovers. 
2.1-Literature on Merchant Banking 
The literature on merchant banking tends 
to be non-empirical, descriptive and focussed on its 
historical-evolutionary aspects. The literature under 
this category includes Morton (18)(1964), Wechsborg (29) 
(1966), Kellet (15)(1967) and Kathleen Wain (27)(1979). 
However, as Sandra Mason (16)(1976) pointed out, "rela- 
tivelJ little has been written about merchant banking. 
Such studies as exist have tended to be largely historical 
in character, emphasising the-development of individual 
banks and on the personalities and families involved. 
Even the more recently published books on the subject are 
essentially discriptive in approach. " 
To date, the : major contributions on mer- 
: Chant ban' in_g organisational structure and strategy are by 
Sandra Masoa and Derek Robinson (23) (1976) 
. 
Sandra Maori 
advanced the view that although all merchant banks claimed 
to cover all the basic activities of merchant banking, not 
_ 
71 
all elements in their financial packages are of equal im- 
portance to each individual bank. However, she perceived 
that their role as financial advisers to industry in the 
post-war period has been one of the prime sources of mer- 
chant banking development. She also detected that increa- 
singly, merchant banks have tended to recruit both gradua- 
tes and professionals., especially accountants and lawyers. 
Miss Mason and D. Robinson stressed the prime strength of 
the few elitist UK accepting Houses as being 
_the ability 
to 
create and innovate within'an informal environment in which 
professionals are readily available. These factors have 
enabled the merchant banks to preserve their dual capacity 
as innovators in financial developments as well as solvers 
of complex financial problems. The presence of a multi- 
plicity of in-house skills is vital especially in huge fee- 
earning activities pertaining to bids where the emphasis is 
on team work rather than individual approach. This hypo- 
thesis was advanced by D. F. Channon et. al. (5)(1975) in their 
study of Slater Walker Securities (SUS), the merchant ban- 
king arm of the now defunct Slater Walker Group. J. Wechs- 
berg also drew attention to this important aspect in his 
study of how Warburgs, the leading City merchant bank ser- 
viced their industrial clients by asserting that "... many 
big corporations are badly managed. When they are faced 
with serious financial problems, their boards are utterly 
helpless and often make the wrong decisions. We offer a 
thinking service, acting as a group of advisers. Often, 
we move in as a team, sit down. with the management, diag- 
nose the problems, try to find solutions. "1 So, from 
these literary sources, we can hypothesise that team work 
is very much an integral part of merchant banking approach 
to corporate advisory services. 
2.2 Literature on Mer 
, 
ers and Acquisitions 
The literature fall- ins under this 
t, J. echsberp, "op. c?. " pp208-209. 
_32- 
classification would include the works of Albef'ts (2)(1966), 
Rose and Newbould (24)(1967), Ar field (3)(1967), Newbould 
(20)(1970), Moon (19)(1959), Singh (26)(1971), Ansoff (1), 
(1971), Doctoroff (6)(1972), Samuels (25)(1972), Kuehn (14) 
(1975), Firth (9)(1976), Meeks (17)(1977), Weinberg et. al:. 
(28)(1979) and Prof. J. F. Pickering (22)(1979). Of these, 
the empirical research works of Newbould, Kuehn, Singh, 
Meeks and Michael Firth are primarily connected with the 
theme of profitability or stock market efficiency of merg- 
ers and acquisitions., Their relevance to this study is 
relatively marginal owing to the different approach and 
objectives used in this study. The study by Prof. Ansoff 
and his associates is different in perspective in that he 
focussed on planning. One of the main conclusions was 
that companies perform better when they plan their acquisi- 
tions. However, since its focus is upon company planning 
rather than either the process of acquisition or the role 
of merchant banks, the relevance of this study is again 
limited., Hypotheses tested me therefore dran principal- 
ly from the remaining literature such as Weinber 
, 
irn ieid, 
Moon, Samuels, Doctoroff aid Pickering. Their individual 
bearing on the 5 major research areas &e., merchant bank- 
ing, bidding strategies,. defensive strategies (inclusive 
of profit forecastj and inter-related aspects delimited for 
this dissertation is discussed in greater detail in the va- 
rious sections in this chapter. 
2.3 Literature Pertaining to Bidding Strategies 
The empirical survey undertaken_ by 
John Kitching 
. 
113)(1973) of European acquisitinns effected 
hatn... een 1965-70 earing c_ on this study a! - 
though 
has 'ý an indirect 
.,,,. ýy 
the research orientation is different. Hitching 
examined the pre-acquisition planning, the ü3. cidiaS strate- 
_33_ 
gies, the implementation and post-takeover integration pr_ o-- 
cesses of European corporate acquisitions by interviewing 
more than 90 senior executives of major corporations who 
made acquisitions during this period. Prom the results of 
his survey (especially those related to bidding strategies) 
he found that executives attached considerable significance 
to bid timing. 
In a more recent study, Professor J. P. 
Pickering (22)(1979) employed a somewhat similar approach 
but with a smaller population sample of 20 UK 'i rers =' in- 
volved in takeover programmes by interviewing the key cor- 
porate executives involved in the acquisition transactions. 
Like Kitching, he found that in the formulation of ther 
bidding strategies too, the key decision-makers attached 
considerable importanc nta? the timing element and some of 
the interviewees believeAas a rule of thumb, a 20% bid pre- 
mium or more was crucial in influencing the outcome of cov- 
porate takeovers. Philip Shelbourne (3)(1967), a former 
prominent merel fnt banker also suggested that the bid pre- 
mium level should be 205,, ' above" the current mär ; et price to 
ensure success of acquisition outcome, but he cautioned 
against too rigid an adherence to this premium level. 
2 In 
a merger/acquisition conference organised by the uFinancial 
Times". in 1967 (conference papers edited by R. V. Arnfield) 
Philip Shelbourne (3)(1967), then attached to the famous 
house of Rothschilds, gave a highly professional exposition 
on bidding strategies and he stressed that the key to suc- 
cessful acquisit: on-is flexibility, mobility, originality and 
and the capacity to move fast within given principles which 
encompassed the following: 
(1) that the bidder or client should'do his "home- 
work" well and should 'now the rationale of 
his acquisition; 
that's t the biC7. ü. Q2 
,S share LG 
1ti ( pu i\ i., ý. 1 c 
aüýOS. +. ý. Ci, ýN., ý..., 
inspitutiona! 
, 
board or lari y--contro i ed) 
2r P. She? tb. vt me i-c. o i1T-? nG Public Companies - i: tai sii; _; 
rot1ý. 
1S. L. 
.L2 
. fir r., _7 (edit. ), }ý _ , _; r 
(ý P Ij " .1 in R. 1'" S- 
Strategies' 
4.1. 
- 
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should be taken into account in his for: nulaýý. orr 
of bidding strategies; 
(3) the the bid pricing/financing should allow for 
such factors as Capital. Gains Tax (CGT) liabi-' 
lity, the shareholders' wishes, the control con- 
sideration 
*, 
the re--investment option, the under-- 
writing clement, the stock market reaction to 
the takeover and the simplicity underlying the 
structuring of the offer itself; 
(4) that most mergers go through by agreement; 
(5) that' speed and timing are it por_tant elements in 
contested bids; 
(6) that it is desirable to keep something up one's 
sleeve to overcome a stubborn defence; 
(7) that acquisition strategies should be related 
to defensive strategies 
- 
to illustrate, a re- 
vised increased bid is determined by the merits 
Gf the defence, the response of the target com- 
pany to the merger and the reaction of the 
press; 
(8) that merchant banks are adverse to partial bids 
because they are difficult, controversial and 
unethical. 
Many of these hypotheses postulated 
by Philip Shelbourne on bidding strategies were later test- 
ed with his colleagues in the merchant banking community. 
sited in the City. 
2.4 Ir tý'2. 'afilýý'w Pertaining to Daf 2r_S? :e:, ýrratj7. °S 
The empirical y'ol'k. of R. W. oon ('19) 
- 
J1 F. 
(1959) provides one of the earliest insights into defences 
against unwelcome bids in the UK. It should be emphasised 
ed that Moon's work was written before the creation of the 
Takeover Panel in 1969 whose quasi-judicial rulings have 
since radically changed many aspects of bidding and defen- 
sive strategies, practices and approaches. In 1971, Moon 
took the opportunity to update his work in alignment with 
the evolving circumstances as a consequence of the estab- 
lishment of voluntary self-regulations prescribing bid 
practices in the City. 
3 Essentially, Moon observed that 
there were. 3 defensive moves. that a biddee company could 
resort to, to prevent a bid from materialising, namely: 
(1) pjoeehold properties could be revalued arid... 
possibly, surplus property could be sold or a 
sale-and-leaseback transaction effected thereby 
forestalling the designs of the bid altogether; ' 
(2) The issued capital could be brbught into line 
with the capital employed in the business by 
issuing bonus shares; 
(3) The dividend could be stepped up on the ordi- 
nary capital. 
The '1967 "Financial Times" Conference 
mentioned earlier serves as a focal point for the non- 
merchant banking practitioner to observe the modus operan- 
di favoured by a leading merchant banking house in counter- 
ing hostile takeovers as well as the array of defensive 
strategies that could be deployed and exploited. 
4 The key 
in defence, according to F. S. Smith of the traditional house 
of Warburgs is that, "... one must realise that each case 
3. In addition, please also refer to Moon's article, 
entitled 'Marshalling the Defence' in G. M. Dickinson 
and J. 
_,. 
L 
.. + s, Fi an.? al_ i, Ena_ement an, ibýýýk 1ý1u. Haz-Pap Handbooks, ronryon, '1977. 
4. See also Pro2. J. F, Pickerin-'s "The Causes and Conse-- 
qu nce i of Abandoned e1erger : t' occc3. I onal Pape 7 OG, 
Ut;: ýSl', 'lye= 
_56_ 
must be defended on its merits, and these are unlikely to 
be similar in any two cases. Basically, one needs to 
establish points of strength in the defender's situation 
and mobilise resources around these. "5 
Another more contemporary useful work on 
defence against unwelcome bids is that of Weinberg et, al. 
who broke defensive measures into 2 broad categories, name- 
ly: 
(1) Defensive measures adopted before a bid. 
(2) Defensive measures adopted during a bid. 6 
In the foriner category, the authors listed 
9 counter-measures while in the second, they discerned 8. 
Dr.? +. Wooldridge7(32) (197 
-) clarified defensive uneasi. ires in 
the same manner. In the. first category, he included: 
(1) Cross--holding of shares 
(2) Issue of now shares 
(3) Use of vcb. eless shares 
(4) Put big assets outside the control of 
shareholders 
(5) Giving directors long term service agree- 
ments. 
Defensive techniques advocated by him 
during the currency of a bid are: 
(1) Disclosure of favourable information 
(2) Criticise the offer or offeror 
C3) Increase dividend or capitalisation issue 
(4) Alteration of capital structure 
(5) Appeals to loyalty 
5. 'Resisting the Takeover F. S. Smith Bid 
- 
. efensivfe 
, Strategies' in R. V A nfi eid (edit. ) 
, 
%240t. " pp4,1- 
5.1. 
6. See M. 
. 
; jei nberg 'st. al. 
, 
"o 
. 
cit. 
," 
(Chapter 24, P P575- 
627). 
, 
It is 
evjr ¬nt that Dr. iiooldYidge's opinion on this mat- 
ter has been heavily influenced by Weinberg's earlier, 
Work On acquisition (1963). This i s apparent by his 
i 
`^t citations of lei s +^". 1., w of work by llgyn.. r::. srS 
-I 
(6) Profit forecasts 
(7) Asset revaluation. 
Like their European counterparts, 2 
American writers, S. L. Hayes and P. L. Taussig (10)(196? ) as- 
serted that when confronted with an unwelcome bid, a victim 
company could fall back on such defensive actions as split- 
ting the stock, raising the dividend, repurchasing the com- 
pany's equity capital, secure outside assistance, launch a 
publicity campaign, start legal action, make a counter bid, 
and undertake a defensive merger. It should be underlined 
however, that owing to the different banking/financial 
structures, different regulations and institutional frame- 
work controlling both mergers and acquisitions, caution 
should be exercised when drawing on American bid experiences 
and techniques. 
Many of the main obserý-ations/hypotheý- 
ses on defence listed by Weinberg '. Tor0l d r'ýdC 
-t-1+ 
-", 
4 gc 
Pickering in this section-were tested with the empirical 
findings of the merchant banking survey-(see Chapter. 6) 
2-5 Literature Pertaining to Profit orecasts 
Merchant banks are not responsible 
Tor making profit forecasts, rather, they are obliged by 
the Takeover Panel to review and endorse them when used in 
merger and acquisition situations. The starting point in 
the literature survey here has to be the Takeover Panel 
which is responsible for prescribing the broad principles 
regarding the treatment of forecasts as siel as responsible 
for monitoring it. The Panel found that in general, in 
the early 1970s, profit forecasts had a fairly high degree 
8 but since then, it of accuracy (80,9%) in bid situations, 
has ceased publishing 
. 
da.: ta on profit forecasts a! tbougb it 
still maintains a ;. tchin-, 'brief. 
. 3. The Pane'! recorr! ýrl that 'J7(_ß 
-lrof] t forecasts Wore' CCa? e. V- 
od : 9? i???. 71 a iül'tV3i2 o ?.; obi U ni the total 01 e-10 exa- 
mined ('`,: anual Reporz, " 3i s; i^aroh '1971i. 
3,03 
- 
The sensitive issue of deviant profit 
forecasts again became a central point of attention in the 
late 1970s as reflected in the evidence submitted by the 
Takeover Panel. to the Wilson Committee. Under cross- 
examination, Lord Shawcross (former Chairman of the Takeover 
Panel) submitted that. 
"It was originally the Panel's practice to 
monitor the outcome of all-profit forecasts made in bid si- 
tuations. This was discontinued some years ago through 
lack of any evidence that this area of the Code was creat- 
ing any particular problems and the efforts being put into 
the total monitoring process did not seem to be justified.. 
.. 
The occurence of a number of apparent profit forecast 
failures has, however, prompted the Panel tc.... revert to 
its earlier practice if there was evidence to suggest that 
this would be worthwhile. " 
(Panel on Takeovers & Mergers, "Con:; ai. ttoe to 
Review the Functioning of Fi. nanc1a Te ri u- 
tions, ' (second stage evidence) voi. 1, Dean. 1929, PPSO-51)" 
In his study of 95 companies making pro- 
fit forecasts associated with normal business transactions, 
Platt(21) (1979) suggested that the evidence on the whole 
seems to show that profit forecasts are borne out by the 
results in a suffi. cient number of instances. At the same 
time, he strongly stressed the fact that, "The usefulness of 
profit forecasts to shareholders... must be accepted as sub- 
jected to limitations, since forecasts for ever. 6 months is 
fraught with difficulties 
- 
and with dangers unless the in- 
herent shortcomings are appreciated. " 
In yet another study with a much smaller 
sample of S1 firms engaged in profit forecasts in propeetu- 
ses for the new issue of capital, K. R. Perris (8)(1975) at- 
tributed forecast deviations to intentional over-optimism 
and under--estimation of the for ecas tis and the failure of 
environmental assumptions to hold. 
From these sources of Iitrratur^e ; it is 
possible to distinguish 3 Tran features cilýr cterising 
_ 
7g 
profit forecasts, viz., 
(1) Danger of litigation arising from deviant -Co- 
recasts. 
(2) It is subject to limitations. 
(3} Deviations' are a consequence of manegoria1 
undercover estimation and*also partly to non- 
valid underlyin. g assumptions. 
It is- perhaps timely, in view of the re- 
vived interests reported that this survey mention6d- in' this 
thesis set out to establish views of merchant bankers on 
profit forecasts as an important aspect of contested kids. 
2.6 Literature Pertaining to General Questions 
This final section of the survey of li- 
terature relates to the final subset of the questionnaire 
which concerns the claim by UK merchant bankers to distinc- 
tion as merger cum takeover specialists. ' As example of 
such claims, 2 former merchant bankers, viz., Clay and ; he- 
ble (4)(1976) asserted "... a takeover or merger can be sub- 
ject to considerable financial, technical and administra- 
tive complications, on all of which a company will require 
expert advice and assistance if it is to achieve whatever 
is in its best interests. Furthermore, it is an area of 
business which by its nature rarely proceeds smoothly. 
AcceptinS houses have an experience and an expertise which 
it is not normally the client's business to possess and 
which enables them to make a unique contribution. " 
Similarly, Vaug'1i n, Grinyer and Birl ey 
(3? )(197ý) 
s in their analysis of . newly £? ortet public corn- 
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panies, found that in general, merchant bankers were the 
most popular source of corporate Financial advice regard- 
ing flotations. Again, Clay and Wheble (4)(1976) and 
Wechsberg (29)(1967), on this aspect of merchant banking 
industry, strongly argued that the corporate reputation 
of many traditional houses was built on the quality and 
distinction of their' corporate advisory services (relating 
to bids) as well as their organisational and co-ordinating 
capabilities. 
The core of the literature surveyed 
in this Chapter has been selected because of their direct 
bearings and relevance to the aims and main thrust of this 
academic dissertätion. Three sources, particularly, 
Weinberg et. al. (28)( 979), i. rnfield (3)(196; ') and pro. L. J. 
P. Pickering (22)(1979) provide the main foundations from 
which the various assumptions and hypotheses were derived 
to be evaluated with the empirical data drawn from the 
merchant banking community in the City and also the case 
studies selected for this research. 
OHA=PER 3 
TUE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVER PRACTICE: A PERSPECTIVE ON 
CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK PRESCRIBING THE CON- 
. 
DUCT AND PRACTICE OP MERGERS & ACOUISITIONS IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
3.0 Back round 
Corporate mergers and -takeovers in 
the UK are conducted within the framework of the self-- 
regulatory rules of the City Code On Takeovers and 
Mergers. Those in breach of the rules and principles 
and spirit of the City Code are liable to be cen- 
sured. ` by the Panel on Takeovers an'd Mergers (or 
_cemmon- 
ly knöwn as the ! 'Takeover Panel"). 
Due to lack of control and supez%i- 
sion in the 1950s and 1960s, the conduct, procedure 
and modus operandi of some financial advisers and 
their corporate clients received severe criticisms in 
the City and in the financial press. 
1 As a result, at 
the behest of the Bank of England, the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers came into being n March 1968 
encompassing 10 General Principles and 35 Rules. Since 
then, it has been revised many times, the last during 
1976.2 As it stands, it consists of 14 General Prir_- 
ciples and 39 Rules supplemented by a set of Practice 
Notes incorporated in the particular section of the 
Code to which they refer. It should be emphasised 
See Vii. Johnston, "The City Takeover Code f', Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1980. 
A revised code to be published in 1981 is currently 
-being reviewed by the CSI as a rÜsu t of criticis; üs 
acid pressures 
. 
regardi n°_" the repetitive breach-r- of 
u 
-- d'siti of 
t_. 
Co 
dý ri a eýT. `. " 'ý 2d ýp ir., iý the regulations. by the marke _-tid, concert party acntiisi ion or 
Go ±i Fie ids shares by De Beers in the Consolidated ("CGS'") incident as well as the controversial 
chi; 1Eý Qi Rule 
-, 
il by St. Piran. The changes t eizig 
coked 1.. ßt o @i11 race adverti S ei. ^ . en tS ri :'or aid and 
concur pa ty 
_. r Ict3. ce. 
_. 
42 
__ 
that the City Code or the Takeover Code has no statutory 
power and does not possess the force of law nor le. aj. 
sanction but rather, it represents the collective will 
and opinion of professional advisers, financial insti- 
tutions (especially the merchant banks), professional 
dealers in the securities market and key. corporate exe- 
cutives of Ui l companies. In brief, all the professio-- 
nals who are associated with mergers and takeovers. 
Another point to bear in mind is that the Panel does not 
assume a pre"-conceived posture, i. =e. it does not pass 
judgement on the commercial-logic, accruements or dis- 
benefits associated with acquisitions. This remains 
the purview of the board and its shareholders. 
Owing to the esoteric and mul ti-- 
discijlinary nature of corporate acquisitions compounded 
by technical, legal and financial complexities, it' is 
not possible for the Code to be all comprehensive cover- 
ing all contingencies and-loopholes and the Code strives 
to cover theneshortcoming by declaring that: 
"It is impractical to devise rules in 
such detail as to cover all the various circumstances 
which arise in takeoveir or merger-transactions. Accor- 
dingly, persons engaged in such transactions should be 
aware that the spirit, as well as the prccz di rg wording 
of these General Principles and of the ensuing Rules 
must be observed. Moreover, it must be accepted that 
the General Principles and the spirit of the Code vdill 
apply in areas or circumstances not explicitly covered 
by any Rule. " 
(General Principle 1) 
3.1 Merchant Banks and Other Professionals As Advisers 
From interviews with merchant bankers 
and other financial advisers as well as examining a 
cross--section of bid circulars, it is quite evident 
that a substantial portion, of them are ?s sued in one 
name of marchant banks on behalf of their --lients. To 
a certein extent, this is largely attributable to the 
- 
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Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958 which requisites 
. 
that any offer for equity capital or other securities must 
be effected through the intermediary of an exempted dealer 
(merchant bank and relevant financial institution) or a lic- 
ensed 
-dealer. 
3 If the offeror chooses to issue its own bid' 
document, it must receive the prior sanction of the Depart- 
ment of Trade. 
In general, most public companies would 
retain the corporate financial advisory services of estab- 
lished merchant banks in the City to assist in the implemen- 
tation of their merger and takeover activities. This ten- 
dency is largely attributed to the corporate reputation of 
some of the famous merchant banks, in-house expertise of 
their corporate finance personnel and their frequent exposure 
to this speciali sect and complex business as well as their 
ability to underwrite the cash option due-to their large 
financial resources compared to the other financial advisers. 
Although the principal advisers and agents 
of client companies, the merchant barks considered the ser- 
vices of other financial advisers; in particular, stockbro- 
kers (who provide market expertise and also submit takeover 
documentation to the Quotations Department of the Stock 
Exchange), corporate lawyers (who provide legal expertise, 
the drafting of bid documents and legal protection) and 
the accountants (who screen potential acquisition candidates 
and audit profit forecasts) to be important and work very 
closely with them in contested bid situations. 
3. A licensed dealer is governed by the requirements of 
the Stock Exchange, the City Takeover Code as well as 
the Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business-) Rules, 1960. 
I 
- 
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3.2 The Control Consideration 
At the outset, before a formal-bid is 
made, the financial advisers should endeavour to fully 
explain the control consideration to its client who is 
embarking on an acquisition course. Failure to do 
so would raise many problems later on and severely 
affect the acquisition objective and success of the 
client. 
ri. A. ýýieinberg in his updated cork 
has written that the control of a company in the 
legal sense is very difficult to define and what pre- 
cisely constitutes 'effective control' of a company 
"... and 
, 
the very lack of definition, created inevitable. 
uncertainty and difficulty". * Professor Clive 
Schmitthoff, a leading authority on international busi- 
ness law and editor of the "Journal of Business Law"" 
agrees with Weinberg and points out that: 
"Control is very difficult to define.. 
.. 
I think, it is impossible to say that a definite fi- 
gure constitutes control-. It very much depends on 
the individual company. There is one thing which is 
certain that we distinguish in law betyleen positive 
and negative control; if you have more than 25% of the 
equity share capital, you. can create a passing of a 
special resolution and that constitutes negative con- 
trol, and then, what constitutes positive control 
depends on the financial position of every company. 
The figure of 30% in the Takeover Code is quite arbitra- 
ry. It is a general measure and does not quite apply 
to all cases and 29.9; does in my view constitutes 
positive contro?. " 
(Tr. p {- or Interview ..,; +7. -no= 
. 
} Clive Schinittho T -f 
t &; 4. ti. l,. we il'Je? 'g e 1. 
, 
"Takeovers &f . er der. s Svre e 
Max-well. 1. Lonc? en: 19i79. _p'ý, 1 /+ __ 
-- 
Li. 5- 
Rule 34 in the erode is the 
"most im, Dorr-- 
tant rule relating to the control factor. A formal 
bid is mandatory when: 
1) Any person acquires, whether by a series 
of transactions over a period of time or 
not, 
-shares which (together with shares 
acquired by persons acting in concert 
with him) carrying 30% or more of the 
voting rights of a company, or 
2) Any person- who, together with persons 
acting in concert, holds not less than 3O 
but not more than 50% of-the voting rights 
and such person, together with persons 
acting in concert, acquires in any period 
of 12 months additional shares increasing 
such percentage of the voting rights by 
more than 2%. 
The control-factor is pertinent because 
a takeover bid is effected conditional on acceptancos 
.' 
111 relation of a shred proper tiorn of tie sh= r. ca, 
tal. Thus, if the bfferor's objective is to obtain 
complete ownership or effective control. of the target 
company, then all the shares of all classes will have 
to be procured. Within this context then, it is 
normal for an offer to be explicitly declared as con- 
ditional upon acceptances being received in respect 
of not less than 90. % of the shares. This 90% ruling 
is favoured as it enables the bidder to compulsorily 
acquire the minority stake to give it the desired 
100% control objective. 5 
If acceptances received by the bidding 
company fall. between 50.1%1 and 905, then the offeror 
has 3 options: 
5. Section 209 of the Companies Act, 1; 43, provides 
for the bidder to compulsorily acquire she out-- 
stano nß' --hares on 4. -. he 
-save 
teLfns Yher e Ü: ii- 
has s Doeas 
ryoe. l3 a ncce-:,. 
1'ed by L he holders of a`- l 
of the shares involy: ed. If the bidder does not 
exercise its rights of compulsory acCuisi. tidn, 
the minority shareholders can serve_ notice on 
the offeror to acquire their shares at the same 
price as the original off er within j months.. 
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a) Let the offer lapse, 
b) To extend the bid without going unconditional 
immediately, 
c) To declare the bid unconditional but leave 
. 
the door open. 
Voting control is conferred on the bidder 
if it su6ccessfuiiy acquired more than 51% of the equity 
capital. The offer will lapse if acceptances are be- 
low 50%. 
It is pertinent to note that a 75 majo- 
rity of the voting rights exercised at a meeting on a 
resolution can: 
- 
Subject to Court's approval, reduce the 
capital, 
- 
Liquidate the company, 
- 
Alter the Articles of Association 
- 
Under Section 206, Companies Act (1948) 
effect a reconstruction of the eonpainy. 
3.3 Negotiation and A22roaeh 
Within this framework in mind, the next 
stage is for the financial advisers representing, its 
client. to approach the biddee as the onus lies on the 
bidder to make the solicitation. For obvious reasons, 
this is normally done in secrecy (Rule 7). Like a 
battle, time is on the side of the bidder once an 
offensive is mo rated and the financial advisers will 
try to sustain the initiative and not ist it bo 
passed on to the other party. To ensure the future 
6. Ownership or control of i0«_' o1° more of the si:: re 
capital of another company is regard-led. - as t--ie 
test of associate status. 
4'7 
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viability of the merged entity and also to avoid adverse 
publicity associated with contested acquisitions, most 
clients and their advisers favour recommended offer 
and amicable negotiation. Sf- the proposed takeover is 
not well received by the target company, it can quickly 
consult its financial advisers and mobilise counter- 
strategies to fend off the predator or even cause the 
buyer to pay a higher premium. if the victim company 
is suspected to be stalling for time to build up its 
defences or if the negotiation breaks down, the offer 
is then quickly effected by appealing directly to the 
company's shareholders. ' 
3.4 Formal-Decimation of the Bid Attempt 
For the protection of the shareholders, 
when Rule 34, is triggered off or "S, Jhen any firm intent- 
ion to make an offer is notified to a Board from a 
serious source (irrespective of whether the Board 
views the offer as favourable or otherwise), sharehol- 
ders must be informed without delay by Press notice. 
The Press notice should normally be followed as soon as 
possible by a circular" (Rule 5). After the press an- 
nouncement, a press notice or circular informing share- 
holders of the offer must be despatched promptly within 
28 days of the announcement of the terms of the offer 
to the offeree's shareholders (Rule 10). The offer 
must remain open for at. least 21 days and if it is 
-re- 
vised, it must stay open for a further 14 days. The 
offer may remain open for a maximum of 60 days with the 
Panel's approval if a rival bid emerges (Rule 22). 
Once an offer is declared unconditional, it must remain 
for at least 14 days (Rule 23). Thus; it can be seen 
that the mechanics of an offer within the framework pres- 
cribed by the Code is discernible in defined phases. 
_48- 
305 The Contents of the Offer Document 
In general, most bid documents tend to 
incorporate the following features: 
a) The chairman's letter, 
b) "The offer" i. e. the financial consideration, 
financial effects of acceptance and to impli- 
cations, 
c) Corporate intentions relating to management 
-and employees, 
d) Procedure for acceptance, 
e) Information regarding both parties, and 
f) General information relating to disclosure of 
interests, board's service agreements, market 
quotations of both companies prior to the 
bid, material contracts, litigation and miscel- 
laneous information. 
3.6 Contesting 
_ 
gainst An TTnwp comp Ri_d 
Directors may refuse to recommend accep- 
tances if the interests of the shareholders is compro- 
mised and affected by the loss of the company's inde- 
pendence, or if the bid is wholly inadequate or if the 
intention of the bidder is highly suspect (for example, 
asset-stripping). In. such circumstances, it is para- 
mount for their financial advisers to stress to them 
that ".. 
-. 
they shall always in advising their sharehol- 
ders, act only in their capacity as directors and not 
having regard to their personal or family shareholders 
or their personal relationships with the companies. 
It is the shareholders' interests taken as a whole, 
together with those of employees and creditors, which 
should be considered. " (General principle 10V), 
the same time, the Panel and the Stock Exchange stress 
that the greatest care must be shown in any profit 
forecast emanating from either party especin ll 
resoect to the ass,;!! : on 
.; i ich the i<<_ : Lac i, 
- 
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The onus for mak the forecast rests 
__-i th the ýt, ý 
board of directors but the accounting bases and 
calculations must be examined and reported upon by 
the auditors or consulting accountants and endorsed 
by the merchant bank or other financial advisers. 
In the same vein, corporate re-valuation of assets 
must also reflect a high standard and care and must 
be reported and endorsed by independent professional 
advisers (Practice Note 3 to 5). 
-., 
-5ýý 
CHAPTER 4 
BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE 30 MAJOR UK MERCHANT BANKS 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter delves into the background 
and organisational structure of. the 30 London based mer- 
chant banks chosen for this study. It'is focused in par- 
ticular on the corporate finance set-up and the manner in 
which it is organised for fee-earning activities pertain-"- 
ing especially to corporate mergers and takeovers, the 
historical background of the various merchant banks cozy-- 
cerned, their ownership structure, the date of creation 
of their corporate finance divisions, the range of servi 
-- 
ces of r: ^Y.. 'ed to cl en s the span of formtrol and te Etat r 
ing characteristics of the corporate finance divisions 
are reviewed. It also examines the screening process 
adopted by merchant banks regarding new clientele as well 
as the profile of clients who are involved with the mer- 
chant bankers in contested bid situations. 
4.1 Establishment of UK Merchant Banks 
In order to gain an insight into how U`K 
merchant banks conduct their corporate financial advicory 
activities/services relating to mergers and acquisit_Lo? ns, 
it is important to understand their origin and structure. 
The inerchan't bank is an unique financial institution pe- 
culiar to the UK (the nearest equivalent of this being 
f. hp 
__ 
v? caL' iT'i re. t Ei1t. bF'".: 'i{.,,,; and : ciost ^!. 1 ý: 
traditional houses ; fiere founded before the ei ar_i. n fei 
this century as illustrated by Table 4.0 on the. 
iýý.. 
} Merchant 
! Bank4 (encoded 
Date 
rounded 
Merchant rBankirb 
Cateor; r 
MB 1 1894 principal 
MB 2 1833 principal 
MB. 3 1972 subsidiary 
MB 4 1763 principal 
MB 5 1810 principal 
MB 6 1880 subsidiary 
MB 7 1862 principal 
MB 8 1920 subsidiary 
MB 9 1865 subsidiary 
MBIO 1808 subsidiary 
MB11 1805 subsidiary 
MB12 1836 subsidiary 
MB13 1959 principal 
MB14 1839 principal 
MB15 1830 principal 
MB16 1946 subsidiary 
1 
, 
17 1792 principal 
MB18 1868 principal 
MB19 1870 subsidiary 
MB20 1765 subsidiary 
PfIB21 1838 principal 
tiB22 1966 subsidiary 
14B23 1932 principal 
MB24 1917 principal 
NB25 1804 principal 
MB26 1907 subsidiary 
DIB27 1853 subsidiary 
MB28 1973 subsidiary 
; MB29 1804 principal 
MB30 1934 
tamý ný 
principal 
e, 
Table 4-. 0: Date of Establishment and the Merchant 
Banking Category of the 30 UK Merchant 
Banks Participating in this Survey. 
-ý, 
Century No. % 
1700 
- 
1800 3 10 
1800 
- 
1900 
1 81 1 00 
16 53 
11 37 9 9 
- 
Total 30 100 
Table 4.1t: Establishment of Merchant Banks in the 
Sample Categorised by-Century. 
v 
- 
jc. 
From Table 
-. 
1 on the previous page, it 
can be seen that over 53,6; of the merchant banks in this study 
weniestablished in the 19th century. Prominent houses crea- 
ted at this period include banks like I4B15, ; B19, MB25 and 
MB21 while houses like MB30 and ? 1B16 were established in 
this century (see master code for decipherment) 
In terms of operating structure and owner- 
ship pattern, broadly speaking, they may be categorised as 
follows: 
1) 'Pure' traditional houses which operate as pr ncipal 
or independent units, for instance, M B15 and MB25 
2) Wholly owned operating merchant banking subsidiaries 
of clearing banks, for example, MB3, MB28, MB27. 
3) Operating subsidiaries of-non-banking parents like 
MB19 and i; B26. 
However, ' for 'this study, the iiK merchant 
banks-are divided into 2 broad categories, viz., those opera- 
ting as principal/independent units and those which are sub- 
sidiaries of larger, banking or industrial conglomerate orga- 
nisations (see Table 4.0). From the outset, it should be 
pointed out that the distinction as to what constitutes a 
principal merchant banking unit and what constitutes a subsi-- 
diary is quite blurred because all the houses in the former 
category are affiliated or are controlled by some form of 
parent or holding company (for instance, Morgan Grenfell 
Holdings is the parent company of Morgan Grenfell Limited, 
the merchant bank). So, allocation to one or other of the 
banking categories was based on first, the genera?. percept- 
ions of the City and the general public, and secondly, whe- 
ther the parent company is engaged in merchant banking acti-- 
vities. To illustrate the first criterion, banks like 
Rothschilds (iCýthschi C: s Cn ion) a: '3 Barings (i? rin 
Foundir t1 on) are we ! known, easily ident 
perceived as principal merchant banks in the UK Z-InQ worldwide 
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but their parental affiliation (listed in the brackets) is 
seldom common knowledge. Secondly, their respective pa- 
rent company functions as holding/administrative machinery 
and do not undertake any merchant banking functions at all. 
On the other hand, merchant-banks like Barclays Merchant 
Bank (Barclays Bank Limited) and Samuel Montagu (Midland 
Bank Limited) are generally recognised as the opetating 
arms of the leading UK clearing banks and the distinction 
between the parent and subsidiary operations is accentuated 
by the fact that the former is 
-engaged in 'retail. banking' 
while the latter, 'wholesale banking'. For a fuller account 
of ownership status, please refer to Appendix Table 5,. 3, 
Z'0? uule 2. For other organisational and financial details 
on the 30 UK merchant banks, consult Volume 2, chapter 1 
(merchant; banking history/current developments) as well as 
Table 5.1 (financial performance) and Table 5.2 (financial 
highlights of the members of the Accepting Houses Commit-- 
tee). 
4.2 Advantages of Larger Parental. Affiliation 
Respondents were asked to indicate 
the advantages accruing to association with larger parents. 
Their answers are summarised and analysed in Tables 4.2; '. 3 
(next page Prime advantages were given as '' nancial streng- 
th, banking reputation, wider contacts, new business oppor- 
tunities, a ready made client base and quality of service. 
If the figures are-broken down further according to mer- 
-chant banking categorisation (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3), it 
is interesting to note that in the subsidiary merchant 
banks, factors like j6t n ki h1. re fttt ron 
, 
vn 
i 
. 
w. i(llgr expertise. Ozlc fl)- are more widely stressed than in 
the principal banking units. 
In order to discezn i. e di 'ferences 
in perception beE the 
.. 
i ndepE'ýir denr and a. ý 'f ili -Zed i^er- 
.. 
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chant 
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activity sampling statistical technique was chosen. in 
essence, the operating formula for activity sampling is: 
KIP 100-P 
N 
N= total number of observations 
K=1 (68% level of confidence) 
2 (95% level of confidence) 
3 (99.7% level of confidence) 
P= percentage of occurrence in a particular 
. 
activity 
L= limit of error' 
From the evidence 
2 in. Tables 4.2 and 
4.3 on pages Sla"d 55, it would appear that both indepen- 
dent and affiliated merchant banks placed important empha- 
sis on banking reputation and wider professional expertise. 
For the independent merchant banks, cultivating a good re- 
putation was seep to be essential to their growth and sur- 
vival. Consequently, these banks placed greater emphasis 
on this attribute than the affiliated merchant banks. The 
evidence also suggests that affiliated merchant bars recog- 
nised their significant advantage, 
-in being-able to provide 
°-a wider range of expertise as a consequence of their affi- 
liation to large financial organisations. 
Commenting on the salient advantages 
arising, from larger affiliations, a corporate finance mana- 
ger emphasised that, "there is no doubt about it that we 
1. J. A. Larkin, "Wort. Study: Theory °: Practice, " London, Mc- 
Graw Hills 1969Q 
2. Look at the value for both ;_ enchant b: n1 
. 
ng c. - te-oc 
- 
ries. Take indctendent : archant banks, for instanca. 
For each attribute/factor, observe the Cori ýs:; on ýi:. r 
value set beside i 
t. If' the coi%"va3: at ve i' va-',. u& lies 
l'%u side litt V' i an: 5v as 
. 
nd-Loated 
by I 
.. 
-. 
1-lax- Gild 1' l t. ltiI: 
that specific factor in question i; 
- 
5? 
-- 
have the financial muscle. Some merchant banks don't 
have that anymore. The very best of corporate finance 
will survive, I am sure, but there is evidence that. un-- 
less you have the financial muscle, you are not going to 
survive as easily as you have in the past. " 
His view is also shared by a senior direc- 
tor of MB16 who suscribed to the view that: 
"The larger the organisation, the greater 
is its number of customers and therefore, the bigger the 
potential there is for business... but apart fron that, I 
don't think there are any other advantages. Organisa-" 
tions like Barings, Moran Grenfell and-Lizards 
- 
they 
exist very happily without being part of a larger organi- 
sation. " 
The significance attached by-UK merchant 
banks to! being a member of the elitist Accepting Houses 
Committee (AHO) is also not to be discounted lightly. The 
corporate finance head of ME26, a member of the Accepting 
! ý; C11ý$t*e Ylitf} ? n? 'tsa? 'r! h° nnmi^'rýr. r , "' the nno L ý1w ýOýýv. u VN . t. il VLSL ti7 1LiO SSS14 r 
"An accepting house, in the legal sense, is' 
thought by the financial community to be under. 
-, arittpu by 
the Bank of England and thus, depositors feel confident 
even in times of colossal banking crisis1 Once you are 
in the Accepting Houses Committee, it doesn't matter whe- 
ther you are a subsidiary of anything larger, but, if you 
are not an Accepting Houses member, evon under the banking 
statute of the Bank of England... you are in a different 
category, and if you have to compete in the money market 
for deposits, you are at a disadvantage compared to an 
Accepting House. " 
4.3 Disadvantages Of Being Part Of A Larger Organisation_ 
Partly attributable "o the lucrative value 
of merchant banking and the need to diversify from their 
narrow etail' bankin :. base., today, all the major UK ci ea: 
-: 
- 
ý.. 
-. 
i banks 1. 
cc?.,! aI'(ý. F3 
iÜ_1_c'nd 
. 
LSL. ýcnlkj 
_., ý... 
t. 
ýi 
': 
'! a 
`est1;:. i. P_. iaj ýtä. ýý%:; ý i "! a_r. a... Fon'' 1_ 
ter, Lloyds, Grindiays, Standard Chartered 
,c << 
. 
and 
- 
58 
- 
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank have their own icier chart 
banking operations here in the UK (the last two mentioned 
although British-owned are not normally regarded in the 
Cityas British Banks, due partly to historical reason and 
partly to-their domicile and banking operations overseas). 
Section 4.2 lists the advantages perceived. to be conferred 
by membership of such a larger financial group. However, 
disadvantages are also perceived within the merchant banks. 
These are reported in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 on pages 59 and 
60. The main items are conflicts of interest, lack of 
independence, loss of flexibility, lack of specialist image 
and parental interference. 
-Here again, it can be deduced 
that factors like the lack of independence, conflicts of 
interest and loss of organisational flexibility are views 
more universally held by the affiliated merchant banks 
than the! independent banks. The operating merchant bank-' 
ing arm: (Mß11) of a UK multinational bank saw the organi- 
sational dysfunctions in this light: 
"The lack of independence. in corporate 
i: ii. auce, you may have a superior officer viii, hiL fate sa : 
who had a lending cum banking background and who, in fact, 
doesn't appreciate how a fee-earning corporate finance 
department operates. But, what is more important is the 
loss of corporate prestige due to bad losses at one stage 
and also the mere fact that we are no longer in the Accep- 
ting Houses Committee, and if you are controlled elsewhere, 
this is a problem. -" 
Using activity sampling, here again, we 
can discern that both independent and affiliated merchant 
. 
banks attached considerable "significance to conflicts of 
interest and lack of independence arising from affiliation. 
The subsidiary merchant banks perceive both these factors 
with greater degree of concern than the former-category of 
merchant bank. This demonstrate that in operational 
context,. independent merchant banks owing to their exist- 
ing status auo face lesser incidence of conflicts and en- 
joy greater leeway in their decision-making process. Sub- 
sidiary merchant banks (perhaps due to the excessive domi- 
nance of their parent companies) also felt it was difficult 
for them to develop a specialist image for their individual 
bank whereas independent merchant banks did not, perceive 
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this to be a constraint. The evidence from Tables 4.4' 
and 4.5 also reveals that both groups of merchant banks 
perceived that entrepreneurial approach to corporate advice 
is adversely affected when they are affiliated to larger 
groups. This may be ascribed. to the fact that corporate 
finance is a "people business" and findings from this study 
have strongly indicated that the merchant banking communi- 
ty, in general, subscribe to flexible and innovative ap- 
proach when providing corporate financial advice to the 
wide range of clientele. 
4.4 Evolution of Corporate Finance Activities Within the 
Merchant Banking; industry in the UKi 
In most UK merchant banks, corporate 
mezGovs and `takeovers are generally conducted within tl e 
ambit of the corporate finance division/department op. the 
bank. The name of this particular unit sometimes differs 
somewhat slightly but the label, "Corporate Finance" is the 
most popular name used by the accepting and issuing Houses 
to denote their corporate finance advisory services as evi- 
dent in Table 4.6 on the. next page. 
As there is a close functional affini- 
- 
ty between the stockbroking firms and merchant banks in the 
-City, a smaller survey was conducted with 10 stockbroking 
firms in London who are active in corporate finance activi- 
ties and from this survey, it can be seen that the stock- 
brokers too favour tree "Corporate Finance" label as evident 
in Table 4.7 on page 62. 
Earl ie on a we noted that : GOSS of vhc 
UK rerchant banks were. Z5 ab ish d. in th i l: li Lý .. '. l-t'y but 
corporate finance (i. n the strict modern context of the 
tcria ) was not the domain of merchant banking act; ivi. 1, i. r 
- 
62 
- 
Merchant Title or Corporate Finance Year Cori. Fini 
Bank (encoded?. Unit Unit Founded l 
FIB 1 corporate finance department n/a 
NB 2 corporate services department 1968 
MB 3. corporate advisory division 1972 
I4B 4 corporate finance group n/a 
MB 5 corporate finance department '1970 
MB 6 corporate finance department 1960s 
MB 7 corporate advisory division 1969 
FIB 8 corporate finance department 1960s 
MB 9 corporate finance department 1973 
MBIO corporate finance department n/a 
MB11 corporate finance department n/a 
MB12 corporate finance department 1971 
MB13 corporate finance department 1970s 
MB14 corporate finance department 1965 
MB15 corporate services department 1960s 
NBI6 corporate finance 1950s 
MB'17 corporate finance division 1961 
MB18 corporate finance department 1960 
I"IB19 corporate finance department n/a 
DIB20 corporate finance division '1978 
MB21 corporate finance division 1960. 
MB22 corporate finance department 1969 
MB23 corporate finance department "1969 
MB24 corporate finance department ? 1960s 
1025 I corporate finance department n/a 
til 2ö 't corporate finance ciepartmenÜ 1956 
MB27 corporate finance department '1950 
MB28 corporate finance division 1973 
1029 company finance department 1957 
MB30 corporate finance department + n/a 
Table 4.6: Titles Assigned to Corporate Finance Units 
and Dates of Their Creation of the 30 Uh 
Merchant Banks. 
Stockbroker (encoded) Title of Unit 
STK 1 corporate finance dept 
STK 2 corporate finance deptI 
STK 3 corporate finance deptI 
STK 4 corporate finance dept I 
STK 5 corporate finance dept j 
STK 6 corporate finance deptl 
STK 7 corporate finance dept 
STK S corporate finance dept., 
STK 9 corporate finance dept 
STK_10 ' new issues department; 
Table Titles Assigned to the Corporate Finance 
Units of the 10 UK Stoc brokin: =: A: i. rns 
Particir atin`_n this Study_ 
63 
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then, rather, it was merchanting and international trade. 
Corporate financial advisory services, especially those 
related to mergers and acquisitions, evolved gradually 
after the Second World.. War with the rehabilitation of the 
economy. 
3 Unlike the dates of establishment of the va- 
rious houses which can easily be verified, a substantial 
number of respondents have problems in recalling the 
exact period when-their corporate finance operations came 
into being and as such, some of the dates given in gable 
4.6 should be treated in the relative rather than abso- 
lute context. 
4.5 Scope of Corporate Finance Activities Defined 
The corporate finance acti: li@ 
ties per'c'rmed Vy the 
, 
sondou tuurchasic banks cOday are very diverse 
and extensive, and by no means, merely confined to 
mergers and acquisitions. In a sense, their growth as an 
offshoot of 'wholesale' banking grew in tandem with the 
ascendency of London as the global financial centre as 
well as the fact that merchant banks were becoming increa- 
singly recognised by European and overseas clientele as 
consultant and investment bankers due to their accumulated 
experience, professional expertise and worldwide network. 
k 
3.. For a fuller account of the growth of corporate i'ir_an- 
ce activities at this Period, see J. B. Tabb, "Reasons 
for the Emergence of Contested Company Takeovers In 
the 1950s, " in Accounting & Business Research, too i 
.11, 
no. 44, August pp323-530. The Green Paper, "A 
Review of Monopolies & ier gers policy. "H N; S0 (Gmnd. 
', a so provides a üäzs"ü account i egarding 
merger activity from the 1950s to the 19? Os which 
bears directly on the growth of this corporate advi 
sory services of UK merchant banks. 
4 See the British 
. 
Bankers' Association, "London s_ r'. n 
nt: rna -iona 
_' 
anik n Centre, London, 3,! 5Ä.. T-V"i`(: 
and also l: Ll%,, `T ki London G± ear ir i$ ,. fir: , "r ýT: 'ý;. 
London, Nov. (, rerei to (i_ ar, ters "IJ, 1,1 an 
_ di x E). 
- 
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As a result, they gradually evolve from 
the traditional specialist role of merchant venturer in 
international trade to a wider role manifested in the 
image of an Accepting House. 
5 Today, the scope and bread- 
th 'of merchant banking activities have extended beyond 
discounting the bills of exchange and international trade 
(the traditional "bread and buti. er" of merchant banking 
in the UK). In line with the role of London as one of 
the world's leading financial centres, the London-based 
brit sh merchant banks (many of them multinational in na- 
ture) are able to provide banking services such as corpor- 
ate financial advisory services, underwriting, investment 
management, pension and unit trusts management, foreign 
exchange, Eurocurrency Certificate of Deposits (CDs), gold. 
and commodities dealings, insurance broking, leasing, fac- 
toring, international financial activities and consultant 
advisers to foreign governments 
-a reflection of their 
abilities to adapt with changing circumstances and "'Living 
by their wits rather than deposits. " 
As this research addresses itself to con- 
tested 
. 
bids which is under the purview of corporate finance 
division within a merchant bank, it is crucial to under- 
stand the main functions perforri by this specific division 
located in the merchant bank. Analysis of compiled ques- 
tionnaires and the annual accounts of merchant banks indi- 
cated the following corporate finance functions of the 30 
banks selected for this study. 
1) Capital raising (medium/long term): e. g. offer 
for sale, placing, introduction, rights issue, 
loan stock issue. 
2) General financial advice: on relations with share- 
holders, taxation, shares option scheme, dividend 
policy, company law, joint-ventures. 
j. The 
_, 
ccopviirg Houses Committee (the AHO), representing 
he 1-7 %rad itional houses w forme Jn 1914 
, 
and. by 
'the 
' Tý ýt" h" 1. i-'tl it became an important for-. n {' a-. 
d i. sscuýia> {iä: ß on : «'exchanät 
banking 
3: iat tiers 
" 
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3) : Icygerä and acquisitions. 
4) Corporate disposals/divestments. 
5) Corporate reconstructions and schemes of arrange- 
ment. 
6) Project finance. 
7) Underwriting. 
8) Stock Exchange listing. 
9) Corporate strategic planning (business develop- 
ment analysis), 
10) Direct investment. 
11) International finance (corporate). ' 
12) Leasing and factoring. 
Fuller descriptions are given for tho 
30 merchant banks studied in Table 4.8 on the next page 
(see also. Appendix Tables 5.4,5.5 in Volume 2). 
In the same vein, the corporate finsncs 
divisions of the stockbroking firms-chose.. for this study 
perform somewhat parallel. functions but, because of their 
late entry into corporate finance activities and limited 
capital base, they lack the depth and extent of corporate 
financial-services that are being provided by their mer- 
chant banking competitors in the City (see Table. 4,9; page 
67). 
Again, 
_each specific activity may 
be 
broken down into more detailed operations. In the case 
of acquisition activities, the merchant bank may, again 
according to circumstances assist with: 
- 
- 
definition of corporate objectives 
-- 
formulation of bid strategies 
- 
devising form of financial consideration 
-- 
approach and negotiation 
- 
defence a. Qaiiis t hos ti' e bid 
documentation and irioiomentatio of bid 
- 
66 
- 
Table 4.8: The Corporate Finance Functions of the 30 
UK Merchant. Banks Participating in this Survey 
} 
FUNCTION 
M1 BANKS e (hcoc1t M2 M3 M4 M5 P16 ? '1? M8 M9 M10 11 ? 12N13 M14 M1 M16 M1 M18 M19 "M2O M21 
(M21 M22 M23 M24 M25 'M26 1427 M28 M29 M30 
- Corporate planning 
Direct investment 
ý 
,/ ý I 
Disposals (Corporate) 01°( "ýf 
Rund raising Ax 1/ % /, ýý'( ý. ýý'`(. ý/ý ý. ý" 
ý. 
- ,ý ý ý,, v'' v 
7 
General financial advice 1ýl ý ` 
. 
ý'° ý''ý ý, r'  ' ý/  '  wý°   ''ý vý ý 
, 
International activities ' 1.1/ ,,, ý'' , s'' ý, ºr' ý,. r' ý,,, ý ý,, ý" Leasing 
A. M j. C) and acquisitions , erb v 
k. 
- 
iiý 7 R. , } ý/ ,, ý ý, ý" t ý i +rr '  ý ' ýº'ý  ý  ý ý''' 
Project rinanc2 E ý! ! 
I 
i rý 
` 
 
ývý 
 
ý 
ý ý°'`ý ý ý 
v 
Reconstructions 
Stock Exchange listing 
, 
't a    
º! 1ýý' 
,! w 'ý''' ý +ý ý ý, i! ' v i. }. 
ti 
Sources: Questionnaire and Annual Accounts/Reports 
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STOCK- 
(encodes) COI PORATE Fl? I ACE FLrvCT. i. OiTS 
providing corporate advice to 200 companies 
-I - advice on market reaction to annual/interim re- ST 
sults 
- 
arzrange for institutional visits 
- 
corporate advice 
STK 2 - raising money 
- 
mergers and takeovers 
- 
dividend policy 
-- 
advice on major transactions (money raising, ? per--- 
gers, disposals, etc) 
STIL 3 - advice on presentation of company news 
- 
communication with investors 
-- 
general information (lookout for takeovers and 
_... ___...... _. v ý_... 
disposal opportunities, monitor share pri ces, eto ) 
STK 4' -- liaison between the stock market, the company 
and its shareholders 
fund raising 
STK 5 
-- 
advice on annual report compilation 
-- 
mergers and acquisitions 
fund raising 
STN b -- act in markot end advice on takeovers 
. -- 
@_ý-j ry_ngo new issues for unquoted companies (UK ans 
overseas) 
ý IX 7 -- to provide corporate financial advice to cl i ents 
as required 
advice on fund raising in capital markets 
STK 8 
- 
advice on mergers and takeovers 
advice on capital reconstruction 
STX 9 
-- 
to provide corporate financial advice to 300 cor- 
~ýýy 
porate clients 
acting as broker to existing quoted companies 
STic '10 - general corporate advice t 
- 
capital raising including flotations, rights 
issue, etc. 
'° Now in liquidation. 
Table 4.9 ; Corporate Finance Functions Perfornied by the 
'10 Major UK Stockbroking Firils. 
GS 
The framework of this survey is very 
much moulded by the sequential outline of these activities 
just described linked with contested bids. 
4.6 Headship of Corporate Finance Divisions 
Typically, the head of the corporate 
finance division is a senior merchant banking director and 
often carried a title such as, "Head of Corporate Finance" 
or "Director of Corporate Finance. " In some houses, how-- 
ever, the coa por-ate finance division came under the aegis 
of the company chairman (3%), vice-chairman (7%), deputy 
chief executive (3%) or-the managing director (10%). 
_ 
The 
stockbrokers, on the other hand,, due to their unlimited lia- 
bility have partners (60%) rather than directors heading- 
their cornorFte finance units as evident in Pablo 1.. 10. 
Headshi 
Head 
Director 
Managing Director 
Vice Chairman 
Executive Director 
Chairman 
Deputy Chief Executive 
Assistant M. Director 
ýY d" Cl 
6 60 j 
3 30 
10 
1 10 
Table 'x. '10: Headship Titles of Merchant Banks & Stock- 
brokers. 
4.7 Line of Reporting ( na. n of Control) of Corporate Finance 
According 
-zn J; B? x1 ey, 
6e0m: 
3, ý t ees 
are uled 
. 
more. widely in, banking as a ; hole than in ln-i 
b. J. ý.?: 3X. LOy, : tiEl:: ==ý ýý iyl 1ii41 rr1ýýI1ý j Gulf vublishiný-,, 
Texas, 1973, PP41-4-2. 
No. 
lÖ 
10 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
j7 
33 
10 
7 
7 
3 
3 
3 
Headship 
Xartizer 
Head 
Director 
Manager. 
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other industry and this observation was constantly con- 
sistent with the practice of merchant banks chosen for 
this survey. Table 4.11 below shows the person or body 
to which the head of corporate finance reports. In the 
majority of the merchant banks, he is responsible to the 
board or a committee. 
Line of. Reporting No 
.% board 30 
executive committee 9 30 
chairman/chief executive 8 27 
manag director 4 13 
Total 30 10 
't'able 4.11: Reporting System of Corporate Filsance 
Divisions of UK Merchant Banks. 
The committee, which is. usually the'execu- 
tive committee, is the most powerful body in the hard; aid 
it normally includes the chairman and several key direct-. 
ors and its main function is to review , he performance of. 
other banking committees. On the other hand, the board 
represents the_ shareholders' interests and legally has 
power over the management of the bank; its key functions 
encompass the establishment of merchant banking policies, 
the. systematic review of the bank's operations (inclusive 
of budget and capital expenditures), the'sslection, promo- 
tion and dismissals of banking executives. 
4.8 Corporate Finance Staffing Characteristics 
Owing to the compllex1ties, multi- 
discipli-nary and esoteric nature of corporate finance activities, 
there is a practical need for a mu]. LiplicitJ of professio- 
nal skills to cope with the analytical and existi tie de- 
-I mands of private and corporate clients in ciao-- to- :;. 3, 
- 
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operations as well as with transactions (especially take-- 
overs) which may involve considerable banking manpower, 
time and resources. The skilful harnessing and cross- 
fertilisation of these diverse talents and expertise is 
vital in many instances, for example, the outcome of con- 
tested bids. From the empirical findings (Table 4.12 
below), it can be discerned that there is a convergence 
towards 3 main streams of professionals in both the mer-- 
chant-banking and stockbroking samples, namely: 
1) Accountants 
2) Lawyers 
3) Business School Graduates 
In the merchant banks, all the corpo- 
rate finance divisions have accountants and lawyers__but 
only 50% of the latter are found in the stockby okin Y 4L r: us 
. 
1ERCHA IT B I'V ANKS 
Type 
of Staff ! io. 
9 
accountant 30 100 
laver 30 100 
business graduate= 23 77 
generalist 10 33 
financial analyst 9 30 
research analyst 6 20 
ban'., ar 4 '. 3 
tax specialist 2 6 
STOCKBROKERS 
accountant isO0! 
business graduate 6 601 
lawyer 5 (C); 
financial analyst 40 ; 
stockbroker V 
actuary 1 iO 
hanker 1 101 
} research analyst 1 10! 
Table 4.12: Staffing Characteristics of Corporate Finance 
Divisions of Leading UK Merchant Banks & 
Stockbroking Firms.. 
The necessity to 
ry and professional talents within the 
vividly reflected in the submission of 
trial & Commercial Finance Corporation 
Committee on its staffing policy: 
have multi-di. sciplina- 
se financial bodies is 
evidence of the indus- 
(ICrCj to the Wilson 
"The aim of 'LCr C1s to h a-, e equate 
sta. --F available to deal with whatever volume of Ö '-s rir sit 
is possible to generato; Recruitment for he ''F ner }. i. ý1ý 
staff is r om the univers ? üi es... ud ing vhe r::. 
schools, from the accountancy Find other prof oss3. ons urn, 
- 
''. om 
thoro 
of man `Ter not in , 
"n- IL tr,: . 
-ý 91 -- 
lists are recruited as required for technical d. enartrnents. 
Well over 90 s; of present executives and trainees are r: ra-- 
duates or have recognised. professional qualifications. " 
(Finance for Industry, "History &' Busi- 
ness of FFI, " evidence to the Wilson 
Committee, Ist August 1977, p 9). 
4.9 Team 'Work 
The reputation of many. leading UK merchant 
banks domestically and internationally is seen by them to 
be linked with the flair and skills they display in their 
conduct of makeover transactions. 
. 
In their capacity as 
financial advisers to many types of clients in company 
takeovers, the merchant banks are deeply involved in. the 
many complicated phases of contested bids ranging from the 
evaluation of 
, 
company data to negot? ations and docu-mentä. 
-- 
ticn, and gil these steps have to be executed Ly]_i: üýn vi= 
rules prescribed by the City's self-regulatory bodies 
like the Takeover Panel, the'Stock Exchange, the Council 
for the Securities Industry, etc and tight time tonst-- 
raints. 
- 
Clearly, this task is beyond the capability of 
a single executive and more than one writer7 has drawn 
attention to the importance of team work.. For instance, 
Gordon Bing, an American takeover specialist, pointed out 
that: 8 
"Seldom are all essential acquisition funct-" 
ions. under the direct management of one individual. The 
executive who is assigned responsibility for the acquisi- 
tion programme must persuade, cajole or coax his counter- 
parts to provide the necessary missing services. An 
acquisition programme is a complex affair involving a va- 
riety of activities and people who : Wust be closely co- 
ordinated and managed if success is to result. " 
Associated with this issue; the quest-ion asked 
during t 
. 
-. e interview, 
.: as; Dc your s ec. -Lalzs is work, in3.. - 
7. J¬Wechsberg, "op. c 
.x F'ysee, 
", Tarburgs: The 1on-Ccnioriaisi: N) 
-,.. PPi6 
-2C:?. 
8 G. B ng, "Gor rate 
_4cauisit±o: s, 
" Gulf, Texas, 1980,05. 
- 
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vidually or in teams when providing corporate finance advice 
pertai. nin to takeovers? " 
The response was unanimous and according to 
all the respondents, team work constituted the key organi- 
sational approach to mergers and acquisitions as evident in 
Table 4.113 below. 
Approach merchant Banks Stockbrokers 
No. % No. % 
team work 30 100 10 100 
individual 00 00 
Total 30 105 10 0 fl 
Table 4-. 13: Organisational Approach 
. 
to Corporate 
Advisory Activities (Bid Situations) 
Adopted by UK Merchant Banks & Stock- 
brokers. 
Although the stockbrokers too. favour use of 
teams in bid transactions, it was pointed out to the resear- 
cher that owing to restricted corporate finance 
.i 1d L1 V LL. 6. C/ WJ VV VY ib 
o 
i11z, 
5 opaci J7t=1 i.. 
-ß--1. _ '. LCSr _< 
o- 
f 
involvement with the principals i. e., the merchant banks, 
they do sometimes work individually influenced by circums-- 
tances such as: 
(1 } "We' are not a big enough department to work 
in teams. Obviously, we try to divide the 
work up in a sensible manner but we are 
small enough for me as the head of the de- 
partment to know what is going on... I sup- 
pose, it all boils dorm to dealing with the 
more important clients and the less impor- 
tant ones. " 
(Head, Corporate Finance, STK. ) 
(2) "We are mainly involved in the market rela- 
ted aspects of corporate finance and we see 
ourselves as part of the team with the com- 
pan: y 's merchant bank to advise on the mar- 
ket related aspect of a takeover 
... 
Normally, 
=' ea 7 the merchant bank with its inch big-7, e 
of people would have done more detailed 
work; dra;,; ing up the äi d documents, orb., ani-- 
sinÜ the time-table, meetings, negotiations 
... 
and our role is really a less tine-- 
consuminfe one and it doesn't really requi ro 
73 
a big team spending a? oni ti me on a bid c. soign"-_ 
ment compared to a rerchant bank. " 
(Partner, Sm? ) 
The modus operandi of the merchant banks 
and stockbrokers may be illustrated by some of the state- 
nients made by these interviewees: 
1) "We have 3 teams and each has an investment of 15 
people and each team works under 1 director, 
The individual transaction that we advised on 
varies and people are taken out of these 3 team 
groups according to whether they are available. 
Typically, a team of 3 or 4 people could be 
assembled for a particular job under a directo- 
... 
Sometimas, there may be 5 or 6 people on each 
team. 11 
(Director; IMB3O) 
2) "; ihen a client comes in and 
the raising of funds or mw 
. 
rn i° i will establish atei 
tor, an assistant director 
young recruit. " 
(Director, MB27) 
wants to talk about. 
Ling a takeover, we 
or rn Hager and.. a 
3)-"We have the director, manager and the executive 
or, a director, assistant director and an execu- 
tive. More often than not, we work effectively 
in pairs together rather than threes, but cer- 
tainly, that is the theory of it. In practice, 
you have a team which is involved with a parti- 
cular client but that team may not necessarily 
work on the assignment if the assignment arises.. 
We may do nothing for a client for 2 years and 
then work very hard for 3 months and because of 
that, we can't afford a team just assigned to 
that particular client. " 
. 
(Director, MB6) 
4) "There is no rigid structure... but basically, what 
happens is that we have a director and an execu- 
tive every time. We would also have a back-up, 
a second director, a second executive in case at 
the same time either one goes on holiday or are 
terribly invol ed in some other Job. F or adi;: in- 
istration, we actually have 3 groups within th e 
deDDartým, on t... hut we döiz! ý; he : T:: any -ý; ar`t, ic -liar director in charge so" that each member o1 the do- 
J 
A. v+u`. aav 
. 
L_ii ".. JJ. l: 
/4S Ca. 
t. Jý.. 4 v. t. Via. V '+. L ic äi/J 0 Ji4i Ltii 
Ü. 
- 
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different directors. " 
(P'ianager, I04) 
5) "... our team will be Ipartner and I assistant. 
We are able to arrange for a back-up if one 
executive is out, the other one deals with the 
'problems that arise. " 
(Partner, STK7) 
From the above, it'can broadly be estab- 
lished. that in a takeover transaction, a merchant bank 
will create a team with a minimum of 2 executives while 
3 seems to be the favoured norm. There is a need for 
merchant banks to adopt a flexible stance regarding team- 
work. The team sometimes expands to 5 or even 6 execu- 
tives when the transaction in question is very large, 
comp? ex, has overseas involvement, entails a short-time 
horizo .4 there is a need for continuity and back-up or a 
need to dra:: 1. on other specialists to see the job to its 
successful 'fruition. 
4.10 Working Relationships With Clientele and Other Profes- 
sLonals 
As financial advisers and consultant 
bankers to a wide spectrum of companies locally and world- 
wide, the London merchant banks (especially the multina- 
. 
tional ones) have a working relationship with many levels 
ofpioi'essionals and executives running UK companies and 
industrial conglomerates. From Table 4.14 on the next 
page, it can be discerned that during the process of merg- 
ers and contested bids, the prime recipients of corporate 
advice and those drawn into the bid activity are people 
: like company chairmen, finance directors, corporate plan- 
ners, etc. 
Altho*,., zt; h stockbrokers do compete wi h 
ir+rt. t. erchia11 a: n ks in some aspa. V V1 cVlioiý, 1ie L: läiicc Vaa:: ý 
_? ý_ 
Rank Status 
1. company chairman chief execu 
2. company finance director 
3. managing director 
4. corporate planner 
5. lawyer 
. 
6. accountant 
7. company secretary. 
8 
. 
stockbroker 
9., company banker 
ve 
Noy. 
24 80 
22 73 
19 63 
13 ° 43 
11 37 
9 30 
9 30 
5 17 
'. Cable 4.14: Profile of Professionals Interacting 
With Merchant Banks During; Bids. 
Corporate Finance Services Mergers Acquisitions 
Y 
Involvement 
^ 
1 No. %. Involvement No. 
very y invoived ,8 80 very involved 5 50 
quite involved 1 10 'quite involved 14 40 
invo? ved 1 10. involved 1 10 
not at all 0* 0 not at all 0 0 
Total 1 10 105 1 Total 1 110 100 
Table-4. j_5: Working Relationship of Stockbrokers With 
Merchant Banks in General Corporate Advisory Services 
& Specialist Merger & Acquisition Transactions. 
.ý ýý 
_ý 
also work closely Oith them as indicated in Table 4.15 
on page 75. This may be due in part to the moi1e limited 
range of professional competence at their disposal but may 
may also be attributable to their dependence on merchant 
banks for a large proportion of their stockbroking busi- 
ness. This emerges from the answers of 'some of the 
respondents: 
"... discuss and advice on takeover suitability, 
financial. terms and consequences for existing 
shareholders. " 
-- 
"... advice on the preparation of-documentation 
and liaison over underwriting, pricing, timing 
and so on. " 
"The trend is towards closer collaboration. Mat-- 
ters relating to pricing of issues, assessraen. of 
market reaction are. particularly important. " 
-- 
"... varies from case to case. Sometimes, e have 
been virtually an extension of the merchant bank 
particularly in the. preparatiion of bid circulars. " 
. 
"Of the 17 Accepting Houses, or better still, of 
the 8 largest merchant. banks, we are the actual 
brokers to 7 of them. " 
4.11 Criteria Adopted for New Clientele 
Corporate finance within the ambit off 
merchant banking is a fee-earning business and as such, 
the houses are always on the lookout for new customers to 
supplement their exiäi_ng clien-ele. It is true to say 
that of all the merchant banking activities L-61 is m 7k.. r er 
coo ý, or to and takeover act ivities the purview of 
finance that the bank received the maximum ex-posti-i-e 
consequently, the reputation. of a house IS 
- 
?? 
- 
enhanced by a successful operation. Conversely, its 
image can be easily blemished by incompetence, professio- 
nal negligence and adverse publicity. Consequently, it 
tends to select and screen its new clients with due care 
before it commit itself to be its advisers and accept the 
. 
acquisition mandate. Of the numerous factors that govern 
its policy on this matter (see Table 4.16 below), the most 
frequently cited is potential conflicts of interest (87%). 
This being regarded as a paramount. consideration when de- 
ciding on the suitability of. a potential client. Other 
-factors which were cited include the ability of the mer- 
chant bank to acquaint itself with the client's business 
(67%) and its corporate objectives (60%), the quality of 
its management (50%), whether the company is financially 
sound (40%) and interesting enough, the motive for aban- 
doning its former financial 'advisers (30%). 
Factor No, N 
conflicts 0-4 26 87 
. 
whether conversant with the client's business 20 67 
whether conversant with its corporate objectives 1 18 60 
need to be conversant with its management ability 15 50 
crhother the company is financially sound 12 40 
soundness of recommendation 10 33 
rationale for deserting its ex-financial advisers 9 30 
the public standing of the company 7 23 
reputation of its former merchant banking advisor 6 20 
need to be conversant with its key shareholders i 3 
character reference (entrepreneur type of client) 1 3 
whether bank has expertise to serve client's needs 1 3 
Table 4.16;. Screening Process and Criteria for Acceptance 
of Acquisition Mandate Adopted by UK Merchant 
Banks Regarding New Clients. 
Like their merchant banking counter- 
parts, the stockbrokers too adopt certain criteria like 
financial performance, background information, possible con- 
flicts of ? nterest, etc. ) before committing themselves as fi- 
f_a_n_cia. i advisers to new customers (see Table ' 
.! 7 on the 
next page). 
_7g_ 
Screening Factor No. N 
whether client is financially sound 10 100 
background information 10 100 
possible conflicts of interest 10 100 
whether worthwhile business 10 100 
management capability 8 80 
Table 4.19: Screening Process Adopted by Some Leading 
UK Stockbroking Firms Regarding New Clients. 
Some of the procedures and practices. 
adopted by. UK merchant banking and stockbroking houses regard- 
ing new clients are detailed below in order to provide the rea- 
der with a deeper perception as to how financial advisers in 
the City approach this organisational issue: 
(1) "If it is a public company as many of them--are, 
then the information is already available 
. 
1f3 
it is a private coIIpany (lae do get a lot of pri- 
vate companies) they often come with the recom- 
mendations of our parent company. But, if there 
is a suspicion that this is not the sort of per-- 
son for whom we would like to act, then we would 
decline to act because the major thing that we 
have is reputation and goodwill and you can lose 
that very easily. " 
(Head, Corporate Finance, V; B20) 
(2) "The directors, the 5 of us xaeet each Wednesday 
and review every proposition we have been offered 
but we have quite a large number which we look. at 
and say, 'No. We 
. 
can°t. ' on the basis we fee? that 
either that we do not like the deal or, the'chan- 
ces of success are so limited or, we are unhappy 
about the. quality of the management. " 
(Director, MB3) 
(3) "We first of all check whether there are any pos- 
sible conflicts of interest with our existing 
clients. We would also be influenced by the way 
in which the company came to us...; fe then look 
at. the company and the type of business it is in- 
volved to see whether it 
-makes sense 
from the 
company =s point of vie : to look ? 'IB3v 
advice. " 
(Director, MBSO) 
(4) "Be_ore wo take on a Company as our 
A client, it has lo be aper Je iL7 l. 4 Ür ii:: i_ 
....; 
nt 
- 
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board and alb the pa, ýtncra, 
.. 
! 
'tom have h 
. 
--d a num- ber of inuiancee " of companies which were not 
financially sound coming to us oSo, the fact that a corapa,.; y has probt ems is no reason 'i; ha 
we shouldn't advise them provided that we be- 
lieve that it is worth our business and it has 
honourable and capable people running it, " 
(Partner, STK7 i 
14.12 Dealing With Anonymous Clients 
In view of the high visibility and syanding 
of many merchant banks in the City and internationally, 
they may be expected to be particularly careful to ensure 
that they serve as agents of truly reputable clients. 
The rationale cited for their strong reluctance to be in- 
volved with anonymous clients included possible conflicts 
of interest and. the need to preserve their banking ropu- 
tation. The hidden dangers of representing anonymous 
clients far outweigh 
. 
any financial consideration and this 
was seen by some merchant bankers in this perspective: 
(1) "First of all, neither we nor any of the rý or- 
chant bank would act for any person who 
comes in straight from the street. You know, 
we want to make sure for a start that we 
_are acting for a man of principle 
... 
as giere ar e 
one or two operators in the City whose money 
is from suspect sources. We have to safe- 
guard our reputation. " 
(Head, Corporate Finance, i09) 
(2) "',,, le have occasionally people on the phone who 
say, 'We can't tell you on the telephone bit 
we are interested in making a bid for a pu- 
bl;. c, company. Could you help? ' Our first 
question All be, who are our principals? 
r'i cn whom are we {potentially dealing with? 
Par; lJ 
, 
because they are people w"rhor : we may 
not wish to work for (jr we may run the risks 
of a very dangerous conflict of interest 
arising. " 
(Director, mßß22) 
try 3) 
, ale certainly get introduction, from peon 
who say at an early s ýa e that t ne can not 
ruvea. l the nm es o their Clients. e WOUld 
: ive them : enera? help but it?. vroi; to any- 
thing, specific, :e would not be ý)7 fý pý7"ý to 
rrn 
-- 
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4.1 3 ßummary/Reg: ie i. 
more than 63% of the merchant banks surveyed 
have a long history dating back toi the 18h: h or the 19th 
century. On the whole, the Merchant banks perceive 
the advantages arising from parental affiliation to be 
financial power, banking reputation and wider contacts. 
On the other hand, they alsc visualise organisational 
dysfunctions created by such an affiliation, the sal. - 
lent ones being conflicts of interest and. lack of inde- 
pendence. In terms of fee--earning activities revol- 
vin_ ; around the corporate finance divisions, the range 
is very diverse and varies from mergers and a: quisi_ti ons 
to international merchant banking. The staffing of 
the corporate finance divisions is characterised by a 
predominance of professionals from accountancy, law and 
to, quite a large extent, those with business school 
qualifications. More important still is the facts that 
team work{ is the bank: g norm adopted by the whole nier- 
chant banking community regarding contested takeover 
deals. Both these marked features of corporate finance 
underlined the multi-disciplinary and complex nature 
of contested bids itsolf. Owing to the vital contri- 
bution of bid activity to the corporate reputation of 
UK merchant banks, it is normal practice for them. to 
administer a thorough screening process before accepting 
new clientele to prevent possible conflicts of interest 
and also, thy; crucial need to preserve their merchant 
banking reputation. 
Having examined the corporate fi nanco 
organisational structure and strategy of the 30 leading 
UK me ochant ba. nkin houses, vie now come to the acquisi- 
tion and strategy formulation process which is discussed 
in the next chapter. 
°- 
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CHAPTER 5 
BIDDING STRATEGIES 
5.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we discussed and 
examined how the merchant banks organised themselves for 
corporate advisory services. In this section, we are 
starting with the premise that the client has already 
identified its potential acquisition target and we now 
proceed to examine and analyse issues involved in the 
planning and implementation of a contested takeover. 
Factors discussed include the acquisition evaluation tech- 
nique used, bid timing, building a pre-bid stake, 'sight- 
ing shot' 
, 
level of bid pTremium desired, ter: s of consi- 
dezatioi_, 'ai c sins kur : J116re11olüc3r 
, 
eeliis1GiLng ooard s 
recommendation for the merger and finally, the main deter- 
minants influencing the decisive outcome of a contested 
bid. 
5.1 Nurturing of Acquisition Idea 
The generation of an acquisition idea, 
spontaneous or ctherwisv, is the first step towards a bid. 
Although this idea *rriay sometimes originate from the mer-- 
chant bank-, it may frequently comes from the client orga- 
nisation (see Table 5. Oa &. 5-ob). 
Sources of Acquisition Idea No. 
lidea er anaii n fvoir, own client 17 
! ide-i omanat1n from m_rc; 12IIt mi nk 1Z 
i r 
: n. -3ec irieaA 
! 
4_ 
Tab' e 
. 
Oq 
r: c: niiis>it 
on Id. oa 
Merchant 
Acquisition Idea 
Bank 
(encoded) 
Clientele flerchant Bank 
'r, ýixed Undecided TOTAL 
rriB 1 
PIB 2 2 
NB3 2 I{IB 4 
i"iB 2 
1; 18 I 
i", B 
.1 HB 8 
viB 9 1 
iýiB10 ( I '1 
MB11 
MBI2 
' I, 1B13 2 
MB11º" t 2 
? IBIS /_ 
- 
H BI 6 
7 FIB1 
MBI8 
NB19 
! 
-f 
., -- 
 
MB 21 
N1322 c .I 
HB 23 
£IB24 I 2 
PIB25 I 
MB 26 i 
 2 MB 
! ! I 
NB28 
1 
I 
1'iB29 2 
MB30 ! TOTAL 1T1 14 11 5 47 
Table 5.0b: Sources of Acquisition Idea Analysed by 
Individual Merchant Bank's Perception. 
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This is a situation which merchant banners 
said they prefer as: 
(1) "It is not beyond 
. 
the capability of the client 
to know what he wants to acquire but the 
question is: 'How to do it? ' In fact, some of 
the bigger clients have their own corporate 
set-up 
- 
they do their own_ research, they 
investigate companies, they investigate mar- 
kets, they look to see where opportunities 
may be and the role of some of the larj er 
merchant banks comes down to almost a rubber 
stamp. " 
(Director, MB2) 
(2) "I prefer the client to come with committed 
acquisition ideas... r ainly because it is more 
authentic and more successful business is done 
that way. " 
(Director, Iß: 321) 
(3) "I think at the end of the dez, we try and put 
up a lot of suggestions but 9 out of 10 things 
that actually happened, comes from the cl i=u 
(Di-rector, 1,10 14) 
(4) "We run a merger and acquisition unit which 
comprises about 10 people or so and their 
sole function is to find acquisitions or to 
find people to buy disposals from other com- 
panies. They are always looking for tips in 
various places and talking to clients... I 
think, it is fair to say that sometimes, we 
suggest idea, but in the'main, companies them- 
selves know who they are interested because 
they are operating not only in the market 
here in the UK but overseas as well. " 
(Director, MBI7) 
Respondents in the survey suggested that 
an acquisition idea could arise from: 
A) opportunistic Deyelopnenlts 
-- 
merchant bank or agents in the City hear of 
opportunities 
- 
client nears of opportunities- 
-8- 
B) Situational Devel2pments 
- 
triggered off by rival building up a 
creeping stake, or 
- 
triggered-off by rival springing a 
formal takeover bid. 
According to some of the merchant banking 
respondents, the bid criteria that they received from their 
clients could either be "fixed" or "free" and depending on 
the client's wishes, the resultant execution would depend 
on whether it is: 
1) A joint-venture. 
2) Disposal or Corporate Divestment. 
3) Corporate Diversification. 
4) Domestic Acquisition. 
So, contributions of the financial advisers 
would entail the clarification of takeover objectives and 
adopting a constructive approach, and in some instances, 
even dissuading the client if the acquisition idea was un- 
sound. 
5.2 Acquisition Study and Evaluation 
Having. been given the acquisition mandate 
(assuming the merchant bank is happy with aid client), 
the merchant bank then proceeds to the acquisition planning 
stage in which acting as financial advisor, it involves it- 
sel f in the assessment and evaluation of the potential bid 
candidate. This process involves the house looking into a 
wide spectrum of financial and non--financial factors asso- 
ciated :. ýi 
,h bid_ Tt delves into the history of to bidden 
- 
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company, investigates the market and industry in : ": t? ic'_ý he 
business is located, undertakes a financial appraisal a:, 
-)d 
evaluates its management capability as well as the syner- 
gistic implications of the merger and the possibility of 
advanced market purchase (of the biddee's equity) in order 
to facilitate the bid outcome especially it it is an ag- 
gressive one and other issues listed in Table 5.1 belo: "r. 
Aspects Investigated No. % 
history of the biddee company 30 100 
investigation into the market and industry 30 100 
financial appraisal (extracted/extrapolated data) 30 100 
management structure and capability 25 83 
synergy of merger '0 33 
client ºs resources 9 1n 
commercial/industrial logic 30 
possibility of advanced market share purchase 8 2rß 
investigation into the stock market 7 23 
evaluate share ownership pattern/composition ' 23 
investigation into future prospects 6 20 
evaluate "product fit" 5 1? 
state of the economy 1 3 
computer simulation 0 0 
Table 5.1: Acquisition Study and Evaluation Approach Adop- 
ted by the 30 UK Merchant Banks Involved in 
this Study. 
Aspects Investigated No. 
history of the company 10 100 
stock market rating 9 90 
financial appraisal 9 90 
management Capability/quality 8 80 
analysis of comparable companies 5 50 
computer simulation 2 20 
Table 5.2: Acquisition Study and Evaluation Approucr 
Adopted by the 10 UK Stockbroking Firms 
Involved in this Study. 
The factors examined by the stockbro- 
kers in evaluating a bid candidate do not diverge very 
much 
1 
/ýi f1 l' yA rom that adopted `ýhJ ýA banks , wýý.. a e merchant nkand they ýf. { VJ 
ii"tc]. uCi lookiii -, iii o. he ti1. Si or vi ýha 
is stoc 
, 
rket 7ai; _ing, its i1? 7_^". E'iiýent t LiIý%,: - i. -L 
"j' ; ±. l;. J. 
the analysis and. comparison with similar comp aniea 
-- 
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(see Table 5.2). 
The determinants of the line of approach 
of both types of financial advisers regarding the investi-- 
gation of acquisition targets may be amplified by the fol- 
lowing selective extracts from the interviews conducted 
with the merchant bankers and stockbrokers: 
(a) "More often than not, the client identifies the 
target but, provided the criteria are reasonably 
well specified, we will undertake an acquisition 
study. Where it is likely to be an opposed bid, 
the best one can do is to look at the last return 
accounts and the major share movements. " 
(Director, MB27) 
(b) "... the first thing is an investigation into the 
company, its. history., its industry, its future 
prospects, the stock market position of the 
. 
corm-- 
pany 
-in the sense, running searches on the 
shareholders seeing whether major blocks of shares 
is widely held or whether it is family controlled 
a_1d in the light of' that investigatory work, we 
move on to an analysis with the client company. ' 
(Director, T"IB22) 
(c) "Don't forget, we have 2,800 companies in tho DIB16 
portfolio where MB16 invested in. We have got 
those for a start; all categorised into industries 
the type of industrial locations and so on. So, 
we can immediately sort out the likely people we 
want to investigate further. This is extremely 
important. " 
(Director, MB16) 
(d) 
. 
'=... we have got 80 or 100 companies that we are 
official birokers to and as a firm of stockbrokers, 
we have got a research department which speciali- 
ses in investigation and reporting of the number 
of industrial sectors. In all these sectors, we, 
as a firm probably know all the companies invol- 
ved because our analysts are talking to them all 
the time, we have got contacts there, we know 
what they are doing, we know their acquisition 
prograiames... So, there are special cases where we 
are experts in a particular industry and w. ere w 
may be able to initiate some mergers or acau si 
- 
tions. 10 
(Partner, S"iK",, ) 
- 
86 
- 
In the collection and compilation of 
Uisl. ion data the merchant banks usually turn to a va-- 
riet} of sources and charnels of information like Companies 
House, credit agencies, trade publications, stockbrokers' 
circulars, market surveys, banking links overseas, City 
contacts(llke lawyers, stockbrokers, accountants, etc) in- 
ternal banking staff, in-house research library, and in 
big merchant banks like MB'12, it can draw on the specialist 
services of its merger/acquisition unit sited within the 
corporate finance department. 
15.3 Acquisition Checklist 
Some writers like Kitching (13)('3973) 7 
D. F. Channon, J. T9. Stopford et 
. 
. 
l. (5) (1975) and P. J. Herbert- I 
have focused on the relevance of acquisition checklists as 
management tools s or Corporate decision--Habers. In stB 
study, 80% of the respondents cited that- they possess' some 
form of pro-acquisition checklist to assist them in their 
bid planning, From Table 5.3 below, it can be discerned 
that this 
. 
acquisition tool is universal to both categories 
of merchant banks. 
! Acqui s: LI ion Independent Affiliated Total Total 
checklist uerchant morcha_it No. nS 
status bank bank 
wa. ih checklist '12 °ý`ý 
6 no checklist 33_I0 20 
15 
Table 5.3: Ownership of Pr. 
--Acquisition Checklist of the 30 UK Merchant Banks Categorised by Groupings. 
Ef±ecti. veness of a checklist depends not 
only on its comprehensiveness but rather on the' user's abi, 
-, 
-s- 
it; I to inter ; trete its items, £lexil: 1y to suit each c 
. 
i. ýccu 
tance su?, roundinr, a bide CL NB17 director thhscribes t11e 
manner in which a checklist should boo used, ".. it is ! 1o. re 
10P. 
J. C2c::. er'i l" sGil e, 
lIt>(11y !: i üm St a. tegy 
& Acquisition 
rti. j.. Ä c jl 
t1 
ýi ". %L'+ý. '1ý_tý ý.:. 
` :; Wit?, ývý. 'C 
. 
l... 
_. 
'ßäi'".. 
-~i)emont, 
oaD, nae3,1 
8 
f. 
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of an outline structure but it has to be adapted i or each 
particular acquisition. We have in this famous house a 
basic checklist which covers all the important points but 
then it might be added to in certain circumstances or sub- 
tracted from. " On the other hand, drawing from their 
past experience, some of the merchant bankers also drew 
attention to the pitfalls linked %'Iith over--emphasis or, pro- 
bid checklist. Their main objections being: 
a) "We think that checklists are bad as they tend 
to become stereotype. We do everything here 
on its merits. It is far better to approach 
each assignment fresh. " 
(Director,. MB16) 
b) "... We take the view that each situation- should 
be looked at in its own rue ri seI think p: o- 
bably the most important thing to do at the 
start is to get away from the financial figures, 
checklist and the legal side and to look at the 
oýV-r. i' ý.. 7ti. lCvh YJSiv 'v lSCr. S:!! C VLC 
.C1.11Cbý :,... ,.. :Y 
t1t: 
r. 
4 
is the right business. This can be c uiic use-- 
ful as things can become very mechanical if you 
are not careful. " 
(Director, I. h3I i) 
ý: 4 Loan Facilitation 
One of the main advantages that merchant 
banks has over the other financial advisers like stock-- 
brokers, for instance, is the "wholesale" nature of their 
overall banking activities supported by their vast finan-- 
cial strength (dependent on the parental affiliation of 
the individual merChgnt bank concerned)4 its such, the 
irierchant banks not only advise on ac,; uisitior rla ter but 
also are able to- as: 3ist their clients with the nec-ss: try 
credits or loans to complete the takeover tr3IIsacvioI's« 
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All the respondents mentioned that lending 
is an integral part of overall merchant banking activities 
but at, the same time, in unison, they pointed out that len- 
ding does not come under the purview of the corporate fin- 
ance division, rather, it is the function and jurisdiction 
of the banking department and their working relationship 
and approach to the question of loan financing can be seen 
in this light: 
(a) "This does not come under the corporate fin- 
ance department. For merger and takeover 
situations... we would allot-. r our banking 
people to apply the normal banking criteria 
and do the necessary investigation as to 
whether we should assist with a Loan. " 
(Manager, MB4) 
(b) "tile would cover an acquisition either with a 
loan from our banking department or we work 
with Ltd. It depends from case to case. 
Or, in certain circumstances, we have been 
part of a syndication of bankers which have 
put together the necessary loan financing. " 
(Firector, MB3) 
(c) "We have a credit committee and that is the 
committee that approves all loans on which 
1 sit.... and obviusly, for financing an acqui- 
sition for which we are acting as advisers, 
the decision is undertaken by the banking 
side. We, in the corporate finance, acts as 
liaison. " 
(Director; NB23) 
Thus, in the arena of merchant banking, 
from this empirical study, it is evident that loan financing 
is a separate banking function, distinct from corporate fin- 
ance activities. With data on loan financing extracted 
from the case studies bf 30 contested bids supplemented by 
those involving conglomerate takeovers of American oil com- 
panies, 'it is possible to get a notion of the degree of 
help given by merchant banks to assist their clients in bled 
transactions (sac Chapter 8). 
89 
5.5 Bid Timing 
During the course of the numerous interviews 
conducted with the merchant banks in the City, contested 
bids have been compared very frequently to military war- 
fare and like a strategist planning a military offensive, 
timing is of the essence if ä satisfactory outcome is to be 
achieved. In an empirical study conducted by Professor 
Pickering2 on acquisitive firms embarking on takeovers, he 
too mentioned that this factor. was taken into account by 
the corporate executives involved in formulating the bid- 
ding strategies. This survey reveals that with the excep- 
tion of one traditional house, 97% of the respondents men- 
tioned that timing is a strategic factor, an integral ele- 
ment of the overall bid strategy. The rationale influen- 
cing the merchant banks on this issue is highlighted below: 
(a) "... one times the offer at the nadir of the 
{ company's fortune and from then on, things 
are going with you and the market is going 
with you as well. '' 
(Manager, ivB10) 
(b) "From our investigation. and it seems to us 
that the timing is not ripe, we would make 
our views well known. In the end, I guess, 
we would abide by the wishes of our clients 
unless we think it is so paatently wrong... 
I think our advice should be on a whole 
range of strategic aspects and timing is one 
of the factors. 11 
(Director, MB22) 
{c) "I think it is very critical... critical in the 
the strategic sense. Most target companies 
are acquired when they are in some form of 
difficulties; may be because it is low yield, 
lack of liquidity, their growths pattern has 
run out, they are looking le: s attractive 
and their P/E multiple has fallen dramati- 
cally. " 
(Director; ; B14) 
(d) "Tile best time is when the target co.: ps. n has 
produced a poor interim figure or Wr aast. 
2. J. F. Pickerin 
, 
='The Causes and Corsecuences off wanaw ll 
Mergers, " Occasional 
- aAr 906r. - n9 
- 
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So, when a target is down and out and coL- 
u, itted publicly for saying how difficult 
things are... you put in a bid and there is 
not very much more that one can say. If, 
you are acting for a very large company, 
even though the thing goes slightly wrong, 
all that it means is that they have spent 
LF, too much. It is not going to affect 
the company overall. But, if it was o- 
ing to be a company of almost equal size, 
obviously, prudence is very important 
because the company can be ruined by had 
acquisitions. " (Director, MB25) 
The merchant banker holding the slightly di- 
vergent notion regarding the essence of timing based his ai"- 
guments on these grounds: 
"Quite often, it is worth going in bofdre the 
results are published because then, at least you know where 
s are an- you are. Sometimes, if you go in after the result 
anounced, they are already 3 months out of date (or more) 
'ý1 r 
the 
''Z ght t; 1 re ArF bV-ý d to rr t/ý ry T+- es nov a 221, ý YOU ".. 1=G 111 11S4L VVi. V\! 
_J " 
-"ý ++- -- ý, 
to make a bid because Sometimes it is not that muchcheaper 
in the sense that it is never the right time ever to make an 
issue because market conditions are not right. There is 
always a better time to do it and so, in fact, mainly if you 
want to do it and if there is no. major impediment, you do 
tom" 
(Director MB2) 
From the answers given, it is possible to di- 
vide the rationale influencing the timing factor into 2 broad 
classifications: 
1) More immediate/opportunistic timing consider- 
ation. 
2) Broad issues of timing consideration. 
From the evidence provided. by Table 544 on 
page 91 fror the tactical noä. nt of viesi, a great T-. ýa on "Y 
of the me= chant bankers 'favour ini_tiatin their bids coi. nci- 
ding with poor financial performances of their tar ; et Comp a- 
-9 
nies (80c). Sometimes, this consideration may not be para- 
mount if a rival offeror bids for the same target colli_ any 
(60;, ) for under this circumstance, an immediate response is 
needed to prevent the victim from falling into the competi- 
tor's hands. As this study dwells on contested bids rather 
than mergers, it should be-emphasised that all of the consi- 
derations and rationale mentioned here are more applicable 
in the context of aggressive takeovers. if the proposed 
takeover is a recommended one, then the timing element be- 
comes less crucial. 
In 
late this perception 
the publications of 
data provided by the 
tic, e, merchant banks 
theory. 
Chapter 8, an attempt is made to corre- 
(launching the bid to coincide with 
xepressed corporate results) with the 
30 case studies to see whether in prac- 
subscribe to what they advocate in 
Strategic TId Tim 
'! ng Considerations NO.! .ý 
äý i re, 
_1 
ý; ýeril re nozý: ýn? s is Ti-mina Consi Brat? on 
poor interim or annual results (tactical aspect) 
presence of rival bidder(s) 
execute transaction according to client's wishes 
coincide with poor profit forecasts 
coincide with market reaction to corporate results 
coincide with press reaction to corporate results 
availability of large blocks of shares 
bid when target is 'digesting' its acquisition 
Kb) Broad Issues of Takeover Timing 
how tiiell you know the target company 
nature of bid (if recommended, timing insignificant 
life cycle of the biddee company 
dependent on strengths/weaknesses of both companies 
biddee's stock market performance and cycle 
client's financial/foi^ecast calender 
how biddee is going to change 
when shero undervaluation is not apparent 
-to -ha bidden 
24 
18 
10 
7 
4 
2 
1 
1 
7 6 
5 
4 
I 
I 
1 
I 
33 
23 
13 
7_ 
3 
3 
23 
7 3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Table 5.4" Timing Consideration AS An Integra]. Part of 
Bidding Strategy. 
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During the course of the survey; the views 
of some 10 merchant banking respondents (the second mer- 
chant banking survey ) were taken with regard to the "sight- 
ing shot" strategy. Their responses highlighted, viz., 
a) Tactical advantages related to "sighting 
shot. " 
b) Tactical disadvantages related to "sighting 
shot. '' 
c) Determinants underlying its application. 
The intervie ees, in generai, were J. P. favour 
of the "sighting shot" strategy but they r_ e:: o ; raised Its 
shortcomings. A veteran director of I-ME? believe that, 
"There is a tendency for some merchant banks to go in too 
low with the consequence that it doesn't word, and also, you 
give people the chance io rally the-O-; de encos riore affec-- 
tti Ci 
" 
. 
ý5. can J. -.. l: SC: L+i ems- oliv i:,; 
_II; 
ous l1. L. nd-- 
si ght, had the bidder go i n- cri th a higher_ price, I d-oP. ' t 
think it would have failed. " 
Table 5.5: Dotk rminants and Application of the "Si : hting 
Shot" Strategy In Aggressive Takeovers. 
a) Tactical AdvanW, -es 
_10 
to extract data from biddee to estimate its worth 7 70 
to entice a major shareholder to accept 5 50 
. 
to draw out a rival bidder 4 40 
to identify the potential highest bidder 3 30 
the possibility of getting away with it 1 10 
b) Tactical-Di savant es 
generate adverse relation from shareholders 3 30 
if bid is too low, it strengthens the defence 2 20 
dependent upon marke}; conditions (success in one 2 20 
situation and failure in another) 
c) Deter.: finants Und. ei, 1 
.n; att. 3_'-. 
share ownership structure (hic:?. d_ee comti=any) 5 50 
nature of the b id i 
..:. : rnett_ _r controversial, 3 depends on who 30 
if silo iýý t";;. r'tLý; i 
f 
`tl 
9 
-a3_. 
This strategy, it should again be emoha- 
sised, is normally used in conjunction with a hostile bid or 
in circumstances where the bidder and its financial advi- 
sers lacked sufficient financial data about the biddee or 
is tactically motivated by the desire to entice a major 
shareholder to accept or, even draw out a rival bidder in 
the market (see Table 5,5 on page 92 ). This strategy 
r. 14c 
shou? d be flexible enough to enable the bidder to inflate 
the price if needed. 
5.7 Ac_quisition Pinarcin- (Terms of Consideration) 
Generally, acquisition financing can be 
divided into 2 main types, namely: 
1) Cash financing. 
2) Equity ("paper") financing 
Devising the right terms of considera- 
tion is a critical part of acquisition planning. This 
section endeavours to examine some of the basic factors 
guiding the merchant bankers in their choice of selection 
regarding takeover financing. Thus, the question asked 
was: "In making a bid, what factors influence the form of 
bid consideration or acquisition financing? " The answers 
given by the interviewees can generally be sdgmented into 
8 sub--headings, viz., 
1) The bidder's position. 
2) The biddee's positions 
3) Rationales for using -. ash. 
4) Rationale for usiny 5hores. 
5) ^ir 
'nci; ',. ] consideration. 
2 
n 1, 
6) Tax 
7) Stock market factors. 
8) General factors. 
From Table 5.6 (see pages 95 and 96), 
it can be sein that in devising the terms of consideration 
(sometimes called "financial packaging") to suit a particular 
bid, the merchant banks will examine and evaluate a wide range 
of financial and non-financial factors. The determinants in-- 
fluencing the selection of either cash or equity or a mixture 
of both : instruments are attributable to such considerations 
as the liquidity position of the client (47,; ), the control 
threshold desired by the client; (400), the ability to get a 
good teal for the bidder (30A the need to accommodate the 
biddee's wishes (8? %), tax deferment benefits (77%), the need 
to mitigate potential earnings per share dilution (? 0%), gear-- 
ing gnn. ýi ý: owNti{ n (r5 ^ß) " nd other factors NOW in the int. -r- ý. (iai. ý.. ýa..... oäa \vj; Jý and vLlivý r ý.. ý 
pre Vati o franc of TOO 50 
Additionally, the merchant banks will also take 
into account, factors like the cost of funds to its clients, 
possible constraints imposed by the bidder's own Articles of 
A ssoci-ation ;' the ma ket reputation of its client, the current 
interest rates and the ability to underwrite now equities. 
From the interviews, some merchant bankers implied that cash 
seems to be a more popular acquisition medium and in Chapter 
8, an attempt is made to examine the validity of this obser- 
vation with the 
-national figures for acquisition finan- 
cing over the last 5 years as well as with the empirical data 
drawn : freie the case studies of contested bids spannin- the 
19'%9-81. period. `. 
To amplify on the de Jä. minants associated with 
ucqü ýti ý. pric.. 
_.,;, a c- os: s-section of 
the ::: erchant har_': rl' 
obi-erv ci nn; =, is ou ; ined c'elow: 
y 
_ 
1" botlln 
ný 
- JJ 
mTerms ý o;. 
r Table": Determinants of n 
Consideration Evaluated 
by UK Merchant Banks in Bid Pricing. 
(A) The Bidder's Position No. % 
Liquidity and balance sheet of the bidder 14 4? 
Control position desired 12 40 
Solicit best terms for the client company 9 30 Relationship with the company's banker 6 20 
How cheaply can the bidder acquire target company 6 20 
Articles of association determinant 4 13 
Cost of funds to client 2 7 
Dependent on the corporate size of the bidder 2 7 
Bidder's business reputation 1 3 
Effect on the bidder's working capital ; 3 
(B) The Biddee's Position 
Dependent on biddee's wishes 
Desirability to retain some degree of control I 
(C) Financial Consideration 
26 87 
8 27 
Dilution of EPS 21 'f C 
P/E rnultipTh 9 63 
Consolidated gearing position 13 
Contributions of earnings and assets 9 30 
(D) Tax-. Consideration 
CGT liability (deferment through share exchange) 23 77 
Preference for cash by some wealthy vendors 1 
(E) Stock Market Factors 
Stock market ratings of both parties 16 53 
Issue equity if bidder has high market rating 10 33 Issue equity 1 stock marker is buoyant 1 3" 
Issue cash if stock market is uncertain 1 3 
(F) General Considerations 
Question of negotiation 17 57 
ne]. ati re `rowth prospects 10 5 
Control position of bicidee shareholders 7 25 
interest rates prevailing 7 25 
Wheti, er acquiring assets or earnings 6 ?: -, 
Ability to underwrite 3 10 
Question of relative size 
_ 
7, 10 
I 
-. 
9e1 d 
J(F) General Considerations 
Goodwill factor 
Exchange control implications 13 
Share placing 13 
Whether assets are sited overseas 13 
I(G) Rationale for Usin Cash 
Easily assessed by the small investors 18 60 
It is a relatively cheap medium 15 50, 10 Issue cash if there is surplus cash 3 
Issue cash if the target is relatively large 
Minimal dilution in earnings 'I 31 
Issue cash in recession 
(H). Rationale for Using Shares 
Tax advantage (deferment from CGT) 20 6? 
Attractive form of investment 7 23 
Prererence< of institutions to retain quality shares 5 15 
Deferred shares attractive to high tax payers + 3 
Debentures unpopular with high interest races 1 3; 
- 
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panies concerned... solne vendor companies will 
often require consideration in cash because 
that gives them flexibility. Because of Capi- 
tal Gains Tax, vendors can defer payments of 
capital gains by accepting some form of paper, 
either shares or loan stocks. " 
. 
(Director, rB24) 
(2) "This will. depend on the situation. Thus, if 
a client has excess cash, cash will likely to 
be offered while a client's high share price 
would encourage the use of shares. " 
(Director, MB25) 
(3) "I 
-think, one would normally prefer a cash 
to a 
share exchange, and again, it depends on the 
size of the company that one-is taking over. 
It depends on a number of other factors like 
what is the government of the day or how are 
they 'treating shareholders in the form of Capi- 
tal Gains Tax... The whole of the approach has 
to be very flexible. " 
(Manager, MB iO) 
(4) "You really have to look at the pattern of the 
interest rates, the pattern of the stock mar- 
ket, the control post uioi. of Ghee si l"Lhotde r: 
the position of the. vendors and buyer, their 
ability as well as relationship with their 
bankers to give credit for this sort of deal- 
ing. 
(Director, m4Bl6) 
(5) "Obviously, family-controlled business are very 
concerned about control and depending on the 
size of the ä. couisition, they may prefer cash 
and less shares. " 
(Director, ? 1B17) 
(6) "If for example, you are going after a company 
which in all honesty, its paper could come un- 
der attack but you have got to bid shares, the 
sensible answer is the underwriting of shares. " 
" 
(Director, ! MB3) 
C7) "ln a bullish market, you tend to have high 
share prices thus it makes it easier to issue 
shares and in a recession, people are worried 
about their orroi; ri ngs, then you can resort to 
the ccsh insürumen t. tt 
: ýB4) (Manager, 
_9g_ 
The stockbrokers' views on acquisition 
financing adhere closely to those of the merchant bankers. 
This is not surprising in view of the fact that they work 
very closely with their merchant banking counter-parts in 
contested bid transactions and as the head of the corporate 
finance department of a leading UK international stockbrok- 
ing firm sees it; 
"It depends on circumstances. *In any 
trading position between 2 parties, it depends on who wants 
to do the deal and who really is dictating and controlling 
the terms of the deal. If the offeror has a good market 
rating and is a well known listed company, then I see no 
reason why the offeree shouldn't take the paper of the of- 
feror company. The better the standing and the market 
ratirg el' the offeror, the more likely one will be able 4o 
recanmend its paper as acceptable currency. Again, another 
factor which often comes into calculations and judgement 
Capital Gains Tax. " 
(Head, Corporate Finance, STKIO) 
I 
5.8 Determinants of Premium PricinE 
0 
Devising a-suitable premium over the mar- 
ket price is probably one of the most important acquisition 
functions to be formulated by a financial advisor devising 
an aggressive takeover as this factor plays a decisive role 
in influencing the outcome of an unrecommended takeover bid. 
Hayes and Taussig (10)(1967) suggest that some experts, as 
a rough guide, have advocated an opening premium of 20, and 
this could further be inflated according to circumstances. 
Qn this- particular aspect of bidding strategy, this, study 
attempts to determine: 
-- 
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i) Factor's influencing the formulation of bid 
premi um. 
ii) Level or size of opening premium favoured. 
(i) Factors Influencing the Formulation of Bid Premium 
In many ways, the logic, concepts and tacti- 
cal considerations related to premium pricing are similar 
to those governing bid pricing (see Table 5.7 page 100) 
Broadly speaking, they can be segmented into 3 areas of 
considerations, viz., 
a) Financial/J arket factors : 
Here again, factors like the biddee's real 
worth, its PER, net asset backing, the m&rket-value 
of comparable shares, bidder's own market rating, 
return on investment, * liqu-'-di ty of client and the 
anticipated synergy lion the merger are taken ML. 
account by the merchant bankers. 
b) General Factors 
In addition, factors like-the commercial 
logic of the proposed merger, client's corporate 
objectives, relative growth prospects, shareholders' 
reaction to the takeover and revalation of vital 
trade/commercial data by the biddee will also be 
incorporated in the formulation of premium pricing 
by the advisers. 
C) Tactical Ploys 
The takeover specialists like their military 
counterparts, create and design -t^ctical ploys to 
be used in hostile takeovers in order to cap ouflage 
a crucial move or objective or confuse its vic ti a, 
- 
100 
- 
I(A) Financial/Market Factors 
No. Cfl. 
y 
i 
The biddeers worth 25 87, 
The price earning ratio 21 70- 
Net asset value 20 67 
Market valuation of comparable shares 19 G5I' 
The market rating of the bidder 18 j 6Q 
The return on investment 14 41/' 
Liquidity of the bidder 13 431 
Synergy from the proposed merger 11 37 
Profits of both companies 11 37 
Historical market performance of the biddee 9 30; 
Profit forecasts history of the biddee 7 23 
Premium paid for similar takeover 7 231 
Going concern valuation 4 13 
Dividend payout 1 3? 
Biddee's ea-tning power 1 3 
Whether shares (biddee) widely or thinly traded 1 3 
(B) Tactical Factors 
To entice a controlling block of shares 
To fOv vif G 
. 
väl v-: W LüSC U. L L1 , ... üii j 
Whether real or sib sting shot Did attempt 
High premium (for tightly held shares) 
Whether buying assets 
Whether contested or recommended 
Small premium when stock market is bullish 
(C) General Factors 
16 
1ý "t 
1 
11 3l 
9 30! 
1 7° 1 
f 
i( 
t 
Commercial/industrial logic of the merger 24 80; 
The bidder's corporate objectives 11 3`T 
Relative growth prospects of both parties 11 37? 
Dependent on anticipated shareholder1s reaction 10 33; 
Revelation of substantial trading information rj 23ý 
Dependent on anticipated press reaction 3 '10 
Biddee's potential as an independent company 3 10i 
Nature of the bid (i. e. whether controversial or not) 1 3? 
Dependent on negotiation 
Biddee's share value in relation to asset value 1 3t 
Table 5.?: Factors Influencing Premium Priciý g. 
- 
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shareholders, stock market and financial advi- 
sers in the opposing side. Likewise, 3. nre:. m-- 
ium may. serve to entice a substantial or key 
shareholder or, even sometimes, to deter a 
would be competitor from entering the contest. 
(ii) Level/Size of Premium Desired 
In discussion, it was stressed by the in- 
terviewees again and again that although there ara fuze-- 
damental principles guiding approaches to bids, each 
situation i. s unique and demands a flexible, incividt: ^?. 
approach. Likewise, on the level of opening premium 
associated with aggressive. takeover,, the various houses 
caution against subscribing' rigidly to a fixed criterion. 
Activity sampling technique indicates that 
there is broad consensus of opinion of both independent 
and affiliated merchant banks on this issue (see Table 
5.8 and Table. 5.9 on the neit' page). it is significant 
to note that more independent merchant banks subscribed 
to the belief that it was impossible to be precise about 
the-level of bid premium than affiliated merchant banks. 
Possibly, this was because of their longer exposure to 
corporate advisory work and as such, they could see the 
difficulties related to this acquisition issue more dis- 
tinctly than their competitors. This is not surprising 
if we recall that T"Ir. Philip Shelbourne (formerly with 
Rothschilds and Samuel f: entagu) cautioned against adopt- 
ing an absolutist view on this matter. 
'5.9 Pre-bid Stake 
In a second into "ric; conducted i: 'i: l" acre 
merchant b trikii1 i'°SL onden 
., 
`ev:. ii_°: 
,:: 
s Ci'ý : =t ý: 
-- 
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Tab c 
_' 
ý" Vicws of 30 UA Me , chant Banks . e_ý'a_ ding the LC Y G. I 
.. ».. ý. 
of J'ren uCtm Pricing i-na ysed 
by Activity Sampling, 
iýiethod (independent ace: n_orv) 
Comparison cs P 
Opinion ZR ;N K 
I 
P; % 
i 
L 
.iP value : 
ith hat 
more than 20% 4 15 2 26 
(nay- 
riin 
, 23 49- 3 
of a fil.. r!. b, 
40 1 
less than 203 3 15 2 20 21 41 0 33 
impossible to 
.6 15 2 40 25 65 15 7 answer 
undecided 2 15 2 13. 1? 30 0 20 
h 
.-2(: 5 S t9 nifi Cant level) 
_. _..... 
_16ompar. i son of PI 
Opinion <4R I: P; ý iLjP 
jvai 
ue ti+s tn znat 
i 't S 1(max)(ninYof indep.: a. h. * 
taore than b L-7 e7 "t 4ý0 
less than 20; z 5 15 2 33 24, 57 9 20 
impossible to 15 27 13 20 0 40 
answer 
,, r 
undecided ý5 2 20 121 
=41 0 13 
K2(: 5 sif ican±level) 
GV 
.r .-:: 
5 V: JV ilia äs:: 1"l: llri il liiý3Siaý iif' a iixlý 
,, rF - C1-n "! i&' ySBG'. bý y :Cl_. '-iV!. L; - a! 1)_ß3 i r1ý- ý, i c ýit7. lii? i V-.! y ý., 
Method (Affiliated Merchant Banking Category) 
Affiliated merchant banks 
** Independent merchant banks 
where zi. R total reading of each observation 
11 
= 
total number of observations 
K=2 (95% level of confidence) 
P= percentage of occurence in 
.a particular activity L= limit of error 
* For a clearer explanation of the interpretation of activity. 
sampling tool, please refer to page 56. 
- 
(' J 
.. 
"Is a pre-bid stake crucial to your acquisition strategy? " 
Again, the answers binge on the meri is of each bid transac- 
tion. Whilst in theory, it is wholly logical, rational and 
tactically feasible based on the premise that a strong pre- 
bid controlling position would enable the offeror to gain a 
vital foothold which act as a springboard for the eventual 
takeover of the target company (and hence, the decisive out-- 
come of the battle), in practice, however, the application 
of this strategy is dependent upon 2 sets of factors as evi- 
dent in Table 5.14 below. 
Pre-'bid Share acquisition Determinants % 
'aA. Theke r: ctors 
Move price (market) against the bidder 
Dependent.: on whether it is a widely/thinly t'nade d. - 
share on the stock market 
2 20 
b) The Sharehold. 3_nEi Factors 
Dependent upon who holds the vital share component 4 110 it 
Seliout pu; ýdb. ýi i ty by some unhappy investors ýJ= 
on facie i fated by freely held shai+es i. e. no 
-major shareholders 
Table 5.15: Tactical Considerations Related' to Pre-bid 
Share Acquisition Strategy Evaluated By 
" 
UK Merchant Banks. 
The principal issue in building a pre-bid 
stake is whether it moves the market price significantly 
against the bidder. An executive of MB7 stressed this 
aspect: 
"It varies from case to case. In score 
cases, it is a positive disadvantage and those would be 
where you would be bidding for a market where the shares 
are fairly limited. I mean, I can thin of one or two ins- 
tances where you go and try and buy more than 10,000 shares, 
say in a company with 100,000 shares issued, you will move 
the market against you and therefore, yo; are bidding up 
the price that you eventually have to pay. ,t 
It should also be pointed out gnat in the 
- 
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UK, under the City Takeover Code, the bidder cen only build 
up his stake to the 29.9.56 t. ireshold. At the 30;:,; level, he 
officially triggers off Rule 34 which makes it mandatory for 
him to effect a formal offer for the target company. Com- 
panies that have acquired more than 30% of other companies' 
shares without subsequently launching full bids for them are 
deemed to be in breach of Rule 34 of the Takeover Code (the 
Code is quasi-judicial in nature and has no force of law) 
and. once detected, can be expected to be sanctioned and re- 
primanded by the City watchdog bodies like the Takeover 
Panel, the Council for the Securities Industry, the Stock 
Exchange and even face an investigation by the inspectors 
appointed by the Department of Trade under Section 165 (b) 
and Section 172 of the Companies Act, 1948. The 2 most no-- 
torious cases currently involving the flouting of Rule 34 
involved 2 foreign companies buying and 'warehousing' over- 
seas more than 30q of the equity capital of two British quo- 
ted companies, i. e. St. Piran and Dunlop (see Chapter 10 and 
also Appendix B, Group 2 Case Studies). 
I 
From the data on pre-bid stake extracted 
from the -90 case studies, it is possible to detect whether 
in actual contested takeovers, merchant banks are inclined 
towards this practice of acquiring in advance (together with 
their clients) a substantial pre-bid controlling position 
and additionally, whether this holding contributed towards 
the resultant outcome of the takeover attempt (see Chapter 
8). 
5.10 Improved Offer 
in devising the price associated with 
aggressive bids, the tactical manoeuvres open to the finan- 
cial advisers hinge on to possible options, namely: 
(1) Start with- an openin- price but with r'i X±bility 
for revision (for instance, the entry of rival 
-dde no a 
I" necessit? ? suc In a revision) 
i 
--lor- 
(2) Start with an openi. n price which is to be the 
final price as well (for example, where the vic',. "- 
der is able to exert a powerful leverage awing 
to the financial. and trading difficulties of the 
biddee). 
The 
Val bidder comes into 
ves into an auction. 
improve or revise the 
a multitude of consid 
Table 5.1.1 below. 
situation becomes more acute if a ri- 
the contest and the takeover bid evol- 
At this juncture, the decision to 
original bid price is determined by 
orations which can be discerned from 
Determinants of Improved Offer 
a The Bidder°s osition 
commercial logic (credibility of the merger) 
dependent upon client's wishes 
, justification for increase (based on biddee's worth 
dependent upon client's financial resources 
synergy arising from the proposed merger 
, b} The Biüdeel; s Position 
asset revaluation undertaken by the biddee 
new information emanating e. g. profit forecast 
attitude of the biddee to the takeover 
line of defence adopted by the target company 
biddee's shareholders' reaction to the offer 
11 c) General Considerations 
possibility of a counter bid 
the market response to the first bid 
-whether there are irrevocable acceptances 
the initial acceptances level 
recommendation by key shareholders 
the press reaction to the takeover bid 
No, % 
28 %Jt 
25 83 
20 67 f 
1>6; + 
8 271 
22 7 
J- 19 
19 6_, 7 
1( 51 
10 3ý 
26 87 1 
23 77 1 
10 331 
10 ' JJý 
10 33 
Table 5.11: Factors Influencing the Mier chant Bankers' 
Decision to Improve their aid Price. 
a hostile bid, 
or inflate the 
factors such a 
r 
(93), the 
From the above oapiricai evidence, during 
the merch n banks decision to escalate 
bid price is in? i uencecll by 
. 
Vax 1 ety of 
s the Dili: L i rc.? a- 
ý. ll fß=2. c o the ý, " nýo : i: rd ! F: 1 r. 
-. 
emerge nc of a riVa. l bi äder ;ý 7' re iii, u- a 
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to adhere to the client's wishes (835, ), the market response 
to the original offer (77aß), asset revaluation undertaken 
by the target C73; ß), the true worth of the biddee (67; ), 
the. attitude adopted by the biddee-(63%) and the line of 
- 
defence/arguments deployed by the biddee and its financial 
advisers 
The strategic decision to initiate an ag- 
gressive bid based on either a "sighting shot" approach or 
a "one shot" strategy, would obviously differ from case to 
case as, "The bank's advice will depend on tactical c, ons-±- 
derations. For instance, if it is expected that the bid 
will be opposed by the target company, an initial aid price 
; iil frequently be made at a level allowing for an increase. 
. 
should the target company after the initial bid make public, 
facts such as the revaluation of property or a prof it f ore- 
cast w hicý º"Jould justify an increase in the bid price. '' 
(Director, IslB27). 
r oID the. data provided by the case studies 
on contested bids spanning the 1979-81 period, it is possi- 
ble to evaluate-the inclination of merchant banks towards 
both bidding approaches i. e. the "sighting shot-' or "one 
shot" offer (please see_ Appendix Table C, 3). 
5.11 Enlisting the Board's (Biddee Company) Recommendation 
We now come to the stage where the bidden 
and its financial advisers endeavour to approach the target 
company to open negotiation and try to induce the vendor to 
sell and recommend the merger to its shareholders. The 
establishment of a dialogue between the = companies (in- 
volving perhaps many levels of or anisatinr_ý1 ut or? t 
and prof essioiiu'_s) com, ^ : ences with the first cr:: 7r>, ^: ý , Hwy ILVA 
tang ant) :is normally followed tlirouG; h t. nt rý: ý> ýo i ;i ons 
-10rr- 
tail, and are terminated, in which case a bid may be launch- 
ed over the heads of the board to the shareholders, or an 
agreement is attained and a merger occurs. 
- 
However, the 
salient objective of the whole exercise is to avoid bitter., 
protracted and costly takeover "battles and to strive for a 
mutually beneficial merger in the interests of the company 
and shareholders at large. 93% of the merchant bankers 
interviewed were in-favour of soliciting and enlisting the 
support of the board of directors of the target company be- 
fore launching a takeover while the remaining 7 took the 
qualified stance that incases where it is considered to be 
counter-productive or impractical to do so, then no approach 
should be made (see Table 5.12 below). 
Bankers' 
Percept oil 
No. 
ý 
Yes 28 "9 
Qualify ed Yes 27i 
4 Total 1 3G sÜtý 
_ý 
'Views 1Tý {iJ x. t i- 1- Regard- JAL.. 
Table 
5u12: V1. WE, litr=iantlu 
13 alit s ýt 
= Al: 1C 
Solicitation o. L the Biddee's Board Appro- 
val Prior to the Formal Takeover Bid. 
The rationale which underpinned the 
importance of accessing the board is stated by a director of 
NB23 in this light; "Basically, we would always try... in. 
. 
these days, the Office of Fair Trading, political pressures 
and whatever, I think it will become more difficult for con- 
tested bids to succeed. It is always worthwhile to get 
them on your side. " 
5.12 Accessing 11"1a: jor Shareholders of the Target Company 
A critical de er i ?: ant in the out- 
come of a closely contcsst; ed takeover is the availability of 
- 
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large blocks of shares held by dissiden't shareholders. If 
a bidder initiates a bid with a 29.9% platform and in the 
course of the acquisition, manages to enlist the support of 
some key shareholders to give him the critical 50.1ß' major- 
ity voting control, then the bid outcome is almost always 
decided in his favour. Although approaching the biddee's 
board to solicit a recommendation is a clear cut process, 
it is not so with regards to accessing key shareholders 
(who may be private investors or institutional shareholders 
like pension funds, unit trusts, investment trusts) owing 
to the dangers of possible leakage of price-sensitive in- 
format on, the creation of a false market, insider trading 
and unequal treatment of shareholders. Additionally, the 
Panel imposes a quite stringent rule i. e., General Practice. 
No. 10 regarding this matter. 
3 In the light, there were 
mixed responses from the interviewees of this bid factor 
with 33 assenting and another_30% ascribing to a more 
circumstantial stance ("sometimes"). On the other hand, 
27 fel i; it was too r iskz, and wore not in favour of this 
practice leaving a small ninority undecided (` 0) as re- 
flected in Tables 5.13 and 5.14 (page 109). 
Activity sampling technique (see re- 
sults in Tables 5.13 and 5.14) indicates that overall, 
of there is general consensus y opinion n of am. both .. groups of 
merchant banks on this issue with the exception that the 
affiliated merchant banks exhibited a greater degree of in- 
_deckheness over this matter possibly attributable to the 
fact that they lacked wider exposure and experience in 
corporate advisory work related to contested deals. 
. 
To get a better insight into the 
rationale of the merchant banking advisers on this impor- 
tant acquisition issue, a cross-section of their views is 
given on page. 110. 
3. 
"During. the aoarsý; of a t,. itE., y_ ý, ove or n"erp"t r 
tl'cýa: ýý c; 
lGil 
ý 
or when such is in contemplation, ne: ý. iýer the of: ex"or, the 
oiferee company nor any of their respective advi eL snag l 
furnish information, to some sharehoidc,, r which is not 
_-_-ade 
available. to all other h'. reho1 d. ers. ` (Takeovez., Code GP. 1O)) 
- 
09 
Table 5.13: Views of Independent Merchant Banks 12egardi ns 
Accessing Key Shareholders : before A Takeover. 
- 
Comparison of 
nion Opi R T T N L ) P ( max P min P value with affil. rý. b. 
Yes 7 7 2 40 5 85 15 2 7 
; Sometimes 1 5 2 40 125 
' 
65 15 1 20 
: ^0 3 115 2" 21 20 41 0 33 
Undecided 10 15 
.2 00 0 
(0 20 
Y. 
=2(5 Signi- Cccmt1evel) 
Opinion ýR IN i. P, L P (max) 
P 
(min 
` 
C ES 4 15 2 27 23 50 27 
., Sometimes 3 i 
, 
15 2 
; 
1 20 21 41 j0 
No º 5 '15 2 33 X24. 1 57 0 
Undecided 3 15 2 20 1 21 41 10 
Corpari2on of 
P v¢ ). ue w, 
ladeo. ri. b, 
'1-0 
40-- 20a 
0 
K=2 15% Sini f cart{= level) 
Table 
-5.14: Views 
of Affiliated Merchant Banks. Regarding 
Accessing Key Shareholders Before A Takeo vor 
where ýR = total reading of each observation 
N= total number of observations 
K=2 t95% level of confidence) 
-P = percentage of occurence in a particular activity 
L= limit of error 
* For a clearer explanation of the interpretation of activity 
sampling tool, please refer to page 56 
- 
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(1) "There are all sorts of restraints talking to 
people in their capacity as substantial share- 
holders and there is also danger of losing 
security and starting rumours. Whilst in 
theory, it is always desirable, however, it 
is not always practical. " 
(Head, 
-Corporate Finance, NB26) 
(2) "There was at one stage, the practice of hol-- 
ding meetings with selective shareholders i. e. 
the large institutional shareholders which 
would place them as insiders and obviously, 
people will be more careful about this kind 
of thing after the 1980 Companies Act. " 
(Manager, IýIB? ) 
C3) "... the corporate finance department is liable 
to be in possession of a certain amount of 
privileged and sensitive information. Here, 
one should consult the Takeover Code and the 
rules in it are deliberately dratted so that 
they leave a lot of scope for the Panel to 
give discretion. " 
(Director, MB23) 
5.13 Docun entati on and'D oft iieetzngs 
Once the bidding and tactical moves 
have. been devisai by the corporate finance team involved 
and agreed to by the client at the highest level, the 
drafting of the documents comes into the forefront. The 
documentation process as practised in all the Accepting 
and Issuing Houses is done by the corporate finance team 
usually in conjunction with a firm of established City 
la'. rjers eminent in corporate law. At a later stage of 
--the-survey, some of the interviewees were asked to des- 
cribe the. background work and meetings involved in the 
drafting of bid documents and some of their experience and 
observations are detailed below. 
(a) "What : happens is that Y=e, as the offeror's 
advisers, organise and, arrange the drawing 
uu of the documents. vie drav; up our: se Y e,; 
usually in výi@ house the first draft and 
that will be done by somebody like i: i_r°sw? i 
-- 
1.1 
and a director. We then have it circulaýad. 
lie also have as many draft meetings as re- 
quired with our client at which we have the 
representatives of the offeree and the offer- 
or in a non-contested situation (you only 
have the offeror 
_in a contested acquisition) plus their legal advisers. We always use 
a leading client firm of solicitors who spe"- 
ciauise in this work to help us out with the 
documentation. " 
(Manager, MBII-) 
(b) 
... 
we have always drawn up our own offer do- 
cuments. Again, it is relatively flexible, 
We would draw up an offer document in its 
crude form and then call in-our corporate 
lawyers to assist. if it is a contested offer 
you have only one client so you ; rill have less 
proofs. The interesting thing about acau si-- 
tiori is that no one transaction is ever ide-n- 
tical from another one. " 
(Director, MB17) 
(c)--"Well, i%. my experience., most offer documents 
frighten the life out of the board. of dire 
-. i-cra 
.. 
f 
i ;;. se c"-1_enLI w pcýy wüis is Gz. ice rightly 
aSn ecai. a. ý "sv e U. 1 
ý., }-ý 
.ý 
b'v... Cy trie; 3l l! --o Ve v-e. '. 'y t: on; "- 
plicated and they also need to pay atter_i: in. n 
to the multiplicity of the requirements of 
the Companies Act, the Prevention of Frauds 
Act, the Stock Exchange Listing requirements, 
the City Takeover Code... the boar. is not 
familiar with ?t because it is a fairly eso- 
teric subject. " 
(Director, NB2) 
(d) "Some of my colleagues spent a lot of time 
drafting the documents. These draft meetings, 
you know, can go on all-day with 15 people or 
more in the boardroom of the merchant bank 
picking over one mere-paragraph for about 2 
hours before coming to some form of agree-- 
ment. " (Director, IIIBI8) 
5.14 Emphasis in the Offer Documents 
We seen L :. the =eI '_ ý-t, ^ cr :ýc. ýläilYi äii. r, 0j. Z; 
togethex with other professionals devote a great C eal of 
effort and time in "draft meetings" and tree docu: e: 
_t; ation 
. 
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process due to the rigid requirements of the various City 
bodies on this matter. From sieving through a substan- 
tial cross-section of bid documents from 1978 to 1981, it 
can be deduced that a takeover circular is not just merely 
a financial prospectus as it also reflects the line of 
approach and bidding strategies connected with the take- 
over itself and as such, the merchant banks were asked 
what they would emphasise in their bid circulars. For 
convenience, their observations can be examined under 3 
headings, namely: 
(a) The line of emphasis and strategy regarding the 
bidder's position. 
(b) The line of emphasis and strategy regarding the 
biddee's position. 
(c) Tactical and other considerations. 
Factors relating to the bidder's position 
that Merchant banks said that they might emphasise in the 
document were the industrial logic of the merger (9%), its 
control position of the target company (77%), its superior 
management (50%), its strong performance (50%) and the an- 
ti. cipäted synergy to be derived from the merger (30%). 
Obviously, such factors are stressed to influence share- 
holders and the press in. favour of the bidder. It is 
hoped that such arguments would establish the biddee's 
shareholders' confidence in their potentially new invest- 
ment. At the same time, tho'takeover tactician seeks to 
undermine the shareholders' confidence in the biddee in 
. 
both'financial (poor performance, lack of profit forecast, 
for instance) and non-financial terms (for example, weak 
management). 
This "pincer" approach may be fortified 
by a aeries of tactical and other takeover ploys designed 
to discredit the offence and cause the sharonolders to 
switch allegiance through persu<eiv© 
vi V5Allay V4A5 ý11 VC,. t. 5 ) Vt LII VLI V011tJ CLIAG. ' V.. 4 UV 
-. 
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of the bid premium i-nd the general benefits to be gained 
from acceptances (see Table 5.15 on page 1114). This is- 
illustrated by extracts from some of the interviews: 
(a) "Obviously, you try to emphasise on the ad- 
vantages to the other shareholders. You 
spell out the financial advantages... you 
" 
try to spell out the deficiencies as you 
see them in the management of the company 
you are trying to acquire. You have got to 
create a lovely story for yourself and you 
have got to criticise the other side. " 
(Director, MB1k) 
(b) "If you have got a handsome premium that 
obviously is an advantage. As for the past 
record of the offeree, if the company has 
a bad history of either making losses or 
making profits that aren't met, then that 
again, makes it more likely that you wi! 
win the support of the shareholders becaý. ise 
they may not trust their board so much. " 
. 
(Director, IB6) 
(c) "The document. has become so 
_'"_orsg, ana ; ay , and { people don't read liier Sc, 1-,, you 
--_= 
e 
got to do is to spoil out : what the offer is.. 
and you try to explain and emphasise the 
logic of the merger and also the increase 
in capital value. " 
(Director, Mß18) 
. 
It should be pointed out again'that, although 
the emphasis and line of approach adopted in the bid cir- 
culars may conform to a general framework, its substance, 
style and arguments should be highly flexible and adapta- 
ble to allow for possible arguments and counter-attacks 
from the opposing party. The second circular. and subse- 
quent bid documents are to a very large extent dictated 
by the nature of defence put up by the biddee and its 
financial advisers. So, there is a tendency for both 
the offeror and offeree to pace their 
_ 
documen is according 
. 
to evolving circumstances initial docu.:, entatio i 
being patchy, i. e. brief in substance and fovm, with 'Ohe 
stronger emphasis and ar`uments reserved for the !;? ter 
stage when the outeo! nn is most crucial. or' _C. ý. £.:: re 
- 
ill, 
, (A) The Bidder's Position 
-. 
No a : ! 
3 
,, kne inctustria! /Comrerela.. logic of the merger yjI 
The bidder's prebid controlling position 
The bidder's management strength 
The good performance of. the bidder 
Stress synergy 
Emphasise good profit forecasts 
(B) The Biddee's Position 
The lack of profit forecasts 
Offeree's weak management 
Offeree's poor performance 
Poor profit forecasts record 
Poor acquisition record 
Low return on assets 
(0) Tactical & Other Considerations 
Attractive premium 
Di. screclit t 
the iddee whenever possible 
Assurances on employees future 
Benefits (inancialinonLfinancial) from 
Increase in capital value 
27 
. 
711 
15 501 
15 50 
9 30 
0 
5 
2.1 7_01 
7 
`571 
15 
-50' 9 30 
6 20! 
2 r# 
{ 
23 7", 
19 Ja7 
accepting irr j 
14 4r 
Support by biddee's board or key shareholders 13 43 
Determined by the biddee's situation 13 43 
It Is a fair and reasonable offer. 10 3?. 
Contrast progress of the two companies 
Increase in income value 
Determined by how controversial is the 
Opportunity cost of pitidee's investment 
8 21 
deal '1 3 
1 3ý 
Table 
. 
15: Emphasis In Offer Documents and Its Determýina. nts 
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perspective of this matter, please refer to Appendix A, 
Group I Case Studies. To get a deeper insight on this issue 
the reader should also consult the 10 case studies (Appendix 
B). 
5.15 The Press In-Takeover Situations 
The reason why some would be bidders shun- 
ned away from aggressive takeovers is because of the wide 
publicity given by the financial media to controversial 
acquisitions. ' There is also the fear of its image being 
tarnished as a "corporate predator. " For the merchant 
banks, acting in their capacity as financial advisees (ei. 
-- 
ther in bid or defence), wide coverage and exposure by the 
leading press of their role is vital to their domestic a. d 
internation ]. merchant banking reputation especially if the 
ti. 
unSact2'Jia is 1Tic-Eilivu3s. y doviSou GI2C1 6 C-'.. L1tG'd in their 
Clients' favour. Undoubtedly-then, the main financial press 
exercise considerable influence in the decision--making and 
bid/defence approach of the City merchant banks and other 
financial advisers. 
In 1; 08, possibly the figst ever survey 
was undertaken by J. W. Thompson to assess the relative im- 
portance of the various factors which influenced the deci- 
sions of private investors, institutional shareholders, 
and stockbrokers as well as financial advisers in the GEC/ 
AEI battle. A primary aim of this survey was to evaluate 
the effectiveness of media advertising used during bids. 
In 1979, the " pin_ancial Times" commissioned a somewhat pa- 
rallel study, this time rega d 
. 
ng the Sims Dar'by/Guthrie 
takeover. This recent survey reveals that the following 
sources of media info_-, uation were used by the 34 -'--y 
banks, stockbrokers ax)ö institutional lniestc. (äP. ß Table 
-> 116 -- 
5.16 below) 
Media Investors & Advisers Choice 
Publication No. n- 46) 
Financial Times 44 96 
The Daily Telegraph 25 54 
Investors Chronicle 15 33 
Daily Mail 12 26 
Sunday Telegraph 9 20 
The Economist 9 20 
Financial Weekly 3 7 
The Observer 2 4 
Evening Standard 1 2 
Evening News 1 2 
Guardian 1 2 
Table 5.16: Media Sources Used by irk Financial 
-Ad. visers I)urin Mergers/Acquisitions. 
Source: adapted from Financial Times "A Case Study: 
Takeovers" F. T., London, 1979, P19. 
mho question asked by the "Financial 
survey wün tlWh c "b t/ .L 
. 
>... 
.. ý . ý., i, : ias ýa r"üº"_ývc". v.. ýii:. ý. tv. i ý'jvis_itct. r_.. ý4ýJ ... lt 
particular would you take notice of? " As opposed to this 
during the second survey, the researcher asked, "How cru- 
cial is the press in times of mergers and contested bids? " 
As a whole, the interviewees said that 
they take into consideration the influence exerted by the 
media during the acquisition process and according to the 
view put forward by the house of MB4% 
"Certainly, institutional investors are 
influenced by what they read in the influential press es- 
pecially in the 'Lex Column' in 'Financial Times' than what 
you'see. in the small newspapers. I think public relations 
which includes the press is very important and we certainly 
make an effort to make sure that the press understands what 
is happening and we are always ready to talk to the press. 
Usually again, it depends on personalities and particular 
circumstances. We normally encourage out clients to talk 
and brief the press. '' 
This view is also closely held by a veter- 
an merchant bankers who feels 11 
... 
particulsrly in defence 
(I suppose, the offeror as uell), it probably pays to keep 
-1^7 - 
the top financial press in tune with your thoughts. In 
other words, if you are making or defending an offer, before 
you send out your documents, it would be as well to have 
along, if you like, the top 3 or 4 financial editors just. 
- 
to inform them of the background of your defence or revised 
offer... Undoubtedly, the 'Financial Times' and 'The Daily 
Telegraph' carry the most weight. " 
(Head, Corporate Finance, N B9; ) 
From the data derived from the case stu- 
dies, in Chapter 8, the press and editorial comments related 
to some of the more controversial bids are analysed and 
highlighted to discern the degree/extent in which the press 
influences the strategic thought process of the Ui r erchantt 
banks in contested bid situations. 
{ 
5.16 Determinants c Success 
Once a hostile bid is mounted and the 
whole machinery set in motion, if stiff resistance is on-- 
countered, then, depending on the size of the takeover, the 
line of approach adopted, the image of the bidder, the stat- 
ure of the. financial advisor, etc., the event is usually 
well covered by the leading financial media particularly if 
the bid is highly controversial like that of the Lonhro's. 
bid for SUITS and the House of Fraser. The interaction of 
so many internal and external factors makes it sometimes 
fairly difficult to pinpoint precisely the main determinant 
which effectively decided the outcome of the contested deal. 
As such, the interviewees were asked.; "What are the most 
iIiporf: ant factors in determining whether a contested bid is 
, 
or - not? " t this juncture, it should be not d 
-successful ä v A+V v. v 
that "success'! Es used here should be inteýýr_"r eL CS e as 
attaining effective corporate control in the takeover b_. a 
-- 
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and not whether it is a Good bid or nota 
oDe rýnta of SueceaS 
_ 
iVTO ;ý 
price adequacy (fairness and good premium) 2'i- 80 
industrial/commercial logic 20 67 
bidder's performance (market-rating/image) 17 57 
support from key shareholders 17 57 
tactics/arguments employed by both bidder/b3. ddee 16 53 
recommendation from board of directors 13 43 
level of ore-bid stake 11 37 
assurances regarding management, employees, etc 11 37 
past record of target company 9 30 
press comments 9 30 
the general stock market conditions prevailing 6 20 
Table 5.17: Determinants of Success in Contested Bids As 
Perceived by the Merchant Bankers Participa- 
ting in this Survey. 
The prime determinants perceived by the 
merchant banks which contribute to the success of a contes- 
ted offer are factors like price adequacy, i. e. a fair and 
reasonable offer supplemented by a handsome premium while 
the non--financial, determinants would embrace such considera- 
lions as the commercial logic behind the bid, approval and 
support from kcy. investors, recommendation from the board 
of directors and other attributes listed in Table 5.17 above. 
In the evaluation of success in an ag- 
gressive takeover, according to a senior MB30 director of 
corporate finance: 
"Price will' be a very important consi- 
deration. The institutional shareholders' perceptions and 
the industrial logic are rated very high and in certain 
cases, institutions let it be known that unless there is in- 
dustrial logic even though the price may exceed what they 
would hope for their shares to stand in the market place 
for a certain number of years, they would not without recom- 
mendation from the biddee's-board accept sich a demand. " 
This perception is given further ere- 
dibility by a director of NB27 lio feels that ".,. the impor- 
tcnt factors are put tcEoly- ra fin nc? al vec'Kü ;e attrýac-- 
tive to the recipient shareholder to persuade him that the 
- 
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bidder is e. t least good, if not superior in various as-- 
p; ec, rs ; . fnr j nst ;,. n. ce, in p?: odu; ct mix, in its activities, its 
managcment... The bid is sometimes regarded as successful if 
it gets to 51%, in other cases, depending on the structure 
of the group, it is necessary to get 100%. " 
The factdrs which contributed to the po- 
sitive outcome of contested bids are analysed and discussed 
more fully in Chapter 8 (see also the detailed discussions 
of the 40 case studies contained in Appendices A and B). 
5.17 Su Review 
Bidding strategies as we have noted are 
deeply inter-related with various financial and non- 
finsncia? i' cto ýýs. The merchant bankers in their capa- 
city as financial advisers generally prefer their clients 
to identify their acquisition targets in order to ensure a 
firmer commitment and also, a higher degree of bid success. 
Timing constitutes an integral. part of the overall acquisi- 
tion, strategy and as far as possible, merchant banks like 
their takeover bids to coincide with poor financial perfor- 
mance of the target company, for obvious reasons but, this 
is not always possible due to the intervention of rival 
bidders. An opening premium of about 20=' 
, 
was widely quo- 
ted as reasonable and the terms of"consideration are basi- 
cally influenced by 6 principal factors, viz., the client's 
position, the aggressor's capability, the financial ratio- 
nale, tax considerations, stock market performance and 
general factors. ' The merchant banks also favour solici- 
ting the board's recommendation for the merger but there 
was less etmeral agreement on pro-bid approach to key 
.:, a,..... <"a. v1,: ;iv: te 1. <t ý. i :, i <: Ui 1. iL5 vi Vif. tý,. Viiü1 tilt ii Uii'J U ti :L 1ý1 ti 
. 
i, týfiiý, 
.L 
cola--G7': mt? 
_I1ts on such a Uract'? ce. 
- 
120 
- 
In. general, the offensive strategies are 
devised within broad principles but not at the sacrifice of 
flexibility. The approach taken is generally strongly in- 
fluenced by the. position and condition of the client, the 
prefornance of the biddee as-well as capitalising on the 
vulnerability and weaknesses of the target company. 
From the merchant banker's viewpoint, 
pricing, industrial logic, the strangth of the bidder, the 
support from key shareholders are salient. factors which de- 
termine the final outcome of a contested bid. 
In the next chapter, we shall be examining 
how merchant banks go about contesting an unwelcome tC&A. er 
bid as well as studying the main tactical issues related to. 
defensive strategies. 
4 
/ 
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CHAPTER 6 
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES 
6.0 Introduction 
In their role as financial advisers to 
a multiciplicty of clients, 
-the merchant banks also 
have to service their clients by defending them against 
hostile or unwanted takeovers. In assuming the role 
of a defender, likewise, the merchant bank and its sup-- 
porting services in the City (example, the stockbroker. 's, 
lawyers, accountants) have to react swiftly by planni nü j 
devising, co-ordinating and pacing their defensive moves 
in order to win maximum shareholders support for their 
cause. This section then endeavours to focus on ca& 
amt: important de o nsi e issues. It examines how mar_ 
chant banks would react to a hostile bid, their reac- 
tions to defensive strategies suggested in the litera- 
ture, the rationale behind their choice of defensive 
strategies, the tactical implications of the distribu- 
tion of shares, (example between the board of directors/ 
families, institutions and the public), the main empha- 
sis to be placed in defence circulars, the different 
interests to be taken into account and also the non- 
price determinants taken into consideration in their 
decision-making process. 
Additionally, owing to the significance 
of profit forecasts to defence and the controversy sur- 
rounding its usage, its influence on shareholders' 
views as perceived by the financial advisers themselves 
is discussed. Because of the Panel's ruling that 
, 
when 
used iii takeover §ituatl 
_s, iv k, L; 1" 
7i nainc'i al adv sers, an L. is also made to :?? `ü_ -i-Ii 
1ý 1 1. L 
the problems 4rad. difliculL:, ies encoun 
L 
ýered by t_Lhe ae_. 
Chant/ blinks in re v1 e1"ling i. or 
ecas Us cr. : :t 
el l us 
J=am`. 
... 
-- 
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views on deviant forecasts in view o rile current trend 
towards Iitif; ati oil by dissatisfied clients over this 
issue. 
Essentially, the approach taken throughout 
the defence is affected by: 
(a) Whether the client is agreeable but want to 
contest the takeover on the ground of price, 
or 
(b) The client rejects the bid totally and wants 
to defend its independence. 
6. 
`1 Factors Influencing the Formularion of Defensive StrateRi. ýes 
? }ýýT sr ''mac 
_ýn. nnrý cz: -rý -t ha rý ýnrýn it c 
{ 
we 2. 'e asked; "How d IN"ol - go about 
dev- siin your dE' ens e 
strategies Overwhelmingly, the respondents cite' that 
speed was essential in countering the unwanted takeover 
to prevent the initiative from remaining in the bidder's 
hands Normally, this was done by writing to the coin- 
-pan. T's shareholders and telling them to do nothing and not 
to react to the unsolicited bid (see specimen of a 'typi- 
cal' holding statement issued by Guthrie Corporation in 
Appendix Table C,. 4-. 1, p+38 as well as other circulars re- 
lated to mergers and acquisitions in appendix C). 
Fundamentally, the merchant bank tends to 
determine its line-of defence with reference to: 
't) Timing of the bid, 
2) Nature of the bid, 
3) The bidder's position, 
4) The 
.: iddee' S position, il 
5) Tactical and Cori idoratioýýs. 
i'. ra T. 11e 6 (% on ti: C i. 
_; i; i? ý: =a 1Lc Cif? 
- 
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rac O ': 3 1'ßo e % 
A) 111: 1111{"; 
In relation to the client's Performance 4 40 
Client's ability to forecast 1 10 
Expected or unexpected? 1 10 
, 
B) Nature of the Bid 
Whether offering cash or equity 3 
_30 
whether the bid is fair 2 20 
Whether a low bid with marginal prebid stake 2 20 
Kind of P/E multiple offered 1 10 
(0) Tactical. Considerations 
Defence adheres to the line of attack 7 70 
Dependent on the ' firepower' of the bidder 3 30 
Pace the defence and conserve core strategies 1 10 
Dependent on the length of-the takeover 1 10 
Exploit bidder's weaknesses 1 10 
(D) Bidder's Objectives 
`R?,:! 
' 
, 
&.. [Il' 1ine of bUsiiiesS or di vei', sification 2 20 
: Whether inbli nod on asset-stripping 1 10 
(E) Client's Attitude & Performance 
Attitude of client to the takeover attempt 6 60 
where defences are and types of defences available 5 10 
Whether the Z: ergeo is logical to client's business 3 30 
How is client expected to perform j 30 
heuer there are any dominant shareholders 2 20 
Is it in shareholders' interest? 2 20 
Perform ice of client's shares in the market 2 20 
Whether new or exist 
. 
ng client 1 10 
Why is the company attractive? 1 10 
Client's viability as an independent company 1 10 
Table G, O: Factors In f luonc zig the UK 1-1er_ chin t Bankers 
Formulation of Defensive Strategies to a 
Hostile Bid. 
- 
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seen that the defence is adapted to the approach of the 
takeover (7O ). The line of counter-attack will also be 
determined to a large extent by the attitude of the client 
company to the offer (50%). Having weighed these factors, 
the merchant banks then proceed to evaluate and examine 
what defences are available and where they are located 
(50%). Other factors taken into consideration will also 
include aspects of the time in which the bid was initiated 
(40%), the terms of consideration offered (30»), the ra-- 
tionale behind the takeover (30%), shareholders interest 
(30%)and the composition of shareholding of the client 
company (30%). From the tactical viewpoint, the defender 
will also try to anticipate the length of the contested 
battle, the bidder's "firepower" (i. e. his financial capa- 
bility-to improve the offer) and equally important, to 
capitalise on any weaknesses displayed by the bidder. 
These points are both illustrated and 
i 
.. 1t ýaa vi5G 
following rertiictvýw L''.:. : 7ticlir ii-e-. s LiöUE: 
by merchant bankers during-interviews: 
- 
1) "You react very fast. There are a number of stra- 
tegies like asset revaluation, dividend increase, 
profit forecasts and the commercial rationale.... 
. 
You work out your tactics and strategies as to how 
to defend the company at the same time making sure 
that you are able to hopefully keep the share 
prices above the figure of the bid. " 
(Director, MB10) 
2) "Two things you need consider. Profitability 
- have. they struck you on a bad year? The second 
thing which is equally useful is in fact the added 
value because you can always say to shareholders; 
'It is not worth accepting X because if we remain 
independent. tomorrow, you can have Y'. This is. 
very effective because it forces the offeror ei. 
-- ther to abandon the case or to have some market 
value rather nearer the asset value. " 
(Head, Corporate , 'ýinance, ä `. 9) 
3) "... it depends on the circumstances or ; 
"ý, ýý cas : 
__'! 
You heue got to look at the whole sm-rJ n- 
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tors; How the biddee company has performed? How it is 
expected to perform? Ho;; the share prices have pev- 
formed over the last fevi months ? What kind of P/E 
multiple the bidder is offering? Perhaps, more funda- 
mental, what is the attitude of the offeree company to 
being acquired? I mean, the defence will vary accord- 
ing to the nature of the offeree and the offeror company, 
whether they are in the same line of business or comple- 
tely different. " 
(Director, MB2I ) 
kj "The first thing you do is to write to your own sharehol- 
ders and say, 'Don't do anything until you have heard 
from us. ' Then you start. You of course look, to the 
strengths of your own business and if you look to the 
weaknesses of their business, you ask yourself, what are 
they offering? How can we persuade shareholders that 
you are actually worth a bit more. Strategies again 
depend on the year end. How are you doing as a company? 
How you think the other company is doing? You contact 
your own established public relations firn, you got the 
views of the stockbrokers, you analyse the share register 
and you try all you can to discredit the of 
(Director, lle'MB16) 
6.2 Defensive Strategies 
We saw earlier on the literature survey 
pertaining to defensive measures in chapter 2 that this 
subset of contested takeover has been relatively neglec- 
ted by writers and researchers. With this in mind, in 
order to generate new data on this area and to widen our 
knowledge about the relative utility of particular defen- 
sive tools, we then asked the merchant banks and stock- 
brokers to rate some selective counter-measures advocated 
by writers like Moon (19)(1959), Wooldridge (32)(1974), 
Taussig and Hayes (10)(1967) and Weinberg et. al. (28) 
(1979). The perceptions of both groups of financial 
advisers are listed in Table 6.1 on the next page. De-- 
fensiv techniques 
. 
ike property revaluation 0 
dividend increase (1OO'`-'>). prof? forecast (iOOj and 
._ 
'I26 
Lefensive Tool Merchant 
- % 
Bank: No. n=30 
Stock- 
brokers(Vo. ° (n=10 
1. asset revaluation 30- 100 10 100 
2. sale Of assets 13 43 2 20 
3. capital reconstruction 7 23 0 0 
4. dividend increase 
.' 
30 100 10 100 
5. bonus/scrips issue- 2 71 2 20 
6. profit forecast 30 100 10 100 
7. legal action 11 37 5 50 
8. appeal for loyalty 30 100 9 90 9. placing 21 70 6 60 
0. effect an acquisition 16 53 3 30 
1. acquire bidder's shares 0 0 1 10 
Table 6.1: Perceptions of 30 Leading UK Merchant Banks 
Stockbrokers Regarding the Functional Applicabi- 
lity of Some Common Defensive Measures Advocated 
by. Literature of Corporate Finance. 
{ 
Other Defensive Tool No. 1% 
commercial logic 17 57 
"white knight" 16 53 
market operation (driving up the market, price} 13 43 
enlisting trade union support 9 30 
lobbying the a reference 9 30 
enlisting the support of employees 8 27 
enlisting the aid of the media 4 13 
discredit the offeror 4 13 
exploit any dissent on the bidder's board 1 3 
emphasise on new products 1 
1 
3 
Table 6.2: Other Defensive Measures Advocated by the 30 
Merchant Banks Selected for this Study. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
- 
-IVhite Knight may be defined as a buyer preferred by the 
target company to the original bidder. 
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appealing to shareholders' loyalty seem to be highly 
regarded by the City's leading finencial advisers. Be- 
sides the listed defensive strategies, the merchant ban- 
kers were also asked whether there were other straVegios 
which they favoured using in the defence of their clients. 
Their answers are shown on Table 6.2 in the previous 
page. 
Throughout the defence, choice of combina- 
tion of moves is very much a matter of judgement as is 
the case with tactics, by*the bidder. This is brought 
out strongly in verbatim excerpts from the record o 
some of the interviews: - 
i) "The great thing about this is that each case 
is different. If you are going to defend a 
company which has no money, then it is-Vital 
that you fight on the asset basis. So, when 
you are defending a bid, you are defending on 
the fact that people are not offering enough 
for your company or also if the papers say { that "the bid is bad. So., if, your company has 
-a bad run and' -not making money but has enor- 
mous assets, then your defence will be to 
revalue your assets and point out that you 
can do all sorts of things to make profit 
come u_D. " (Director, t1B3) 
ii) ''White knight' is a possibility... ? 'caking 
oneself indigestable... the prime consideration 
of making a bid for another company should he 
Justifiable in its own terms rather than just 
making sure that you are not taken over 
yourself although sometimes it is very diffi- 
cult to make a clear distinction between the 
two... Again, if the bid motive was entirely_ 
financial and if they have no industrial logic 
you should also emphasise that. '' 
(Director, : B30) 
iii) "Dividend is always important because one of 
the factors that the bidder will a? ways play 
on is the higher income that he oe ofi er- 
ing, and after that will i nevite b? y Provoite 
the biddee to increase his dividend to nl3tc 
what the aggressor was offering;. _ don't 
lr think h nu.; ism 
-m 
C:. T 1(11 lnvboýv7. b---t 
s onal ly, it can goner- l; e very mild co fi don- 
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CO. On the other hand, legal action is very rare 
unless you have the EEC or the American connota"- 
tions but this practice is beginning to creep in. 
Appealing to shareholders' loyalty is often called 
the 'Roast beef and Union Jack defence'-when all 
else have failed, you then wave the Union jack and 
shout, 'Roast beef. and Yorkshire pudding! ' and it is 
always. amazingly successful. As to. lodging shares 
with friendly factions, to a limited extent, the 
old defensive strategy used to be to resort to ac- 
quiring something from your friendly company for 
shares thereby issuing new shares to the friendly 
company but again, that is one of those things 
that the Panel outlawed but occasionally, you can 
find someone who is prepared to come into the mar- 
ket and buy your shares. " 
(Director, MB14) 
iv) "When I was defending 
__ 
a long time 
ago, it has a number of feminine shareholders. 
Now, we wrote to them with a good over-pouring of 
emotions and it was authentic. It is not going to 
win the battle against the institutions but it 
makes the difference. The other factor which is 
important in defending your business is to extol' 
yours virtues 
.. 
The strengths of a good corporate 
finance department is to work with your lawyers, 
your accountants and your stockbrokors in develop- 
ing and refining your 
-tactics. In defence, it is 
like politics. You don't win this thing. You 
wait for others to make mistakes and then capita-- 
ilse on them. You try to lay traps for them but 
you have got to keep the initiative all the time 
and the Sime takeover failed because of tactical 
blunder. They were so close on price but. they 
didn't leave themselves the flexibility to tip the 
scale. " 
(Vice-chairman, 1 012) 
v) "Again, X and Y, we conducted an extremely success- 
ful campaign to get that bid referred and it was 
referred. Whereas in appealing to shareholders' 
loyalty, you have got 3 types of shareholders; the 
board and their families, the big institutions and 
. 
the small investors and it all depends on the pat- 
torn of ownershiv... the small investors and insti- 
tutions tend to be loyal to their boards. That is 
. 
way I say that not many bids go through against the 
board's wishes. " 
(Director, ME6) 
- 
12, ' 
- 
vi) "Revaluation of the corporate assets is impor-- 
tant but you will find that she offeror: is bas- ing his offer on what he thinks is the up--to- 
date value of the offeros's assets. Therefore, 
I think you will not often be getting much ni- 
leage out of the revaluation of the asset 
because there is a sporting chance that this up- 
to-date value will be taken into account by 
either the market or the. offeror when he makes 
the takeover bid. He may be trying to get the 
company on the cheap but my instinctive feeling 
is that you will only get some mileage out or 
the revalued assets. " 
(Head, Corporate Finance, S Y3) 
The 11 defensive strategies listed in 
this section are compared against those used in situatio- 
nal context of the 30 case studies to discern whather in i 
practice, defensive measures are only confined to-the-se 
mentioned few or whether, defensive techniques are in- 
deed diverse and comprehensive in range as opposed to the 
filndameri l ones normally mentioned by the "i tE3I. "ature of 
corporate finance (see Chapter 9 and Appendices A art-1 B 
pertaining to the 40 case studies). 
6.3 Share Ownership Pattern and Influences on Tactical 
Approaches in Defence 
Table 6.3: Share Composition and its Influence on Defensive 
Thinking & Tactical I-loves of Merchant Banks. 
A) 0:. hip" Vested with Board/Family No. % 
easier * to defend (if control is deeply entrenched) 26 87 
influences the bidder to negotiate 19 67) 
; B) Ownership 
. 
Vested with Institutions 
influence by financial calculation 
more reasonable and reliable 
possible to canvass their viel-; s 
constitutes an effective block to 
-dilerrua if there is cross holdings 
easier to defend 
('cold--blooded'), 1'17 57 
114 
Q 
27 
the bidder ö 20 
in bidder; biddee;. j '. ', ' 
! some holders tend to be loyal to the bo rd '3 t-' (c) Ownership Vested with the Public imestors 
more loyal to the board i.. w. ea iez to defend 
accessibilüy high (i-i 
.:? 
-- 
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From Table 6.3 on the previous page, i, 
can be c:? that the merchant banks do perceive thD, t 
their defensive task is greatly facilitated if the board 
of directors or the family holds the dominant stake and 
voting control (87%). On the other hand., there is wide- 
spread belief amongst the merchant banking community 
that institutional holders are more "calculating" or 
"cold-blooded" as their decision-making process is ulti-- 
mately determined by their investment strategy 
However, 17% took the view that institutional sharehol- 
ders can display strong loyalty to the board and another 
20% expressed confidence that a concentration of voting 
power in institutional hands would effectively block an 
unsolicited bid attempt. Yet a substantial number of 
merchant banks (67%) felt that, relative to other share-, 
holders, independent investors tend to be very loyal to 
their board irrespective of financial performance. 
The influence of ownership structure on 
the defence is illustratod by the followinS cross-section 
of comments by merchant bankers interviewed. 
a) "If the proportion of the shares held by the 
board is substantial, it is easier to defend. 
Similarly, if a large proportion is held by 
the institutions, but ultimately, institu- 
tions will sell when the price is irresista- 
ble. The private investors are less easier 
to get to and there are many individuals and 
there are many reasons for buying and sel- 
ling but they have more lasting loyalty to 
their board. " 
(Director, NB22) 
b) "The critical factor is the number held by the 
board. If you have got boardroom control 
and a.. united board, then you have no problem 
although you have to take the interest of the 
other shareholders into account... the trend 
is for the general public, to be loyal to the 
board, but for institutions, they are pe 
ded more by financial arguments.. ti7. an v. ýv 
general public. 
(Director, 1MB6) 
- 
13-1 
-- 
c) "Some institutions have a reputation of always: 
supporting the board and do not sell out with- 
out the board's recommendation. For the small 
shareholders, the best thing is to appeal to 
loyalty and some form of jingoistic flag : 'laving 
approach. Very often, for large significant 
shareholders, 'the only approach is to talk to 
them personally. " 
(Head, Corporate Finance, IIH2O) 
d) "If the board of directors hold 51% you need tit 
worry. With our institutional cl 
, 
ients, ;; e, with 
with our stockbrokers do keep in touch vii-ni 
them very closely and we certainly do cultivate 
our institutional shareholders. If a lot of 
shares are held by the members of the generai 
public, our defence circulars . "rili tend to 
appeal to shareholders' loyalty more ,o than 
institutions. " 
(Director; NB23) 
e) "If the-board of directors own 40% of the com- 
pany, then that company is in a much stronger 
position to defend an unwelcome bid. But, 
t"ý 
.1 the directors 
. 
what t_ r_: i must , u_ý c, t_rh. 3.. i 
position not as individuals but in the light o 
the shareholders as 'a Wholo. * As for the ins- 
titutional shareholders, their power is imma-----se 
... 
A company which has no institutional sha;: e-- 
hoi ders is in a much stronger position to fight 
off an unwelcome predator than a company where 
institutions own 20%, 30% or 30% of the share 
capital. " 
(Director, MB21) 
In a recent study commissioned by the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICAE{t1), Pros. R. J. 
Briston and R. Dobbins surveyed the growth and concen-ýra- 
tion in the ownership of British industry by various 
financial institutions. They discovered that the own- 
ership of ordinary shares of UK listed companies by va- 
rious institutions had grown substantially since 1966 
and by 1975, the combined -inancial institutions had 
already owned 4-35; of the Dub? ic? y quoted. share--. ýI 
Similarly, in 1971, ' in the US, %, the SEC institui ea 
major survey into the growth and ram if ica t ion., of _ ls- 
1 
klL 
1. 'ý G111t: itiý. 1L. Gnci. L c41.! 
-tJt.. 
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Table 6.4 (refer to page "133) shows that by the mid- 
1970s, American institutions had gradually increased 
their ownership level of the -total shareholdings in the 
New York Stock Exchange. 
In view of the strong significanco 
. 
attached to share composition by the merchant bankers 
interviewed, its influence on success or failure of the 
defence in the case studies is analysed in Chapter 9. 
Also, the implications of rising institutional sharehol- 
dings for future takeover bids are discussed and evalua- 
ted in Chapter 10. 
6.4 Choice of Defensive Strategy 
Following discussion of the Various 
types of {defensi"ve strategje`` i oia ed ioi' ve t; he 
merchant bankers were, asked; "What factors bear upon 
the choice of defensive strategies? " From the respon- 
ses tabulated in Table 6.5 on the next page, it can be 
seen that the merchant banks focus on the shareholders' 
interest, the basis for contesting the offer and the 
performance of the client itself. Other factors taken 
into account include actual market reaction to the bid, 
press reaction, shareholding structure, asset situation 
(for example, the availability of surplus assets), the 
ability to forecast, industrial. logic and the bid price. 
These factors are taken into account wholly or select- 
ively by the defending merchant bank. 
To reinforce the above observations, 
verbatim reports of some of the answers given by inter- 
viewees are given below: 
1) irrt depends on the company. If the company's 
prospects are supers, then the em hasi s is on 
the prospects. Tf tY1 
. 
-o ýý "ý . ^ e: S ý" 
. 
T_= strip 
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Stocks 191- 9- 75) 
)'ear Tna itutiaý: a t) ,h 'I Id 
ý 9' 9 "711.5 85. i i Ov 
965 22.7 3. 100 
'ý 973 313 8 68.2 100 
1974 33.4 66.6 100 
1975 33.6 66.1+- '100 
Source: adapted from fl. Joý3rio on & R. Dobbins, " 
. 
bid; p206. 
Factors 
(A) Financial Performance 
History and state of the hiddee 24 80 
Its ability to forecast 17 57 
Profit forecasts record. 13 43 
Bidder's weaknesses 12 40 
Prospect for dividend increase 
- 
11 37 
Future earnings 11. 37 
B) Market Fac tors 
i'iarket reaction to the takeover 22 73 
offer price 16 53 
Harket conditions 8 27 
(C)ýShateholdersl Position 
Whether shareholders are bettor, /worse off. 25 83 
(D) Basis for Contesting the Bid 
Price consideration 19 63 
industrial logic 17 57 
Independence 4 13 
(E) Miscellaneous Factors 
Press reaction to the bid 21 70 
Share pattern of client company 19 63 
Asset si. -uati. on 19 63 
Shareholders reaction to the of.. 'Cor 16 53 
1: hethe2. r it is an ässe[---strippinr_; situation 10 3 
'1. ' Ipo of industry cC both pa:, -'ti es i 3 
the ,t1 
.31s1 
I. 
ct.: ý. t, 
. 
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assets, then you look at the assets and a reva- 
luation of the balance sheet. It entirely de- 
pends on the circumstances. " 
(Director, MB3) 
b) "Well, the forecast where the offeror based his 
arguments and his latest published information. 
If you are in a position. to forecast better pro-- 
fits then you obviously capita 
Where he has used your balance 
appears to be considerably out 
you lay your major emphasis on 
luation. " 
(Director, 
Lisa on that. 
shoot value and 
of date, then 
your asset ý ova-- 
NB27 ) 
c) In corporate finance and in defence, things 
don't fall into black and white and the idea 
that you can sort of plug all the information 
into a sort of computer and come out with the 
right corporate advice just isn't r 
, 
Fata This 
is not how it works. It is feel and 
(Director, 'MB24) 
d) "The main thrust depends on what the basis of 
ybur' defence is... depenaS On the basis unat you 
do not wish º: o be taken over or on the baiis of 
every company has its price and that the price 
offered has to be a fair price and the emphasis 
will be as strong as circumstances allot. Some 
circumstances, you have got a number of defen- 
sive features, which you can incorporate. Scme 
will require very minor emphasis whereas in other 
defensive situation, it might be a very major 
emphasis because you haven't got a lot of ammuni- 
tio" " 
(Director, M310) 
e) "It depends on what the state of the economy is. 
Where the bidder is trying to buy them? And, if 
you feel that they are trying to buy you at the 
low point in your profitability and therefore, 
you can't increase your dividend or make a fo 
cast, you have then got to turn to the other de- 
fensive options, for example, asset revaluation. 
The other thin; of course is the 'white knight' 
strategy 
. 
This is the ultimate strategy i. f all 
else fails. " 
( ý; iroctor 
, 
IT'S I
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6.5 Tine of Em basis in Defence Circulars 
Circulars to shareholders end the press 
are an important part of the defence in all contested 
takeovers. Consequently, the merchant bankers were asked 
asked; "What salient, information do you normally incorpor- 
ate in your defence documents? " Their replies are ana- 
lysed in Table 6.6 below. 
INFORMATION & EMPHASIS No. 
a Financial r'actors 
not asset value S 24 80 
performance of client (profitability/forecast) 21 70 
inadequacy of offer (low P/E offered) 1s 60 
future dividend policy 
! 
17 57 
under-valuation of assets 14 47 t 
trading and earning propects 14 W 
contrasts track record of both companies 11 37 
contrasts share performance 
-5 17 
(b) Non-Financial Emphasis 
reasons for shareholders to retain investment 
the 7ß{ard s rejection of the merger attempt 
benefits arising from iindepc; nden: ce 
property revaluation 
commercial arguments 
shareholders loyalty 
lack of synergy arising from merger 
strong management of client company 
support of key investors 
self-glorification 
discredit the bidder 
highlight valuable contracts 
highlight valuable products 
emphasise on the stable labour force 
r -7 02 1 
63t71 5(; 
53' 
2? 
20 
'j7 
1 
7 
f 3! 
. w3I Table 6.6: Salient Information Emphasised in Defence Circu- 
lars Favoured by the 30 UK Merchant Bis. 
bankers attempt 
Perhaps rather obviously, most merchant 
to adduce reasons why shareholders should 
retain investment in the company (80c5). The ne!: asset 
' aluu 
z 
the performance of the client, low PER, offered ; 
future dividend policy ar_d the undervaluation of assets 
are the o:: r. ý: ý' salient 
-fan-tors :, ý. ýýfsque itb ý_A ac r-rsl i3.7 G_ . "ýý. v 
2,11 
23 
IJ 
Aý t 
1n_ 
15 
8 
6 
6 
7 
I 
I 
merchant bankers. 
1; 
A cross-section of the perceptions of 
the merchant banks on this issue is presented below: 
1) "Obviously, it is the equity in that it is to 
those people that you have to appeal to save 
yourself from being acquired. It is really 
what is applicable for that particular opera- 
tion. if the board holds large equity hold-- 
ing, then their stake becomes critical. As 
for institutions, they have their own criteria 
for assessing performance and are more likely 
to be interested in the short term premiui 
than the required allegiance. The onus, there- 
fore, is on the client company to shop: why the 
premium shouldn't be received by the sharehol- 
ders in a bid situation. "- 
(Director, NB30) 
2) "... state of the company including the history 
and where relevant, future profitability.. In- 
formation which is felt that the shareholders- 
need in order to come to an appropriate deci- 
sion as to whether to accept the offer or not. 
Some of this införmation is laid down in the 
London Stock Exchange Regulations. Where 
appropriate, discredit the offeror. '' 
(Director MB25) 
>) "It depends. In a defence document you are 
really writing a letter to your shareholders 
and you can only nail it' down to three things; 
one is the current profitability and dividend, 
the second is assets and the third is pros- 
pects. Defending yourself on prospects is a 
_very 
dangerous thing to do because, the better 
your prospects are, the 
. 
more attractive you 
will be and the more reason for the predator 
to get a crack at you-! The classical defence 
and line of emphasis is 'Up with the dividends 
and look at our assets, '" 
(Head, Corporate Finance, NB26) 
4) "It all depends on anyone of the factors that 
we have talked about earlier, i. e. Profit per- 
formance, asset revaluation-and the attitude -, 
of the board of directors and if you know that 
you have Cot a WL S7 roste tu t. 
- 
3 ion which i yat nsst 
the offer, then you might get his per!: Assion, 
to quote his views as well. " 
(Dil? oi: 'uou, 
r- 
5) "I think one of the things you can say, I don't 
think that is that secretive anymore is that what 
. 
you have got to. incorporate in your defence do- 
cument would depend on your strategy. You never 
have one defence circular unless the bidder 
goes away. 1 mean, what happens is that the 
offeror makes an offer which you reject and 
then he sends out his offer document and you send 
out yours to your"shareholders4 You know, then 
he may increase his offer and you don't want to 
have everything in your first defensive document 
because you won't have any room to manoeuvre in 
the second. " 
(Manager, iriB4) 
This last comment is particularly inter- 
esting in that it reflects a widespread view that a good 
number of persuasive points should be held back from the 
first defensive circular for subsequent use. For--a. more 
comprehensive insight into information listed in defence 
documentation, please refer 
. 
to the two groups of case 
C L" t. 
ýýCi 
ýv r. ýý-__ ýs. VC: ý1p- 5 
t; UdjeS 116e'-I 1.1: jäppenu 1+^G. 7 1i ý:. LS - d 17 ý1 i, tY.. 11. s .. 
ively; into the counter. arguments and line of defence eru- 
ployed against unwanted takeovers. 
6.6 Sectional Interests Evaluated by Financial Advisers 
Before Recommendation for Ner er 
A defending merchant bank is its capacity 
as a financial advisor to a client company in a contested 
bid situation is invariably confronted with a multitude of 
considerations in coming to a decision as to whether it 
should recommend the terms offered. This is important 
because UK companies operate within a very complex and 
sometimes ambiguous legal, commercial and institutional 
fiüi. 
^. e crk. In view of is, the respondents were as ed; 
"'hat interests do you teke into account in advising 'ou V 
client's board to accept the terms offered? '* 
'I J0 w 
Inte?, esi Evaluated No. 
_ 
rs n, °rest Ü `l J care io? 
_e Employees interest 30 100 
Reputation (merchant banking) in the City 22 73 
Interest of the board of directors 11 37 
Interest of the local community 7 23 
National interest ! 17 
Table 6. %: Interests Evaluated by Merchant Banks 
Before Recommending Acceptance of a Bid. 
It is evident from Table 6.7 above that 
merchant banks lay heavy 'emphasis on the interests os 
the shareholders and employees above all others as both 
a matter of principle and to protect their merchant 
banking reputation. Reputation was cited frequently 
during the survey as of importance to visibility and sur- 
vival. Its protection then is clearly en important 
determinant of actions taken.. The merchant banks at ta- 
ched secondary importance to the interests of the board 
of di regtors; the community or national interest based 
on the premise that: 
"... it is very tempting for a board of di- 
rectors who don't have any shares in the business to 
provide their recommendations to shareholders to accept 
an offer if they are given promises of wonderful service 
contracts, pensions, perks and all the rest of it. I 
thin. 1k one has got to be very careful in advising the 
board. as to how far its interest lay with its sharehol- 
ders can diverge... With the employees, you have arg obli- 
gation to ensure that their rights are not impaired as 
to the terms of their employment, wages and pension 
rights. I think, it is unrealistic to believe that we 
financial advisers would accept significantly lower price 
for shareholders if the price of doing that is to fund a 
large amount of somebody else's pension rights. Our own 
reputation in the City is very important because it is 
the only way we can get our business and if people ques- 
tion our integrity, well, we have lost our principal 
asset. So, i think you are hired by the shareholders 
to do the best you can for them in so far it does not 
conflict with our own views of what, is right and wrong.. 
Nobody pays a damn to national interest although they 
pretend to. 
(Head, Corporate Finance. iyiB26) 
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6.7 Non-Price Determinants Influencing Bid Acceptance 
We have just examined the interests 
that a defending merchant bank has to take into account 
in advising the acceptance of a hostile bid. Likewise, 
from the pilot study, it soon became apparent that there 
were other factors 
. 
besides price that influenced a nier- 
chant bank in making its decision process. Conse uent-- 
ly, the respondents were asked: "What other conditions 
apart from price would you advise a corporate client to 
take into account when deciding whether or not to accept 
an initial or a final offer? " 
For conveniences the non-price 
determinants influencing the defending merchant hank's 
decision-making process. may be divid=ed into 6 sub-üroups: 
1) Interests of shareholders, employees, ! anne- 
{ ment and the community's interest other than 
price 
2) Offeror's image curs capability 
3) Future implications for client's business 
4) Line of approach adopted by the b dyer 
5) Reactions to the bid 
6) Other considerations 
From the tabulated evidence in Table 
6.8 on the next page, it is apparent that the interests 
of those involved with the client again assume prime i nni-- 
portance in the eyes of the merchant banks. Other fac- 
tors evaluated taken into account included the possibi-- 
lity of a counter-bidder or a 'white knight' coming to 
the rescue, the general reaction of the leading financial 
media, the line of approach adopted by the offeror (i. e. 
whether the bird greatly undervalued assets or earnings), 
trading prospects, suitability of the bi rider, tae strong 
desire of the client/ to remain indeplend Cm and Jhcc e Vices 
lity of the bidder to improve his bid price. 
- 
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Non--Price Factor NO 
(ti) interests 
Interest of shareholders 23 77 
Treatment of employees 20 67 
Preservation of management 5 50 
Community's interest 1 3 
(B) 0f f eror' s Ima e/Capability 
Suitability of the bidder 8 27 
Ability to pay more 6 20 
(0) Reaction to Bid 
General press reaction 16 53 
Lro; ion of shareholders' loyalty 7 
Level of acceptances to initial bid 5 17 
Level of acceptances to revised bid 3 10 
(D) Line o: i' r pproach Adopted by the Bidder 
Undervaluation oz assets 13 '-! 3 
Undervaluation of potential earnings 9 30 
]? Lon Perm Iýýn1. ý_crýtions for Client's Business 
Trading prospects 11 3`l 
Future development of business 
-10 33 
Desire to remain independent 6 20 
Effect on biddee's business 3 '10 
Benefits of increased financial backing 3 110 
Future price of new products 
(F) Other Factors 
Possibility of other bids emerging 7 23 
Basis for justifying future by rejecting bid 5 17 
Table 6.8: Non-Price Factors Evaluated by UK Merchant Banks 
Before Bid Recommendation 
-- 
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To amplify these points, f ou Of t h 
replies to the question are reported verbatim below: 
1) "There are so many factors. If the client 
wants to reject the offer, why? ;s it be- 
cäuse management is too comfortable preserving 
its own little niche? Does it undervalue the 
company in asset terms? What will happen has 
become. increasingly important to the client's 
employees and in fact, the new Companies pct 
focus on this aspect. " 
(Director, [MB2) 
2) Well, there again, it is a. question of judge- 
ment. How much do you think you would get 
out of the bidder? Ho;. much do you actually 
want to do a deal with him and to shut. out 
other bidders or contenders? There again, 
it is one thing that an advisor has to be very 
careful of because, if you do a 'closed de a".. 
with the first Chap that comes atop _, you have 
got to gat the board's backing. ft 
(Head, Corporate Finance, NB26) 
{ 
3) "It 
-depends bas: cä: lly on whet-hei- you feel you 
are going to be able to justify the future 
for the company at a hi Cher price thin the 
ones that you have been offered. If, it is 
in. the interests of the sh, rehclders and em- 
ployees, then you should do something positive 
for them rather than preserve-your own posi- 
tion and fight bitterly to the end. " 
(Director, IN1B30) 
"I think if there is a good price but if the 
intention towards the employees is appalling, 
then you have got to take a stand here and 
fight on that basis. '' 
(Director, MB23) 
6.8 Profit Forecasts In Contested Situations 
Although 
.po 
it forecasts are not 
mandatory Curing a Contested takeover, this factor is 
advocated as a defensive measure by, for irrst 
.: 
ic 
, 
Wein- 
berg et ^i. ( 22) 1979) Hayes and T_us i''' 
- 
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Pickering (22)(19l9) and rnfie]. _i (3)(191, ? ). A great 
majority of the merchant bankers interviewed were cons- 
cious of, the importance of profit forecasts in a defence. 
Contributions of forecasts were seen from 3 perspectives: 
i) Financial, 
ii) Tactical, and 
iii) The merchant bank's. 
Perspective Ido. 
A) Financial Perspective - 
.- 
-- --__ý 
indicator of a company's profit 26 8? 
it measures the value of a company's business 18 6; s 
it provides a picture of current performance 13 43 ! 
it is a reflection of trading prospects 9 04 
indicator of management record 7 25 
value the company on future earnings stream 7 23; 
reflection of growth potential 4 13! 
it is relevant when a company is making a loss, I 3 
assists in the market rating of the. client 1 3 
B) Tactical Perspective 
it induces the bidder to. pay 
. 
more 21 70 influences the level of dividend increase ^C 33 
generate greater shareholders loyalty/confidence 17 
one of the main planks of defence 12 71 
C) Merchant Bank's Individual Perspective 
afford advisers to meet other client's executives -- 1 3 
influences willingness to undertake the defence I 
Table 6.9: Perceived Accruements of Profit Forecasts to 
Shareholders In Contested Bid Situations. 
From Table 69 above, it may be seen that 
most of the merchant banks value profit forecasts as m-- 
portant barometers. of the company's profitability 
Furthermore, a profit forecast serves as a measure of the 
value of the company's businoss (60%), provides a picture 
of current performance (43%) as well as influences the 
' dividend level. As such, a good prof- it forecast may in- 
duce the bidder. 
_ 
to pay more for the cli e it company. For 
these reasons, as long as good results can be foz -- . as t. 
the merchant ýýank rs customer iy riet prof; L fore ' 
.s 
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meeting hostile bids. 
The importance and utility of a profit 
forecast is illuminated by the following extracts from 
the views of the merchant banks: 
"Ii I am a shareholder, I will look to by di- 
rectors to tell me enough so that I can make 
a judgement. If they are three-quarter of 
the way through in a year, an average company 
director ought to tell me what the year's end 
is going to be, the results, i mean. They 
certainly have. that greater knowledge than I 
do and I will certainly want that information. 
They are vital in formulating one's decision 
-- 
-whether one accepts or rejects a bid. Cer-_ tainly, when you get three-quarter of the year 
ahea4 of you, a company is under pressure. 
When you don't make a profit forecast, share-. 
holders are going to assume that you are not 
making one because the company is not doing 
very well. " 
(Head, Corporate Finance, MB20) 
+2 j "in general terms, it is desirable to have a 
profit forecast so that shareholders when 
called upon to decide to accept an offer or 
not, know or have some idea of what the com- 
pany is currently earning or what the company 
is likely to earn. However, it is not easy 
to achieve a forecast when a company, for ins- 
tance has just announced its results for the 
year. As such, it is very difficult to fore- 
cast 12 months in advance that quickly depen- 
ding upon the nature of the company's business. 
You have to ask yourself whether it is better 
for the shareholders to have no forecast or 
whether they have a forecast which is not re- 
liable. ' 
(Director, MB2I ) 
3) "It gives people an idea of what is the value of 
their ovin company. In general terms, you look 
at the prospects of the company and see the way 
it is going... assuming that you are into the 
financial year in which the shareholder has no 
financial information, it could be a highly 
relevant factor if the company is going to make 
a substantial loss for that year and that could 
be extremely relevant. " 
(Execuv1. 
w7° MI c-) 
14 lf 
- 
4) "... the extent of tiw; hich it can influence 
shareholders' opinion would depend, i s. zpp-" 
ose, partly on the past record of the cor 
pany and partly on the historical pattern of 
profitability. if it is a consistent fore-- 
cast, people would probably take the forecast 
for granted, but if the profits have 
. 
-one 
down the last 5 years and in your forecast, 
you say that profit is going to double the 
next year, people night take 
-it Seri cuss; ." 
(Director, MB6) 
609 Difficulties Related to Poreoaszin 
A profit forecast can be defined as an 
estimate of future profitability or earnings based upon 
Siveilo assumptions. In view of the fact that 
only an estimate, it is significant that the investing 
public should have reasonable confidence in, its accura 
5 Týý) 1. ý -t, e rs In c 
'r yerha-, 
)s 'Lo. -1 iV111. ý7 1 CC. JV lI. týu en used 
in 
tl 1 UvY 
contested acquisitions, the Panel requires the financial 
advisers to examine formally, endorse and report the 
forecast= This places a heavy burden of responsibility 
on the merchant banks who are sometimes unhappy about the 
way in which this exposes them given the difficulties 
a61e 6.10 6Qlow), frequently encountered (see 7 
Difficulties Related to Forecasting No. % 
Most clients refuse to provide informative assumptions '15 50 
Tendency for the board to exhibit over-optirm sn 13 431 
Difficult to forecast ahead if results were just out 8 27 
Underlying assumpticns are more difficult to formulate 7 23 
Constrained by Panel rulings '- 12 
y Tendency for clients to focus on general trends 3 10 
Constrained by patchy data in some annual accounts 3 -10 
Sometimes, have to screen the forecast in a dad '! 3 
Sometimes, inquiries are not translated into osde -s 
Acutely dependent on auditors (case of new clien is) 
Determined by the ^uai it ' 
-of information and weopl e 1 3 
Acutely 
. 
eºerde t tjic 
I DD ilemnma of no forFc st or uro1 _ý di 7) ý 
Tcible ' ?" ßi7 fi. ul ti ;, P- ?e -ý? edi o profi Forccý ýý 
r. n-i yr n:: by -týý 2, nK,,! p! it R? rl:: s 
- 
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Half of the respondents 
. 
interviewed cited 
that perhaps the greatest difficulty associated with screen- 
ing profit forecasts is the reluctance of their clients to 
provide informative or meaningful assumptions (50%). This 
problem is further compounded by the general inclination for 
most boards to exhibit over-optimism in forecasting (4xß). 
The forecasting calender too may constitute a problem area 
particularly if the results have just been published (27; ). 
These difficulties confronted by merchant banks in reviewing 
forecasts are illustrated by the following replies during 
the survey: 
1) It basically is difficult because we go out 
and vet the forecast in a day whereas the 
client may be spending a couple of iwon 
. 
hs corn-. 
piling it and the auditors, a few wee'Lts audi 
ting it. We do it in a day! So, it--is very 
easy to miss the whole blatant thing. " 
(Director, MB13) 
2) '"One of the sad problems with the regulatory 
authorities is that the Panel said that iss any 
sort of defence conducted in a takeover, if 
the chairman has made previous remarks about 
future profits they have to be reported on and 
this has significantly inhibited company 
chairmen from making remarks aoout future pro- 
fitability because they are frightened that 
if they are not careful, they get taken up by 
the Takeover Panel. " 
(Director, NB24) 
3) "... it is very difficult to forecast 12 months 
in advance that quickly depending upon the na- 
ture of the company's. business. Certain 
business for example, have an order period of 
next to nothing 
- 
in heavy engineering, they 
might have an order book which stretches for 
9 months while other businesses have order 
books which last. perhaps for a week... and 
there are circumstances which is extremely 
difficult to forecast accurately. " 
(Director, 
4) 1`1 think it all depends on how up to date the 
published information of the company 
. 
is, 
What one is up against is whether it is oiise 
for some directors to expose themselves to 
- 
146 
-- 
making that particular profit forecast 
where it is difficult to make a forec, aste 
As you know, there is no prize for a fore- 
cast going the other direction. " 
(Vice-chairman, 1012) 
5) "Most companies are unwilling to provide in- 
formative assumptions. Nine ti roes out of 
ten, they give assumptions that the unex- 
pected doesn't happen and are not prepared 
to say openly that 'Our profit margins will 
be 9X and our turnover will be FY. 1 
_Instead, they focus on general trends and no unfore- 
seen circumstances 
... 
So, at the end of the 
day, you almost get a mass of meaningless 
assumptions. " 
(Director, MB-14) 
In a close-ended question, the__res-- 
pondent were also asked ;; hat they percoi ; red' to be the 
main problems in forecasting itself. Their responses- 
are tabuulated in Table bell 
_Problem__ Unreiab1ee fore_casting tool 23 ?7 
Insufficient time 19 63 
Nature of the business 14 47 
Unreliable accounting methods 7 23 
Limited market data {6 20 
Table 6.1i. Main Problems Perceived by r-ierchant B" s 
In Conjunction With Profit Forecasts. 
6.10 IMonitöring of Profit Forecasts 
Only 30% of the respondents made an 
effort to monitor the profzt forecasts where they ware 
involved in the screening and the endorsement of it. 
The majority of the respondents does riot indulge in such 
a practice as it is time consuming and partly it is done 
by the Takeover Panel. The role of the Panel in jiioni- 
torine forecasts in bi. ci si uilations will be d1 01's Cl i o. 
Chapter 9. 
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6.11 Deviant Forecasts 
During the course of this research 
spanning the 1979-1981 period, the press reported sever- 
al law suits brought against merchant banks over inaccu- 
rate profit-forecasts. Consequently, it was an oppor- 
tune time to monitor the views of the various merchant 
bankers on this crucial but sensitive issue. 
Factor No 
(A) Perceived Liabilities 
all parties are equally liable 19 63 
board of directors are liable if a forecast is 76 30 fraudulent 
advisers are innocent "if assumptions are reasonable ! "0 30 
obligation to explain deviations to the Panel 18 27 
grounds exist for client's recourse to litigation ; 'i'? 
B) IIHp1? cation.,. 
-- 
ArisiI?,: r from Deviant Forecasts 
it affects the merchant banking reputation 
directors obligation to r sdr. 6 ss a deviant forecast 
advisers in+C ilr a moral responsibility towards client i 
danger of inducing or creating a false market 
lessons to be drawn for all parties involved 
16 53 
3 10 
10 
3 
'I 3 
Table 6.12: Perceived Liabilities and Implications Arising 
From Deviant Prosit Forecasts. 
According to some merchant banks, a pos- 
sible cause of a deviant forecast may be that the biddee 
never attained its full financial year due to the transfer 
and integration of its business into that of the buyer. 
From the. evidence apparent in Table 6.12, quite a number of 
merchant banks (63%) felt that the liabilities arising from 
inaccurate forecasts should be equally blamed on all par- 
ties involved. As opposed to. this view, 33% of the res- 
pondents felt that they are innocent and there should not 
be any basis for litigation if the underlying assumptions 
of the-forecasts were reasonable. 
Generally, the merchant banks perceived 
that the Enos t serious implication arisin` w; om a poor 
for 
C. CiQsl is he adverse ÜÜSJ11city ; nd ita . 7- Z- 
, 
0. 
`. 1 Lj1-1. i 
- 
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ban, king reputation (53;? ). It was also pointed out by some of 
the interviewees that the board of directors should take imme- 
diate action to correct a bad forecast the moment it became; 
apparent that it had been over-optimistic. 
These views are amplified in a cross-section 
of the responses by the merchant bankers: 
a) "Lonhro is contemplating legal action against Mor- o Grenfell, and Pentos, against Singer& Friec!. 
- 
lander around some acquisitions. The law is not 
clear on this. You can say that the directors 
are wholly responsible for this but this isn't 
what the law is developing. So., we are very sen- 
sitive about Drofit forecasts and we trust that 
they are goin. to be fulfilled. Very frequently, 
the-profit never see the light of day anyway be- 
cause the bidder integrates the whole thing, 
charges huge costs to its acquisition and that is 
the end of it. The-company never gets to the end 
of the year because their business is transferred 
o the bidder so that their forecast is never 
proved right or wrong. "' 
I 
(Director, NB2 3) 
_ 
b) 'The merchant bank is asked to use a certain degree 
of commercial common-sense in expressing a view on 
the assumptions behind the forecast. Although I 
would hate to find this coming back to haunt me, 
I suppose, if the forecast proves to be wrong and 
that is because one of the assumptions made is 
quite ludicrous, then the merchant bank ought to 
have some degree of responsibility as it suggests 
that someone didn't bother to make sure that he 
understood the nature of the business and the basis 
on which the forecast was made. " 
(Director, IB22) 
c) "I think you will find (I am not allowed to mention 
names) that there could be a course for redress 
for the company. I think there could possibly be 
legal actions against the financial advisers if 
they were negligent. So far, none has succeeded 
but I think the principle lies against the corn- 
pany as they are the ones preparing the forecast. " 
(Director, LB2I )- 
d) "I think there is a liability for all parties in- 
volved in the profit forecast but, having said 
that, I still think, that st is the company and tie 
directors : ": ho must bear the responsibility for 
- 
'1=4-ß'j 
- 
deviant forecasts. Otherwise, it is difficult to see 
from the practical point of view, how many accountants or 
merchant banks would be happy to put their scal of appro- 
val to a profit forecast. " 
(Manager, MB11) 
Sorge of the threatened litigation8 against 
against financial advisers over deviant forecasts are dis- 
- 
cussed in Chapter 9. 
6.12 Summary/Review 
In summary, -in devising suitable defences 
against' hostile bids, the merchant banks will usually take 
into account such factors as the timing of the bid, the 
nature f the takeover, the tactical considerations and 
the strengths and weaknesses of both the bidder and the 
target company. Key defences include asset revaluation, 
dividend increase, profit forecasts and appealing to the 
loyalty of the shareholders, however, the tactics adopted 
are strongly influenced by the client's share composition 
and the reaction of the major press towards the takeover. 
Non-price determinants too exercise a material influence. 
For example, sectional interests, the bidder's capability 
to see the bid through (or sustain the acquisition at- 
tempt) and the long term ramifications for the client's 
business are carefully evaluated by the merchant banks. 
Equally important is the fact that defensive measures we 
planned, paced and implemented in the light of the oppo- 
sition's-line of approach and emphasis. it should be 
emphasised that the merchant banners- stressed repeatedly 
the need for a flexible response to competitive moves. 
They also perceived creativity and jute; etnent as beim; 
critical to success. 
The next chant. ; r. studies 
-the n: il; urce of I: he 
-- 
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relationships between the merchant bankers and their sup- 
portive financial advisers in the City (i. e.. chiefly the 
stockbroking firms), their clients and the degree of their 
interaction with the Takeover Panel, the main 'watch-dog' 
body in the City. 
4 
0 
- 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE DISTINCTIVE ROLE OF MERCHANT BANKS AND THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER SPECIALIST ADVISERS AND 
REGULATORY BODIES 
7.0 Introduction 
This final section on 'the results of 
the field survey considers some aspects of the relation- 
ships between merchant banks and other financial advi- 
sers (or corporate finance specialists) especially the 
stockbrokers, the factors that give merchant banks the 
distinction as merger and takeover specialists, the 
financial advisers involvement with the self-regulatory 
bodies (p v. rticu? arly the Takoover Pane .) and row they 
vier: their business relationship with their corporate 
clients. 
7.1 Merchant Bankers Perceptions of Their Role in Mergers 
And Acquisitions 
In general, the merchant banks saw 
themselves as having a distinctive role as takeover 
specialists. Their perceived contributions are listed 
in Table 7.0 'bei ova: 
ROLE 
Takeover specialists (expertise in 
devising complex deals) 
Expert co-ordinator (the "orches- 
tra! leader") 
High visibility (reputation) 
High gnade professionalism in 
corporate äi fl tflCe 
Advisory services backed by finan- 
cial power 
Table 0 riercha 
, 
alt Bank& Percept onl- of 
i1E'i 
, FI' ý'r, i_CýjUiS1 t iO71 $ pocia1 ist s. 
NO. 
25 83 
20 67 
16 53 
ii 37 
their :: , Ie: A- 
- 
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They saw both their orientation and 
expertise as quite different to that of stockbrokers 
who also provide a corporate advisory service to compa-" 
nies involved in takeovers, albeit on a much smaller 
scale. Perhaps more obviously, they also regarded 
the role of the lawyers as quite separate from their 
own, This emerges strongly from replies reported ver- 
batim below: 
a) "Stockbrokers look at corporate finance in 
a different way. They are more of a ser- 
vice organisation and market related in 
orientation. As such, oat stockbrokers 
will not hold themselves up to be corporate 
finance experts because they don'. have the 
capability and financial standing. For 
example, Cazenove gets a lot of business 
from Warburgs and it would be counter- 
productive if Cazenove starts makixg 
-in-i 
roads in bids and deals. " 
(Vice-chairman, MBI2) 
b) "Well, stockbrokers' loyalty are to their 
customers really, to people who buy and sell 
shares and not to companies one is talking 
about. A merchant bank in the corporate 
sense... our customers are the corporations 
that come to us for advice as opposed to the 
shareholders or investors who may buy or 
sell in the market. Lawyers have a special 
skill which is required in special circums- 
tances. " 
(Head, Corporate Finance, MB26) 
c) "The stockbrokers corporate finance depart- 
ments do not do what we are essentially 
doing. A firm like Cazenove, for instance, 
with a large corporate finance department 
tends to act for their clients in conjunction 
with a merchant bank. Lawyers are lawyers. 
They do not have the commercial or financial 
expertise. If the lawyers poached into our 
territory... they would be very foolish. I 
don't think they would get too much work 
from us in the future. " 
(Direc tc; r, ?; B16) 
- 
- 
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d) "I think the answer goes back to . ": hat I J have said earlier as the conductor of the 
orchestra. The lawyers have their own 
lines, the stockbrokers their own market 
expertise and the merchant bank is the jack-of-all-trade but master of none. " 
(Managing Director, MB2) 
e) "Well, in this thing, we like 
leaders, the co-ordinator of 
professionals and we call on 
separate bits, of expertise. 
what none of the others have 
to back our judgement. " 
(Director, MB23; 
to be 
all these 
them on their 
We also have 
i. e. IQonay 
These views were largely mirrored. in' 
those of stockbrokers interviewed on role in takeovers: 
-- 
"We think that merchant banks are principals and we 
believe We a. ee' 
. 
gelnts. 
"Wa Inormally work very closely with a merchant 
bank in a particular situation concerning takeover 
n 
- 
"most listed companies have a broker and a merchant 
banker who work together on any issues, takeover, 
etc. " ° 
- 
"... varies from case to case. Sometimes, we have 
been virtually an extension of the bank particu-- 
. 
larly in the preparation of circulars. " 
7.2 Degree of Involvement With Stockbrokers 
Overwhelmingly, the merchant banks 
asserted the fact that they have a very strong working 
relationship with their stockbrokers-7n this field but 
they sat-., them (and other advisers or experts) as suppor-- 
tive services and not as serious competition. The 
stoo h brokers are m inty consulted for their stock _ý! ar- 
ý_et expertise while the lawyer. s handle tine legal 
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intricacies of the individual deal. From Table 7.1 
below, it is apparent that the stockbrokers hold reci- 
procal view with those of their principals. 
Table 7.1-: Perceptions-of Stockbrokers Regarding Their 
Involvement With Merchant Banks In Both 
Advisory Services & Contested Bid Transac- 
tions. 
CORPORATE ADVISORY SER- CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 
VICES (INVOLVEMENT) ( (INVOLVEMENT) 
No. 
. _Ii a 
-i Very involved 8' 80 5 50 
Quite involved 1 10 4 40 
Involved 1 10 111 10 
Not closely involved 1010 
TOTAL 10 1100 
1100 
The importance of this symbiotic- rela- 
tionship is 'underlined by the assertion by one of t,: 0 
stockbrokers interviewed that his firms alone acts as a 
broker to nearly harf of the members of the Drestizious 
Accepting Houses Oomdttee. 
" 
Other stockbrokers too 
perceived a close association with the merchant banks 
saying: 
- 
"Very closely. The only reason we would rt work 
closely may be perhaps ii' the client is too small 
to involve a merchant-bank. " 
- 
"It depends on whether our specialist expertise 
is required or desired. " 
- 
"Of the 17 Accepting Houses Coy mittee members, or 
better still, of the eight largest merchant banks, 
we are actual brokers to seven of them. " 
- 
"Tree trend is towards closer collaboration. Mat- 
ters relating to pricing of issues, assessment of 
market reaction to hostile bids are particularly 
3., ^1oortant. " 
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7.3 Reasons for the Distinction As Merger & Acquisition 
Specialists 
Merchant bankers were asked for their 
distinctive role as corporate advisers in mergers and 
acquisitions. Their answers are tabulated in Table 
Table 7.2 below: 
REASONS NO 
leputation and track record in mergers acquisitions 26 
Financial power 24 
Experience and daily exposure to corporate. ' finance 21 
Co-ordinating ability 21 
Creative. innovative and flexible 21 
Team work and. professional approach to transactions 19 
Multi-skills institution ("one-stop bank") 18 
Personal involvement 1.1 
High analytical skills 
-- 
9 
Broad speciaiisations and general knowledge 5 
Impartiality I 
Wide corporate contacts in U_t and worldwide 
Table ?. 2 : 'Reasons Given by UK Merchant Banks for Their 
Distinction As Merger R. Acquisition Specia- 
lists. 
0 
80 
70 
70 6; I 6C` t" 
30 17! 
3,1 
:ý 
They regard their reputation as the most 
important factor (87%). This, they consider to be based 
on their financial power (80%), experience,. expertise and 
daily exposure to corporate finance work (73%). Furthermore, 
their ability to co-ordinate other professionals in devising 
and implementing the deals (70%) supported by-a flair for 
creativity. (70%) and teamwork approach (63%) operating within 
the "one-stop bank" umbre? ia, great? y enhanced their distinc- 
tion and market share in this lucrative fee-earning activity 
The merchant banking community's claims 
are illustrated from answers given in the field survey: 
1) "We have the financial muscle. I am two desks 
away from the chairman and deputy chai. man, so 
we can move very, very cuick] -q. In ýr: ' 
.a 
communication, we hove the speed of 
Sn p? Tha_-p_ w har e befit: of hn . "i ý? ý 
__ 
ýý 
(Director, 
. 
IBý23) 
- 
') ý 
2) "The Corporate Finance Division of a !: lerchanz 
bank has specialist expertise which is not 
collected in any other profession. " 
(Director, MB25) 
"3) "We are adaptable and flexible. We move at 
no notice and hopefully can come up with 
innovative ideas on how companies should coo 
-whatever it wants to do. I think a lot has 
to do with the expertise and if it wasn't 
for the expertise, I don't think have much 
of a continuing business. " 
(Director, NB2I ) 
4)-111 suppose, it is experience which is the 
most important. We have under one roof 
range of skills relevant to our type of work 
and the relative lack of these within alter- 
native organisations. We are able to deal 
with a multitude of companies and providing 
a whole range of services. We have the abi- 
lity to give professional qualitative advice. " 
(Managing Director MB2) 
L: ` tft. T4- 11T tL.. ý l- YOU 1-.. Ciº.. 
L li.. 1+.. 
,7 .1.... Jf 
of con ideraolo 
. 
experience... it must moan a 
lot to the long established merchant ban. k s, 
They have handled many, many deals of diffe- 
rent types and of different situations. 
They have got a large staff and diverse ex- 
perience, different experts who work on dif- 
ferent deals. So, you are employing a very 
significant body of experience and knowledge 
and it is dust a historical face. that accoun- 
tants, lawyers or stockbrokers do not have 
that history. " 
(Director, MB22) 
As opposed to this, the stockbroking 
community interviewed saw their distinction as corporate 
finance spocialibts as follows: 
-- 
"The merchant banks are competent but they have 
a different', sort of competence and that 
_' 
iah 
we have to work closet y together. ". We stock- 
brokers are more conscious of the 
_ýa_ket ec 
tors... I think, we 
.. 
ould tend to cnca ire:: situ-- 
tional holders better. than rierc ; art; roan:;: }., ;ý 
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We have a knowledge of the market, of the institu- 
tions and how they react to particular situations 
how the stock market reacts to particular develop- 
ments and trends. " 
- 
'One needs both. We advise in the relative vralua- 
tion of the financial securities offered in take-- 
overs. " 
- 
... 
we have an edge over the merchant banks in rela- 
tion to the smaller companies and particularly to 
the possible growth of the Unlisted Securities 
Market. " 
-- 
"No. I don't think there is any because we don't 
act as a corporate advisor without a merchant 
bank. " 
In chapter 9, this self-centred merchant 
banking h 
po 
thes4 th t4 "-I, c arc UK 1 
.c 
leading : enger any? a 
acquisition specialists is tested by reference to their 
market share of this business reflected in the case 
studies. 
7.1 Involvement With the Takeover Panel 
From the outset, we already stated that 
the Takeover Panel, the main self-regulatory body, sup- 
ported by the Council of Securities Industry, the Stock 
Exchange and other financial institutions lays down 
guidelines for and control of takeover behaviour in the 
UK. Consequently, i ntervie%.. s were conducted with 
(SRB 1)l and various other self--regulatory bodies to 
gain insight into the institutional framework of Se-'1'L- 
regulation as. practised in the City. In the course 
of this survey, SRI and S.. B2 indicated to_ ýn r_ s ýý- 
1_ Encoded. Co 1! 
- mast er cnc? e for detai_s(SrcB 
se? 
_f--regul. ato, ry 
body) 
P-- 
- 
1; g 
, 
eher that they have a close workin relationship with 
the financial advisers in the City and because of 
their informal organisational structures and communica- 
tion systems, they were highly accessible to the mer- 
chant banks and other professionals at a short moment 
notice (see interviews with SRB1 and SRB2 in Chapter 
£, Volume 2). 
During the follow-up interviews 
with merchant bankers, they unanimously declared that 
they worked closely with the Takeover Panel and often 
consulted it on acquisition matters. As one merchant 
banker explained: 
"Oh, my personal relationship with the 
Panel is excellent. i know them all... I find-them ex- 
tremely capable and actually very helpful because our 
position here as I see it is quite interesting, because 
here, we often have very. large stakes in companies and if We actually Q vise those companies you could s=ly 
there is conflict of interests. There is conflict of 
interest on our investment side as opposed to the 
advice side and we have agreed with the Panel that if 
our merchant bank itself owns more than 20% of the com- 
pany, we would not be allowed to act for the company 
if it was being taken over because of the conflict of 
interests situation as the Panel would surely ask, 'You 
may want the bid to succeed wearing the investment hat 
but are you going to give totally unbiased advice? ' 
It is a fair point, a fair point. So, questions like 
this we have to go and consult the Panel. " 
(Director, MB16) 
lk 
In chapter 9, using the case studies 
as a basis for comparison, we will attempt to discern 
the degree of involvement between the merchant banks 
and the Panol regarding contested bids. 
7.5* dorkinF Relationshins With Corporate Clients 
on this subjec , the ri, erchan: banks 
unanimously cl aimed than they all favoured a long term 
--159-- 
working relationship with their corporate clients for 
obvious business reasons. This was especially so 
where the merchant bank advised companies seekinö'acqui- 
" sitions and making bids rather than defending against 
them. Merchant banks advising acquisitive clients like 
Grand Metropolitan, Thomas Tilling, Hanson Trust, must 
clearly generate a high and regular income from fees. 
However, when acting in a defensive capacity, particu- 
larly for a new client, the need for a relationship is 
removed by success and the independent existence of the 
client is terminated on failure (when he is taken over). 
Given the variety of corporate ph _lo- 
sophies, styles and temperaments of their clients, 
is to be expected that merchant bankers' relationship 
with them will sometimes be in discordance. This is 
particularly so when the advice is related to Contested 
bids where emotional and time pressures may be highs 
. 
eAre turn tc tý.; s; ss;: e in fur her ? eta ýs inca ter 9.. 
7.6 Summary/Review 
We can draw certain empirical con- 
clusions from the evidence presented here. First, 
there is strong relationship between merchant banks 
and stockbrokers, the latter providing specialist sup- 
port to the former on pricing and other aspects related 
to the stock market. Due to this special relationship, 
the brokers seldom advise clients directly on contested 
offers for fear of offending their merchant banking 
clients. Moreover, they often see the merchant banks 
as having greater expertise in corporate finance. 
Second, owing to the complex nature of contested bids 
and re1e;.; 
'ri i 
institutional fý'c iaewor': S there is ireý, uent 
communication between the' 
-i al advisers F. nd se ý. f- 
regulaatory bodies., Despite cases such as S. it z. ii in 
- 
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the UK over the last 3 years, the merchant banks str. oje, 
ly reaffirmed their faith in this relatively efficient, 
informal and economical system of self-regulation over 
.. 
that of an expensive and bureaucratic American SEC 
(Securities & Exchange Commission) model. Third, 
merchant banks prefer continuing relationships with 
clients though this may not always be possible and exis-- 
ting relationships may be disrupted by disagreements 
exacerbated by the highly charged atmosphere in which 
takeover bid is conducted. 
Having examined the various aspects of 
the relationships between merchant banks and stockbro- 
kers, between merchant banks and self- rep uiatory bodies, 
and finally, between merchant banks and their clients, 
we shall now proceed to chapters 8 and 9 which dwell on 
the comparative results and" behaviour derived from the 
empirical data gleaned from the field survey and caso 
studied. 
-iÜi 
-- 
OUAPTER 8 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: MERCHANT 
BANKING ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE & BIDDING STRATEGIES 
8.0 Introduction 
Chapters 4,5,6 and 7 reported v e;, s 
of the merchant bankers and to a smaller 
-degree the s oc 
._ 
broking community. To test these, 40 contested bids occu- 
ring between 1979-1981 were analysed in detail using ýýre s 
reports, offer and defence documents and other reports as 
the sources of information. Using this evidence, hypothe- 
ses are tested on the benefits of affiliation to lapger 
financial groups, dys£uneti cris arising from such an associ a- 
1on, loan' t ciiýLüiiüsa, viwinu; vi the bid, opeiaii v: 
... 
i 
terms of consideration, inclination towards pre-bid control, 
the influence of the media on takeovers, and finally, fac-- 
tors which determine the decisive outcome of a contested 
bid., 
8.1 Advantages of Affiliation 
The prime advantage regarding aliiiia- 
tion with large parents according to most merchant banks 
surveyed is financial strength. This hypothesis is giver. 
strong credibility when we compare the balance sheets of 
the 30 merelant banks and their parent'or anisations (see 
Appendix Table 5.5 in volume 2), As can be rjs. ýý:; t'3'ned 
from, {_ 
.. 
btli.. s %I s: 4 f. : IS a f'i '. i? t (mss rJf;: hi ö vci. º. E' imc clan - 'Jan'tics such as E3,51 i 
ý I; J.. ý. 1 
1. M12O, 1'n2G1 M1327 and i'iB28 have large si"?: '"ýýiý:. i 1. c: ý. 
- 
M131 ng 
With total assets amountinc,; to over £: ' billion or 
- 
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Undoubtedly, these merchant banks can draw on the huge ca- 
pital base or their parent companies who are either large 
clearing banks or British-controlled overseas banks. 
8.2 Organisational Dysfunctions 
The disadvantages of association with a 
larger parent cited most frequently by merchant banks was 
that of conflicts of interest and lack of-independence. 
In the context of this study, conflicts 
of interest denote a situation in which two or more in;: er- 
ests are legitimately present but opposing. In the UK, 
many of the senior merchant banking directors are also non- 
executive directors of numerous companies. As such. the 
mercban t hmil'ker caught in this situation is 
torn be i-'wen responsibilities to his bann', to the client 
company and to the shareholders of many other. comp nies 
involved of which he is the director. Additional respon-- 
sibil ity to a parent company fur the? complicates -this 
pattern of sometimes complicated roles. This may occur, 
for instance, when giving advice to clientele who are 
clients of the commercial bank of which the merchant bank 
is a subsidiary. In such circumstances, the merchant 
bank not only needs to adopt an impartial approach but may 
have to convince its clients of the independence of its 
specialist advice. 
HoWever, with the rapid expansion and 
diversifications of many of the leading UK clearing banks 
internationally and into merchant banking in the 1970s and 
the 1980s, the line between '; rholesalei and 'retail' bank- 
ing is becoming increasingly blurred. This accelerated 
163 
convergence and overlap are likely sources of conflicts 
particularly in terms of the allocation of banking func- 
tions. Conflicts of interest may also be accentuated by 
the differences in the corporate structures and strategy 
of*both types of UK banking systems. A well known case 
illustrating this problem involved Sir Charles Ball who 
refused to cede the oedium-term lending business of Bar- 
clays Merchant Bank to Its parent company, Barclays Bank, 
and was removed from his post as chairman. 
Another example arose from a conflict of 
interest between Midland Bank and Samuel. 4ontagu, its 
highly established merchant banking sub idiary. In Octo- 
ber 1980, its former chairman, Mr. Philip Shelbourne rc- 
signed to become the chairman of British National Oil Cor- 
poration (BMOC). Instead of allowing Samuel Montagu to 
appoint its own replacement, Midland Ban deliberately 
bypassed the board of its merchant bank by bringing in an 
outside appointment to replace Mr. Shelbourne and not con- 
sulting the board over this important appointment. The 
press had speculated that Mr. John Gillum, the deputy 
chairman of Samuel Montagu was the natural successor to the 
ex-chairman. Commenting on the high-handedness of Mid- 
land's action, "The Times" newspaper stated: 
This was no way to treat the management 
of a merchant bank whose membership of the Accepting Houses 
Committee implies independence from its parent. The pity 
is that at Montagu, it has set about it in a way which can 
-raise doubts about how independent its merchant bank ac- 
tually is... Not surprisingly, it has caused bitterness 
within I-Iontagu. 11 
(Phe Times, " 10t: ß October 1980) 
In this particular incident, it is Jerti- 
nent to recall that when Midland Bank acquired control of 
Samuel Mlontagu in 
. 
1973, it had to give an undertaking to 
the Accepting Houses Committee that Samuel iNiontagu will 
have the chance to develop as an independent merchant bank 
within the 1-1i Bland Groups However, this insider t :g is 
illustrated that 4idland's ban_": ing policy_ to: °rares iz SUD 
- 
- 
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sidiary had changed and that it did not 
--a-dhev. to the spirit 
of the earlier undertaking. 
Owing to the international operations 
of both clearing and merchant banks, potential conflicts 
also emerged in this area of operation. For instance, 
Midland Bank and Samuel I4ontagu again clashed over the 
functions of their Singapore incorporated merchant banking 
subsidiary (49% stake held by Midland Bank and Samuel Mon-- 
tagu with the rest being retained by'its Singagora partnews) 
Midland Montagu Merchant Bank which was created in 1980. 
The top management of Midland wanted "MMMB" (Midland it: on- 
tagu) as a vehicle for large syndicated loans in order to 
exploit the generous tax concessions of Singapore, a major 
Asian offshore financial cants. Samuel Montagu, on the 
other hand, favoured developing it into a fee-based and 
gold-bullion trading type merchant bank reflecting its own 
forte. An impasse emerged as a consequence of irreconci- 
lable differences on operational roles 
A merchant banking subsidiary's position 
can also become compromised when its parent company is been 
acquired by some other organisation. If the bidder was a 
foreign company, then the merchant bank's Accepting Houses 
statuscuo will be rendered vulnerable. It should be 
emphasised that both the Bank of England and the Accepting 
Houses Committee do not encourage foreign ownership of Bri- 
tish merchant banks. In fact, in 1980, the Accepting 
Houses Committee expelled Antony Gibbs, one of its oldest 
members, following its acquisition by the Hong Kong & Shang- 
hai Bank because the new parent bank was regarded as a 
foreign bank, Antony Gibbs was not deemed suitable to re- 
tain its Accepting Houses status. Similarly, when Marsh & 
McLennan acquired control of C. T. Bowring,. the status of 
Singer & Friedlander, its merchant banking subsidiary be- 
came compromised, again, due to the foreign nature of its 
new American parent company. in order to p. ý'eser :e inge_ 
& Friedlander 's membership within the !,. ccep t ino Hou'seS (; om-- 
mittee and also to facility to its taKeover of ý3oz. ri: z 
, 
Marsh & £'Ac 
, 
ennan then carried out it o utid. e-urtai. ing to the 
16, 
Accepting Houses Committee by selling the merchant Dank to 
European Ferries, a company more amenable to the Accepting 
Houses Committee. 
8.3 Loan Facilitation 
Ensuring the availability of a loan to 
enable the bidder to complete the takeover transaction is 
an integral part of acquisition planning. This is 
. 
arti- 
cularly important: if the bidder's resources are limited 
and. it. is making an acquisition of a target company of con- 
siderable size. The. emergence of a counter-b: idder__can 
also inflate the bid price and make recourse to external 
funding necessary. From the survey, all the respondents 
stated that they would assist their clients ;; ith the ne- 
cessary credit facility in L akeover transactions but empýsa- 
sised that such a facility does not come under the purview 
of the corporate finance department, rather, it is a func-- 
ti. on. of the banking division. ' It is interesting to test 
this declared willingness of merchant banks to assist their 
clients with loan facilities by examining data from the 
case studies. 
( 1-b ý 
Loan Success Failure Failure Loans (d) as " of 
Facility in bid 
No. 
in bid 
No. 
rate (b) { 
as % of d 
given esse stur; i-- 
No. es n=0 
No loan aci-I 
lid used 9 7 44% , 16 53G 
Loan facility i 12 2 14; } 11ý 4 ? 
used 
Total ! ! E', g 
Chi-scuare 
= 
3.085, critical value = 3.84, degrees of free- dom 
=I( 5% level of S i3n ifi canoe) 
Table 8.0: Bids Effected With and Without Credit Facility 
And Their Outcome. 
From the evidence . ven in Table 8=0 
above, it can be discerned that there is ais: iost a baleuico 
t- 
-- 
between bidders embarking on takeovers with loan facility 
and those proceeding without. However, chi-square test 
has shown that there is no difference in bid success be-- 
tween those effected with credit facility and those with- 
out, impiying that credit facility, whilst important in 
assisting the bidder in his acquisition programme, does not 
necessarily ensure the successful outcome of a takeover 
attempt. 
Although data on loans for takeovers is not 
available for merchant banks in the UK, there is evidence 
of the scale of support in the USA with. 'major takeovers 
where the bidders or potential buyers arranged huge lines 
of credit with their banks as shown by Table 8.1 below. 
Borrower ý amount I ý-__-. --_ Lead Bank 
Mobil Oil. 6.0 C%Tt oan ý` 
Gulf Oil 6.0 Bankers Trust and National Westmixtiterl 
Texaco 5.5 Chase Manhattan } 
Marathon Oil 5.0 Chase Manhattan 
Du Pont; 4.0 Chase Ianhattan 
Seagram 3.9 Citibank and ? anufacturers Hanover Bali' 
Conoco 3.0 Morgan Guaranty, Chase, Bank of America 
Allied Corn. 3.0 n/a 
Pennzoil 2.5 Citibank 
Table 8.1L: Financing Arrangements on July 1981 for major 
American Corporations Embarking on Takeovers. 
Source: adapted from the "Financi. a? Times, " <14/7/81 and 
28/7/81). 
Within the comparable period in the UK, no such 
instances of credit facility of this size has been detec- 
ted or arranged for such gigantic acquisitions. 
8.4 Bid Timing 
In Chapter 5, the empirical evidence fro; the 
Yield survey suggested that in general, merchant banks 
believe that as part of their acquisition strategy, ti: -Ang 
was a crucial fnc or but at the same tine; -they pointed 
- 
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out that they have also to take into account many other 
factors which impinge on their corporjte dccisioi1"-,:: a kin- 
process. None the less, it was generally agreed that the 
financial performance of the target company is an impor- 
tant determinant of the time of the bid. It was Possible 
to test this hypothesis using the financial data extracted 
from the case studies (Group 1) by discerning the time the 
takeover was initiated with regards to the financial per- 
formance of the biddee companies. It is possible to 
divide the takeover timing mechanism into 3 prime cat2go- 
ries 
Timing in Relation Bic. % of Total ' Failure to IFaiiure 
to Target Company I; o. Bids Acquire hate M 
TL (PP) 12 40% 3i 25 
TL NP) 10 3 ill 40 
TL (IP 8 2 2 25q; 
-- Total I 30 
Chi-square 
= 
0.711, critical. value = 5.. 99, degrees of 
freedoym 2 5% S199tiif icant level). 
Table 842: The Timing Mechanism-of the 30 Case Studies 
Rey 
TL(PP) 
= 
takeover launched by the bidder coinciding 
with the positive performance of the 
biddee company. 
TL(NP) 
= 
takeover launched by the bidder coinciding 
with the negative performance of the biddee 
TL(IP) 
= 
takeover launched irrespective of the bid- 
dee's performazic. e i. e. when the ti, «ing 
mechanism is upset by a counter-bidder. 
The evidence from Table 8.2 above indi- 
cates that the number of bids effected coincidinf, with good 
corporate performance of the biddee marginally exceeded 
those when the target's performance ,. as depressed. Al- 
though it would be logical to infer that it would be rela- 
tively simple to acquire a . sic 4i m company characterised by 
bad results, the evidence above conveys a different message. 
-- 
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This observation is reinforced by the results of the chi- 
square statistical test which illuminated the fact that 
good bid timing does not necessarily generate a corres- 
pondingly high level of acquisition success. This empi- 
rical finding may be explained by taking a mixture of 
these circumstances into account. Firstly, bids initia- 
ted in conjunction with depressed corporate results of 
the biddee company are normally opportunistic by nature 
and as such, the defender can capitalise on this factor. 
Secondly, in some instances where the bidders attempted 
to discount heavily on assets (Cambridge Royalty Corpora- 
tion/Cambridge Petroleum Royalty and the Francis Indust- 
ries/Cvered case studies), the key shareholders resisted 
strongly and successfully defeated the takeover attempts 
structured along this line. Finally, owing to the inevi- 
table controversies surrounding contested takeovers and 
the change in the Governuent's. official policy to merger 
(from "favourable" to "neutral" posture), they are now 
more vuingrabl e to a 
-refereence by the 
O- i c. 
-¬ ; oý 
_ 
rcLd ins (Lonhro/SLTITTS, Lorhro; : kose of Fraser 
and. the Hong Kong & Shanghai-Bank/Standard Chattered Bank/ 
Royal Bank of Scotland case studies). So, although the 
timing mechanism from the bidder's point of view may be 
'correct' this study has shown that success is not neces- 
sarily requisite nor ensured as the outcome of a strongly 
contested bid is dependent on a multitude of factors. 
8.5 Terms of Consideration 
Acquisition financing and devising terms 
of consideration entail a broad understanding of both fi- 
nancial and non-financial aspects. An earlierr, chapter 
(5) has shown that merchant bankers take many diverse 
factors in o account when deciding on the cash or equity 
terms of a bid. During the course of the nmerchantl banking 
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survey, many of the respondents pointed out that over the 
last few years, acquisition financing has been marked by a 
preference for the cash element rather than for share ex-- 
change., This observation has been given credence by data 
from official publication (see Table 8.3 on the next page). 
supporting the general trend towards cash financing. as well 
as evidence from this research based on case studies (see 
Table 8.4, page 170). ' 
It is difficult to pinpoint the precise 
reason for this phenomenon *but there are 2 possible expla- 
nations of the greater weight given to cash in acquisition 
-financing during the period 1979-1981 selected for this sur- 
vey. One possible reason is that the contemporary bidders 
favour more effective corporate control (shareholders of 
biddee company by accepting cash are in fact surrendering 
their claim to the company) whereas in a share exchange, 
depending on the ratio of the newly merged entity, the 
biddee shareholders still have a stake in the enlarged 
group. Another more likely reason is that equity prices 
here throughout the period undervalued assets and bi? dee's 
shareholders may therefore have found cash more acceptable. 
8.6 Opening Premium (Bid Pricing) 
On average, over all the Group I case studies 
the bid premium was 19.3%. 
1 This figure is very near to the 
premium level advocated by the merchant bankers (see Chapter 
5) and also writers like Hayes and Taussig (10)(1967) and 
Philip Shelbourne (3)(1967) who stated that the bid premium 
should be approximately be over 20% over the market price. 
One would have expected that the higher the premium, the 
lower would be the failure rate. However, the evidence in 
1. The premium was calculated by ta king the opening bid, 
price on the day of the announcement of the cor al take- 
over and subtracting the final market price of tie bid- doe company irn ediately prior to the despatch- o' the hi. d 
.2 ti. n "1 .n . ýrº . 1.1%^ .. rir+. '. iiv /ý i°' lýn 4"0 ýrcýl t+ '' b` 4.4. V A. Cii VJ. va. i ttuaiv waaV ýr uýr. av vi rmv,... \: ý. 
.. - .. 
t 
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eUI_ Cash ; 
-' 
ordinary 
Equity %j 
pr ef 
. 
Snares 
C,.. Loan 
St; cý; '_k 
_ 
Total 
E: pen-' 
cl i; ux 
N, 0. of 
Acc uisi- ýi. c zs 
-ý 
1970 
2y6 28 
251 22. 
55ý ýý 596 53 
221 
275 
21 
r 25 
19069 
1,122 t1Cl: r3 
1971 285 31 437 48 189 21 911 884- 
I 972 4-93 20 1 , 'L59 58 580 
23 27532 11210 
1973 691 53 466 36 147 11 
1974 314.7 68 114 22 47 9 508 t 501 
1975 173 59 93 32 25 9 291 5 
1976 ý> 72 > 120 27 7 15 4148 353 
1977 512 62 304 37 8 1 824 481 
c78 654 57 463 41 23 2 1,140 567 
1979 933 56 515 31 208 13- , 656 534 
1980 760 52 669 45 46 3 1,11-75 469 
Table 8.3: Mergers and Acquisitions of Industrial and 
Commercial Companies within UK 1969-80 
Source: CSO, "Financial Statistics, " (No. 229), May 1981 
and HMSO, Business Monitor MQ7" (4th Qtr113 London 
1980. 
I TYIýn of Fi anc n, I'4a. %' of Total Bid (n=30) 
; ', ash instrument 15 50 
`Equity instrument 8 27 
mix_turo 7' 22 
Total AC 00 
Table 8.4: Characteristics of Bid Financing 
Discerned in Case Studies. 
- 
17.1 
Table 8.5 below suggests no such relationship. 
Premium 
class 
Ido. of 
bids 
Bid Failure 
No. 
Failure Rate 
b as % of a 
Less than 1 4 1 25 
I-9.9 4 3 75 
10 
- 
19.9 8 1' 13 
20 
- 
29.9 8 3 38 
30-39.9 2 0 0 
40 
- 
49.9 4 1 25 
Total s f 
- 
Table 8.5: Level of Premium Adopted by Bidders in 
the Case Studies and Failure Rate. 
Success! Failurel Total 
Premium Class INoo Igo. 3o= 
below 20%' 
above 20 
11 
10 
5 
4 
16 
4 r 
Total 21 1 ýý 
Chi--square 
= 
0.025, critical value = 3.84L. -degrees 
of freedom =1( 5% Si nif icant level) 
Table 8.6: Opening Premium Analysed by Obi-Sqvate 
Test. 
Indeed, the rate of acquisition failure 
peaked in 2 classes of relatively high'premium, i. e., the 
20%-29.9% class and the 40%49.9= class. Specific expla- 
nations can be found. In the first category, one failure 
may be attributed to the blockage imposed by the Monopolies 
Commission (the Hiram Walker/Highland Distil cries case 
study), the second failure was due to the rescue effected 
by a 'white knight' RTZ Company in the last minute (Ward/ 
Tunnel Holdings case study), and the third takeover failed 
owing to strong resistance from the founding family and key 
institutional holders (Sirre Darby/Guthrie case study). In 
the second category, despite the attractive premium attach- 
ed to the offer (over 40%), the merger was blocked by the 
Monopolies Commission (the Standau!. Chartered Bark/Hong 
Kong &: Shanghai }Jank/Royal Bank of Scotland case study). 
Computation from Table 8.6 above also indicated the ? Pact 
that bids initiated wi tir a premium of more than 20; 1 do n at 
necessarily have a higher chance of success than the 
- 
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effected below this specific threshold. This evidence 
from the case studies is consistent with the empirical 
findings of the merchant bankers (Chapter 5). 
8.7 Pre-bid Stake 
Interviews with merchant bankers, repor- 
ted in Chapter 5 suggested that the size of the pre-bid 
shareholding or stake in'the biddee is an important factor 
in bid strategy. 
Prebid 
stake 
j (a) 
No. of 
bids 
(b) 
Bid Failure, 
No. ! 
Failure Rai 4 
b es g of (a 
0-4.9 J6 2 33 
5- 9.9 4 1. ' 25 
10 
- 
14.9 7 4 57 
15 2 2 100 
20 2 2 
more than 25 '91 0 0 l 
Total 50 c i 
Table 8.7: Pre-bid Characteristics of the 30 Case 
Studies and its Failure Rate. 
'Success FailurelTotal Pre-bid Class No. No. No. 
below 20y 10 9 19 
above 20% ii 0 11 
Total 21 !yi 30 
Chi-square 
= 
7.444, critical value = 3.84, degrees 
of freedom =I(: 5% Seri-;, f (cc nt level) 
Table 8.8: Pre-bid Stake Analysed by Chi-Square 
Test., 
From Table 8.7 above depicting the number 
o takeover bids effected from various levels of control or 
ownership status. and in Table 8.8 (reclassified into e ma-- 
jor grou_pinGs), it is evident that the bids launched 'Lro-.,, 
{... rm 1, less th v. =O am mere li L-<? 1' r_. fl -; l a han 
those launched from a p! ctform of more than 20%. 
--173- 
8.8 The Role and Influence of the Media in Contested Bids 
We have seen in Chapter 5 that the majority 
of the merchant' banking respondents have indicated that it 
was their policy to brief the press at all stages of a 
takeover' battle. However, it is very difficult to measure 
quantitatively the extent or the influence exercised by 
the media on the merchant banking community on the final 
outcome of a bid. Nevertheless, their comments must to 
some degree influence the opinions of the fund managers 
and the small investors. It is possible, however, as in 
Table 8.9 on the next page to determine. whether or not 
press comment was favourable or unfavourable, particularly 
in the final stages of the battle, and whether such co-D- 
ments in the "Financial Times, " "The Times, " and "Inves- 
tors Chronicle" were associated with success or failure. 
The number of failures among the 6 examples selected was 
too small to permit statistical analysis but the Table does 
ý1 ve general i mpressi on of a ssoci ion. ý;. ý"y^ n1y 
the merchant banks believe-that-the press is influential 
for-they exploit favourable press comments in their cir- 
culars to shareholders (see Appendix A, Group 1 Case Stu-- 
dies). Both bidder and biddee and their financial advi- 
sers may also resort to heavy advertising when the in. depen- 
dent shareholders held the key to the outcome. As a case 
in point, in the context of the Dalgety/Spillers case 
study, advertising was unusually intensive with Spiller's 
adopting a novel defensive public relations approach cen- 
tering around the cartoon figure of "=red F iourgrader" in 
order to foster identification with the Group's products 
as well as evoking shareholders' sympathy. The heavy ex- 
penditure incurred in advertising in this particular ins- 
tance, provoked a new Panel ruling that all future adver-- 
tiseruents related to bids required its seal of approval. 
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8.9 Success Doter; cinazit"s 
Once control of the biddee company pas-- 
sed into the hands of the bidder (usually, the 50.155% thres- 
hold), the defender very often found it difficult to offer 
any more resistance and would normally resort to recommen- 
ding the merger to its shareholders. From the find ngs 
of the survey discussed in Chapter 5, the merchant bankers 
usually attributed success to such factors as price ade- 
quacy, industrial logic of the merger, performance and 
image of the client, recommendation from key shareholders 
of the target company and approval from the board. in 
this section; the major perceptions of the respondents 
are correlated against those findings of the Group I case 
studies (see Table 8.10 below and also Appendix Table C. -) 
which depicts comparative highlights of the case studies), 
I Success 
. 
Deterna naht 
Nerc ant 
Sur:: oy 
Banking4 Oase Stud 
n=7() ± ie n=30 
price adequacy 16 
industri al/commercial logic 20 14 
bidder's performance 
support from key shareholders 17 9 
tactics and arguments 16 20 
recommendation from directors 13 15 
level of pre-bid stake 11 17 
assurances 10 17 
past record of target company 9 11 
press comments i9 9. 
market conditions 16 8 1 
Table 8.10: Comparison of Determinants IrifiuencinE Success 
between those of the Merchant Banking Survey 
and those of the Case Studies Spanning the 
1979-81 Period. 
Interviews with the merchant bankers had 
suggested 11 pertinent Factors linked to bid success. As 
such, each of the case studies was analysed to establish 
if these same 11 factors ;: light have been present. 
The first two determinants require fur- 
ther elaboration as they are rnthsr subjective. The res- 
pondents in the survey of merchant bankers did not define 
". price a e^. uac p Clearly, a price could be det'inef! 
- 
1ßj6 
as adequate if it induced a sufficient number of shsrehol- 
d©rs to accept the offer, but the relationship with success 
would then be tautological and of no empirical or practical 
interest. Consequently, it was necessary to develop cr_1. 
- 
teria for "price adequacy". In analysing the case stud- 
ies, two considerations were taken into account; 
1) Whether a premium was incorporated in the bid 
pricing. 
2) Whether there was revision in the original bid 
price. 
Industrial or commercial logic as defined 
in this survey, pertains to the type of merger proposed 
by the bidder, i. e. whether it is vertical, horizo: ital or 
a case of corporate diversification. For instance, i' 
Trust House Forte were to bid for William Collins (the 
publisher) rather than the Savoy Group, then the mer er 
a6 tempt No- lu be ueE; tlcit to lack C: o ie ci 2 log i as gis: 5t 
House Forte does not have the* relevant management expertise 
in running a publishing business. 
Thus, within the framework just defined.; 
the evidence from Table 8.10 confirms the professional 
judgement and honesty of the merchant bankers interviewed 
on this significant bid issue. 
8.10 Summary/Review 
in terms of operational advantage, vie 
noted that the majority of the UK c? eaa: "ing banns and Bri- 
tish-owned overseas banks merchant banking offshoots are 
; 
indeed supported by the vast financial resources of their 
s ad :. re so ved t" -r Parent companies. G the other -u.. 
,_ .r.. . _ä 
these merchant banking operations stiff ered fron time t c, 
time from parental interference in terms of 
_ 
conflict of 
r ýj 
_ýl, 
_ 
interest arising from allocation of functions to boardroom 
matters such as the appointment of senior staff. 
Broadly speaking, the merchant banks favour- 
ed providing their clients with credit facility in order to 
facilitate the takeover bids but this is not a function of 
the corporate finance division. Rather, it is the purview 
of the banking division within the merchant bank. Although 
the merchant banks were guided by the basic principle of 
initiating takeover bids to coincide with the bad results of 
the target companies, evidence in this study suggests that 
this was not always possible due to the entry of rival bidders 
or potential buyers building up a secret holding in the victim 
company. 
The opening premium according to the findings 
of this study is about 19.3% and. cash constitutes the most 
popular means of acquiring control of the biddee company. 
This is is 
broadly in line ine ., with 
3. t. the 
pes ce . -pL 
Lions 
of 
the 
merchant 
banks and the literature surveyed. Although general finan- 
cial and non-financial principles exist for prescribing the 
terms of consideration, there is no straight forward formula 
as each case is dependent on special factors involved and a 
matter of serious negotiation. The evidence suggests good 
underpinning reasons why the bidder should build up a substan- 
tial control stake before springing a takeover attempt so as 
to increase his chance of success (empirical findings have 
shown this to be the case). It is also apparent that the 
press does exercise some degree of impact on the tactical 
thinking of financial advisers and to a certain extent, the 
outcome of each contested deal. However, its precise contri- 
bution is hard to measure. Finally, the contributory deter- 
minants to the success of an acquisition are very much contin- 
gent upon factors like price adequacy and the inability of 
the VON company to defend itself due to general financial. 
weaknesses and other factors. 
- 
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF E PKRICAL FINDINGS: DEFENSIVE 
STRATEGIES AND THE ROLE OF MERCHANT BANKERS AS TAKE- 
OVER SPECIALISTS 
9.0 Introduction 
The focus in this chapter is on the 
defensive techniques and the inter-relationships between 
merchant bankers and others. It therefore discusses 
again factors such as the ramifications of share composi- 
tion on tactical manoeuvres, features associated with the 
underlying jass mr+: i(TQ of forem- (. nc! TC ncari in 2%nrtii-= i: ri 
hiri_ 
litigation associated with deviant forecasts, factors 
enabling merchant banks to maintain their supremacy as 
merger cum takeover specialists in the UK, the degree of 
their involvement with self-regulator j bodies and final l, 
the nature of their working relationships with their cor- 
porate clientele. Within the discussion., the results of 
analysis of the 30 case studies are again compared with 
the perceptions of the merchant bankers reported in Chap- 
ters6 and 7. 
9.1 Defensive Strategies in Dersnectitre 
In order to contest and successfully 
dof end itself against a hostile offer, the manag: men t or 
board and its financial advisers can resort to certain 
counter-measures as ý; : have seer. in Ghapte e 
the degree to which both öiddee and advisor 
_ 
can tn o eva- 
vivo action is C1? ctate(i. 0. ' inf S il 
_?. 
C': ýs sue ý r'S the L. Lill: -- 
ri? 9 
- 
ciary obligations to shareholders and the code of conduct 
imposed by the UK self-regulatory system. The decision- 
making process here is also guided by the need to provide 
shareholders with all the relevant information to enable 
them tQ judge the merits and demerits of the takeover pro- 
posal. As such, the board together with its merchant 
banking advisers and 'stockbrokers cannot simply frustrate 
a bid without taking into account the various City provi- 
sions, rulings and restraints prescribing the conduct of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
Table 9.. 2. Correlated Data of the 11 Defensive Strategies 
ve°ausive -Strategy Observa . ions 
Merchant Banks! Case Studi ; s:. 
1. revaluation (asset) 30 22 
2. dividend increase 30 14 
3. profit forecasts 30 17 
4. appeaiforlojalt 
_4 
acing - __.. ____ 
30 
----- ýf W 'fir 'I ----- 
6. effect an acquisition 1ö 8 
, 
asset disposal " 13 j ý: 
8. legal action 1s t7 
9. capital reconstruction, 7 0 
10. 
"bonus/scrips issue 2 0 11. buy bidder's equity 0 0 
Spearman Correlation-Coefficient 
= 
0.905, critical value 
= 
0.6091 (significant at the 5% level) 
The perceptions of the merchant banks 
when correlated with the data from the case studies regar- 
ding the 11 selective defensive strategies in Table 9.0 
above reveal a high degree of consistency. A Spearman's 
rank correlation-coefficient of 0.905 suggested a highly 
significant positive association between defensive strate- 
gies favoured by the merchant banking community and those 
discerned in the case studies. Using a two-tailed test 
for a significance level of 
. 
05, we find that the critical 
values for ""r" are' 0.6091. Therefore, we would reject 
the null hypothesis of no correlatiors: The r vi clrý_1^- 
again suggests is that the merchant bankers into-vie'.. J ýro 
-180-- 
expressing openly the principles on which they work. 
The first 4 defensive strategies in Table 
9.0, i. e. asset revaluation, dividend increase, profit 
forecast and appeal to shareholders' loyalty are clearly 
not only cited. more frequently by merchant bankers but 
were also actively used most frequently in actual takeover 
cases. More controversial defences, such an undertaking 
an acquisition programme, legal action and sale of corpo- 
rate assets were also combined with these 4 in a'number of 
cases where thought appropriate. We shall now investigate 
the 11 defensive strategies selected for this study in 
greater depth and examine the implication's from the com_oa- 
rative analysis between the advocacy of the 
. 
merchant banks 
and the realities of actual contested bids reflected in 
the case studies. 
(1) 
. 
Asset ReValuation 
The most popular and much publicised de- 
f'ensive device which target companies deployed in the face 
of hostile bids is the adjustment of the fixed assets in ? 
their corporate balance sheets. This is because some com- 
panies are opportunistic bidders aspiring to acquire under- 
valued assets cheaply or in specific cases, where up to 
date financial information was deficient, they would employ 
the "sighting shot" strategy to extract the relevant fac- 
tual data for them to appraise the real worth of the target 
companies. From the biddee's viewpoint; the revalation 
of up-to-date accounting information during the 'currency 
of the bid provides its shareholders with the chance to 
rationally evaluate the merits or demerits of the offer. 
In business or industry which is asset, 
- 
orientated but reflecting. poor or erratic performance, for 
e sample, companies like Hardy, SUITS, the House of Fraser, 
Proprietor of Hayes ': s harf 
, 
End;? : ish Propcar j- Colrpo_ation, 
el apioo,, and the Sad: oy; 
- 
'1 LJ -- - 
tuteci one of the main planks of defence in order to demons- 
trate to their shareholders the strong net asset backing 
behind their holdings. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Action Defence Defence 
ýT l 
(a) as ; Total 
; taken Success Nco r 
revaluation 5 17 22 23 
no revaluation 4 4 50 
Total 21 1 3ÖýI 
Table 9.1: Asset Revaluation and Implications for 
Outcome of Defence. 
Statistical Results: 
Chi-square 
= 
2.078, critical value = 3.8ý-, degrees of 
freedom 
=1( 5% Sýný3ican E level) 
Results from Chi-square test in Table 
9.1 above have confirmed that asset revaluation does not 
exert material influence on the outcome of defence This 
goes to illustrate the point-that although property reva- 
luation is a vital key in defensive strategy, for its prac-- " 
tical application to be enhanced, it should be harnessed 
in tandem with the other counter--measures designed to de- 
feat an unwanted takeover bid. 
(2) Dividend Increase 
Under the Counter Inflation Act of 1973, 
listed companies could not raise the amount of ordinary 
dividends paid in relation to their share capital by more 
than 10% over the previous dividend level without the 
approval of the Treasury. Consent however, from the Trea- 
sury was always forthcoming conditional upon successful 
defence if the board of the biddee indicated i. ts desire Uo 
contoat the takeover by escalating its dividend pc j "--out.. 
in 1979, however, the present'. Conservative Goveri! nient lif- 
ted this restriction. Its application as a aefezive 
- 
182 
- 
took is based on the premise that a higher dividend often 
enhanced the value of a company's aquity. 
abc d) 
Action __ Defence Defence 
,., L as % aý N taken O  a .l Success(No. Z Failuý e(No. ); of (. c 
dividend increase I5i9 14 
no dividend increase I4, 'i 2 16 25 
Table 9.2: Implications of Dividend Increase for Outcome 
of Defence. 
Statistical Results: 
Chi-square 00407, critical value = 3.84, degrees of -free- dom 
=I(. 5% Si9ni fee nt. level). 
The evidence from Table 9.2 above hic., "h- 
lighted the fact that dividend increase by itself is not a 
key determinant in the success of a defence. Like the other 
core defensive strategies (for instances asset revaluation), 
it has to. be employed jointly with other defensive techniques 
designed to ward off the unwelcome bidder. 
3) Profit Forecast 
Table 9.3: Profit Forecast and Implications for Outcome 
of Defence 
Action Defence Defence dot i a) as ; bi taken Success(No. ) Failure(io. ), 
_1 
oT"__ ) 
profit forecast" Ino forecast 
12 `} 17 I 29 59( 
13 ! 3-1 
I Total ? ý3 }, 1 ý- 30 
Chi-square 
= 
0.00/, critical value : 3.84, degvees of freedom 
= 'i nif ý'cajj 1 evel ) 
'! uern iirtgs 
- 
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ted that from the case studies, slightly more companies re- 
sorted to profit forecast as a defensive tool but attracted 
a lower success rate underlining the fact that defensive 
strategies are numerous and varied and although profit fore- 
cast is considered to be a pivotal defensive strategy, its 
deployment in contested bid situations does not necessarily 
ensure success implying the importance of the need to in- 
corporate. other counter-measures as well. 
-(4)Appeal for Loyalty 
The investor r. eceivin-e notice of a take- 
over bid is obliged to carefully evaluate the merits-and 
demerits of the offer. In makin, a judgement, he may rely 
on the recommendations of the board of directors, financial 
journalists, ' lawyers, stockbrokers, accountants, iaves-Vimeni; 
analysts or bankers as to whether he should retain or dis- 
pose of his equity. He may speculate on the prospects of 
a higher premium from rival bids emerging or else face the 
prospects of being "locked in" as a minority holder should 
the bid succeed. Statutory provisions (City Code, Stock 
Exchange rules and Companies Act) also make it mandatory for 
directors of the biddee company to comment on the offer. 
It is precisely at this point-that the management together 
with its financial advisers can first seek to win the sup- 
port of their multitude of shareholders through the defence 
circulars. Appealing to shareholders' patriotism is the-re- 
fore universal in all contested bids and this line of de- 
fence must be interpretated broadly as patriotism or loyalty 
includes anything from national interest (in the case of 
Highland Distilleries and the Royal Bank of Scotland) to 
pointing out to the dangers of asset-stripping by the bidder. 
(such an accusation was levelled by Liggett against Grand 
I: et; ropolitan) or the general unsuitability of the oifero= 
. 
For example, Savoy attempted to undermine shareholders' 
- 
18L 
confidence in Trust House. Forte by declaring that the mer- 
ger with Trust House Forte lacked logic because Trust House 
Forte operates highway cafe, In the case of 
, 
Spillers, as 
the company could not make full use of financial arguments 
due to its bad, performance, it shifted its line of defence 
to the sentimentality of shareholders through heavy adver- 
tising using the caricature of "Fred Fl. ourgrader. " This 
approach is normally exercised when there is a predominance 
of small shareholders and if the basis of contention rests 
on independence rather than price. 
{5) Placing (Issue of Shares to FriendlZ Holders) 
Placing, basically involves the issue 
or sale of a block of the company's equity capital to a I 
sympathetic instituution, company or individual, is designed. 
to thwart unfriendly bid by making it more difficult for 
an outsider to acquire the company. Placing also includes 
arranging cross-holdings, issue of equity to the trustees 
for the incumbent company's staff or its pension fund, 
rights issues, acquiring a friendly private company for 
shares and share option scheme for employees. There are 
2 documented cases regarding its usage in the sample of the 
30 case studies. In the first case, after Provincial 
Laundries' failure to acquire St. George, the Armstrong, 
family (the dominant shareholder) placed some of its shares 
with private individuals. In the second instance, when 
Dunhill-Logida withdrew its bid for Aspreys, Morgan (iren- 
fell, the merchant bank (advisor to Aspreys) successfully 
bid for the blocks of shares owned by Dunhill-Logida and 
the Philip Asprey Trusts and then placed these with chosen 
clients. This had the effect of giving John Asprey, the 
current owner-chairman, decisive control over his company 
as well as serving as a deterrent to future bids for his 
rý 
li. ý ýitAu Street L Jüä 
ýA C: 1TPV v : ý^, ^""""ri ý" business ý Sv-v ýý1iL11y. J. 1 `'iJVýý ýý 1,. 
-. 
r- , -d L- - -'='c ="--ý 
-- 
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takeover bid in Appendix B, Group 2 Case Studies). 
(6) Capital Reconstruction 
This seems to be a lowly rated defensive 
tool by the merchant banks and the case studies failed to 
. 
reveal its application. The logic behind, its usage, how- 
ever, is quite subtle. For example, if a target company 
suspected that a takeover was attempted and was motivated 
by the company's under-geared capital. structure, the board 
can propose a. capital re-organisation to incorporate the 
required gearing into its capital structure through tüe 
substitution of preference capital by ? oan stock. 
{ 
(77) Scrips Issue 
It is another lowly rated tool and again, 
our study has uncovered no example of its application. In 
essence, this strategy is designed with the small, unsophis- 
ticated investors in mind. Presumably, when used, it has 
the effect of reducing the bid premium (which is based on 
the pre-bid equity) and therefore, the takeover will be 
construed as less attractive than before. For example, if 
the biddee's share is worth 200p and the bid is at 250p, 
the premium offered is thus 25%. If the biddee splits the 
equity 4: 1, the bid then becomes 60.25p per share (still a 
25% premium on a 50p shore) bi)t psychologically to the small 
holders, it is less attractive than 250p-for a 200p share. 
1. See i. A. yei. nberg eYF a"J. " ý/ 
, 
_=/'ý iV. __ (Fart V) for l or J JUC ctetails on this defensive strategy 
. 
-- 
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(8) Undertake a Defensive Merger 
The Takeover Code does not allow the biddee 
to embark on an acquisition during the actual takeover 
process merely to frustrate the bid in order to preserve 
its own independence. However, the Code does not res-- 
train the biddee from resorting to this strategy before 
or after (an aborted) takeover attempt. In the context of 
the case studies, in some cases like Wellman Engineering 
Corporation and Ewer, the bidders (i. e. Redman Heenan 
International and Cowie respectively) objected to their 
expansion programmes. In order to prevent further dilu- 
tion. of their shareholdings, the takeover attempts were 
swiftly initiated to coincide with the diversification 
programmes of their targets (in the case of Wellman sus gi-- 
neering Corporation, its proposed acquisition of "IB D" 
-n 
the USA and in Ewer's case, the takeover of Eastern Trac- 
tors). This tactic is also actively pursued by victims 
who have successfully eluded their potential bidders in 
the first attempt. The biddee then launched an acquisi-- 
tion programme contrived to strengthen its line of defence 
against the anticipated second bid attempt fror.: the or i gi-- 
nal bidder. From the case studies, it can be seen that 
Bestobell, British Sugar Corporation and Guthrie have 
availed themselves of this post-attempt defensive tactic. 
(9 ). Sale of Corporate Assets 
Similarly, the disposal of corporate assets 
is disallowed by the Panel, but again, this strategy may 
be used before or after a bid. in the case of Grand 
Metropolitan's attempted takeover of Liggett, the target 
company resorted to this controversial defensive strategy 
by instructing its financial advisers to arrange for the 
`disposal of parts or. all of its major assets. The s.: bse-- 
quent sale of Liggett's subsidiary, Austin nichols to a 
French company, Pernod R card, during; the process of the 
bid attracted heavy criticisms J, fro the b uv_, 
-. 
187 
highly unpopular move further accentuated the aggravat: icns 
that surrounded this bid attempt. In this particular 
-case in point, the usage of such a defensive tactic during 
the. actual takeover itself should be viewed in isolation 
because Liggett is an American company operating in the 
USA where such a practice is not outlawed by the Securities 
& Exchange Commission. 
Trust House Fortdsattempted takeover of 
the Savoy Group also coincided with the latter's proposed 
disposal of its East Wing property to another buyer. As 
an outsider to the actual event, it is not possible to pin-- 
point the true rationale influencing the disposal of this 
asset by the Savoy, but, from the strong resistance displayed 
by Trust House Forte towards the sale, it is not unreasona- 
ble then to infer that the disposal of this property con-s- 
tituted an integral part of Savoy's master defensive stra-- 
tegy designed to ward off unwelcome bids. 
Yet another case involved Lonhro's con- 
troversial. takeover of the House of Fraser. To frustrate 
Lonhro's persistent attempt to gain creeping control of the 
company, the board of the House of Fraser then decided to 
negotiate a sale-and-leaseback of its Oxford Street D. H. 
Evans departmental store with an institution in order to 
raise £29 million. This was done possibly with 2 defen- 
sive motives in mind, firstly, to strengthen the company's 
balance sheet and secondly, to put some of the prime assets 
of the Group outside the sphere of control of the bidder 
in order to dissuade him from mounting a full bid. 
(10) Leal Action 
Leal action is defined here in he wi. d- 
est sense as it encompasses reference to the monopolies 
OoL nis i n, Schere of rr fl^"f; r.; nit devic and la w": 2= ^. y-v 
- 
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In 4 of the cases analysed, submission was made to the 
1.. onopolies and Mergers Co: i: aission. Three of the 
cases cited in Table 9.4 below resisted strongly but in 
the case of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the company had 
approved the bid from Standard and Chartered Bank but not 
that of the Hong Kong & Shanghai. Bank. Despite this, 
pressures from other groups led to a referral and subse- 
quent blockage by the Government. 
Bidder Target MPIC Outcome Verdict 
GEC 
___ 
Averys cle reä isucc, -sFdii 
'Hiram '1lalkor 
SUBS ; cleared successful; 
Standard & Chartered Bank Royal Bank of vatoed ý. a so H. Y. & Shanghai Bank Scotland 
ve 
Table 9.4: Takeovers from the Case Studies Rene; red to 
the Monopolies 0 omr issioils 
In the case of the proposed acouisition of' 
Cambridge Petroleum Royalty, the bidder resorted to the 
legal device of a proposed Scheme of Arrangement but owing 
to its gross undervaluation of the biddee's assets and the 
vociferous institutional objections, Cambridge Royalty 
Corporation failed to obtain the 75% majority required for 
the scheme to be successful. 
(11) Accuire the Bidder's Shares 
Evidence from this study reveals that this 
novel defence has indeed been used for the first time as 
the circumstances warranted Sits adaptation and usage in the 
UK. In our Berisford/British Sugar Corporation/, Rank Hovis 
McDougall case study (see Appendix B, Group 2 Case Studies) 
we noted that the British Sugar Corporation !, ''s bei'-na ac- 
tively pursued by Berisfords and in order to 
- 
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Berisford's takeover design, British Sugar Corporation im-- 
piei ented a series of defensive moves. Its main defence, 
however, pivoted on undertaking a sizeable acquisition it- 
self. When it suddenly acquired a minority stake in Rank 
Hovis McDougall, the biddee suspecting the true motive of 
the British Sugar Corporation responded quickly by building 
up a counter equity holding in British Sugar Corporation. 
The Diagram below will serve to elucidate the implications 
of this bold tactical manoeuvre more precisely. 
I 
BERISFORD 
*N.. 
'ý. ý --, (5o. 5%) 40,, ' ýº, (10 
. 
Si') 
IBRITISH SUGARI 
CORP, 
X0.5% 
14 
i MCDOUl ArJL 
legend: 
--- 
line denoting actual course of action 
--- 
line denoting possible course of action 
Diagram 9.0: Novel Defensive Ploy Undertaken by Rank Boris 
McDougall to Neutralise British Sugar Corpo- 
ration's Takeover Design. 
As can be seen from Diagram 9.0 above, 
Rank Hovis' bold defensive action had the effect of stifling 
British Sugar Corporation's takeover ambition as well as 
rendering British Sugar more vulnerable to being acquired by 
Berisford should it mount a second takeover attempt for the 
company. Theoretically, this would be facilitated by R"Ik 
Hovis' disposal of its 1C. 5 , stake in British Sugar to Boris-- 
forde However, it should be emphasised that this anticipa-- 
ýýý 
ted course of action requires t ',,, 
-e 
'Makeover Panel's sanction 
for under its rules, Rank Hovis McDougall could not act in 
collusion with Berisford. This defensive move serves to 
show that in contested situations, each case should be struc- 
tured and transacted accordingto the merits of the circums- 
tances involved. 
In retrospect, defensive strategies are 
ex&hsive; but the key to the outcome of the contest is very 
much subjected to the ability of the defending party to se- 
lect the right strategy which should be relevant, unconven- 
tional and decisive (see Transcript of interview with F? B3 
Volume 2). 
9.2 Share Ownership and Implications for Defence 
In Chapter 6, it was indicated that inor, 
chant bankers perceived that shareholding structure strong-- 
ly influences the acquisitive or defensive strafe ies cloy-- 
ted. Interviews with them suggested that the 3 main cate- 
gorisation of ownership structure engendered 3 bread streams 
of tactical defensive thin-king, viz. 
(1) Control Vested with the. Board/Family 
Easy to defend. 
(2) Control Vest-e3with Institutions 
Dual implications as institutions are 
generally 'cold-blooded, ' 
ý3) Control cs ed wi ii: Public 
Reiative-ly et, 
_s 
to defend as üriv _t ut 
vestors tend to be more l oval to their boards o., jus-c 
'j 9.1 
display irneaýtia. 
To'enable a basis for comparison of data 
derived from both research samples, the shareholding pat- 
tern of the companies in the case studies was broken do: n 
into 3 ownership classifications based on the 55', sharehol- 
ding criterion (see Tables 9.5 and 9.6 below). 
Table 9-5: Shareholding Oharacterise. d by Ownership Type 
, Dominant Holder & Implications for Defence 
llni-: nmmý_ 
Dominant Defence (b) as 
J 
Merchant Bank's fl ews 
" Shareholding 
" 
share- 
 
Ass s cce 41 O 
.L 
(a) re s cr. of share coüpos- ý,,.. ý c lasWica-- holder No on tactical. manoeawresi Lion No. . 
beard iamily J 
above 5M 14 43% 
ý-: -ý-----ý. ---"-"-... _. ý.... M. _. __. _.... _. _ 
easy to deienel" 
i nS TtU1ý, a ons ýr ý 
i tt ! dltý u-cec', ). f (above 5r / nancial ar ents Yy 
3c holders 20 7 I 35 iiö "toLf. ne t ;oVJ. 'Jý U.. 
Vi 
5r (above %) t L the board" 
I 
Table q.: Tactical In p1ica Lions of Ownership aü i' sr an ci' 
Biddee Companies on Defence Outcome Atnalys,;,; d 
by Chi-Square Teei. 
baarenolüs. ng Dereace sue--Deýence 1F'ai-j r, w category cess ( o. Iur"e (No. ;t offal 
board/family 68i 
instil cu ions 5y 14 19 
public 7C13 20 
Total ' 'i 1 7,5 ;;; __.. 
Chi-square 
= 
1.309, critical value = 5.99, degrees 
of freedom =2(. 5% Sdh rf f*caot level') ) 
Evidence from Table 9.5 above tends to sup- 
port the views of merchant banks on this defensive 
However, the results of Chi-square test presented opposin,; 
-evidence by showing that share composition does not exert 
material influence on the outcome of defence. This find-- 
. 
ing underlined the fact that share composition i 
e6e l'i of 
-overall 
" er 
.. ýv: Lý.. ý.. v v.. 
defensive strategy 
* This arbitraty figure was chosen because under the revised 
Companies Act, --'it is mandatory for a holder of 5% equity stak 
to declare his shareholding. There is double counting here 
owing to the approach adopted but nevertheless, the computed 
results matched very well with the respondents` views on this 
defensive matter. 
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(i) Behaviour of Public Shareholders Di cerný: 5le In Caso 
Studies 
The merchant benkers' views of the perceiv- 
ed response of private investors to bid situations and 
their loyalty-to their boards adhere closely to that of 
Chesham's empirical study regarding shareholders' behaviour 
(see Table 9.7 on the next page). In 3 case studies in 
particular, the public remained loyal to the biddee compa- 
nies, viz., Montfort, Evered and Wellman Engineering Cor"-- 
poration and bids were repelled. However, with the decli- 
ning trend in individual ownership of UK equity capital and 
the growth of institutional capitalise, it can be anticipa- 
ted that companies in the future may find it more difficult 
to maintain their independence. 
(lýý Behaviour of Institutional Holders D scernible iii Case 
Studies 
According to R. J. Briston and R. Bobbins, 4 
institutional holders are acquiring roughly 2% of all. UK 
listed shares annually, and at tho end of `11977, they al- 
ready owned 46% of the ordinary equity in UK quoted compa- 
ni. es and are responsible for more than 50% of the UK stock 
market turnover in shares (see Table 9.8 on the next page). 
Inevitably, such a concentration of ownership of British 
. 
industry in institutional hands would certainly constitute 
a compelling force in the stock market since institutions 
have the ability to influence prices and decide the outcome 
of takeover battles in the UK as shown in this survey. 
Of the 9 successfully defended cases aga- 
inst unwelcome bids found in the case studies, in 3 of the 
cases examined, viz., Bestobell, Cambridge Petroleum RoL; al- 
ta4 and Guthrie Corporation, the institutions were largely 
responsible for. the defeat of tho takeover a4-tempt- In 
the case of restobell, British Ty-re o-. ý Rubber Company (3Ti. ) 
?} 2, I{, J. ris can c< Re obhin,, ý oýec fi:, (see Chanters and 
Q? 
-. 
Statement: ýg gee Did agree ap nio 
I would be happy to accept a bid if 
the directors of my company approved 65 21 1! 1. 
I should be reluctant to accept a bid 
if the directors of my company oppo- 62 26 13 
se dit 
. ý. ý . .. a= - 
They would probably They would probably 
or definitely do as or de finitely not 
If the directors the directors 
I 
do as the directors 
advised: advised % advised % 
Acceptance of hid 70 
6 
5 
12 (Rejection 5 
r Table 9.7: Willingness To Follow Directors' Advice About 
Bids. 
Source: Cheshain, 
- 
" ttittude of Private Shareholders to 
Mergers and Aceuisitions, ' London, Occasion paper A0.5, r ov. 71, P31. 
Table 9.8: Estimated Ownership of UK Companies '197i-77 (%) 
1971 1972 15 3 7ý g 
' 
26 Z 
Insurance companies 13.9 '14.8 1 15.4 15 a5 15.9 16.3 Private pension funds 6.4 6.9 7.4 8.4 9.0 9.5 10.1 
Public pension funds 2.8 3.3 3.6 4.5 1 5.1 5.6 6.3 
Local authnrlt4 P. f. 1.5 'I. 7 1.9 1 'i .9 f 2.5 2.8 3.2 
Investment crusts 6.? 6.8 6.5 6.6 t 6.1 6.3 5.9 
Unit trusts 3 :1 1 3.1 3.4 4,1 4.2 4,2 
4.2 
4 0 Other shareholders 6 66 64,3 62.2 59.1 s57.5.55.7 5 
. Total equity market 100 1 , 100 1 100 J 100 'l00 I 'iou -100 
Combined pension funds 8 : 16. 19z 9 19.5 
Combined institutional 133.4 1 35.7 137rr 40.9 X42,5 ILL. 3 /L6. o investors 
. 
S. ource R. J. Briston et. ai., "Financial institutions & the Stoc'r". ': 'i8 ?L t', t? 't Manar e_ment_ 
_3i 
h1io 
,? 
'ü hies 
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attributed its failuro to gain control largely to the 
lack of support from 3 important institutions in the fi- 
nal phase of the takeover. In the second case, dissident 
institutional holders voted against the proposed Scheme 
of Arrangement (the bidder requires a 75% iiajority vote 
to win) by Cambridge Royalty Corporation, and in the 
third case in point, PSI&G, the largest institutional hol- 
der of Guthrie sided with the biddee and released a strong 
supportive statement against the bid (see Sime/Guthrie 
case study). 
Institutional involvement in managerial 
decision-making in contested bid situations can also be 
analysed more in-depth. For example, in the Dalgety, 
Spillers case, because of institutional cross-holdings in 
both companies, the controversial nature of the bid, the 
failure of Dalgety to present a convincing case for merger 
and the unimpressive performance record o- Dalgety, tile 
institutional shareholders were confronted .: i 1h a dilemma 
as to which party it should support. In fact, the strong 
resistance came from some pension fund holders of the bid- 
der itself. As a result, a "case committee" of the Na- 
tional Association of Pension Funds (pension funds con"- 
trolled about 15-20% of Dalgety's equity) headed by Air-_ 
ways Pension Fund, explicitly stated their desi'r'e to vote 
against Dalgety's capital raising resolution formulated in 
conjunction with the proposed takeover of Spillers. 3 
In Lonhro's controversial bid for 
SUITS, the outcome of the battle centred around the stra- 
tegic 9% holding held by the Fraser family trusts (this 
block of shares would increase Lonhro's equity holding to 
over 40% in SUITS as it initiated. its bid from a platform 
of 30%). In order to prevent Lonhro from successfully 
3. The insti iuti ons' at Tempt to seek 3 of e ý? ; ve meeting 
with Dalrety Through 
. 
ý. 7 ecia2 Cam: ''' Q nRii tee jus t: e- 
fore the EGI4 
. 
faille", du co 1tion from the 1-me! 
Instead, they wrere he anel ýe Dal -elý; 
individually,. 
_. 
`1 fl J 
.. 
acquiring this stake and to persuade Sir Hugh Fraser, the 
deputy chairrat z, to break, his pledge to the bidder, Char- 
terhouse Japhet, financial advisers to SUITS, with the 
Panel's approval organised a syndicate of 8 institutions 
to make a higher offer for this specific trust holding. 
The underlying rationale of this tactical move was to com- 
pel Lonhro to improve its bid-for SULTS. 
Owing to the controversy surrounding Lonh- 
ro's attempted takeover of the House of Fraser, the insti- 
tutional investors in this second instance also activated a 
a "case committee" headed by the National Coal Board Pen-" 
sion Fund (NCBPF), the largest shareholder, to protect 
their investments in the company. The "case committee. " 
representing 35% of the votes sought to resolve the tont? uw" 
in. g uncertainty and ambiguity that surrounded the divided 
House of Fraser's board and expressed its 
. 
hope that the com- 
pany would strengthen its board to bring about a ne,.: 
direction. It is interesting to note that a few days 
after the formation of the institutional ad hoc committee, 
the Fraser's board of directors finally removed Sir Hugh 
as the chief executive of the company. The exact role of 
the institutions in bringing about this drastic change is 
difficult to fathom but it can be speculated that strong 
institutional pressures must have reinforced the fortitude 
of the Fraser's board and its merchant bank, Warburgs (the 
bank had in fact quietly pressurised Sir Hugh to resign 
earlier on) to implement this boardroom decision. Insti- 
tutional support was also critical to the House of Fraser's 
board continued struggle against Lonhro. In an earlier 
corporate boardroom tussle in which Lonhro attempted to 
block the sale-and-leaseback of D.. HJBvans by House of. Fraser, 
the latter managed to defeat Lonhro's resolution which was 
chiefly attributable to the strength of institutional sup- 
port for the company. 
In the Case of Decc 
., 
cons train-e Par u. J y 
by the 
-obsol e'te capital structure and the concentration o`. 
voting power with the board and partly because of the «civer: e 
-'IB'C; 
financial performance of Docca over teile last few years, 
institutional investors in fact held meetings with the 
company to persuade the board to strengthen its management 
in order to reverse the company's continued losses. It, 
is hard to imagine how Decca would have defended itself 
in view of the erosion of shareholders' confidence and 
institutional disenchantment with the company. Naturally, 
not very long after these meetings, when GEC and Racal 
were bidding for the company, institutional support for 
independence was evidently lacking. 
With the balance of power increasingly 
in their hands, UK fund managers are potentially able to 
intervene in the industrial performance-and corporate de- 
cision-making process as well as fight for the rights of 
both the small and large shareholders. The Wilson Com- 
mittee Report and recent speeches by Sir Keith Joseph 
have advocated that institutions should adopt a moS direct 
and positive role in company affairs. From the case 
studies, it may be seen that-institutions such as the 
Kuwaiti lnv6stment Office (K: lo), Prudential Assurance, 
M&G and Britannic Assurance are almost ubiquitous owing 
to their diversified portfolios. For instance, Table 
9.9 on the next page shows the industrial'portfolio of the 
Kuwaiti Investment Office and it is evident that because 
of the size and extent of its holdings, the Kuwaiti In- 
vestment Office, undoubtedly has the inst. tutional power 
to decide the future of many UK companies when they are 
threatened by takeovers. 
(iii)Nominee Holdin 
During the course of this survey, a few 
respondents said that nominee shareholdings could some-- 
ti ies create difficulties for i: }lam d fend ;. tom '! i ä'ß: }ic nt üan'l 
especially if the nominees are sited overseas and hence 
beyond the jurisdiction of the UK company law or self- 
Y'c üü -or system, ýt1Uc-e. ýltiä ýýc'vs ý, ý: i :3 üvý üt vv 
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Company % Holdinp 
Aberdeen Construction Group 7.6 
Allnat London Properties 5.6 
Anderson Strathclyde 7.8 
Bank of Scotland 9.0 
BBA Group 7.8 
Birmid Qualcast 6.0 
Bridon 5.6 
Burmah Oil 5.93 
Caledonia Investments 8.92 
Capital & Counties. 6.42 
Ca. ýoods Holdings 8.. 1 
Chubb 10.9 
Coats Patons 5.02 
Commercial Union 5.29 
Dawson International 5.3 
English & Scottish investors 11.02 
Equity & Law Rife Assurance 7.13 
General Accident Assurance Corporation 9.1 
Gerrard & National 5.6 
Glasgow Stockholders Trust 7-55 
Guardian Royal Exchange 
- 
5.91 
Hambros Investment Trust 7-3 
Harrisons & Cr osfield -9.98 
Hikson & Welch 8.7 
Hogg Robinson Group 7.7 
Ho: rdon Alexander Group 7.8 
Jesse! Toynth e 3, S 
Lakeview Investment Trust 6.14 
Laporte Industries 5.5 
Legal & General Group j 6.2 
London & Manchester Assurance 5-02 
London & Montrose Investment Trust 6.6 
London & Provincial Trust 8.5 
llcKechnie Brothers 5.1 
Mowlem (John) 9.1 
Muirhead 7.7 
Pentland Investment Trust 8.63 
Powell Duffryn 5.44 
Property Holding & Investment Trust 8.9 
Romney Trust 8.1 
Royal Bank of Scotland 8.04 
Royal Insurance 5.7 
Scottish Ontario investment 14.6 
Slough Estates 5-1 
Sterling Trust 6.68 
Stock Conversion & Investment Trust 7.78 
Trusthouse Forte 5.1 
Union Discount Company of London 10.45 
Table The Kuwaiti Investment Crvice 
.. 
r ::, Staký es ý in 
British Companies. 
Source: The "Fli ncia. l '. 
' ; l7=Sý n ý1 jiý} 
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quite successfully by some foreign buyers to acquire unsus- 
pecting UK companies by stealth (see the Kangra internatio- 
nal/Renwick and Gasco/St. Piran case studies). 
In Decca's case, the late founder chairman, 
Sir Edward Lewis besides making the electronics company 
relatively bid-proof by concentrating 17.2% of the voting 
equity in the hands of the board, also placed some shares 
in unknown nominee holdings (see Table 9010 below). This 
has the dual defensive function of denying the potential 
bidder easy identification of the company's shareholding 
composition as well as preventing hire from knowing the 
voting power of the owner-shareholder. 
.' 
I Nominees I bnares jCredit Suisse of Zurich Nominees 486,000 
Hartson Nominees 420,000, 
Control Nominees 391,000' 
Bishop Nominees 266,0001 
Heathview Nominees 204,000; 
Table 9. 'iO: Nominee Holdings of Shares Assumed 
to be Related to the Decca ts Board. 
Source: The "Financial Times, " (19/1/80) 
The problems posed by nominees and steps 
toward reform are discussed more fully in Chapter 10. 
9"3 The Assumptions linderlyinQ Profit Forecasts Used in Bids 
We gat-hered from the findings of the : z: er-- 
chant banking survey that difficult problems were created 
for merchant banks required to approve profit forecasts by 
ambiguous and unimpressive assumptions. Table 9.11 
(pane 179) shows the profit forecast assumptions of 44 
cormpanies (1919-811 )a"' As can be seen, assumapt. ion_s like 
"management policy will remain unchanged" or "no se_crio us 
ý- 
-t-" .. . S1 f' n c. - . r. " . moo` -^ ýrýýi-;? -4 "i Jý_ vi, ý" 
.: º_üi ýi U.. üii iiI +.: ic 0 Gýäai: iij' O- )L' .., --- -- 
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and are somewhat uninformative. IN ors specific assumpt:. ores 
about prices of products, maintainence of market shares in 
the face of competition, the value of the company's quoted 
and unquoted investments or exchange rates would permit 
better appraisal of the forecasts. Furthermore, as turn- 
over is one- of the main contributors to profits, the fore- 
cast should attempt to link group sales with recovery in 
demand resulting from, say, a decline in the rate of de- 
stocking by clients. Statements on managernent. policy 
could usefully be expanded to cover remedial action direc- 
ted to curtailing losses with the expected financial out- 
comes. Similarly, an analysis of debts. and creditors is 
often useful as are precise assumptions as to, say, the pro- 
bable duration and outcome of current or anticipated in- 
dustrial disputes. Nor should the substantial cost of 
manning a defence against the-unwelcome bid be i nored as 
an extraordinary item of expense. 
4 
9.4 Monitoring of Profit Forecasts 
During interviews reported in Chap- 
ter 6, the majority of the merchant bankers said that,. 
because of manpower shortage. and time constraint they do 
not monitor profit forecasts endorsed by them. Instead, 
the Takeover Panel oversees this task by randomly picking 
out forecasts and monitoring them for results. 
Outcome Forecast As % of Total No. Forecasts n=107 
success u 
failure 31 29 
Total 1 107 i 1D 
Table x. 12: Accuracy of Profi.:, Forecasts by Def endi rig 
Companies Effected During Takeovers a 
Source: adapted from C. A. Westwiok, "The 
Profit Forecasts In Bid Situations, " London 
10 AIW 
, 
1Ova 'T 
_ 
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The evidence (see Table 9.12 on page 
200) from the Panel's earlier effort (1969-71) reveals 
that there was a relatively high degree of success in 
forecasts made during bids. As a result of this, the 
Panel has since 1972 ceased publishing results related t*o 
to forecasts. used in both mergers and acquisitions. 
9.5 Litigation Arising from Deviant, Forecasts 
We have noted earlier on in Chapter 6, 
a cross-section of merchant banks interviewed for this 
study have expressed concern about the possibility of 
libel actions arising from missed forecasts. In order 
to discern whether such misgivings have any foundation, 
an extensive search of newspaper reports over the last 3 
years was undertaken which revealed impending lawsuits 
against professional negligence resulting in deviant 
Profit foracas Vs. The first involved the threat of -Legal 
proceedings by Lonhro against Morgan Cr. enf. eil and Grindlay 
Brandts as well as Turquands Barton Mayhew (accountants) 
with reference to a missed forecast after its acquisition 
of Dunford & Elliot. The company had in fact forecasted 
profits of 
. 
25 million for 1976/77 period when it was ward- 
ing off a hostile bid from Johnson & Firth Bro.: -. i in 
December 1976 and again reaffirmed this figure when Lonh- 
ro made a higher bid in February, 1977. However, after 
acquisition, it failed to meet its target and made a pro-- 
fit of only £1.7 million. The Panel subsequently got 
involved when it made its own investigation of the affair 
but in its verdict found the defendents had acted in good 
faith and advised Lonhro accordingly. 
4 
The second case involved Pentos suing 
, 
Singer & Friedlander and accountants Nal vern & C;;,,, pany in 
1980 over overstatement of assets of Caplan Pro fiie by 
"950,000 (unich have 
-indirectly r. riateria)-Iy a. r ec <ea the 
company's vroi its) as well as for a shartt«ý.? 
_ 
_o 
ti ýý00 000 
4. The "Financial Ti ýe, " (21/5, '80) 
- 
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in forecasts. 5 As a : result, Pentos relieved the financial 
director of Caplan of his executive duties and received a 
sum of L'50,000 from hire as compensation. Pentos also 
reached an agreement with Plr. Ian Caplan (who later resigned 
as-director of the company) and his family in which the 
latter will pay Pentos £700,000 to allow for the overstate- 
ment of assets. 
In the third case involving the contested 
acquisition of Fairey Holdings by Doulton & Company ( a. 
subsidiary of S. Pearsön & Son), the bidder successfully 
forced the National Enterprise Board (NEB), the parent 
company of the biddee to accept a lower offer of £22 m_l- 
lion'as against a proposed price of 12,24 million. This 
situation arose when Doulton requested Morgan Grenfell, its 
merchant banker to examine the optimistic forecasted fi- 
gures of £5.5 million made by Fairey Holdings in conjunc- 
tion with the takeover. As a result of this re--appraisal, 
the bidd. ee then revised the forecast downwards from £5.5 
million to S4 million and warned its shareholders of the 
deteriorating situation on the economic front. 
With regards to the threatened lawsuits 
by the dissatisified clients against various financial 
advisers related to the Dunford & Elliot and the Caplan 
Profile acquisitions, there seems to be no follow-up of 
these 2 cases in the media and therefore one has to assume 
that out-of-court settlements were arrived amongst the 
parties concerned (see also Chapter 10 which contains an 
extended treatise on this issue). In the Fairey's case, 
despite. the forecast adjustment, in 1982, the media specu- 
lated that because of anticipated losses, S. Pearson might 
sue the financial advisers concerned for deviant forecast. 
This proved to be speculative. 
k 
5. Capin n forecastod a profit of 1.4 million for the year 
ending August, lc'? 9. 
2O 
- 
9.0 Distinction as Mer er and Acquisition (Specia? i L; ts 
We have seen from Chapter 7 that the mer- 
chant bankers in general perceived that they enjoy certain 
advantages over the other financial advisers in fee--earning 
earning corporate advisory activities. Analysis of the 
case studies certainly confirmed their predominance as 
financial advisers in contested bids (see Tables 9.13 to 
. 
9.15 on page 204 and also section 12.3 of the Postscript). 
Such work is moreover heavily concentrated in the hands of 
a few leading UK houses like =. Morgan Grenfell, 
Kleinwort Benson, War- 
burgs. * Only in 2 particular instances, do we find stock- 
brokers (i. e., Montagu, Toebl & Stanley and Close Brothers) 
involved ehr se in contested battles without the involve- 
ment of". mlerchant banks (see Appendix Table C. 5)" 
It should be pointed out- that in certain 
instances, the client may retain the services of more than 
one merchanIP banl: For ýaxarnp1. A, in the ca. -, 3e of the Hong 
Kong & Shanghai Banks bid for the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
it not only retained the services of its own European mer- 
chant banking arm, Antony Gibbs, but also that of Hambros 
Bank as well. In transnational acquisitions, especially 
in the USA, British merchant banks work closely with their 
American counterparts as was evident in Grand Metropolit- 
tan's takeover of Liggett where Warburgs allied itself 
with Morgan Stanley, the famous American investment bank 
in 'Wall Street. " 
9,7 Involvement 'With the Takeover Pane_). 
Earlier on, we have noted that the mer- 
chant banks declared themselves to have a strong relation- 
ship with the Takeover i'a_nel. Existence of this linkage 
is amply borne out by information in Tables 9.16 and 9.17 
See also Appendix Table 0.6 for decaiis of t? 
e1 ieoteu by financial advisers (Group 2 ease 
- 
20'E 
- 
Merchant Bank (all categories) 
ý: ý= 
. 
fl ct 4111 tc'! 
.U 
by individual mer- 
chant bank (No. ) 
Barclays Merchant Bank 4 
Baring Brothers 4 
Charterhouse Japhet 1 
County Bank. 2 
Gray Dawes ýf 
Gibbs Antony I 
Hambros Bank 2 
Hill Samuel 4 
Kleinwort Benson 7 
Keyser Ullmann 2 
Lazard Brothers 3 
Lloyds Bank International (M. B. ) 
Morgan Grenfell 7 
Robert Fleming 3 
Rothschilds 3 
Singer tx Friedlander 4 
Sanuel Montagu 4 
Standard Chartered Merchant Bank 1 
lv; 'agg Jo Henry Schroder 4 
Warburgs 
Total i 66 
Table 9,1 : Contested Bid Transactions Handl.; d by the 
Individual Merchant Bank Discerned in the 
Case Studies 
J. Merchant Rank ( (wholly-gowned subsidiaries of UK 
clearin /overseas barks} 
i 
Transactio 3n Hardie ÄI 
by individual mer- 
chant bank (iyo" }{ 
Barclays Merchant Bank 
.4 County Bank 2 
Gibbs Antony t 
Grindlay Brandts 0 
L). oyc. s Bank International (N. B. ) 
Samuel Montagu 
.4 Standard Chartered Merchant Bank I 
Total '13-1 
Table 
. 
14s Contested Bid Transactions Handled by the Indi- 
vidual Merchant Bank Discerned in the Case Stu-- 
dies Categorised by Affiliated Status (Non- 
independent), 
* Sometimes, a client is advised by 2 merchant banks 
Category of Financial Adviser_ s As % of Total 
handling the Contested makeover Bids No. financial 
advisers 
I. 1e rchant bank$ constituting surti ey sample 66 88.0% 
'Merchant banks outside survey sample 2 2 6% 
American investment banks 5 6, G 
17 K stockbrokers 2 2.6 
Table 9-1 5,. Total Contcstied Bid Transactions !-a. nd ed. o: i the 
D ffern Types of '1Ii? i2C? el ise S i1? scerno ? 
c ed oýýhýs 3z? veyý In the Ca e Studios Se c 
- 
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(see pages 206 and 20? ) which show the frequency and no-- 
ture of involvement between merchant banks and the fake-- 
over Panel in the case studies'used in this dissertation. 
From the findings tabulated in both Tables, it is evident 
that the Takeover Panel is indeed used as a multi-function- 
al body by the merchant banks (or indeed other professional 
names) in these context: 
a) as a lobby 
b) as an appeal body 
c) as an arbitrator of questionable bid practices/ 
behaviour 
d) as a guardian of the 'spirit. ' of the City 
Takeover Code. 
Of the 40 case studies of contested bids 
the Panel was involved in at least 14. Its involvement 
ranges from seeking clarifications regarding erroneous or 
ambiguous byd statemeiý4s made by chief executive s of te 
bidding companies to extreme form of public censure for 
the deviant bidder (J. J. Raper 
- 
see the Gasco/St. Piran 
case study in Appendix B). 
The evidence thus suggests that the 
Takeover Panel is actively involved in contested bid acti- 
vities. This highlights the fact that contested takeovers 
are controversial and complex and consequently, advisers 
may sometimes breach the technicalities and the 'spirit' 
of the Code. From the case studies, it was clear that 
some. advisers attempt to circumvent restrictive provisions 
and stretch non-statutory "legalities" to its limits. As 
the case studies show, control is made particularly diffi- 
cult because bid strategies are constantly evolving in line 
with changing environmental and institutional forces. Con- 
sequently, a fresh approach may be required with each new 
transaction according to the type of industry and the cir- 
cumstances surrounding it. 
-206-- - 
Table 9.16: Nature of the 'j'a' eover ; Panel's Involve! en t. 
with i'? n ýT]Ciäl Advisers During Contedte: i 
Bids (Group I Case Studies) 
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Table 9.17: Nature of the Takeover Panel's involvement 
faith Financial Advisers During Contested 
Bids (Group 2 Case Studies) 
CASE STUDY NATURE OF PANEL'S INVOLVEMENT 
Panel sought clarification from Mr. 
i, onhro/House of Fraser 
Tiny Rowland reCarding his state:: ent 
that his initial bid price would be 
the final offer. 
Sanuel Montagu lodged a strong protes 
M. H/_; r. ngra Inta, natinnaJ. against tho unethical use of nominee 
/Renwick companies as a vehicle for takeover 
of Renwick by I11r. necker. 
Avana successfullobtained permis- 
sion from-the Panel for the disposal 
of its minority shareholding in the 
biddee company during the course of 
Avana/Robertson the takeover. As a result. of this 
precedent, the Panel ruled that all 
future deal of this nature requires 
1 2k hour notification. 
"t The Takeo er nr.. C: i -- t4 tultýd cwn. 
investigation into ; 
": r. J. J. 1? cper's 
infringement of the City Takeover 
Code and the subsequent imposition by 
Gesco/St. Piran the Panel on Gasco's obligation to bid for S;. Piran, Furthermore, the 
Panel issued its strongest-censure 
against i? r. Raper by rebuking him pu- 
blicly. 
Due to the novel bid tactic adopted 
by BICC (bid conditional'on appraisal 
of Highs & Hill. book value- by inde- 
pendent auditors) and protz; acted 
BICC/Higgs & Hill period of indecision, the Panel then 
intervened and set a date-line for 
the bidder to effect a formal takeove 
-for the biddee. 
The defender accused ',; r. Rupert Piurdoc 
and h, r. Robert Maxwell of collaboratio 
i. e. the sale of the Tatter's share- 
holding in Collins to News Internatio 
News international/ nal was linked with the settlement of 
William Collins an industrial dispute nnetween ooth 
entrepreneurs. The Panel rejected. th 
allegation as well as the sub;; aquant 
appeal against its decision by Schro- 
der W'agg, the defending merchant bank 
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9.8 Worki Relationships With Clientele 
From being financiers of international 
trade, British merchant banks have emerged as the most 
important source of financial advice for the corporate 
sector domestically and in certain markets overseas, for 
instance, Hong Kong (see Postscript). However, as we 
have repeatedly demonstrated in this study, advice on 
contested deals implies constant exposure to publicity or 
being involved in conflict of interest situations or with 
controversial industriälists/entrepreneurs. Sometimes, 
these events contributed greatly to the stresses in º. he 
advisor-client relationship. 
The best case in point involves that 
of the well known Accepting House, Warburgs, Lonhro and 
the House of Fraser. This merchant bang, was formerly 
advisor to Lonhro but resigned in the early 19r2Os due to 
di. i. f, erencPs. This quarrel was to continue 'or 
in its capacity as financials advisers to the o tse aä 
Fraser in which ? 1r. Tiny Rowland held a substantial stake 
and was represented on the board. Indeed, it seams to 
have been one factor in precipitating the ultimate split 
in the boardroom which led to the removal of Sir Hugh as 
chairman. This particular crisis illustrates the fact 
that merchant banks are deeply involved in their clients' 
affairs and their on-going professional relationship does 
not always proceed smoothly.. 
In yet another widely covered incident, 
the merchant bank was sacked by the corporate client. 
The crisis of confidence occured when Guinness Peat the 
parent company of Guinness Mahon, the merchant bask, sold 
its 21; s' equity holding in Linfood to Gulliver: Food's which 
Lt in turn sold it to Argyll Foods in September, 198 t. A' 
er'; ards, Argyll used dis particulýsr block of shares as 
a springboard for theAtak 
eo 
: oar of Linfood Ho d:.: ýý Li n-- 
food then replaced Guinness 1? ahoi, 1wlt}1 ! loru: c as 
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its new merchant banking advisor. The change of advisor 
was natural given the fact 
. 
that many of Guinness Mahon' s 
directors (who are also directors of the parent company) 
were retained as non-executive directors of Linfood. These 
directors eventually resigned as a result of the boardroom 
strife which erupted over the sale of Guinness Peat's 21% 
stake in Linfood to Gulliver 
. 
Foods. 6 
These two particular incidences underlined 
the fact that there are practical constraints and limita- 
tions to the capability of merchant banks to influence t; he 
internal affairs of their corporate clients. High-handed 
actions, poor communication or lack of co-ordinations some, 
times may sithply influence the client to take drastic ac t-k 
ion and seek a new financial advisor. 
{ 
9.. 9 Summary/Review 
This chapter has shorn that defensive stra-- 
tegies are critically dependent upon the nature ad empiha. 
- 
sis of the offensive strategies. To be effective, they 
have to be devised and adapted to the specific situation. 
Of the 11 defensive strategies selected for testing, 4, vi. z., 
asset revaluation; profit forecast, shareholders' loyalty 
and dividend increase, were found to be very important and 
normally constituted the principal or main line of defence 
in the various case studies examined.. The others wer. used 
in various degrees and it is int. resting to note that with 
the 
. 
shift in the Government's policy towards mergers, more 
and more defending merchant banks are treating; the Mono oli- 
ew' and 1'1erger'S Commission as a final resort or defence 
when all. else hs failed. 
-G. 
. 
Lt show i oe emphasised nat Lord Kissa n, :7 
chairman of Einfeed 1'ß'i: ' red from his chlor exec ? ti`r 
DDost. a week before tb'-Ls block was disposed of.. 
- 
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The other crucial point whic4 under- 
lined strongly the creative aspects of s traten f orniulabion_ 
has been well supported by some of the case studies, for ins- 
tance, Rink Hovis McDougall's swift response and innovative 
share buying approach in British Sugar, was clearly beyond 
the anticipation of the bidder and it has the effect of stale- 
mating the corporate designs of-all parties concerned. Equal- 
ly important is the fact that defensive strategies are by no 
means merely confined to these 
. 
few counter-measures highligh- 
ted for testing. The case studies approach have sufficiently 
demonstrated that defensive strategies (for that matter bid- 
ding strategies too) are richly varied. New and "peripheral" 
strategies are constantly created or adapted from elsewhere 
to led support. to the core strategies (as identified in this 
study) and at times, they may become a key part of the defence,, 
as in the Berisford/British Sugar Corporation/Rank Hovis Mc- 
Dougall case. study. 
The victim Company was found: to have a 
higher rate of survival when the shareholding is widely con- 
centrated in the hinds of the family, board members or indivi- 
dual holders than institutions because of greater loyalty ex- 
hibited by private shareholders to their-boards. 
Profit forecast assumptions in contes- 
ted bid situations seemed to be largely uninformative general- 
ities. 7 None the less, so. far, no cases for professional ne- 
gligence involving financial advisers have succeeded in rela-- 
tion to deviant forecasts. So, there is no legal precedent 
to fall back on. Thus, unless the Panel dispensed with the 
need for the merchant banks to endorse their concurrence with 
the reported forecasts, very little can be done to prevent 
dissatisfied clients from suing merchant banks and accountants 
for misplaced forecasts in the near future. 
7. This tends to expose the merchant ban s. who are unable to 
properly check the forecasts in : ßnä with the ca? irre 
of, information available. 
- 
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Despite the rac e of merchant banks se- 
lected for this special study, there is a tendency for contcät-- 
od offers to be conducted by a handful of merchant banks in the 
City especially the few large multinational traditional houses 
(with equally big corporate finance divisions) and, increasing- 
ly, some wholly--owned merchant banking offshoots of large UK 
clearing banks. These banks have managed to maintain their 
market shares of this high fee-earning business in spite of 
spasmodic competition from some stockbroking houses. However, 
owing to the close inter-relationships between most of the mier- 
chant banks and stockbroking firms in the City, and also to 
other factors mentioned in Chapter 7, the stockbrokers tend to 
act-as agents for merchant banks servicing and advising them 
more on the market-related aspects of takeover rather than 
assuming the role of principals. 
There is also a high degree of involve- 
ment between merchant banks and the Panel in the area of con- 
tested bids. This is a clear testament c the fact , at des- 
pite familiarity with takeover transactions, owing to the Oi ty's 
institutional framework, compiexities, legalities, ambiguity 
and fast evolving events surrounding contested offers, merchant 
banks have to constantly consult the Takeover Panel regarding 
various aspects of bid approaches and practices. As a result, 
it is, hard to conceive that non-merchant banking professionals 
lacking in corporate finance 
-expertise, experience and finan- 
cial power would attempt to advise companies on transactiorfsof 
this nature without the help of merchant banks. Finally, 
advisor-client relationships have not always been smooth and 
amicable. Generally though, there is no real evidence nor 
reason to believe that there is widespread discontentment exis- 
ting between the 2 factipns. 
In the following concluding chapters, we 
will be reviewing some of the salient hypotheses, contemporary 
takeover problems/issues and suggested re crrus, summary and 
review of both acquisition a11Ct defensive -aeei 
, 
i't'C; 0 
banking and corporate advisory nctivitiec_ in the ýý3v 
, 
i2' 
G 
ällý il 10 
CONCLUSIONS I: ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED REFORiiIS OF SALIi NT 
CURRENT TAKEOVER ISSUES/PROBLEMS DISCERNED IN Eý; PIRICAL 
CASE STUDIES RELATED TO THIS RESEARCH 
10,0 Introduction 
MAN course of interviews and analysis 
of the case studies, we have discerned that there are 
many contemporary takeover issues and problems facing 
financial advisers, the City and other related interests. 
As these issues are of immediate concern and re]_ev. -ncr 
to this research,. the; -' are highlighted and discussed in 
this section. They include the following: 
t) Unidentified buyers, "concert party" and 
nominees. 
2) Market raids and "quick--fire" takeovers. 
3) Institutional porter. 
4) Profit forecast. 
5) Conflicts of interest. 
Furthermore, this chapter also traces 
current changes related to these issues and problems and 
also delineates certain recommendations for reýorms. 
I. { Unidentified 3uye s, "Concert Party" and Cto iin es 
T2S survey has sho n that Ti- 
_s 
C-r:, C-- 
UK ii s: companies have been acquired 
tioIIabie zc eovei tactics 2aß c cu ar' y ki.: ! ors-l,,!: 
.i 
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using nominees to cap. ou_la; e their real intentions. 
Such an operation is normally conducted through off- 
shore nominees and to circumvent the UK Companies Act 
1976, Section 27.1 Occasionally, the anonymous bidder 
can deliberately acquire various blocks of voting equity 
capital (each under 4.99 to circumvent the 5% ruling 
for disclosure) through concerted effort and goes on 
accumulating and 'warehousing' these stakes until it is 
near the 30 trigger level. 
In the Group 2 case studies, Rangra 
International, a Hong Kong based company owned by a 
South African businessman. secretly acquired a 27.5% 
ýý rm stake in the Renwick Group through the stockbroking 
of A. J. Bekhor. At the same ti nie, investors sheltering 
behind the nominee name 'of-the Uto Bank of Zurich also 
use4 the same broking firn: to acquire a 22-5; %' equity hol- 
ding in Renwick. It should be stressed that both the 
biddee and the original bidder AAH Limited, failed to { 
identify these overseas nominee stakes till vhe verL; 
last stage of the takeover-contest when ilr. Bocker", the 
South African entrepreneur revealed himself as the po- 
tential buyer. He then promptly gained control of 
Renwick when he purchased the other strategic block of 
shares held by Uto Bank. As a result Of those contro-- 
versial tactics, both Renwick and its merchant banking 
advisers, Samuel Montagu protested to the Panel but the 
Takeover Panel ruled that there was no collusion or 
acting in concert despite the use, of the same stockbro- 
king. firm. 
In the notorious St. Piran case study, 
Mr. Jim Raper acquired. ownership of St. Pi ran through 
several stages through the concerted use os 7 foreign 
nominees according to the Panel's investigat_on (see 
. 
the Gasco/St. Piran case study i. In both these cases 
1o This empowers the directors of' jar. t d 
reasonable notice to require tile nomanoCs 
the beneficial holdere of shares in the 
-_ 
21'! 
- 
the buyers with their substantial pre-bid platform man-- 
aged to successfully acquire the victim companies very 
swiftly. Even more serious was the fact that owing to 
the modus operandi in which the two acquisitions were 
effected, the defending merchant banks could not put 
up any credible defences to prevent their clients being 
taken over. 
In two other cases which had not resul- 
ted in formal bids (although the possibility existed), 
involved De Beers, the South African mining conglomerate 
and Goodyield Holdings of Malaysia utilising nominee 
companies2to secretly build up their control in Consoli- 
dated Gold Fields and Dunlop Holdings respectively. 
Their covert action resulted in large scale condemnation 
in the City and attracted the Department of Trade which 
subsequently instituted investigations. 
Reform Measures 
The. predominant acquisition issue which 
sharply divided the views between the Government and the 
City revolved around the seemingly intractable problem 
of "concert party. " The ambiguity and imprecision of 
the concept of acting in concert which ultimately re- 
quired proof of intention was initially felt to be too 
difficult for proof of contravention, enforcement or 
legislative control and so, 
-the Government decided 
against it. In July, 1981, after much deliberation 
the Government finally produced draft clauses planned 
for incorporation in the current Companies Bill. Under 
this new proposal, any shareholder who is concious? y re- 
lated to a "concert party" will be obliged to disclose 
the size of the whole grouping's equity holding a Thi. s 
is because ho will be liable to be counted. as interested 
2. In both instances, surAsed to have &. cted : ii con=cert 
using foreign nominee companies. 
-2 15 - 
in the total holding and not merely confined to his own 
shareholding. The City and the St. ock Exchange hay: e in 
fact all along favoured the Government implementing 
changes so that the obligation on a shareholder of 5% 
or more in a British company is applicahle to a group 
acting in concert which has 'warehoused' 5% or more of 
a company's share capital. Nowadays, with the removal 
of exchange control, enforcement of the proposed provi- 
sions may be difficult in relation to foreign holders. 
To provide for this contingency, the draft clauses also 
deem non-co-operation with investigation a criminal 
offence (under Section Qk, either the. unhelpful share- 
holders or their agents are liable for two year impri- 
sonment). 
The main reform in the new legisla- 
tion clauses focuses on the "self--help" provisions. if 
approved, it will strengthen a company's own power to 
investigate holders with interest in its equity capital. 
it f4an ue re : a11aU-3 VL11 t CO: ipäi: de3 already hti: vc 't 
to unravel the beneficial holders/o:. ners of shares in 
nominee names. However, the line of approach advocated 
now is that they can approach any shareholder whom they 
feel has had an interest in their company shares during 
the previous three years. If the shares have been sold, 
the company can ask for the identity of the buyer, but, 
if they are frustrated in the course of their inquiries, 
the draft provisions would empower companies to apply 
to the court for restrictions (Section 174 of the 1948 
Companies Act) to effectively freeze the shares and this 
implies that the mysterious buyer would not be entitled 
to vote nor receive dividends for the duration of the 
restrictions. To assist the shareholder further, the 
new amendments to the Companies Bill also allow share- 
holders who together controlled a tenth or more of the 
voting capital in a company to compel the company to 
exercise its power, to find out the real o; hers of its 
equity provided they demons t?: ate re. sonabý a ! gas fo 
-- 
2 "i6 
such a request (unmi taknhly designed with St 0Piran in 
mind so that a company with a puppet board of directors 
under the control of an unknown shareholder would not 
easily evade its corporate responsibility). These 
official measures were undoubtedly designed to fit in 
with the 1980 Council of Securities Industry's proposals 
in the Department of Trade consultative document motiva- 
ted by the De Beer and Dunlop affairs 
- 
which proposed 
cancellation of shares whose beneficial. shareholders 
fail to expose themselves, the rejection of ignorance as 
a line of defence in the. accumulation of holdings and 
finally, the definition o= control to encompass indirect 
. 
holdings through intermediaries. Additionally, regard- 
ing the latest draft relating to the Code, the Council 
for the Securities Industry also proposed that a finan- 
cial advisor should be regarded as acting in concert" 
with its clients. As such, all its dealings and share-- 
holdings would then be circumscribed by the regulations 
applying to the bidder. As envisaged, this proposal 
evoked an t unfavourable response from both merchant banks 
and stockbrokers whicb managed portfolio investment on 
a discretionary basis as vehl as providing corporate 
. 
financial advisory services during contested acquisitions. 
Finally, the Government also strengthened the powers of 
investigation of the Department of Trade's Inspectors to 
enable them to call witnesses when investigating a com- 
pany's affairs. 
Preventive self-induced action can 
also overcome the problem of overseas nominee holdings' 
where real beneficiaries of the shares are difficult 
to identify. Firstly, through the invokement of S. 27 
of the 1976 Companies act which empowers board of direc- 
tors to compel any holder to reveal the capacity in which 
he hold shares. Secondly, Articles of Association can 
be amended in, anticipation of such a problem arising at 
an Emergency renewal -estin( (EG i" convened on a 2c 
,y 
-- 
2'x'7 
-- 
night's notice to insert a provision enabling directors 
complete power to enquire about the beneficial ownership 
and control of shareholding at any time. Non-compliance 
by any holder within 42 days will enable the board to 
disenfranchise him. Such an inbuilt provision would 
serve as a potential deterrent and also enable the board 
to take swift counter-measures if a covert bid action 
seems imminent. Furthermore, if a company is frustrated 
in its endeavour to discover the beneficial owners of the 
holding, it can appeal to the Department of Trade which 
can invoke S. 174 of the 1948 Companies Act which permits 
3 the Department to impose 'the following sanctions: 
1) Any transfer of shares shall be void. 
2) There will have no voting rights. 
3) No further issues can be made connected 
with the shares. 
4) No payments can be made on the shares. 
Ar. exhaustive search o the financial 
press reveals that over the last few year's, some British 
companies have indeed taken precautionary steps based on 
these measures to curb the abuses of nominees (see Tabie 
10.1 below) : 
DoT's Action Company Invo1 Nominee lac-ubsequence; 
S. 173,174 king 8.27, tion Taken Takeover (Remarks 
1948 Co. Act 1976 Co. Act 
( 
against B 
i 
Bond Street National 
Fabrics WestminsterG_ovebell failed Guernsey Tst 
- 
Davy Corp. n/a Enseroh 
blocked 
Bondon ýra1l I no bi. d. -°ý 
- 
; Bangers Gp. 
-VO Nominees t 
4---- 
-="------_-e, 
-s 
Lord. stat: us Guinness Kissin unclea I Peat 
Table 10.1 : Counter Pleasures Taken by Some Briltish Companies 
to Disenfranchise Nominee i oldinCgs (1980/81) 
Source: The "Financial Time 
. 
s. " (1(, 180 1981) 
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On balcnce, the Government's neti-: po- 
licy is to foster an effective means of obtaining dis- 
closure of "concert party" holdings in British companies 
and those camouflaged by nominee names. 
10.2 Market Raids and 
_"Ovick-Fire 
"(Raoid) Takeover 
The concept of market or "dawn" raids 
is basically a market. operation where buyers procure a 
substantial number of shares in a company in a very 
short space of time at an attractive premium. This 
practice is not new to the stock market but gains noto- 
riety when De Beers adopted a two-tiered strategy of 
secret putchases through nominees and then swiftly moun- 
ted a market raid of the 
. 
shares of Consolidated Go d 
Fields on the London Stock Exchange in rebruary, 1980. 
This covert share acquisition strategy enabled Do Beers 
to acquire a 25 equity holding in the company within 
a. very short period of time. Hcwever, owing to strong 
protests from Consolidated Gold Fields about. the incog- 
nito modus operandi adopted'in gaining par. tia. l. control 
of the company and the extensive media criticisms, both 
the Stock Exchange and the Department of Trade instituted 
formal investigations into the whole affair. In a sub- 
sequent report published in July, 1980, the Inspectors 
criticised De Beer's usage of the two-tiered method 
which exploited the loophöles in UK company law and 
share registration procedures. In conjunction to that, 
its operations involved members of the Stock Exchange 
(Rowe & Pitman and Akroyd & Smithery) in evading the 
'spirit' of fairness and disclosure on which the British 
stock market was modelled. 
Reform I°Iaasures, 
Desai c the. D% Beer inch.. t : r:: ot 
-. 
_:. r co ?,, stu- operation of tat:: nature continued. 
, 
2,, g_. 
dies, from Table 10.2 below, we observed that there 
were 3 incidences of market raids and the 3 'raiöers' 
successfully used their market raid equity holdings as 
powerful leverage to acquire full ownership of their 
victim companies (see also Appendix Table C. 7). 
Prebid i% Aiter! Price of Raider Victim Stade Raid : laid Ct'tcor:? e 
'Yule 'a to ixQver ex 
-- 
º'; ý" Ü` ýc äug ec is 
'r; inin Supgli s L. Sco i_.. 
_ 
4.0 4------6O iacnuired ý£tarwest 
; G. Cooper ;-{ 29.5 95 acauireci 
Table I0.2 : Market Raids Executed by Bidders ConstitutinS 
the Research Case Studies. 
To curb further abuses, the Council for 
the Securities Industry on 7th, August 1; x80, imposed a 
temporary embargo on this practice and outlined measures 
it intended adopting to stop this practice. Under the 
Council's proposed reforms, market raids are allowed foxr 
holdings below 1555 since at this level, control was 
deemed to ne stil rested in the biddee's h ends. H;: y"- 
ever, if a buyer intends to obtain more than 15%, it will 
have to give 
-5 working day, notice (which is more viable 
than the half hour originally proposed by the special 
committee of the Stock Exchenge). In retrospect, this 
proposal has the following advantages: 
i) It provides the remotest shareholder with 
adequate time to take advantage of the offer, 
ii) It allows a rival bidder to effect a counter 
move, 
iii) It permits the defending company's board 
sufficient time to mount its defences and 
arguments. 
In the first week of DeceL: ber_ 1980, after 
refining its draft proposals, the Council then imposed 
_ 
an official ban on this acquisition practice and. ro . i1 
gated two dominant rules governing: share nc:, ýui.: ý" : ý: ý; 
ýý 
a) Anybody who intends to hold more than 155 of a 
company's voting capital through the purchase 
of a 5% shareholding from more than one party 
must effect a partial or tender offer to all 
shareholders.. Tender offers can be at a fixed 
or a maximum price and must be advertised in 
two national newspapers at least 7 days before 
the event. If the tenders aggregate less than 
1% of the voting rights, 
- 
the offer is void. 
b) If a 150-' shareholding comes to be held by other 
moans, example a-by-product of a takeover, the 
company and the Stock Exchange have to bp in-- 
formed by noon of the next dealing day. 
However, the advent of 4%-, hese -new 
rulings did not completely stop adroit financial advi-- 
sers. from - f:: n din the legal loopholes in the new 
r: ulin s. Two particular takeovers focused on in this 
study (ciao Guthrie and Law Land case s tu. d. ies j serve to 
remind us of the futi. ). i ti. y of more rules and also the 
swiftness with which local financial advisers exploited 
deficiencies in the interpretation of non-stat Cory 
rulings. Basically, these two case studies illuminated 
the way in which effective 
-independent ownership of UK 
listed companies can be transferred by substantial share 
acquisitions on the London Stock Exchange. 
The new style of market raids which 
characterised rapid takeovers involved the bidder stat- 
ing his bid terms and then entering the market and. per-- 
suadin; key shareholders (especially institut onal hol- 
ders) that their best in-erests, lay in taking cash 
immediately rather than losing out while waiting gor the 
uncertain outcome of the takoover. As a consequence, 
the defender or its si all investors have been left, with 
no opportunity to debate or evaluate the financial or 
4. ' F'o. r a Li-l' ler account of the I-: cw 
_ruii. n; ý 4sc "J ties GoYerrsýr Sub t. n äi tC, ýýsQ: 1},; ý_C 1 011 
ýýýi2 
_*ý: 3s: r 
- 
2a1 
- 
commercial merits of the takeover attempt. In the case 
of PER; AS acquisition of Guthrie Corrporation, strateSic 
control changed hands in a matter of only 4 hoursl 
Again, the media centred their attention on this vexa- 
tious issue and to curb this new form of market operation, 
the Council for the Securities Industry(which has the 
critical role of supervising the behaviour of UK security 
markets) instituted 3 more restrictions which are high- 
lighted below: 
1) If a company plans to initiate a market raid, 
it can only acquire 15% of the votes and is then, 
banned from acquiring any mors equity for 7 days. 
2) if a. compauy already owns 15%, it can buy a furr- 
ther 5% in the market and is then prohibited, 
If a company already owns 29.9 
, 
it can acquire 
a further 4. a% and then the 7 day moratorium or 
restriction must apply. 
a Under this new ruling, a market raider 
cannot state that its initial bid price for the shares 
will be its. iast before the first closing date of the 
offer (such a statement norm lly has the effect of fort- 
ing shareholders to sell without waiting to hear the 
board's response). The underlying rationale behind 
these moves is to provides. the biddee's board with time 
to consider its position, solicit professional advice 
and consult shareholders. ' In this particular instance, 
the City regulatory body is again responding to the wide 
public'concern about the growing.. frequency of such raids 
and the need to inhibit the bidder's freedom of action or 
manoeuvre. 
1O J. Rise Of Institutional Power and, Implications for 
ids 
The gradual rise of institutional poae. v 
in the USA in the 1060s- led the Securities & -! xchan-e 
22.2 
- 
Commission to institute a comprehensive investigation of ins- 
titutional involvement in all aspects in corporate decision- 
making. The difficulties encountered in this special study 
are-illuminated below. 
5 
"Information upon which to base a judgement as 
to whether or not the potential, power of institutions to in- 
fluence corporate decision is or is not exercised 
-is hard to 
come by. The response to the study's question shows some 
reluctance on the part of institutions and corporations to 
discuss this matter. Such data as is available tt. enc. s to 
show that.... if they lose confidence in the management they 
tend to sell their holdings in a company rather than to 
attempt to control or influence renegement decisions. <Lgain, the extent, nature and impact of institutional participation 
in corporate takeovers is not a matter which to any signiri- 
cant. extent is susceptible of statistical analysis. The 
study, therefore, endeavoured to explore this question by case 
studies. " 
In the UK securities market, over--the 
past few years, institutions have overtaken the private i nves- 
t-ors in the stock market,. In a more recent s tuy,; ý'eL^ýý>ken 
by -he London stock Exchan6e or, shareholder profiles of 35 f 
companies representing just over half the total ve; ue of 
shares in the market and 320 of the top 500 companies, the 
evidence shows that institutions held over 64n>' of the total 
equity with private shareholders holding 36%6 as illustrated 
in Table 10.3 below. 
ýSn. ýu.. - 
'ý lI . ý.... _. d 
»anInv, ý ra -InvestmentlPension Other Individual Valuation ice Gorn- & unit funds institu- share- 
group panics trusts tions holdings 1 %%f 
`ý i '° 
over 7uuü '10 lid iy 11 
.E 7o 200rn-500ri 21 13 19 10 37 
ä 15im-°200r: ß '17 11 18 33 £101 m-- 15om 19 13 20 18 
1 
- 30 
76m-. 5'100m 18 14 16 14 38 
51m-W 75m 1 17 14 17 14 33 
36m- 50m l 20 14 14 13 39 
£ 26m-"-' 35m E 19 17 14 11 29 
£, 21 r, ý-ý, 25rß 19 19 14 º 15 º 33 
W 0Lr 
_ 
20m 20 12 1 17 38 
Table 10.3; 1981 Survey of UK Sherehold ng Conducted the 
London Stock. Ey chant o. 
Sou Ca: Tlit. ' ýýý'in nalb. } T'1'1? S, 't (24/0/81) 
1a ß : C; ; 7. t volume 
6. As C_ posed yto t: he 32 . es united by the i! on 
ß; U'.:;: ': 1. -tee 
%, W 
Using the case studies method adop vod 
by the Securities & Exchaube Commission, results from 
this research indicated that institutions with subst-an-- 
tial holdings or the financial ability to procure such 
holdings often determined the outcome of contested bids. 
This is illustrated well by. the case study of Guthrie. 
Sime Darby, of which PERNAS is the largest shareholder 
attempted to acquire Guthrie but failed to gain control 
because of strong resistance from the founding family and 
key institutional holders. Then Sime Darby sold its 
shares to PERNAS, another Malaysian conglomerate. PERTAS 
then bid for Guthrie at a much higher premium. Most os 
the institutions, including N&G which attested its loyalty 
to the company, in this instance, sold their shares to t hp 
new bidder. In, a circular on 6th October 1980, addressed 
to the shareholders of Guthrie, Mr. N. J. Gent, its chairman 
attributed the loss of. Guthrie's. 160 years of independency 
mainly to ".... the short term investment perspective of 
some instiiutional fund managers and the failure of the 
Council for the Securities ludustry to institute effective 
self-regulatory controls. 11 
From our case studies, however, it is 
clear that not all institutions adopt a short-term pers- 
pective when considering transfer of corporate control. 
In this context, institutions may be classified as: 
- 
(A) Institutions Having Long Term Perspective 
Institutions like Britannic Assurance 
have demonstrated consistent investment policy and loyal- 
ty to the biddees. It was responsible for the preserva- 
tion of independence of Bestobell and Evered. Britan- 
nit's adherence to a pronounced portfolio investment 
policy was in fact instrumental in the defeat of British 
Tyre w Rubber Company (B1n. R) in its takeover ai% (': iii', i; of 
- 
? i!; 
_, 
'1a le 1O. 'J-4-: Portfolio Hold. s O: 
C! 
i -- LJ: J. '.. : ii. 
.ý nt -fl 
, 
ýynaicate 8. C. 
Torikinson Car oe is 10.9 
Triplex Foundries Group 10.0 
united Spring & Steel ^r0.2 
Vaux Breweries 
-': -. q John Waddington 10.1 
Wheway Watson Hldgs 7.2 
! Allen & Lacy 10.0 
Alt & Wiborg 5.1 
'lverys 7.7 BestQbell 10.0 
Bifurcated Engineering 12,0 
IBlagden & Noakes '10.1 
1Blundell-Per. moglaze H? d s 10.2 {Boddingtons'Breweries 11.2 
`! Border Breweries 
-10.4 
`Brickhouse Dudley 
t 
7.4- 
:1 Brown 8.3 
jBuc'_ ley' Brewery 10.0 
013utterfield--Harvey 8.9 
'W. Canning 11.3 
11R. Cart 
.. 
right 8.1 
iCasting` 10.2 
Concentric 10.1 
H. Cory 8.2 
Davenports Brewery-Hldgs 9.1 
Deritend Stamping 12.8 
ýiding & Mills 'Do- 9.1 
Ductile Steels 4- 
Duport 8.5 
English Card Clothing 6.6 
Evered & Co. Hldgs 13.7 
Perry I-ic:; arir Group 10 
_ 
C, 
Flexello Castors ;, Wheels 5.2 
n odens 6: 4 
Foster. Bros. Clothing 6.0 
Gil? et Bros. 
-iscou.. v 
20.8 
Halite Hldgs 9.6 
Hardys ýR. Hansons. 10.3 Hargreaves Group 10.6 
Philip Harris 24--5 
Harris & Sheldon Group 8.9 
Hickson & Welch 5.0 
Highland Distilleries 5.0 
Hoskins & Horton 12.7 
Jenks &:, Catell 8.3 
F. H. Lloyd Hldgs 6.2 
Martin-Black 5-3 
Metal Closures Group 5.1 
Midland Trust 30.5 
1lorall (Abel) 11.0. 
Moss Engineering ý 10.9 r ansog William 7. C. 
Ransomes, Sims & Jefferies 11.9 
Ratcliffs 6.3 
Record Ricl`ýýy 11.0 
Rtef se . ssurance 7.5 
Revertex 6.3 
Ku'Ue oid 11.1 
G. }i.:; cho-1. es 10.2 
- 
S1- ýJn. Gt ý! r1 1 C. eýf 7 C'is C 
6 Ua'ia art ( 
r \t. a 'I f r-. r. )/(. / frn)) 
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Bestobeli in :. b. icb 3ritannic Assurance held a 
The ubiquitous spread of Britanni c's portfolio (see Table 
10.4 on previous page) is certainly a Compelling force. 
On the other hand, it should be underlined that its port. 
- 
-folio alone covers 1/6 of the total number of biddee com- 
panies chosen for this research (see Table 10.5 below). 
From these companies in which institutional shareholders 
are dominant or moderate and where Britannic singly held 
more than 5% equity capital and had expressed its support 
for independence, it can be seen very distinctly, most 
of the acquisition attempts failed. 
Case Studs B. AL*. Share--ý holding 
, 
LSize of Institu- Supgoirt 
tional Holdings Istatement 
j Qu : cou,., j 
ý, BTR/Beýtobell %,, '10.0, su stantia7 (more / than 40; ) failurel 
Francis Ind. / 10.81 substantial (more / 
-I ure Evered " than 
IGE0/erys 77 mar anal (less than 2.0 )/ success 
Hiram Walker/ 5"6' moderate (more 'ýsý ltlreý *Hi ghland Dist. than 20 ) 
pule Gatto/ 
Reverte 7'7 
marginal ( Less 
titan 2G ;ß nja E I alt,. res_, 
S 
Table 10.5 : Posture Adopted by Britannic Assurance Regarding 
Its Portfolio Holdings During Bids. 
* Britannic Assurance 
(B) Institutions Havin Short Torf Persl, eotive 
Institutions like the Kuwaiti Invest- 
ment Office (KIO)' which is inclined to take profits and 
was partially responsible for the loss of independence 
of such companies as Decca, Averys and Law Land. rohe 
Savoy Group was also rendered quite vulnerable when the 
Kuwaiti Investment Office pled ed its ler`; e shareholding 
7, ns reflected in the policy statement made by !! r. J. 
Jefferson, Britannic =s chairman who declared., =`rie see 
little logic in takeovers by companies merely see ing to 
sustain or improve their own growth rate by 
"tion. Such bids removed from an investmen ana 'i hs 
freedom to choose the types of investments sui. i be 'car 
his. fi nd. s e Some takeover b ?. ds are sheer Y_L Ly _..: haps the takeover bidder is most use to society _ eu he 
fails. " (quoted in "The Economist" 25/8/79). 
- 
2Zv 
in the company to Trust House Forte, which in turn, used 
this as a springboard to make a formal bid for the Savoy 
(see Table 10.6 below). 
Size of Institu 
Case Study tional Disposal Institution- Outcome 
before bid 
; Starwest H. G. T. Management a Gart-- 35`3% success Leslie more Investment G>, j 
Churchbur y/ l Royal Insurance, ýI&G j I 1 
°8%' success Law Land aitk v. ý, ff ice KuL 
'Trust House - 22. C ' IKuwaiti Inv. Office failu:!, e Forte/Sajroy 
Table 10.6 : Institutional Disposal of Large Blocks of Shares 
to Bidders Prior to Actual Takeovers. 
(ý) Si ificance of Decline of the Private Investor 
Evidence Presented by Briston and Dob- 
bins, 8 the Wilson Committee (31)(1980) and lately, the 
Stock ExcHange9itsol± indicates the rise of institutional 
shareholder in the UK with institutions holding more than 
60% of the total stock market equity. With the bslance 
in the hands of the public, therefore, it is pertinent to 
examine the ramifications arising from this phenomena 
and its likely impact on future takeovers. We noted in 
this study as well as that of Chesham10 that the small 
investors tended to be loyal to the board. This makes 
it difficult to acquire companies in which they held 
strong voting power. Of the 3 relevant case studies 
examined, perhaps St. Piran was the most controversial as 
well as financially devastating for its shareholders due 
to the greatly discounted net asset value. Although the 
small investors attempted to form some sort of ad 'roc 
'protection committee' this action was quite futile as 
8. P. J. Briston & R. Doöbins, "op. cits 
9. The "Financial mimes" (2Y% %81 j 
10. Chiesharn ymaibarnaºed Industries, 2. cit, 
- 
20 
- 
Gasco N. V. managed to acquire St. Piran speedily due to 
its strong pre-bid controlling position. We also saw 
that a powerful corporate investor, the Gentor Group 
endeavoured to resort to litigation to compel Gasco to. 
pay a higher price and for no apparent reason, withdrew 
at'the last minute. Thus, it forfeited an invaluable 
chance to fight for shareholders' rights like Prudential 
did for Newman Industries shareholders. 
This brings to mind the pertinent 
question regarding institutional power and its perceived 
role. To what extent should they concern themselves in 
company takeovers to protect the private investor? If 
they are not content, should they merely maximise pro- 
fits by simply disposing their shares? We observed in 
this research that in a number of cases where ins Üitu-- 
tions felt strongly about company performance (for 
instance, Decca and Law Land case studies) or, the in- 
compatibility of the potential bidders (Lonhro, Dal ei; y 
and Jim Raper of Gasco) they reacted in various ways 
and in various degrees.. In the case of Decca, they 
approached the board to suggest an uplift in company 
performance, whereas in Law Land, they simply liquidated 
their holdings. In SUITS, the House of Fraser and 
Spillers case 'studies, they fell back on their 'pro-'U 
committees' which in turn activated individual case 
committee whose objective fundamentally was to watch 
and monitor takeover situations closely. 
11 While in 
the Gasco/St. Piran affair, the largest single corporate 
holder, Gencor, attempted legal action to redress a mis- 
carriage of justice. So, in all these cases, it is 
quite obvious that increasingly, some institutions are 
feeling less restrained and they are adjusting to a 
stance where they can assume amore constructive and 
active role in influencing the conduct of companies in 
11. The various institutions in conjunction with t_le 
1Tidltri aua limn', estment ProtectioI t'i e (`Z ) in 
have an 'z1ýJre l3 ýjýnstitutý. onal Shareholders Coui: n-. J-ttee` (ISS-DO) to protect their portfolio interests. Still, 
there is no defined procedures for acts V : "a ýý ný; ine 
_l JU 
or the different co'nmittees. 
c ý, ýij 
which they have a moderate or substantial s;. isrehold 
Even if the rate of dis-investment by ordinary shor eliol- 
ders were to slow down, the role of the shareholders in 
the future as pröprietor will largely be ineffectual as 
he is often viewed by companies as an investor who will 
not question their corporate decisions and will only 
interfere in the most extreme circumstance. Owing to 
this passivity, geographical dispersion, lack of finan- 
cial power and the inability to form pressure groups to 
change inefficient management ar prevent the loss of in- 
dependence of their companies (by bidders using somewhat 
controversial acquisition tactics) cheaply, ordinary 
shareholders nowadays tend to be more and more dependent 
on the institutions to protect their rights and act as 
countervailing power to the unwelcome bidders. The 
Wilson Committee too was-both concerned and impressed 
with the rising power of UK institutions and advocated a 
more. active role in British industry. 
{ 
Another i__ eres. tint facet that cme-, r cd from 
this empirical study is that in a minority of leading UKL 
listed companies, family or entrepreneur li n cage is still 
quite dominant. 
I2 Although most UK companies are run for 
the benefit of shareholders with due regard to the empl. o-- 
yees' interest, it is possible that in ;: a. ct, family 
interests may dominate. This may sometimes lead to a 
bid which is not in the interests of the shareholders. 
Indeed, empirical. findings in Europe and the USA have 
adequately demonstrated that mergers and acquisitions 
have on average been unprofitable possibly because of the 
high premium over the market price requisite for bid suc- 
cess or even the diseconomies of size, In the long run, 
the interests of the bidder's shareholders can be adver-- 
sely affected particularly when acquisitive companies 
like the defunct Slater iý: al: ker Group or Lonhro which are 
inclined to buy control into other businesses thrown 
heavy issue of the cor: eny's equity capital. 
12. See Appendix Tab anr 
-ec3- 
in the context of r3ritish eeouo! liti 
, 
it is unlikely that institutional investors constrained 
by both manpower and skills would relish interference 
or imposition of their will on the management of compa- 
nies. Perhaps, it is also relevant to note the fact 
that both merchant banks and stockbroking firms managed 
many pension funds end the corporate philosophy of both 
City financial institutions favour selling as opposed to 
direct interference. But, on the other hand-, our case 
studies shöwed that in highly controversial bid 5itua, 
- 
tions, institutions have intervened to protect them: 
investments. Perhaps in view of the concentration of 
. 
power in their hands, institutions should seek to e er"- 
else their' shareholder power more actively and construc-. 
tively,, 
"may be through restraining the power of acquisi-- 
tive management (in terms of unissued shares), the. pro-- 
visi on of management talents through a newly created 
consultancy body and strengthening the role of the execu-- 
tive directors. Companies vulnerable to to keoverrs 
would then have recourse to their institutional share- 
holders for constructive assistance and corporate guid- 
ance rather than merely surrendering their independence 
to the first offeror that comes along. 
6 Reform Measures 
It can be argued that the powerful 
institutional shareholder need to reconcile portfolio 
ownership with a large degree of responsibility to man, 
agement, employees; creditors and clients which cannot 
be attained by the adoption of short term performance 
criteria (in the case of the Kuwaiti acquisition of the 
Proprietor of Hay's Wharf, the defending company stated 
that it was an unsatisfactory offer and promised substan- 
tial supportive defence i nc_. uding asset 
bull 
, 
the LASi: 3 cations £a-1_1e t 1'Ieed. he iý0öý; ý_ 
and hear i_ s cse or even ca for. the for:: ýa i 
-Lt 
lar). Whet is required is a elj _j; e in t?. e of 
-- 
23o 
-- 
the institutional shý: ro of d er and not in more 
provisions. 
10.4 Profit Forecast 
. 
In chapter 6, we have discussed and 
highlighted the following aspects of profit forecast, viz: 
i) The desirability of a profit forecast in 
defensive situation. 
ii) The difficulties confronting financial advi- 
sers in their review of for. ocasis related 
to contested bids. 
The main issue which emerged in the 
light of 'certain revelations by merchant bankers and the 
incr'eas1_ng { trend for clients t : r'y'. ýi, ten to 
advisers for deviant 
. 
forecast:; 
" sake i pertinent to divide 
the discussion of this issue into two parts. 
a) Trend towards litigation and ramifications 
for financial advisers, 
b) Suggested reforms. 
9 
, 
Trend Towards Litigation and I mpl. ications for Advisers 
Particularly over the last 3 years, as 
vie have previously discussed, some dissatisfied buyers 
threatened to sue leading financial advisers -nd account- 
ing f rms over badly inaccurate f orecas -_ s made whilst de- 
fending against a takeover. it should be stressed that 
companies are not obliged to make forecasts in connection 
with bids. Ho:: wever., when forecasts are used, more so n 
defensive capaoi-ty, tue 
.ýc: I1el at. -tached great s ý;: ": l? '1G^. n t: 
to their c-. r of u prep era? ions inC! 
2L1. 
- 
are responsible in particular for the latter. The Panel 
holds a watching brief over profit forecasts and implemen- 
ted a system of random checks but since 1972, has not 
published any figures on forecasts. However, the Panel 
still monitors. forecasts very closely and over the last 5 
years (1976-80), according to the figures provided to the 
researcher, it has in-fact requested 85 forecasts from 
offeree companies as illuminated, in Table 10.7 below. 
It gave no information, however,. on any inaccuracies 
found. 
Table 10Profit Forecasts Monitored by the Takeover 
Panel (1976-1980 
4 
Year ]Forecasts Requested 
from biddee(iios 
1976 ) 18 
1977 23. 
1978 16 
1979 1,980 16 12 
Source: The Takeover Panel, +981. 
In the USA, where litigation is more 
common, there have been a number of lawsuits connected with 
failures to achieve profit forecasts (Dolgow versus Ander- 
son and Harry. H. Levy versus Douglas Aircraft)" In the 
UK, we have just noted that over the last 3 years, Lonhro. 
and Pentos threatened to sue both merchant banks and 
accountants for professional negligence arising from mis- 
placed forecasts. Regarding the accountants, there were 
two out-of-court settlements (see Tables 10.8 and 10.9 on 
the next page). This move deprived the British accoun- 
ting profession and other professionals as well of a cur- 
rent judgement in-the area of professional negligence. 
This trend is believed to have the backing of the judi- 
ciary based on the assumption that the public interest ?- 
13.1ýISG, as"r: tib: lis[]ed Profit iýv: L , 'ýc as C r" s; ýc. i ! ýC ltýfi_. ý:. 
chapter 4). 
- 
2.; 2 
- 
Table 10.8: Possible Litigation Threatened by Bidders 
Against Financial Advisers Connected with 
the Review of Profit Forecasts. 
LITIGATION aid- 
-- - (NOUNCED OR i, , . ,. 0ý; ý]. 3LE ACQUISITION DDETIZ CONTEMPLATED ISSUE D EI+'ENDE dTS 
or 
, 
an C: renf ell 
Dunford 
_ 
Elliot Lonhro announced d/f'r G. Brandts, Tur- 
quands, 3arton & 
Mayhew 
Singer & Fried- 
Caplan Pentos announced d/f lander, Nalvern 
Fairey Holdings 1 
contemplated S. Pearson (withdrawn) 1 d/f 
I-, Ioroan Greniel l 
Peat Nartlick, 
i 1 
. 
NEB 
d/f 
= 
deviant forecasts 
Sources: "Financial Times" (Lonhro/D. Elliot) 1979-1980 
"Financial Times" (Pentos/Oaalan) 13/12/79 
"Financial Times" (S. Pearson/Fairey) Jan/Oct 1961 
{ 
Table 10.9: Out-of-Court Settlements Paid by Accounting 
Firms in Conjunction with Professional 
Negligence Lawsuits (1981). 
ACCOUNTING TYPE OP DAi AGL TYPT OF 
, AMOUNT FIRN LITIGATION SETTLEMENT PAID T0 
Deloitte Sias- i professional o Neviviann 
lout-of-courti 
9 000 l £445 ls skins Cc Se lisence iie Ind. , 
Neville urofe=a1 out-of-court Penton 
, 
400,000 
Zussel]. neöli b 
Source; `: inancial Times" 21/'. 3/811.3/8/81 
-- 
r"- 
best looked after by ailoti", inn, professions to settle 
their differences through self-regulatory mechariis'^o 
Such a practices again, is only practical as long as 
self-regulation works. The London and County collapse 
has demonstrated a need for the public to judge the pro=- 
fessionals through some form of disciplinary action im- 
posed on the quality of professional performance and 
responsibility. On the other hand; if too hard and 
punitive measures are imposed on financial advisers then 
the following repercussions might result: 
1) Establish a possible legal precedent for more cost- 
ly litigations akin to that of the American system, 
2) Affect the reputation of leading merchant banks 
and accounting firms, 
3) Increase iri advisory fees to the detrimentof the 
shareholders} 
4) Avoidance of profit forecasts. in bid situations 
. 
thus depriving shareholders of an important evalua-- 
tivo too l. 
A Reform Measures 
Forecasting is both a science and an 
art and it is quite widely practised by public companies 
in Europe and the USA. 
11ý It should be streesed that it 
is not an exact science and therefore almost all fore- 
casts will have some form of inaccuracy. However, owing 
to its special relevance in takeover situations, there. 
is a critical need for the City and the companies to 
maintain the general credibility and the availability of 
forecasts for an efficient market to operate in the UK. 
As such, some suggested reforms are listed below: 
'i A stater er. tl - from,, the financial advisers 
(iie chant banks and account 'nts) c1 ?r i'yi Tl 
_' 
1-. In the USA, 7rofi ý 2ýOiec st is vC1. ).? _C:. l in lll'_ ý <J- 
tions due to the pronibition 1933 
Securities Ac$ (Release NoG 1362: 'i' ;ý). 
2b4 
-- 
the extent o their involvement iris--a- 
1'1r' the board. 
2) The degree of responsibility taken by 
each advising member vis-a-vis the 
board of directors. 
3) A disclaimer concerning the accuracy or 
rnliabili ty of the forecast to act as a 
sort of indemnity. 
is 4) A "safe harbour" provision 'which en- 
courage voluntary disclosure on profit 
forecast devised in the appropriate 
format but at the same 4iL e accomplished' 
without too much disclosure of factors 
which are of sensitive or com4 e7r- 
cial nature which may affect the fore- 
casting company's corr_: ct tivo position, 
5) In the ne 
{ (February 
to remind 
that only 
nature of 
casts. 
ýr1y revised Takeover Code 
193". ), there is a provision 
t omnani. es and she. reho'. der7 
limited reliance could in the 
things be-Placed on any fore- 
The Takeover Panel, as we have pointed 
out earlier does randomly check on profit forecas'Lls used 
in conjunction with takeovers. In the case of Danford 
& Elliot, conforming with its institutional practice, 
the Panel has conducted its own investigation and issued 
a statement exonerating the advisers. Such action will 
to some extent serve to reinforce and reassure those 
involved in forecasting. But, unless there is adequate 
legal protection for financial advisers and a general 
understanding by the clients on the basis and limita- 
tions of forecasting, there my be a General rasi7. srvation 
15. Simi 
-1_ar 
to that pro-Pu! C.; '. 1 ed the S 33-5699,197tß), 
-i 
_+ 
on the part of advisers. to bypass this business piract; ice 
at the expense of investors who have the right to all 
relevant company information to evaluate the merits or 
demerits of an offer. 
10.5 Conflicts of Interest 
Conflicts of interest arise in situa- 
tion where a professional or a financial institution is 
assuming dual capacity. Potentially, conflicts linked 
with takeover situations may be distinguished under the 
following circumstances. 
1) Corporate Finance/Investment Nanaherent 
Most merchant banks and to some ex- 
tent. stocl; brokArG it-17lar vary l ;:! "a fi-n: ic nn }}eha 
of their clients but ;o what extent, despite the 
existence of the 'Chinese o! all t do they share- common 
directorship? Common personnel? joint accessibili- 
ty to non-public price-sensitive information, files 
or other research materials? 
2) Fiduciary Duties 
Irany bankers sit on the board of UI{ 
listed companies as ron-executive directors. Inevi- 
tably, they face conflicts in discharging their fi- 
duciary duties when their own merchant banks may be 
involved in advising on the acquisition of the com- 
panies with which they are affiliated. ' In America, 
for instance, Joseph Flom of Nev York, the famous 
corporate takeover lx.: yer_ (ý;: ho : acts sometimes for the 
off eror and so: ie dues for the defence) t,: as sued by - 
"Chinese 
; ric; ht for brýencil of du ;y : ": hen 1: ennecott 
---------- 
Wall" is a City jargon alluding toy the voluntary 
barrier/safeguard erected by financial institutions L-o avoid 
conflict of interests situations e. g. investment and corporate 
advisory activities sited within the financial institution. 
... 
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hired him to defend itself against takeover from Curtiss 
Wright (several years before, Flom had acted on a re- 
tainer basis to Curtiss Wright to defend the company 
against unwanted bids). 
3) Merchant; Banking Merger 
Controversy also surrounded the Charter-- 
house Group acquisition of Keyser Ullmann when Throgmor- 
ton Trusts which was managed by Keyser took precautionary 
measure of contesting the Parliamentary Bill ("The Char- 
terhouse Japhet Bill") sanctioning the. merger owing to 
the conflicts of interest because both Charterhouse and 
Thr. ogmorton are involved in investing in small public 
companies and Charterhouse acts as corporate advisers to. 
some of these investments.. This problem was only re- 
solved when both parties agreed to create a new manage- 
ment company which will maintain the independence and. 
continuity of the Throgmorton Trusts. 
4 
4) Parent Bank and Merchant BankinE Off-shoot 
All UK clearing banks operate merchant 
banking operations which make full use of the parents' 
vast domestic and international network-and as such, 
share common clientele base. Conflicts may arise when 
both bidder and biddee are-customers of parent and subsi- 
diary. If the parent acts as a lending bank to both 
clients and is providing loan for the takeover, are 
there consistent guidelines for preventing the misuse of 
privileged information (like liquidity, strategic plans, 
relationship with key shareholders, etc, ) against the 
biddee client? Should they side in favour of the b g- 
ger customer and how far should they commit themselves 
if a contest breaks out?. 
;: Reform Measures 
it should be emiphasi_ >C. <ý t 
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that conflicts of interest will continue to be a 'grey 
area' and that even in the USA with its more stringent 
legal supervision, these remain largely unresolved. in 
the final analysis, it is the professionals and key 
executives in the City who must voluntarily adopt safe- 
guards against abuses and decide whether a potential con- 
flict will lead to abuse. Ideally, conflicts may be 
resolved through preventive initiatives and the right 
balance of law interwoven with market forces. It is 
convenient to demarcate the proposed measures under 3 
sub-categories. 
i) Structural Reforms 
a) More attention should be paid to the formu- 
lation of forma. procedures and practices 
to ensure that the 'Chinese Wall', the 
standard safeguard adopted by the City 
4 against Coilf lit L is a roans i; iu protective 
mechanism and not just an illusory barrier. 
b) In the problem of handling privileged in-, 
formation or common clientele, the relevant 
advisers should adopt a neutral and detached 
posture when their clients are involved in 
contested situations. 
c) Companies should opt for more unaffiliated 
directors or a "minimum of such directors 
in instances where abuses are apparent. 
Similarly, merchant bankers who are caught 
in conflict situations should detach them-- 
selves from being involved to enable the! 
to carry out their fiduciary duties to both 
the company and the bank. 
ii) Disclosure 
513:? S ý2 i1 _' c`» a. ) Transactions thcl l <=,? e rise to 
- 
2,38 
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conflicts of interest should be disclosed to the 
shareholders. 
b). Investment managers, directors and officials 
should be required to-disclose all purchases or 
disposals of all- shares in specially related com- 
panies (for example, common directorship or cases 
which they act as account managers or investment 
banker) effected for their personal portfolio or 
members of their immediate families. 
c) Some dealing rooms of UK merchant banks have res- 
tricted lists of companies where one aria of the 
bank possessed knowledge that aught affect the 
share price. 
iii) Legal Prescriptions 
a) Tighten the px'ovisions of the Prevention of Fraud 
(Investment) Act, 1958 and extending its provi- 
sions from licensed to investment advisers. 
b) The Council for the Securities Industry is cur- 
rehtly devising a code for the licensed dealers 
akin to that of the Takeover Code and to prevent 
the blatant abuses of inside information (under 
the 1980 Companies Act, use of insider informa- 
tion for personal gain at the expense of other 
shareholders has been xiade a criminal offence and 
carries a two year imprisonment sentence). 
c) Practices leading to conflicts in complex situa- 
tions, if they can be isolated should be prohi- 
bited rather than surrounded with unworkable 
restrictions. 
In this study, we saw evidence. o. i con- 
f_l. icging bid incidences and ronagement conflicts of 
interest afflicting City financial advisers in your birief 
Z39 
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review of this vexatious issue. Some of these conf)_ic; t ; 
examined are more acute and require more in-deptti study 
which. is clearly beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
To facilitate institutional accountability, an acute and 
enlightened attitude' should be taken by all concerned. 
Some of the measures advocated require a. highly practical 
enforcement mechanism. As' the UK stock market evolves 
and some of the rules undergo radical changes, the role 
of multiple-function merchant banks and those of other 
professionals in the City is likely to become more con- 
flict ridden. And for these reasons, there is a need 
for reduction of conflicts so that legitimate confidential 
and financial relationships remain inviolate. 
10.6 Self"=Regulation in the 'i 8Cs 
.- 
)EE isal of Curren- 
Instiitutionsl System 
Ever since its inception in 1909, the 
Takeover Panel has sought to control a small group of 
merchant banks, issuing houses and stockbrokers which 
operate mainly within the City. It is just over 3 years 
since the Bank of England established the Council for the 
Securities Industry to fill in the vacuum in self- 
regulation and to avoid the-necessity for intervention 
of the statutory authorities into the City's financial 
affairs-and market operations. We observed that mergers 
and acquisitions in the UK are prescribed by institutional 
bodies within a self-regulatory system. As such, bidding 
and defensive strategies have to be devised not. only with- 
in the guidelines and practices of the-City but a-so to 
observe the 'spirit' of the Code as well. In essence, 
the K securities market is supervised through a mi'. ture 
of. self-rege! ati on and statutory rules. Howeve is 
over last few shPane and 
.' 
t 
_i. r. °, r- r- notably. ýthe uw years. e Panel 
ent of Trade's investigations h 
. 
vu aue i ti on i. 
2/CO 
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aspects of takeover behaviour and practices. In pü Li- 
cular: 
1) Overseas nominee holdings, 'concert party" and 
breech of Rule 34 (Gasco/St. Piran affair). 
2) Overseas nominee holdings, 'concert party' and 
control by stealth (De Beers/Consolidated Gold 
Fields and Goodyield/Dunlop Holdings incidences). 
3) Rapid takeovers with hardly time for the defender 
to respond (PERNAB/Gutbrie and Churchbury/Law 
Land case studies). 
'I) Controversial personalities and questionable 
tactics (Lonhro/SUITS and Lonhro/House of Fraser) 
and, 
5) Accusation of collusion between key shareholders 
in special circumstances (News International/ 
f; cbeä t Maxwell/týJilli an Collins case stud). 
In these cases, the 'spirit' of the 
Code was infringed. This has led to widespread media 
criticisms of the shortcomings of self-regulatory sys- 
tem because of the vulnerability of some UK companies 
even sore of the blue-chipped companies to the deter- 
mined buyers. So, once again, there was strong advo- 
cacy for the establishment of a British SEC system by 
some quarters who favour the adoption of a statutory 
model. However, evidence from this research demons= 
trated that the City merchant banking community, while 
recognising the d. eficieneies and structural weaknesses 
of a non-statutory system are still strongly in favour 
of the status quo. for reasons advanced in chapters `J 
and 9. On balance, on grounds of economy, differences 
in securities market system, different business -phi lo- 
sophy and approaches, it can be ýirgued that there should 
-. 
2l 
.i 
be 
ao aroit. , ý1-. LJf'r1L: 2 Pos.. ti-n of the "., mori 
del in the City (see the comparative system as pres- 
cribed in Table 10.10) 
Staffing Annual Organ±sa- Approach Companies Lis- 
Institu- (No. ) Budget tional to ted on Stock 
tion 
. 
1980 structures Takeovers Exchange(No4 
Takeover 
* 20 
. 
7/ 4m ý informal quasi 2,000-3,000 # Panel judicial London S. E. 
Securities I bureau- legal- 2,000-3 000 
w Exchange Commission 
2,000 o $6 rn 
ratic istic 
, New fork S. E. 
Table 10.10: Comparative Institutional Framework Proscribing 
Mergers & Acquisitions in the USA and the UK. 
* Inclusiv e othe Council for the Securities Industry staff.. 
** SE 
= 
Stock Exchange 
Compiled from the CSI, "Annual Report, " and the, "Fin. ncial 
Times, " (1980-81). 
) fl1ho Li-i 1 r. nn rtnr,. r, 4-i-^n f ý" n ý' += -r-r", 7>> d44 !t J"J.. l "l Al Sl "J"'t:.,. V VV V. t iý.. v-N SY*a 
stotu tort/ framework as practised in the City to be a 
viable system and this view is shared by the researcher. 
One possible criticism of the. present system is than too 
many of the constituent members of the Panel and the 
Council for the Securities Industry are interested. mem- 
bers, i. e. represent vested interests. This flaw could 
be redressed by increasing the number of independent 
members to act as countervailing power and this would 
make it easier to resolve controversial issues like 
'concert partmarket raids as well as reinforcing pu- 
blic. confidence in both bodies in terms of objectivity 
and openness. With the American Securities & Exchange' 
Commission's model in mind, it can be argued that statu- 
tory system is not an alternative to self-regulation 
because of the limited scope available for defining any 
legislation :: hic: creates criminal offences. I'ioreovcr, 
J ; ixera is a lac, =-, of ;; 
_nara. _ oonsensus within U...,, 
about what cons ti t"u tes una, `---,, ptable lb-id p--;, 
---c 
tic, es and 
behav? ollem 
. 
This, combined i th other ý: tock Jxch ne 
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regulations exceeds the forma] limit of legislation 
adopted to circumscribe behaviour. While the inclina- 
tion is for outsiders to draw a firm distinction between 
illegal and legal behaviour/practices, in "grey areas"- 
one has to take into account that more regulations and 
restrictions will generate attendent problems. For 
instance, the Council for the Securities Industry's 
rules on the operation and conduct of market raids make 
it difficult to acquire 30% of a company. A potential 
bidder must stop at the 15% mark and then effect a formal 
tender offer as in the Allianz offer for Eagle Star. 
Financial advisers soon saw the loopholes in this new 
ruling. Instead of impeding rapid takeover, this me- 
chanism greatly facilitated the bid effort of the of i'eror 
who would commence his takeover by acquiring equity 
holding, announce a bid price and then buy on. -3y sta- 
ting that the price will not-be increased, the bidder 
can exert tremendous pressure on shareholders and even 
poitfoliot managers. The Law Land and GuLh ie case 
studies were two classic takeovers conducted in this 
fashion. This shortcoming was only remedied by a new 
Panel ruling that obliged the buyer to pause at 15% to 
permit the defending board to evaluate an attempt to 
secure effective control so as to give proper guidance to 
shareholders generally, 
In the final analysis, it can be 
said that tie' securities market operates more efficient- 
ly under a framework which is equitable and flexible. 
. 
A contemporary provocative study by S. M, Phillips and J. 
'R. Zecher argues that there is no evidence to suggest 
that the current American SEC model serves public in- 
terest. 16 Recourse to more formal restriction then 
would severely hamper the freedom of the market place 
and is also incongruent to national investment objec- 
tives aimed at inch cin domestic industrial revival. 
16- 
, 
i-i'imý'rtl 1TýS rx 'ý'ý'/"C'Ci1ý17'; ' 
_'ný S'ýC . '? ''- 
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In conclusion, institutional frz' -^" 
work should strive towards a model which would ensure 
stability and propriety in the market place without 
adversely affecting corporate initiative and innovation: 
This can be done by building upon the present system of 
general principles to which specific prohibitions and 
imperatives could be further added. Furthermore, if 
the Takeover Panel and the Council for the Sdcurities 
Industry are to continue. to operate substantially intact 
in the 1980s, they should strive continuously for higher 
standards and to demonstrate the effectiveness of self-- 
ad. roinis tration in the City. The 'watchdog' bodies not 
-onl;; require power over those in the City but at the same 
time, have the ability to operate within a context of 
relative openness, effectiveness and fairness. Given 
the history of these non-statutory bodies, there is a 
real need to extend both its field of operations and 
authority to cope with changes and complexities At the 
same time, ' the Government has an undeniable obligation 
to support the country's self-=regulatory bodies with sora-e 
form of legislation to enforce disclosure and compli. _ t ce. 
The implementation of these measures together with the 
upgrading of professional expertise and consistent eva- 
luation of the operating system by the media and public 
would significantly contribute to the reformation of 
self-regulatory system in the 1980s. 
. 
10.7 Contemporary Merger Policy and Implications for Future 
Contested Takeovers 
Since '1965, British Governments throujh 
the Monopolies & Mergers Commission have examined more 
than 50 merger references 
, see Table 1O1'; on the next page). Despite 
this fact, no distinct policy h---%s been evident ,: ric y 
implies that the successive Governments chose to be 
-24- 
Table 10.11: Monopolies & Mergers Commission's References (1965-81) 
VER-- ;r . R-- 
B DS DICT BIDS 
B i+ý/rresseci. Steel : cars/No t ti n harz f 1"I z7z L 
' 
FU Development/F 1"IC Y 
. 
1966 1)entsply/AD International Y 
Ross Gp/4ssoc. Fisheries N 1975 
Dental Mfg. /Areal Dental. Y ; iorvic Secs. /, ']. Canning L Dentists Suppl y/Aural Y -urocanadian/Ft 
. 
Withy N 
Dental Aural Ind. /Herbert Morris IT 
GKN/airfield Y 
BiCC/Pyro tenax Y 1976 
Pilkington/UK Op i: ical N 
1 %6 Babcock & Wilcox/Hei"Iorris N 
Fruehauf Corp/C. Fruehauf Y UDS Montagu Burton N BP/Century Oils it 
19_8 
Barclays/Lloyds I Provident Fin. /Cattle's I, 
Barclays/Lloyds & Martins I"ä Assoc. En ineering/Serck L 
Thorn/Radio Rentals Y Sketchley/Johnson Gp. L 
Smith Bros. /Bi. sgood B. Y 
-I c'69 Zheem Int/iRedfe rn Glass L 
Rockware/Redfearn Glass If 
Unilever/Allied Breweries Y United Glass/R. Glass N 
. rank/De La Rue Iý Derrl. tron/Brit. E. Controls L 
Marley/tRedland L 
a -ý 9? g 
9 7 0 j 
- - - 
Lonhro/Suits Y 
Burma. h/Lapor_to L Hepworth/Johnson L 
British Sidac/Trans Paper N 
GEC/Avery Y 
Reed/Bowater L FMG/Alginate Industries Y 
'i 2 1980 
Beecham/Glaxo N Ij, 4']al'cer/FI' land Pis till, It 
Boots/Glaxo ll Blue Circle/Arlr1. Shanks Scars/William Timpson L S&W Berisford/BSC Y 
Europcar/Godfrey Davis Y 
G. Metropolitan ; /Coral L 
Tarir1ac/': rolse'_e--Hughes L 
Glyn: 
"red/A_rrnitrage Shanks L 981 
Whessoe/Capper--Neill L Ent. serch/Davy N 
Britý: 
"Iatch/4lilkinson Y Hoverczatt/Hoverlloyd Y 
S:. ord Sw r  Lonhro/House of Fraser N 
Bowater/Hanson Trust L European E. 'erriep/Soalink N 
Davy Int. /Brit. Rollmakers N SCB/HYSB/RISS N 
i '? BTR/Serck A 
Argyll_/I, infood 
Boots/House of Fraser N -_: 
l, ofldon_ (I. County/ raver s: I, -,. 1- V `. Sr 
F: a le 8 ear/. iernard Sun- 
1 Yes tY) 
- 
21; Awaited (A) =1 y 
U ari-r;: c co-aso t 'I date a/ oad 
- 
Y~ io(1.1 )= 
211; (L) 
-1 
,- 
corr: p11. ýýl i_'3''O li uýl'C10;; 1' ýpýi y 
rº t 2ý9, '5ý61 i cr! lIlý_I1C. l. üý. 
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imprecise. The Hans Liesner Report (Consultative 
Document on Monopolies & 1Terger Policy, Cýmnd. 7i98) ins-- 
ti tuted by the former Labour Government proposod that 
merger policy should be shifted from "favourably: " to 
"neutral. l. 
. 
It proposed that the Government should 
explain publicly the new Berber policy and also Ares- 
cribed nonstatuto'y guidelines to enable criti ca'. eva 
luation of all mergers that v ould increase economic 
power or reduce competition. The Fair Trading; Act, 
1973 was to be amended to enable the Monopolies Commis- 
sion to determine 'public interest' by balancing the 
disadvantages of reduced competition with that of 
increase competitiveness internationally. Adopting 
one of the central themes of the Liesner Report that the 
concentration of British industry since World War II ha-111 
not only been disappointing but has in many instances 
caused a reduction in competition, the new policy has 
shifted to as _ýt, i- more-. -. t .,., 1 i`:... L'y 
--k hoý., als approach i: aple_ 
Jeep» scru ' ny by 'e ; '. 1onnnnl 4 cc Ccrýr+' cf. i. on i'or i".. +' '. ' 
+. vom. +r rvw.. ý N.. i.. Le .ý VV. "l_li 
. 
'ý. J 1. 
.. 
mergers Tho now approach towards , monopolies and er- 
ger policies can be interpretated as a subtle deterrent 
to bidders and their financial advisers- that ti-lie., would 
need to present a more coherent and cogent case gor 
their proposed mergers if they were to succeed. 
0 
In conclusion, legislative reforms it, 
merger control are hard to conceive, The implications 
of the now merger policy is to support the case--b;; 
--case 
approach favoured by the mlonopolies Conmiss on, Ho - 
ever, it is very difficult to generalise about the 
relationship between the structure of an industry and 
its perforý nce, - . 'here 
is no simple answers riven the present economic condi- 
tions, as part of its broader sty, ai tr,. egy, the rv ernmenv e 
<thouid strive tod evaloD a robust corm 41 v ýve Y1ý v on-- 
: IIent ar1d ensure that deficient corpora-: 150 ;"], rtiý? iiEent 
. 
_' e 
n c"t insulated voi: i Z'ý'`.: '".. ýý of 
--------- 
---------- --------- 
-------------------------- 
üi.: 
'. ý. r Z. T: =. ý. ".... 
....: t ý..;:: ..: 
ir. 
* See 'Daily Telegraph's' Article, "John Biffen to Review Role 
of Monopolies" (22/l/1982). 
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threat of takeover sometimes acts as a catalyst for the 
target company to implement measures to im-prove perfor- 
mance but this response should be long term and not 
short term. In spite of the present Conservative 
Government's subscription to the new merger policy, the 
recent reluctance and ineptness to which the Government 
responded to the Department of Trado's advice regarding 
the winding up of St. Pirar:, demonstrated that firm gui- 
dance is still lacking, and, the essence of its new merger 
policy has yet to permeate swiftly through the plethora 
of City institutions involved directly or indirectly 
in*the supervision of mergers and acquisitions. In 
view of the rising complexities, evolving market and 
technical systems, this vastly fragmented machinery re- 
quires more effective co-ordination, communication and 
guidance so that the sum of parts with strong central 
backing can function smoothly as a whole. 
In the 1980s) the main task of the 
Government in this difficult area of national industrial 
management should be the adoption of a consistent but 
flexible policy towards corporate mergers. This would 
provide the City, `the companies and the shareholders 
With the necessary guidance which has eluded them so far. 
10.8 Summa_ T/Rev? e rr 
As discussed in this section, the 
issues and problems associated with merchant banking, 
bid behaviour and practices within the UK institutional 
context are very complex and far-ranging. In essence, 
it is a contest oetaeen two groups of professionals 
- 
the financial, advisers implementing the ambitious corpo- 
rate. expansionary plans of their 
.. 
clients and the public 
efficia7. s/professior. u7. s who are 1responsible for over-- 
soeing and regulating the bid designs and beh i. our of 
acquisitive corporations and entrepreneurs. o:! Ie 
V- 
_ 
`Ir 
noted the weaknesses of the American stotutory system and 
the unsuitability of its wholesale transplant into the 
City. Moreover, it is hard to conceive that mergers can 
be judged in a mechanical fashion. With the objectives 
of the public interests and competition policy in mind, 
this researcher firmly subscribes to the concept of self- 
regulation and organisational flexibility. 
In conclusion, the interests of the share- 
holders, managers, employees, consumers and the domestic 
economic structure can best be served by a mixture of 
formal and non-formal regulations augmented by common 
sense and rationality. As we have seen in this study, 
formal regulations cannot stop takeover abuses totally. 
This problem is further compounded by the fact that the 
scope of existing legislation remains unclear. An-such, 
the step in the right direction is for both the City 
bodies and the Government to limit the circumstances 
Sere 
abuses call happen. 
ýýý 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSIONS II: SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES 
AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY 
11.0 Introduction 
This final'chapter examines and highlights 
the hypotheses and observations discerned and tested in 
this dissertation. Within the broad framework doli- 
mited for this research, both bidding and defensive 
strategies and their special features are evaluated. 
In view of the extensive' research findings and the re- 
sultant perception of gaps and structural flaws linked 
with certain areas of both merchant banking and corpc- 
" 
oiry cýtý ff; c^ o perms^i- ng to c`i^ ~te$te bide 
.., 
rate advisory 
º-7, crrr. a. Vºý 1.1 %0 A. v`4. u+. ýý vv uv. + 
some recommendations, gor further research are listed or 
the benefit of interested scholars and researchers. 
0 
11.1 Summary of Research Hypotheses And Observations 
Hypotheses suggested by the literature 
and direct observations were tested using data collected 
in the survey of merchant banks, the literature search, 
the analysis of 4+0 case studies, and the comparison of 
the salient features of the latter with the analysis and 
views expressed in ttne merchant banking survey. The 
results are summarised in this chapter in sequential 
order: 
1) In the area of corporate finance and merchant bank- 
ing in general, the merchant banking community per- 
ceives their greatest corporate asset to be financial 
power. 
L_ 
- 
2.9- 
2) Broadly speak} n ;, the merchent banking; rn nagenient 
perceives the potential disbenefits arising from 
affiliation with larger parental groups to be con- 
flicts of interest and lack of independence. 
3) A good number of the corporate finance divisions of 
the 30 UK merchant banks selected for stud;; were 
established in the 1950s in line with the rising de- 
mands of specialist advisory activities in the City 
and the gradual ascendency of London as a global fi- 
nancial centre. 
4) The label, "Corporate Finance Division, " is the most 
popular name adopted by UK merchant banks to denote 
their corporate advisory services. It is within 
this division that advice is proffered to clients re-, 
garding bid transactionse 
5) Corporate finance divisions are staffed largely by 
accountants and lawyers and to a lesser extent, 
busindss school graduates. This u.. del"i 1 sie's, tzie i- 
portance of providing an integrated in-house diverse 
professional skills. 
6) Owing to the inherent complexities, multi-discipi. nary 
and. esoteric nature of contested bids, team work is 
the most important and common organisational method 
adopted by British accepting/issuinj houses in advi- 
sing their clientele in bid/defence situations. 
For the bigger houses with their correspondingly lar- 
ger corporate finance divisional set-up, the hierar- 
chical structure is normally staffed by corporate 
finance directors, assistant directors, managers, 
assistant managers and corporate finance executives. 
7) Depending on the size, complexities, timing, geogra- 
phical location of the transaction and also exposure 
of the bank. (from the perspective'of reputation), 
the team size may vary with a director and a , naneger 
working together to four, five or more, 
1invo? 
ving, 
e 
L: 10pucu, v. j' 
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.. 111aµ`" the senior director, the assistant director, the 
ger, the assistant manager, executive or even other 
specialists incorporated for the assignment from the 
other parts of the merchant bank. However, most 
banks favoured teams of two or three. 
8) When asked to act in a takeo%rer by new clients, most 
merchant banks and stockbrokers thoroughly screen 
their potential clients before consenting to act as 
advisers, mainly to avoid conflict of interest and to 
preserve their reputation in the City. For these 
same reasons, they will not act for anonymous clients. 
9) In the formulation of acquisition ideas, merchant 
banks norna7. ly like their clients to generate or iden- 
tify the acquisition targets believing that their 
cli nts"should know what they want to acquire. The. 
merchant banks believe that this co.? tribuUes to the 
chances of success. 
1G) Many merchant banks use acqu sitio n checklists. How- 
, 
ever, they cautioned against too great a reliance on 
4 
checklists and suggested that their lists tended to be 
adapted to suit-each circumstance. 
11) Whenever feasible, merchant banks assist a takeover 
with a loan, this credit facility being provided by 
the banking division rather than the corporate finance 
division. 
12) Merchant banks favour initiating their takeovers at a 
.. 
time when target companies have just published poor 
results but this is not always possible. Rival bid- 
ders may put in a bid or build up a pro--bid stake in 
the common target company. 
13) That the terms of consideration are influenced by 6 
principal factors, viz, the target's position, the 
bidder's capability, the financial rationale, tu.: 
cons dv'rat1 ons, stock ': ýar1zet performance and gelle 'al 
considerations. 
51 
14) Over the last 3 years; cash has become the popular 
medium of acquisition financing. 
15) That the 'sighting shot' concept is commonly used in 
contested bid situations, the rationale being to so- 
licit sufficient up-to-date information from the 
biddee to enable the bidder to appraise the real 
worth of the company. 
16) That the 'sioht_ng shot' strategy has a higher degree 
of success than the 'one-shot' strategy. 
17) IF there is more than one bidder, the bid price esca- 
lates rapidly and the rinal price on average is 34-. 41; ý1 
above the initial bid uriceý 
- 
18) On average, the opening premium for contested offer 
is roughly 19% while the final premium is 15.75; over 
the initial premium level. 
19) That as part of 
strong inclinat 
form of pre-bid 
market raids or 
takeover bid. 
the acQu: A-s tä on strategy, there is 
"a 
ion 1: or he bidder to acquire some 
control_ n the target company through 
other means boLore springing the full 
20) As an extension of the above factor, it can be estab"- 
1ished that the higher the pre-bid stake, the higher 
the chances of success. 
21) The majority of the merchant bankers like to get the 
support of the bidder's board for the merger to faci- 
litate the takeover. 
22) Whilst in theory it is wholly desirable to. approach 
key shareholders prior to the takeover, the merchant 
bankers displayed nixed reactions because of the 
constraints imposed by the Panel regarding providing 
equal information to all shareholders. 
23) Takeover circulars (or documextation) are essentially 
drafted by the corporate finance team assigned for 
the takeover task in conjunction with the ban'- °s 
legal advisers. 
22- 
24) In bid circulars the emphasis is on factors such as 
the industrial logic of the merger, the bidder's pre- 
bid controlling position, lack of profit forecast by 
the biddee, his weak management, the attractive pre- 
mium offered and the bidder's management record. In 
general, the bidder seeks to discredit the target 
company. 
25) In general, merchant banks perceive that the press 
exercises considerable influence in contested bids 
and hence indirectly influences the tactical aspects 
of their strategy formulation. 
26) Although inevitably price constitutes the paramount 
factor in gaining full. ownership of the target corn- 
pany;, the outcome is also a consequence of many non- 
financial determinants like commercial logic of the 
merger, good performance/image of the bidder, approval 
from key shareholders to tactics, ploys and strat 
empioydd by both parties o 
27) In defence, the formulation of counter-strategies is 
a function. of the line of approach undertaken by the 
bidder. 
28) Broadly speaking, counter-measures include appeals to 
shareholders loyalty, asset revaluation, profit fore- 
casts and dividend increase but are supplemented by 
other moves developed to. meet the circumstances sur- 
rounding the takeover bide 
29) In defence, merchant banks do. not subscribe rigidly to 
fixed principles. Rather, they believe that a good 
defence requires flexibility and a creative approach 
which removes the initiattoive from the bidder and des- 
troys the value of his tactical moves. 
30) In. the formulation of defensive,. strctegies, the mer- 
chant banks are guided by facto ý such as the tip: ing 
of the bid, he natur. eo the bid, sts en ; ohs and 
weaknesses of both parties as well as other tactical 
: 'vil<. iiiit"ý is U. LviIZ 
-" 
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31) Before choosing their defensive strategy, the merchant 
banks tend to evaluate the financial performance of 
their client, market factors, shareholders position 
in general, basis for contesting the bid and miscel- 
laneous factors such as the press reaction to the 
takeover attempt. 
32) in their defence documentation, merchant banks favour 
emphasising factors such as the net asset backing the 
company, the performance of the client (profitability 
and prospects), inadequacy of the offer, reasons for 
shareholders to retain their shares, lack of manage- 
ment's support for the bid, benefits of independence, 
property revaluation and future dividend po? ieye 
33) Merchant banks perceive that their client company 
stands a better chance of retaining its i nde yen ý. en. ce 
when its voting power is vested in public's hands due 
to traditional loyalty of small shareholders to the 
board. 4 there shareholding is widely dispersed, as 
a result, a heavy emphhacis tends to be put on loyalty. 
in bid circulars and mass advertisements. 
34) Merchant banks attach great importance to shareholders 
interests and employees' interests are deemed to be 
crucial as well. 
35) In advising acceptance of the bid, merchant banks be- 
sides the financial consideration, also evaluate fac- 
tors such as the balance of vested interests, bid- 
der's capability/image, long term implications for 
client's business, line of approach adopted by the 
buyer and the general reaction to the bid itself. 
36) Profit forecasts are valuable because, first, they 
indicate the company's profitability to shareholders 
and second, they may induce the offeror to improve 
his offer. 
reviewing profit ýý forecasts i'oT'_c`i '"t bankers In sý ýti; 
__ý: tw the merchant 
perceive their task to be compounded by the failure 
of most companies to provide informative assumptions. 
- 
2- 
38) With the increased tendency for dissatisfied custo- 
mers to resort to lawsuits over deviant forecasts and 
professional negligence, merchant banks are becoming 
increasingly worried by the implications of such ac- 
tion, and in the long term might become reluctant to 
incorporate this tool in defence. 
39) That in the arena of contested bids, there is a funs-ý 
tional working relationship among the merchant banks, 
the stockbrokers, the accountant, and the corporate 
lawyers. 
0) The merchant banker perceives hirselý to be the ? eader 
and contral co-ordinator of this team of professionals. 
41) Vis-a-vis other professionals, the merchant banker 
perceives his role as f nancial advisor,. to be-well 
de 1ned, and this si er; 'i from his ability to devise 
complex takeovers as well as co-ordinate other profes-- 
siona. ip involved in this sort cý transaction 
42) From the merchant banking community's point of view, 
their distinctive advantages are their banking repu- 
tation, financial. power, experience and their daily 
exposure to this sort of advisory work. 
43) Stockbrokers are restrained from assuming the princi- 
pal role in contested takeovers for fear of upsetting 
profitable relationships with the merchant banks. 
44) In takeover transaction involving UK companies acqui- 
ring US corporations and vice-versa, there is a ten-- 
dency for British merchant banks to co-operate with 
their American counter-parts. 
45) Financial advisers work closely with the Takeover 
Panel implying that there is a high accessibility and 
that the Panel monitors mergers and. acquisitions very 
closely. 
KrG) In general, the over ihel mirig majority of the zerch n tom, 
-Lr- 
bankers favour self--regulation over a statutory system., 
for overseeing the conduct of mergers and acquisitions 
in the UK despite occasional imperfections and abuses. 
47) That merchant banks perceive their business relation- 
ships with their clients to be long term. 
+8) That over the last 3 years, UK merchant banking opera- 
tions have been characterised by a trend towards con- 
glomeracy and this trend-is likely to continue. 
49) As a result of the above merger movement, it can be 
hypothesised that for the 1980s, more merchant banks 
will seek to develop and fully exploi' areas where they 
have a competitive advantage. 
50) In the 1980s, merchant banking subsidiaries co- UK 
Clearers can be expected to becoma strong competitors 
of established traditional houses in fee-earning acti--. 
vities as well as international blanking. 
51; With inyreasii pressure and competition from domesti o 
and foreign merchant banks, a ma j jority of the 30 London 
merchant banks selected for this study are expanding 
actively overseas especially into the iior_th American 
and Asia/Pacific regions perceived by many experts to 
be the main growth areas for international merchant/ 
investment banking. 
52) in the understanding of the total process and mechanics 
of contested bids as it is conducted in the UK, the non- 
merchant banking practitioner needs to approach the 
issue-with a multi-disciplinary base as well as compre- 
hending the institutional framowork that prescribes 
behaviour and practices and hence, strategies. 
1 1.2 Bidding Strategies in Retrospect 
a) Ob ectives of the Takeover 1; xercise 
def-intion, the objoct, 'Iv, ý of 
the bidder is to acquire ý, Iio h of the sh; res 
.. - 
th@ 
target company to give effect ; i. ve co: uorat cc:: ý: ý'.; "., 
ýý. 
.- 
CJ tJ 
. ý. 
In the UK context, this tends to mean that over 50(' of 
the. biddoe's equity capital be successfully acquired. 
2 
In other cases, an equity holding of 29.9% can also 
confer effective control (refer to the Lonhro/House of 
Fraser case study) with the single holder able to exert 
tremendous influence on boardroom and corporate deci-. 
sion making process. 
b) Target Identification and Market Operation 
In this study, we discovered that a 
majority of the merchant banks prefer* their clients to 
identify the targets although many would ad. ýisee on 
suitability of the choice. Once the mandate to act 
for a. client has been agreed upon, then we come to the 
pre-bid share acquisition' phase. From evidence- 
collec-ted during the research, it appears that most bidders 
favour building up a substantial stake below the 5% 
discl. osabl. e level. or just under the trigger roil-. t i'or 
the following reasons: 
i) To increase the thence; of success. 
ii) A 
_large pre-bid control level would act as 
a psychological leverage to coerce recommen- 
dation from the board of the target company. 
Basically, the share acquisition process 
may be executed in the following manner: 
i) Market raid operations (Gough Cooper and 
Guthrie case studies) 
ii) Disposal by large institutions (Law Land 
case study) due to disenchantment with the 
target's performance. 
iii. ) Availability of a large shareholding from 
an institutional ' oder (the Savoy case 
study), or a powex-f. a1 : ndividuai 
. 
nv4sfor 
ce For a fuller discussion on the control coil: -ý Je , a- 
tiorý, sec iYI, A.: 'c nbor ot. Us., " dart i), 
2(7 
(Giltspur case study) or a family holder 
(William Collins and the Mäuse of Fraser case 
studies). 
As far as possible, the bidder would 
endeavour to buy initial control in the victim company 
through subtle design for pre-emptive disclosure of the 
potential buyer's intention would distort the market 
price of the biddee's shares making the eventual take- 
over operation more prohibitive in financial terms. 
Additionally, premature publicity would enable the tar-- 
get company to tale anticipatory counter measures such 
as the adoption of special bye-laws (Section 2; of the 
1976 Companies Act, for instance) to thwart nominee 
holdings or even solicit corporate assistance from a 
"white knight. 
Mechanism 
While there are fundamental princi-- 
ples guiding'the financial advisers in their acquisition 
planning and execution, the empirical evidence adduced 
in this dissertation indicates that an outstending fea'- 
ture of contested deals is the retention of flexibili6y 
within a master plan. This is necessary because of 
the variety of defensive measures and the possible entry 
of a counter-bidder. Prior to the ban on "concert 
party" action and nominee holdings, there were some 
cases where the bidders resorted to the 'warehousing' 
of the victim company's share capital overseas through 
the skilful utilisation of foreic n nominees (St. ira. n 
and Renick case studies). 
3) Bid Timinand Financial I= ck__ i 
The tim] 1"ý t? G 
.: 
F';: t in any 
., 
takeover is crucial. As conceptualised, the bidder 
would exercise more influence over this factor than the 
biddee company. Ideally, most bidders would like to 
initiate their takeover bids to coincide-with a period 
of adverse company performance (either through a fall 
in profitability or a period of sustained losses) of 
the offeree relative to their own positive results. 
This is an important consideration especially when the 
bidder is resorting to a share exchange. He is, in 
this context, undoubtedly influenced by the managerial 
theory that a high P/E multiple, a good market rating 
and a correspondingly low P/E multiple and poor market 
rating would generate an even higher price for the 
buyer'; s shares and may improve its P/E initially. 
Irrespective of the forms of arguments presented in 
this area of bid timing linked to acquisition financing, 
the underlying rationale remains the same. So, in a 
4h, arG ij4. . LnG, the 
. 
arkat acceptability of the bidder'5 
own shares is important. However, the bidder may not 
always have freedom to determine the timing of his bid 
for a rival contender may commence building up sizeable 
control or even effect a formal takeover for the sane 
target company. Under these circumstances, for example, 
Liggett, OMT, Laurence Scott and Stag Pine case studies, 
it may be necessary to launch a bid quickly to forestall 
or counter that of a potential rival bidder. on the 
other hand, if cash forms the main financial offering, 
then the P/E factor is of secondary importance. zore- 
over, data from this study and also official sources 
have indicated that over the past few years, cash has 
become the most popular medium of acquisition financing:. 
Acquisition P. re iuL^. 
bile price is Oft@n perceived to be 
the final determinant ant for a succ cs sf ül take o e. i ,a high 
: ml. llm Over the c 
w 2t9 
classic one being the Savoy case study-) fail. 4d to soli- 
cit the desired shareholders' support. This may be 
attributable to factors such as intense loyalty to the 
company, unequal capital. structure with voting power 
favouring the target company, or the business being 
held tightly by thq family ($t. George and 'illiam Col- 
lins case studies) who favour independence. 
r) APortunistic Bid 
In some other instances where the 
buyer surmises that there is a likelihood of a rival 
bidder and there the bidden is experiencin great ziýýýy a-- 
cial difficulties, an opportunistic bidder may make a 
"one-shot" offer (Lindustries and Laurence Scott case 
studies). The current economic recession too p: ovided. 
some of the opportunistic bidders the ideal timing to 
acquire their target companies cheaply or at a great 
discount o their net asset value (see Table 11.0 beloºy). 
Under this condition, the bi ddees all exhibited symptons 
of difficulty. such as continued losses, reduced dividend 
or dividend restraint, staff redundancies and the adop- 
tion of business rationalisation programme. Under 
these circumstances, both the boards and their advisers 
have to react under groat pressures and normally, defers-ý 
ces are difficult to mount. Consequently, in the 
majority of the cases, the victims felt compelled to 
recommend the acceptance of the bids to their sharehol- 
ders even with qualifications (OMT, Lindustries, Evered 
and the Spillers case studies). 
Bidder Biddee 
Final 
Bid price NV. utC07! 
Burns Pni1p Hoffnung 88p 125p success 
Dalgety Spillers 50p 64P SVc ces 3 
Hanson Trust Lindustries 135p 225p success 
Caparo Girl" 5jp 79p success 
Mining Supplies Laurence Scott 65p : 195p succe-s , Starwest/ALP Gough' Cooper . 145p" 215p succ sz 
Table 11 
.C Opportunistic Bids t':. Discount to lla :t Value Related to Case Studies. 
ý- r tiv -_ 
ý) "Quick-Firs "Bid Technique Su Eq ie; aented z) IN ar : et Raid) 
In 1980 and 1981, a number of bids were 
made characterised by"quick-fire'bid approach. This 
was designed to give the bidder the maximum leverage to 
compel other shareholders to sell, once effective con- 
trol (the 50.1% level) is attained,, Essentially, the 
"quick-fire" bid technique is an aggregate of some or 
all of these tactical ploys; the bidder normally com- 
mences his takeover by procuring a strong pre-bid hold- 
ing in the target company, then seeks the requisite 
support of key shareholders in the biddee followed by 
further 
-share acquisition both off and on the raarke-t., 
Once this carefully co-ordinated operation is commenced, 
the iaommentum is sustained and the bidder then declares 
that he is assured of important support or effective 
control and is able to coerce the board of directors 
and other shareholders of the target company to reccm- 
mend t1äe bid. The tactical superiority of this '. rapid - 
takeover technique lies in the element of total sur- 
prise. It is swift, may be psychologically deva. sta.. 
ting, decisive and does not allow the target company 
time to mount any or some form of credible defence to 
counter such a bid technique. 
h) Flexibility and Incremental Approach 
Lonhro's endeavour to acquire the House 
of Fraser was in fact effected through a mixture of 
covert and overt strategies 
- 
incremenUaily designed to 
cater to evolving opportunism and circumstances. The 
strategies as conceived, show a great deal of planning, 
in-built flexibility and'excellent timing. Its main 
moves against the House of Frailp can be outlined as 
follows: 
- 
Uses SUITS to gain an important covit-Irol in 
Vhp- 
Hofase 
J. 1'rOs1s1 i 
L(1 
- 
--A Installation of Lonhro's nominees on the boa, d 
of the House of Fraser by proxy battle, 
- 
Seek the alliance of Sir Hugh Fraser (the ex- 
chairman and the most important shareholder), 
- 
Weaken the board of the House of Fraser, and 
- 
Undermine the market rating of the target com- 
pany. 
i) Legal Device and Conventional Bid Approach 
.A determined bidder seeking full 
ownership of a highly coveted company (which in turn 
because of its vulnerability has designed strong de. fen-- 
sive system) must-formulate equally skilful and crea- 
tive bid approaches to surmount the entrenched line of 
defence put up by the biddee. In the Trust House 
Forte/Savoy case study, to circumvent these legal and 
financial impediments, both Trust House Porto and its 
merchant; banking advisers then devised its acouis_tidn 
approach through a sequential two--tiered strategy with 
the second automatically becoming operational following 
the failure of the -first. Through a skilful applica- 
tion of the company law, using the scheme of arrangement 
(SoA) device, Trust House Forte proposed that each criasp; 
of Savoy's equity capital to be voted separately. Un- 
der this interpretation, a 75% majority of "A" shares 
would provide Trust House Forte with the control of all 
the shares in this category of capital structure. So, 
the main determinant in acquiring strategic ownership. 
of the Savoy Group hinges critically on gaining the 
support of the high voting "A" shareholders. When the 
High Court rejected Trust House Forte's application, it 
then resorted to the fallback strategy of a conventional 
takeover. 
j) Unconventional Crew Live Takeover 
_, 
ýanroa. Sill 
We saw from bogs ; ru: ýs of case st u- 
. 
M22 
dies that creativity can : ýaniiest itse f in 
.. 
any ilays. 
In the Avana/Robertson case study, the bid was formula- 
ted in such a way that it is difficult to pinpoint the 
real tactical purpose when Avana declared it was selling 
its existing minority stake in Robertson while at the 
same time mounting a full- bid for the company itself. 
This approach besides being unconventional was also 
contrary to normal acquisition logic. Generally spea- 
king, Avana's action can be interpretated as a subtle 
ploy designed possibly to facilitate: 
i) Avara with sufficient flexibility for mainoeu"- 
vre during the rapidly evolving circumstances 
that usually surround a contested bid, or, 
ii) By disposing the biddee's equity in the ma_--- 
ket for cash, it will be 3: eceivin E-1 million, 
in cash and then possibly uses it to repo---- 
chase those shares back under its o. 
-: n b?. d 
terms (akin to a rights issue in reverse), or 
iii) It is not confident enough that it will take 
control of Robertson. As such, it did not 
want to be locked into a minority stake in 
a family-controlled business and thus, may 
be fully exploiting this chance to reduce 
its holding while Robertson's price was in- 
flated by the bid attempt. 
k) Controversial Bid Approach 
In more extreme, controversial but 
untypical cases involving a. triangular tussle, the ori- 
ginal bidder may even threaten to acquire the rival 
bidder itself. * In the U ;,, L-7 this.:. 
t ea oly happened when 
Burma Mines announced its inteztxwn to counter--CJid for 
*' See D, &. a ram 's 1.0, gage (ý 3 
Cýj 
St. Piran. Jim Raper (Gasco) then reacted swiftly by 
declaring that he would effect a formal takeover of 
Burma ifines which resulted in the intended victim's 
(Burma Mines) immediate withdrawal. In the USA, re- 
cently, a similar ploy. has been used in the Mobil/U. S. 
Steel attempts to takeover the Marathon Oil Company. 
Frustrated by U. S. Steel in its acquisition attempt, io-- 
bil has resorted to this drastic action by tendering for 
25%of the shares of U. S. Steel! 
*Co. A (bidder) 
ýl 
Co. B (bidd©r)I 
I 
i Co, A 
)(bidder) 
Co. B ýüGiýcý3 
1 
Co. C 
target) 
te ýnr Qt} 
Situation (i) I Situation (ii) 
Diagram 11.0 H yhly Controversial Triangular Bid 
Technique With the Original Bidder Attempting to AQ- 
quire the Rival Contender. 
* Co. 
= 
Company 
'"3 Conclusions: Defensive S traten ies in Retrospect 
a) Defensive Response to Hostile Rid 
The counte and line of de.. 
fence adopted by the target C or pidn j 
-and 
its financial 
advisers will depend on the following consider? tions: 
i)- fi 
- 
". t, 1... 
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ii) The line and emphasis of attack adopted L; t 
-e 
aggressor, 
iii) The financial power of the offeror (its stren-: 
gths and weaknesses), 
iv) The performance of the biddee company itself 
and future prospects, 
v) The basis for contention i. e. price or indepen-- 
dence? 
vi) The voting power and share ownership structure 
of the victim company. 
b) Objectives of the defensive Exercise 
The case studies show that defensive 
styles and tactics are very much a function and res- 
ponse to bidding strategies. Moreover, it should be 
emphasised that "Its is not possible to ýýreai: thi eh 
defensive tactics may he utilised or the order in 
. 
which they may be employed. "3 To recall, we observed 
that some of the defensive strategies employed in the 
case studies coincided broadly with those extracted 
from the literature of corporate finance and tested 
with the majority of the UKW merchant banks and stock- 
there brokers. It has been demonstrated that while 
are central or pivotal defensive measures guiding the 
advisers, however, like acquisition strategy, their 
flexibility is fundamental to an effective defence. 
The ability to devise and structure defensive measures 
around the core strategies is vividly illustrated by 
the comparative' analysis of tactics and strategies 
found in Case Studies Appendices A and 3. As evident 
from the findings of this study, variations of some 
fundamental tactics and ploys could be applied in 
different circumstances. Fit? " 'cvo , the main aim of 
the defensive exercise is to , modify defence=s to accu 
. 
- 
sition approach and to create- and 
3. Secufi 
Vies l:: 
Exchange Com: rj 3-sslo-rlj (ýi%Cc"l. L 4Ci 
r 
ý'"'ý- s 
Tt should be nc ted t'nt t! -C, 'C Ot 
case studies -iot; hod in Ghe I' ap_ roacl: be is: cV 
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-- 
tactical iov, -s designed to neutralise the bidder's ini- 
tiative, to bewilder him as well as to solicit support 
for independence from the key investors or to elicit a 
higher price from the bidder. 
c) Voting Influence and Implications for Defence 
Voting power and its concentration 
as we observed in chapter q, in the final analysis, will 
be a major determinant in deciding whether the defender 
retains its independence or not. From the defending 
party's point of view, we have also noted in this study 
that ; "wher_ ownership is diffused in the hands of the pri-" 
vate shareholders, one of the main lines of defence will 
be a direct appeal for shareholders 'oyalty via: 
i) A steady stream of defensive cireul aß, 5 
4 
ii) Heavy advertising in . he pre 
. 
The arguments used in such an appeal 
seek to suggest: 
1) The bid is opportunistic. 
2) The merger lacks industrial logic, 
3) The bid grossly undervalues the company, 
4) The quality of the offeror's shares may 
not be good, 
5) Performance of the offeror is not good 
relative to that of the biddee, 
6) Dividend increases may be made, 
7) Forecast of future profits/prospects are 
good, 
8) The bid is disrupt ve and will adverse l ;y 
affect the corapan; y's stability and recd- 
very. 
2 ?6- 
d) Defence Against-Acquisitive Bidder 
In the case of an acquisitive bidder, 
there is often an attempt to identify a particular 
weakness in its past acquisition behaviour and then 
fully exploit it. Hanson Trust offers such a case in 
point. It is an acquisitive company but exercised 
great financial prudence in its offer terms (bid pr-i- 
cing) hence its subscription to the "one-shot" stra;. egy. 
However, this acquisition philosophy engendered quite 
a high failure rate where targets have recognised its 
strategy (see Table 11.1 below). This underlines the 
weakness of adhering to prescribed principles and ü 
strategy devised with little space for manoeuvre= 
Drawing from its past experience, however, there are 
signs that Hanson Trust is shifting from a rigid bid. 
practice to a more flexible posture as exemplif ed by 
its current successful acquisition of Berec. 
. 
This 
again, was an intensely contested trianguiar= battle 
between Hanson Trust and another rival, Thomas Tilling 
for the Berec Company. The takeover attempt by Han- 
son Trust developed into a protracted affair but with 
the entry of Thomas Tilling halfway through the contest 
as a "white knight" Hanson Trust's chance of winning 
looked slim but it managed to acquire Berec after it 
- 
had revised its original offer. 
Bidder : iz Target Line of 
ýýpprc, acn ; Outcome d t d a op e 
Hanson Trust Lindustries one shot strategy ISuccess 
Hanson Trust G. N. T. one shot stratekýJ-y1failure 
, - Hanson Trust G. H. Downing one shot strategy 1failure 
Hanson Trust Berec flexible str3. tegy j uccess 
Table 11.1 : Success Rate of An Acquisitive UK Company 
* Fail ed in the first bid attempt. 
e) The "White Knight" Strategy 
As indicated : in `the case S U6i s? 
- 
strategy can assume two characcerý t c: sý 
ý- I) 
i) Pure "white kuiGht" strategy in º hich he 
biddee seeks a full merger with a more suit: 
-- 
abl_e party (Gough Cooper and Giftspur case 
studies). 
ii) Enlisting. "white knight" to consolidate his 
shareholding in the target company to deny 
the bidder the strategic share holding stake 
needed to gain* success or to indirectly in- 
duce the bidder to improve his offer (iý; ont- 
fort and the Evered case studies). 
f) Institutional Defence 
The institutional shareholders examined 
and evaluated in this research now possess tremendous 
power-to influence the outcome of contested takeovers 
due to the size and the spread of their portfolio. 
In this survey, we found that institutions were partial- 
ly instrumental in defeating opportunistic bids in some 
- 
1. i1S- Oi the acquisition attempts. in situations where 
titutional holders displayed strong resistance to the 
bid, the defender and its financial advisers could seek 
their formal support (the classic one being Britannic 
Assurance) and also work them actively in defeating 
the-hostile bid. 
g) Lobbying Lor A Monopolies Gemnission Reference 
In the USA, one of the most powerful 
ab 
jSterrent, to a bidder rests on anti--trust basis enforce-- 
Aby the Justice Department- and the Secur. ties & Exchange 
Commission. In the UK, some of the merchant bankers 
interviewed suggested that more and more financial 
advisers would defend their slic-sifts by getting the bi dis 
referred to the , "iononolies Coim,; fission as a weapon of 
aai '"Io: is ghat last resort. Table. 11.2- on the next rý. 
1/8 of ttic 40 care Studios., in ac ý>> had 13Oefl 
-- 
208 
- 
to tho ; onapolies Co,., Of these, t, lio werc 
cleared and proceeded successfully with their bid pro- 
grammes while the other three were blocked by the Com- 
mission on various grounds. 
- 
Bidder Tarr-e t C verdie t üutcome 
y Genera. Electric Con1nan Averys I c earl süccas 
_ Hiram Walker Hz7_, iai d Dist_., blocked lapse 
onnro 
_ - _ 
SUITS cleared succ iss 
Standard & Chartered/ Royal Bank of blocked lýý_ýse Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank Scotland 
Lonhro House of Erase blocked lapse 
Table 1 1.2 : Case Studios Referred to the Monopolies: 
Commission, Their Results & Subsoquent Outcome 
11.4 Summary and Conclusions of : tree S tulc y of Merchant Banks 
and Corporate Advisory Services related to Contested 
Bids 
In many ways, it has been clearly es- 
tablished in this. study that strategy formulation is a 
consequence of the substance, form and 
. 
line of approach 
employed in each case. In conclusion, this study 
serves to fill a gap. 
-in the comprehension of the multi- 
faceted nature of contested takeovers by examining how 
UK merchant banks conduct it within the existing insti- 
tutional framework. We started by looking at the cor- 
porate finance structure as constituted within the 
overall merchant banking framework and how the cross- 
section of leading houses approach their takeover 
assignments. vie then proceed ,, rith the assumption that, 
the client had already identified : pus acquisition I.  
and then covered the opera 
. 
cna'+ piiases of bid 
p1anni ng, strategy f ormu; a ti on r, 0. the r 10 G. 13S op ndl. 
f avoured in co:: pan 
..,,... 
2's 
ly, this lt udy thea e:: amined how -e char (3 .. 
_"L. 
ý ýL 
26cj 
react to hostile offers for their clients, their selection 
of counter-measures and how they would proceed to defeat 
the takeover attempt. Current problems, issues and 
trends k. re then highlighted within the research frame- 
work prescribed in chapter 1. 
In essence, it can be established that 
once a contested bid is in progress, events will move 
very quickly and develop into a climax. in the, midst 
of these shifting circumstances, the financial advisers 
and their clients in both offensive and defensive situa- 
tions will endeavour to hold the initiative. While adher- 
ing to general. principles, they will bear in mind that 
contested bids are seldom straight forward. Hence, 
each deal is governed by special factors. As such, 
strategies need to be highly 
. 
fle, xible, well-timed, care- 
fully planned, creative and responsive to both internal 
and external forces, as well as to the line of approach 
adopted by the opposition. 
.! he prime duty; of a merchant 
bank (other financial advisers as well) is to provide the 
client with the best possible course of advice cum action 
given the set of events and industrial logic underpinning 
the merger attempt. 
'11.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
In view of the numerous issues (bid) and 
merchant banking practices that became apparent as a re- 
sult of this empirical study, there is great scope for 
both deeper and broader research in the following areas 
related to merchant banking and corporate advisory ser- 
- 
vices pertaining to acquisitions; 
Choice of mOrCý13r1t Dank as ad_"v'i n 
cLnan .vs ra i corporate Nnancil SBZ-CE. ý 
.,.. 
x_41-_., to i. E1'. 
.., 
2ý7O 
gees and acquisitions. 
2) Attitude of institutional shareholders to takeovers. 
3) The need to simplify complex bid documentation for the. 
benefit of the small shareholders. 
4) The role of the media in takeovers. 
5) Conflicts of interest arising from contested bid situa- 
tions. 
6) Comparison of self-regulatory system (UK) with that of 
the American Securities & Exchange Commission system. 
7) Competition and growth arising from merchant banking 
operations owned by leading UK clearing banks. 
8) Threat of foreign merchant. bans to corporate 
. 
finance 
and related fee-based activities of UK merchant banks 
in the City. 
9) Cost--benefit analysis of advertising in contested bids. 
0) Possiü3. AIJ of UK s ockb1'o! 'ti: ii. $ z: Ssum fG dual ea. ) e LLB' 
i. e. stockbroking and ierchAt banking in the late-1980s. 
and approach ý'orein ýat. e 11) How UK merchant banks conduct 
over transactions. 
ýr`a 
2'ß "i 
r OSTSCRTP1 
CORPORATE ADVISORY ACTIVITIES IN THE 1980s 
12.0 Introduction 
This final section examines the current 
trend towards conglomeracy in UK merchant banking as 
Well as the divorsification efforts of sor^c City stoc 
- 
brokers and the competition provided by foreign ! Tier- 
chant banks in the field of fee-earning activities. 
Most of the London-based merchant banks are cur i: entlr 
ac titre iy pu_ x suing a program ie of over eas expansion es-J- 
pecially into the g : +owth markets of the U<S. La and J, sie/ 
Pacific. 
1c 
,1 
n8T? }. 1ng? ' i' i ltß 
Over the period. ; hick this research co- 
vers, notably 1979-1981, international financial ser- 
vices in the City and. "Wall Street" have been characte- 
rised by a ýý r1 rise 
i 
ý... 
T1 Dez "teTe. 1, s in the insi x ra 
e- 
. 
. 
ýc,. A, money 
broker, merchant/investment banking and even the 
clearing banking sector anion st local institutions and 
also with foreign companies. We shall, ho'iever, 
confine our interest to the merchant* banking and clear- 
ing banking sectors (see Tables 12.0,12. -1 and 12.2 on 
the next page),, Looking at Table 12.1, tie can see 
that the iALirger '-=1 the IQorchant, banking sector 
. 
involved 
at least 5 members of the Accepting Houses Comii: i eo 
representing 29.4 
, 
of the to Gad. Ti: erchant banks belong- 
ing to it. This number cou? d,.; 'isc if the muc apec; u-- 
lateci meng r of ui ]. 1 Snj uo3. aznd=llcrri7. _L Lynch : ere to 
T7R 3 terialA' soQ 11 
- 
Th"a trend in t be. tin r: cial i 
gers in the US-ii and l1ti is t ! ý>riccd by zý sI, i_ý ý"; J i ro 
U `Jý S LA 1 J. J(J. V 4.. J\1 i. a1VV V: l li VUI'. A'i 1.3. - /. üU V.. vV. 
i 
1-. +. 
-" 
- 
2'72 
- 
Table 12.0: Conglomerate Financial Services Mergers In 
""Wall Straat1' Tice ý1caýo_foQý 
iLi: G 4 El `'`7j G Gý',. 1ýBILITIFS ri1RTRS i1L ýT 
li 
rlý) 
Stockbroking, mutual funds, investment 
,,; 1; A, ýor can banking, internationa]. b nkin , travel-- 
ý'ý. r press/ýýriearson 915 lers cheques, travel services, cable TV insurance, charge cards, data services, 
publishing, mortgage banking 
Prudential/ 38r 5tocý: urokiný, investments, cornraodities , Bache insurance, mutual funds, tax shelters 
Sears Roebuck/ ercnandisin" insurance, savings and 
Dean Witter 600 loans, real estate brokerage, construcr- 
y nolds 
tion, consumer credit, stockbroking, 
e investment banking 
k'jjj . )ro/Salomon Commodities trading) .- orldtride invest- 
." Brothers 550 rent banking, market making in invest- 
, rent grade securities re ,e ire Donaldson Lut- Stockbroking, investment banking, secu-- 
:ýn,; enret t e/ 44 2 cities 7; radin commodities, ? rýsý 'i ý, 
_tu-- ACT, I "Ent-1. tional and individual money mane> ement 
Goldman Sachs/ vor awiae investment banking, securities 
. 
Aron n/a sales and trading, individual investing, real estate, commodä ties research 
Bechtel/ 
n/a 
Engineer. ing, construction., energy, 
Dillon Read. 
,i 
investment banking, securities 
So rce: rý i nnnri ij Time "' (^i/i2/f3 i 
Table 12.1: Takeovers and Potential Mergers In the UK 
Merchant Bankine SPctnr (1a70_iaa1l 
ý E.. GriI'll iT BIDDER' S BANK 
- 
AHO BUYER BUSINESS REMARKS !; C )UlRED STATUS 
Da, ndati Day 
- 
i+'. fiý investment tru com )l ete . 
dr-%SB overseas bý. r'rin 
fi 
cornplerýod( 
X21? er cc ! ''a' indust1. '1.21 ý1 comp_I e ett 
U_I.. l sann Jacile t industrial cor: i ; J_ecec 
r°b)Iuýila: n l)oýr ýcanäia iý? t1., ban ins cu;:,, ýleteý 
Hiýý 7 Samuel. speculative 
-- 
Lord K. issin mexchant üan er psrtiaý 
(ALE ARIUG BANK BIDDER BIDDER'S BUSINESS MARKS 
Lloyds cc Scottish Lloyds Bank clearing bank cpl*ý 
Royal Bank of Scotland SGB/HKSB international banking blk- 
Grindlay Bank, speculative 
- -- 
ý' cpl 
- 
completed 
Ali; blocked 
Table 12.2: Takeovers and Potential Mergers In the UK 
Clearing Banking Sector (1979-1981) 
-- 
ßi3 
financial services. Comparatively` it should be euoha- 
sised that as British merchant banks tend to be more 
specialist in outlook, the portfolio of financial and 
related services provided by them are less diverse than 
those offered by the existing or newly created American 
financial houses. Just how significant and diverse 
these American mergers are can be gauged by the fact 
that the mergers represented a cross-fertilisation of 
investment banking, research, stockbroking, insurance, 
commodities, merchandising, "aecurities trading, insur- 
ance, engineering, construction and energy. The Ameri- 
can commercial banks are not involved in these ; vergers 
because they are constrained from entering investment 
banking because of the Glass-Stegall Act (introduced in 
1933 during the Great Depression). However, there are 
indications that the American commercial banks are taking 
the threat posed by these new financial conglomerates 
seriously. During the Securities Indus try Associa ti on3. ýs 
annual S-011'ing m eting in Ber., -. u a, she comme: r c 
. 
a' 7i8. iý': is 
argued that by offering such substantially new financial 
and international banking services,. the securities indus- 
try have increasingly encroached on its-banking terra-- 
tory and that they also should be allowed to participa-in 
actively in services restricted to securities institu- 
tions under the 1933 Glass-Stegall Act. ) In the IIK 
context, just how strong this trend towards conglomeracy 
will be and what potential-advantages and dysfunctions 
congl omeracy will bring can be surmised from the cross- 
section of views proffered by some merchant bankers on 
this issue: 
a) "It could be. There are already a few big 
mergers as you know; Keyser Ullmann with Oharý-ý" 
terhouse Ja. p}yet and some of the smaller ones 
are amte ikely to be taken over. size is 
not so much a crite 
. 
ýia4n c`his fields it is 
wort-: so in 
, 
he bank rid `3 1 eid 7 
.. t£' ns 
because 
'one has ab gge. ''. b=nking =ol? pý it 
makes much more d fi erence to your co. ý p orate 
1e "F al Times, " (28/4/81) The r ±. nnnciý. 
_-_--- 
----, - 
2' 14 
- -- 
finance Of 
oer banking group, 
offer amore banning 
bly that way, attr 
other services. " 
course, with a h7 
y'ou vre aoie to 
services and poss1- 
acts clients to ;; our 
(Manager, MB4) 
b) ''You knot, merchant banI have always 
been very interesting animals in that 
they are always very small. It sur- 
prised me when T first came 
-into mer- 
chant banking, how small some of the 
big names-in merchant banking are 
- 
and if you take a bank like Rothschilds 
they are really quite small and yet 
their reputation is. as high as ever, 
whereas banks like Hill Samuel and 
Kleinwort Benson are merchant banks 
which have taken some sort of finan- 
cial weight along side their corporate 
finance departments. (' 
(Manager, NB24) 
c) ""I think there is a tendency. toward 
a con; lomeracy of merchant banks. 
Just like business, if you are standing 
still, you are going rack : arils a r. e_^_' it 
you? It is very easy to think in 
terms of industry tending; to coalesce 
into giant companies-but the snore 
they do, the more a vacuum is created 
underneath them 
-- 
9-iven the right 
conditions like no oppressive taxation 
and so on... so, I think in the same 
way going back to me°chant banks, 
there should be a role for the small 
specialists just as the same way as 
the larger companies. I think finan- 
cial muscle roust play an important 
pari: and so it is helpful, but, there 
is a danger I think, if you grow too 
big, you would be affected by a sort 
of creeping organisational " paralysis. " 
(Director, MBI`1) 
12.2 Implications of Current stockbrokers Diversification 
Efforts into Corro-rat r;:, ncýý. aý : Servicss 
Ui{ stockbrokers, or the other hand, l.: ? C'u h 
offering qui t-e a range of C ; vices ranging 
.i : '0; ) Cam"; o 
- 
21,, 
- 
ate £in::, nce to portfolio ne n'om' 1 nsL 1a 2'i 
from the threat of takeovers by Merchant bans ý= t pri2"- 
sent (this is because the Stock Exchange ruling forbids 
its members from assuming dual capacity in both stoc)-, -- 
broking and merchant banking). However, its fixed 
comnissions- practice is currently undergoing extensive 
review by the R-estxtc VR. j>ractcce Curt- which is expel tad 
to publish its findings by the mid-1980s. Current 
evidence suggests that some stockbroking firms are 
already merging or diversifying into other 
. 
financial 
services to expand their underlying functional and 
capital base should the Office of Fair Trading rule 
against the contemporary fixed eo muissions structure. 
This hoýw, one S4- ochbroker viel. 'ed the possible ch 
-ng 5 , 
is 
in the near future: 
to change. z'h e "Stockbroking is going 
is no question about it. The Vjhole of tib: s Stock 
chan; e practices is under reviewj and of er I`981- or T985 
the sto9kbroking, husinesc would be a different one en- 
tirely. For instance, it is currently an entirel 
closed shop. We sit on the Stock Exchange and c": e de- 
cide who can become stockbroker and who can't.. ºe tr"J 
to run a monopoly! I think, we will see a treater 
stratification of the stockbroking industry, of the 
larger firms which tend to offer more diversified ser-- 
vices to its clients and cover most" cl the markets in 
the world, and the smaller brokers or specialists : ill 
cover a certain sector or a particular country. I 
think in the riddle of 1980s, firms will either merge 
or move upwards ar contract. In theory, there are 
reasons to suppose. that merger with merchant banks 
would be successful. However, this will increase the 
possibility of conflicts of interest in the City and 
lessen the chance of companies getting an entirely 
independent advice and concentrate the resources oä: 
advice to a smaller number. I tend to think that the 
functions will remain separate and. the merchant banks 
as well as the Clearers will see?: other forms of c pi-- 
tal base. " 
(Corporate Finance 1Dire cto, 
, 
STK4) 
Events toward ja and of 19SO and 1981 
imply that some stockbrokers are' 
-already taking Fiction- 
tow"a: rczs this direction of diversification. in Sc=;? i:::;,, 
-. 
ber 1980. Rowe & Pitman one of London's i 
. 
`_ ai 
.- 
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stockbroking firms extended its link w-, i th PICA, a ;? in-. 
gapore based Asian development institution similar in 
function to the ICFC. PICA's shareholders include 
-many of the large multinationals and its board contains 
representatives of Lazard Freres, BNP, Citibank, etc. 
The link between a local stockbroker and an overseas 
finance group is an important development because 
the PICA Group (having a net worth of TJS X50 million) 
specialises in banking, corporate finance and consul- 
tancy services ranging from mergers and acquisitions 
advice to the provision of consultancy expertise to 
the ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian. Nia. ion) 
corporate sector. It is significant to note that 
many of Rowe "&; Pitman's UK institutional clients are 
looking for ways of linking in Far East industries and 
the association with PICA could provide the Tauch needed 
local knowledge. 
The second event which might mark t}:;:: 
start of a trend in the future rationalisation of the 
stockbroking sector was the decision by Rowe Rut=. d ;a 
small but reputable firn to withdraw from the Stock 
Exchange to develop a financial service business con- 
tering on corporate finance and investment manc. geraenv, 
This move represented a deviation froru traditional 
stockbroking into the preserve of merchant banking, 
However, steps toward the ultimate future re-structuring 
of the stock market is still several years away but 
with increasing market pressures, concentration of 
stockbroking business in the hands of a few firms and 
the contraction 'of jobbers, we noted that some b 'ckJ. ng 
firms have already instituted diversification action 
or structural reform to take full advantage of the 
inevitable structu: i. ° @. a. chant ts due in the 
Gs Private Investcie"nt Capital for Asia S. A. 
- 
27? 
- 
12.7 CU: ul)C-A; 1. ti. o!. ro[i; 
of UK Clearers 
While the snaller and medium-sized , «er chant 
banks are vulnerable to being acquired by the biggor 
houses, UK Clearers and British-owned international 
banläs, p there is likely to be a tendency for corporate 
finance (mergers and acqui-sitionq services) and other 
specialised merchant bankii g activities to become in- 
creasingly concentrated in the hands of the es tab z. i. 3had 
accepting houses and subsidiaries of clearers. Just 
what kind of competition would the merchant banking 
,. y ? 
ar he a....., 
ther mýe cý`taii"c i; ävý ý, s of clearers ý pose to the 
If we extend the definition of British clearing banks 
beyond the traditional "Big Four" then the scope of 
domestic U1 , who orale bý eking ß: n12? d co v er i id;:? r 
nu, ber than traditionally percei_vod, as illustrated is 
Table 12.3. 
CLEARING BANK 
Barclays Bank Ltd 1 Barclays Merchant Bank 
Lloyds Bank Ltd Lloyds i=ierchanL Bank 
Midland Bank Ltd Samuel Monta u& Cow 
National Westminster Bank County Bank 
Hone; Kong & Shanghai Bank Antony Gibbs 
Standard : Chartered Bank SCiýIB 
Grrindlay Bank 
4 Grindlay Brandts 
Royal Bank, of Scotland British "Linen Ban? '.. 
__. _... _... _... _-! 
Tab e '12. ý: U.. Clearers 'and Bri-fish Controlled inter- 
. national Banks Fz, their Merchant Banking 
Operations. 
Within the context of corporate 
. 
finance 
advisory services related to takeovers, the overall 
corporate banking strategy of UK clearers rei'). Gct; ed in 
their expansionary activities provide us V J. - h ýIo{ile 
-in- 
sight as to the future thrust into hsi: c. l. v {sae 
1 ý' 
on ?3 earning : iBC't'. Uý:: For Ciäcs. Iiit'i iý 
. 
kýriv i ci"ýý. LC«. 1. 
_C e 
h. in d 
the acquisition of Antony Gibbs b the I1o_l %Lon 
Siamhai Bank %"., as f he Ci. ` er's desir':. to 
; )C'C Appendix CZ Ü_ car'Y v1'je al u 2- i, ': 
cf interm. ; ion a1 Ban_ks ( 980/ 1. 
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merchant oanking cap. bili Ly in Europe and the , ic cile 
_ 
East. This highly successful British-o: "; ned overseas 
banking group has already successfully established its 
merchant banking operations (Wardley Limited) in its 
Hong Kong base. With the' infusion of new management 
expertise and a bigger capital base, Hong Kong & Shang- 
hai hopes to transform Antony Gibbs into an important 
European 
-merchant 
banking arm. At the sate time, if 
Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank had. managed to acquire the 
Royal. Bank of Scotland, the Royal 13ank might have been 
transformed into an international clearing tunk and 
Antony Gibbs integrated with the British Linsen Bank to 
form a formidable UK merchant bank with powerful over 
seas growth potential as highlighted in Table 12.4 
below: 
PARE NIT I)! i! 'ii1aJ? G 
, N1ERCHAITT BANK PARENT CO BA., ý. ý ,i Cr:, S`IE .T 
--0"I 
C T'C; 
_ Anton- Gibbs IINSE+ z20, °CC 
. 
riti sh Linen Bank RBS 6., "1.3°n 
_ 
'" 600 
"--' 2 81 ýs: `ý_ 
Table 
.12.4 
: Merchant Banking Capabilities Arising 
From the Potential Acquisition of 
Royal Bank of Scotland by the Hong Kong 
't Sr'langhai Bank Corporation. 
Griiidlay J3rendts which was expelled 
from the Accepting Houses Comttai. ttee in 1975 because of 
financial difficulties has now been absorbed into the 
Grindlay Bank and as newly reconstituted, it is tur. Tn-- 
ing its attention into the Asia--Pacific aiea. 
4 
Since the departure ^i NN: r. Phil ip 
in iiýL";. Ci yie Shelnourne from si uel Montagu, I r, S ia`f 
new executive has indicated that Samuel Nontalsu should 
develop more broadly its internatic ia. l corporat 
has. S tronv: t':,, Eii ;: C on wi i"ýi 
.ý. C? ] F. 
Cie. 
cause its founder-, FiC, obert SST!; ' jr, 
India and Grinndl a5r & Companj. into ý3 :_i: nce 
in 1343 r i. ß:: 3. r tnz old f 1riý: C)t 
Chris 
-t ran 
ý, iLa. whew (see S EG1 
="i ý_ n,:.. ).?. L' S : s.? G 
1 a: rc "1ý? ý. °, 
_'7C? ý, ü rr . "ýi. r? i R-- . '' T. r iri-r_ . 1kC? f? "" 
- 
21; 
- 
finance activities as dell as ascu,. ", irg a. rotas n_ ti t^ ýý: ý. 
merchant banking capability. 
C 
Like its Asian bankin rival, J Standard 
& Chartered Bank has strong Asian affiliations and 
connections with Africa. In terms of multinational. 
merchant banking, it has already established successful. 
merchant banking operations in Hong Kong, Malaysia and 
Singapore. 
Lloyds Merchant Banking i, ivison which 
is under the purview of Lloyds Bank International has 
strong affiliations with Mexico and Latin Am erica 
Recently, because of a merger effected by its Australian 
merchant banking offshoot, Lloyds International, the 
bank, now possessed potentially the gg sý r .?, r 
finance capability in Australia (see Chap e 1, Volume 
2 for more{ details), 
As shown. In Chapter fir, in terms o oper- 
ating advantages over the other Independent ryes chant 
banks, generally, the UK clearer--owned merchant bsnr; 
_yýg 
arms perceive their competitive edge in 2 main areas, 
viz., 
i) Financial power. 
ii) Bigger clientele base. 
The number of contested offers hand_"I. e,,! 
by this category of merchant banks in this study should 
provide a rough indicator of their market share in this 
lucrative fee--earning business related. to mergers and 
in the UK advising both the bidding and acquisitions 
fending companies (see Tabic; 9. iä`{;. 9.14 and Tablo C i1 
5ý The Hong Kong i. 
- 
Sä. a, ,h ýi lýCiZ:. Z- 
. 
ý. `Jý- 
(Appendix C). Fr: m Pablo 9,144- paf; e 204, it can be seen 
that both Barclays iie c nt Brink and ý; alývel" Mon L. a°- 
(subsidiary of i" idlaud) seem to have a l: tür ina Ed 
in corporate advisory business over its peers. In 
aggregate terms, affiliated merchant banks advised on 
only 13 of the 75 clIe t ccnpanios (involving 30 con- 
tested bids) selected-for this study vis--a-vis 62 under-- 
taken by independent m er. c rant banks (see Table 9.1 
and Table 9. JL 
, "page 204). 
12.4 Competition From American Merchant Banks 
London owes its prime Position as a 
gs:; bal financial/bai. king centre tc the fact that' Brý- 
tain had traditionally been a trading nation, the pio-- 
neer" of the industrial revolution and because of the 
extensive empire it built up, London assumes the loosi. 
- 
tion of a traditional banking centre, Towards the 
second half of this century; more and more foreign 
banks w re attrac t`ed_ o , ()j d on es>ý e_ 
. 
äll y in ihr. late 
ý960s and early 1970s. (. see Tables 12. ^ and i2.6 on the 
next page) to service the needs of their existi. n_g mul- 
tinational clients, to participate in syndicated loans, 
th : Euromarkots and develop business for their own cus- 
tomors. With this development, the main challenge 
confronting the London merchant banks (especiall the 
leading. traditional houses) is to endeavour to preserve 
their ý; iarket share in certain fields like corporate 
finance and international banking as both foreign banks 
especially American banks and merchant banking opera- 
ti ons o_f UK Clearer. s encroach more and. more into the 
dor, minant *bread and butter' merchant banking business. 
Merchant banking tirill therefore be highly compel tive 
as each bank tries to preserve its own market in cor"- 
portto finance, flotations, ne. 
-. 
issues, portfolio 
rz"1:.,: ýjýIý'. enlL and other `l obaý verii%; fires e li# the same 
time 
, 
man_r members of the tr adi 4: i. ena]. cceptin _, ous `:; 
,^ h? 1iF ÜnCjBI'ýýGilc' SZiýiZf:;. Cý3Iiý Si%Z'iý. ý'; 117'Fý. ). C! iý. iiýc :ý (ýý'. ý 
example, ; r. tart' Gibbs, Hý 11 Samuol ; Cbarte: ncýusýe :! aphe t 
c' 
, e3 'aont st e-' rr. , ge,. ne ýt ua. nu., ý.. t", ýý_ýý, ýu nný: FZoth. ýchý +.; iL, ) and t. r .ý. r. Iý.,, ýý,,, ý..,. r. ý 
,., a 2i 
Table 12.5 : Plumber of Major Foreign Banks Represented 
in Leading Banking Centres 
Banking 
Centre 
Banks With 
Direct 
Representation 
Banks Represented 
Through 
Consortium Banks 
Total 
London 248 17 265 
New York 136 2 -138 
Hong Kong 99 9 108 
Paris 92 10 102 
Singapore 96 5, 
` 
11 
Tokyo 98 0 98 
Frankfurt 92 
-2 94 Bahamas 72 3 75 
Luxembour 45 7 52 
Bahrain 48 3 51 
Zurich 
_ 
45 
. 
f. 
-r: e_ -- _. _. _- -_ a. +r 
5 
4-w-=.. ae: v. ww. ýeaaca.,. +, w. r. s. ra". w. r. 
50 
oa.. +. rvy. e 
Source: British Bankers I Association, "London 
. 
As An ! ntern 
-- 
tional Banking Centre, " London 
, 
3B s 'i `ý7, pay '- 
Table 12.6: Number of Foreign Banks Directly 
Represented in London °, New York 
New York London 
Number o ; wanks ritte Number o banks with Year Subsidiaries, Branches or Subsidiaries, Branches or Representative Offices Representative Offices 
1976 
'1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Source: 
144 263 
-77 298 
208 311 
249 328 
249 351 
"Investors Clironiclo, " ; 18/ /81), p30. 
ý-ý n 
- 
232 
-- 
have been st: r oaml i ned %i t: `? new t lent brought in 
the outside to develop traAoiuai mr cei s wad 
sources of income. 
With profitability gradually eaýoded by 
local competitors and aggressive foreign banks, it can 
be foreseen that the trend towards conglomeracy will 
continue and the London merchant banks cri 11 be forced 
to concentrate their corporate strategy on specialisa- 
tions or areas of pure "wholesale" baukin ; where they 
possess the competitive edge. Similarly, the . Teri ca: n 
commercial and investment banks which have operations 
in the City ti will also be concentrating their z.. ýt^rna. 
tional banking activities in the fee-earning area. 
This latest trend in the American banks operating in 
the UK has been highlighted by the chairman of the 
London American Banks Association who surmi :d ul' a ;, I). ' 
banks will develop along the following lines: 
f 
1> US banks would penetrate Lurther into locamarkets 
both in corporate and consumer 
business. 
ii) They would try to increase SterlinG lending 
as a percentage of their total UK portfolio. 
iii) There would be great presstire to increase 
the volume of fee--earning business. ' 
in this research, we have seen that in 
some trans-atlantic takeover transactions (Grand !, lot; / 
Liggett and Narsh & ý1cL' enran/Cd 0Botirý_ng casa studios, ) 
American banks were invoiv2d : pith theisý British counte7.4 
parts in structuring the deals. Some facets of their 
involvement in this area of fee-earning business cpn 
e Gauged by the views of leading 
_'_: 
ice L'!. can 
rmer-chon. nt bas is oiler: sting here i nd can: 
Fminancial-Tin', es 
-2 s- 
a) "Perhaps their cl. -Lent company J is 
looking for an acquisition in the 
States and will look to their mer- 
chant bank and the merchant, bait, will 
usually approach an American invest- 
ment bank. They will introduce us 
as. well as a few others to their 
client and they will like us to, stay 
in the background but they expect 
to get a portion of the fees o ': 
(Manager, FMB1) 
h) "We work very closely with them)seme 
as we work closely with the American 
banks in the States. When we are 
looking for target companies or sel- 
ling situations, we would also con- 
tact other merchant banks who are in 
the position of advising vendor and 
we tap on them to see whether they 
have any interest or suggestions. 
When we are advising a seller and 
looking for a buyer, we would also 
work closely with them. " 
(Vice-President, FEE, 5) 
r 
We discerned earlier tho creation o. con- 
glomerate financial institutions in the USA as a res: lt 
of increasing concentration in the financial sector 
and also the capabilities the, b i39er 
. 
houses now pos-- 
sess 
= 
lt is a distinct possibility that once the 
gestation phase has been completed, these new American 
financial giants will branch out from their ". Wall 
Street" base into London and other off-shore financial 
centres pursuing multiple interiia. tiona1 banking furie- 
tions. They would then pose a strong- challenge to 
the traditional English merchant banking domain in the 
highly renumerative fee-generating business of advising 
on mergers and acquisi yion. 
, 
divest rents, lor_C, term 
finance, re--structuring of corporate balance sheet and 
designing financial packages. 
^ 
ýS 't ri-a1i c 
, 
-. 
ti OI2ä f or F ee 
_Iý ern? n, -,, 
. 
COIISOrtiu I Banking 
Services of MMIerchan-. Ilý: irl; ý 
Since the inception of consortium 
banks i. e. Midland & International Banks Ltd in 19641, 
there have been some doubts about their long term via- 
bility mainly duo to conflicts of interest arising 
among the banking shareholders and the need to demar- 
cate their specialist or geographical roles (as origi- 
nally conceived, their. main objective was to act as 
medium term lending vehicles in the Euromoney markets 
for their parents). ' At a time with diminishing prro- 
fits on straight lending, the consortia are likely to 
seek to diversify away from medium term lending into 
areas like investment banking and advisory services. 
r 
Although consortia have expressed interest of heavier 
involvement in fee-earning activities, signs are that, 
they are still dependent heavily on revenue from len- 
ding and their ability to compete in this lucrative 
area of 4 mercnanly oankcirlß will depend on ho+; 
vn y go 
about resolving the fundamental obstacle of duplicating 
operations of their parent shareholders or business 
identified by their parent banks for exclusive develop-- 
rment. 
a The figures in Table 12.7 ( next pace) show 
that some of them have developed a ranking and size 
comparable with that. of the Hore multinational Accept- 
ting Houses, an indication that given the right multi- 
banking flexibility, formula and stimulus, they can 
constitute a threat to the corporate finance business 
of traditional merchant banking. 
7. A recent study conducted by Steven !. Davis, a 
consultant banker relating to the worldwide strate- 
gies of 50 major co! lnmer eiai banks suggests ei: erging:, 
e at oi3 j. ä i7ds diversion from 
-Ole- na ui on -týo, al, 
sale lend? ng to fee-earning activities such as 
co vVýä c 1i1 nce ý1. dvic C: ý, 51: vestment 
and money transmission (see '. =''International Bank' 
Expan s:. c n. T_; e for a. Re- se 
' 
s. .. 14 
it llli-.... ý_ 
8. "" Con so_rt:. iur. Ba, z: _i: 3; ncieI Time Survey 
--- 
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12.6 The Level of Ac uc isitzon 15 ctivi. b; r in the lily 
In terns of main activity, the f, i : uncial 
sector, distributive trades and mechanical engineering 
sector saw the largest number of mergers in 1979 (see Ta_ 
ble 12.8, page 237 ). The andlysis given by economic ca- 
tegory in Table 12.10, page 207 
, 
indicate. that diversi f_y- 
ing mergers rose sharply from 34 ; in 1978 to 42% in 197; ' 
while the share of-vertical mergers decreased to the low- 
est level since 1975.9 Since then, the level of merger 
and acquisition activity in the UK has remained relatively 
consistent. The figures in Table 12611 
, 
page 23c% show 
that merger and takeover trend in the UK has ,a cyclical 
pattern with a peak in 1972/7X5 followed by a marked de- 
crease through to 1975 and a subs eequent recoive, y. For 
the 1980s, from the evidence given in Table 12.11, we can 
reasonably deduce that there will be a gradual growth in 
merger activity (computated to be approximatel 55 am: ual-- 
ly for the 1980s) but the vo? ume of assets acquired-(see 
Table 12.9,, page 207 )' can be expected to escalate quite 
substantially as conglomerates and bid; indastrial compan-- 
ies seek new areas of diversification (see Table 12.12, 
page 2ý8 and also Appendix Table 0.10 illustrating merger 
trend in the MA). 
Thus, with the level of merger activity 
remaining very much static over the last few years co; npoun- 
ded by declining profitability and market shares in the 
merchant banking industry (due to competition provided by 
foreign Merchant banks and wholly owned merchant banking 
arms of large UK clearers); the elite of the London houses 
will be expected to focus on specialty roles and seek new 
corporate finance and international banking activities 
overaeas. 
12.7 Transplanting Merger &. Accuis. i. tivn Specialism r, broad. 
With on in-corpor e : a, Q` -sorg bi 
.: 
-. 
sýness, a need to serrice Ui 
. 
ýultina ionals, a cý^-. 
_rc 
fcr 
q. OFT. '11ýnnupl, 
-- 
2t% 
Table 12 8: G'; tt 
SIC ORDER NO, :> SSETS AVERAGE ASSETS (cm) 
'i Insurance, banking 4. z'inance ý +t i' r L tý 
, 
=C) 
2 Distributive trades 41 522.3 15.0 
3 Mechanical engineering 17 533 ° 31.4 
4 Chemical c: 
_ 
allied industries 16 212.1 13.3 
5 Electrical engineering 16 958.6 5;. 9 6 Miscellaneous, sere-ice. 15 568= 9 37. `ý 
7 
. 
hood, drink and tobacco 13 5L40.8 41.6 
8 Bl=icks, pottery, glass, cement 2 200.5 '16.7 
9 Metal t, ianu' acture 12 189.4 15.8 
10 Vehicles 10 346.5 31.6 
11 Construction 8 1,501-5 18`f 
.7 12 Transport & communication 8 99.5 112,4 
13 Paper, printing &`c publishing 7 141.4 20.2 
'14 Ag ricultur e, f orestrü &. fishing 6 309.6 51 
.6 
15 Tiii ; ber, f urniture 6 O7 
.8 i6, 16 Oýher mci ufacL"u: cing industries S 74.3 4 2. 
17 Mining &, yuarwyin'k= 5 1,706.1 341. _' 
18 Instrument engineering LL 373.3 93.3 
19 Textiles 4" 37.6 9.1ý 
20 Clothing & 
-footwear 1 9.7 9.7 21 Gas, electricity & water 1.7 'i 
.7 22 Leather goods ü; fur 1 40.0 40.0 
23 Metal goods i 
.4 -1 pu 24 Professionals & 
--e--en 
fi (? 17ý 5 17. r) 
25 Coal c. petroleum products 0 0.0 0.0 
26 Public adrni nis tration/de L ence 0 0.0 0.0 
2.7 Shi nbuildin= & 
, 
_marine 
0 0.0 0.0 
25r7 13 $ 0.0 
Adapted from Office of Fair Trading, "p, nnu l I'm orL i "ý 
. 
"} 
FiiviSO, 1980, p9 i 
Table 12. c). 
- 
Analysis Loy , size oz, 
_Assets 
of Tar of Company 
1 
n-r: 7r. n 1 mnn it c r, r, -mrnn R crýnr nt" : nC.::: -ýn 
ýý 
7 
ETIE OF 
ASSETS Iß'0. 
TOTAL ASSETS 
;:. m 
AVERAGE ASSE'! ' 
0- 24.9 1, ßd 1,865.20' 9. '71 
r 25-- ýý 1. 27 '1153-50 35.3 
50- 99.9 19 1-351-30 71.12 
100-24-9.9 9 1,384.32 153 81 
250-, ", q9.9 3 821.10 271.70 
500-999,9 5,721. L[o <7<1 2S it 1" c ý! 
1,000 and. C; VGI' 2 J. "D"I I i, 2.1 )7 
our- e: 7 ýJý 
Table 12AJ: T'ot: zI. !, C, -, ui-. si. ti-c-n in tr. -c- in 
. 
'. i... ýl7.1 
. 
I`'I fit'. 
7 
_ 
: y) 
.v 
d 
'Ac 
1 9? o 97ý . 53 884 1977 481 
1 72 1,210 19i8 567 
1973 1,205 1979 534 
1974 504 1980 497 
1975 315 1981 477 
Table 12.11:. Bid Activity in the UK Spanning, 
the 1970-1981 Period. 
Sources: GSO pubiicatioiis and the "Financial Times. " (1979-81) 
Table 12.12: Large Mergers and Acquisitions Effected in 
the Uý., 1980. 
BIDDER SECTOR TARGET SECTOR A' 
2ri i: i sh Netrctl eum T t>S 1 Set E i_orl m'i? i; 
_ 
Marsh i4cLenrnan insurance C:, `r. Bot: ri ng insurance 191 
.7 
0,0.0. (Honk; Kong) shipping ' 1'uriiess Withy shipping 1'12.5 
tRacal Electronics electronic. 
_ 
Decca eloctricals 04.3 
, 
Imperial Cor, t. Gas oil CompAir- mech. engin. -8.1, 
1 1c10 (Kuwait. ) investment HW ni sc. (uncl) 5307 
Aliegheny Ludlum conglom. ..: Match misc(encl. ) 53.5 
Charterhouse mist. (fin. " Keyser Ullmann merchant bk 11"3.2 ý-Poseco i)insen metals Unicorn Ind. mech. engin, 38.3 
gVickers mech. engin. R-Royce Motors motors 38.1 
PBlue Circle bldg. mat"s. A. Shanks bldg. mats. 35.5 
Sun Oil 
 
oil Viking Oil oil 31.4 
I4IPI Furniture stores Status Discount stores 30.4 ? ýCostain construct. County &. Dist. property 28.5 
British Land property UK Property property 21.7 
Guthrie trader City ýS: Int. inv. trust 2o. 0 
Globe lnv. Trust. i. nv. trust ; '1. E. Trust holding co. 18'. 1 
Reed Int. paper/pkg. L&P Paper advertising i7,. 5 
Burns Philp conglom. Hoffnung trader 17. 
HKSB banJ Antony Gibbs merchant k 17.4 
Seagram wines G. S. Sandeman wines 16.9 
$ F. W. Woolworth stores BQ (Retai.? ) stores 16.6 i Hume Holdings inv. trust Dawnday Day ýýisc. (f iii. 16.6 
H. Queens=ray stores I. Ren ton stores I-4.4 
Dotson Park In 
.',.. 
, neci2. en i n. :: clf LLB 4p,. Tools riech: e-nC,? n 14.1 
Dunham lfount inv. co. Nor4; est HQls on rust. '! j. 5 
Supreme Invs. I IiV. Co. tioy00 loii t': `ý ct. 2,0- 
B7'it7. Stl L tn i)J_'operty "orn 
Allred London proper y 3ouGh Cooper i 
.' _i i ."r '1 
T. Cowi e motors 
George i 
. 
uer. ^o or: '1 10. 
`rJÜ! 1. ý; Doves'. iýj. ýý iiiir__. ii= 
2a- 
growth and stability, in erna ion 1isatlon of wo I 
trade and current shift in economic emphasis for the 
next decade, more and more London-based UK merchant 
banks are likely to diversify worldwide in quest of 
new ventures and to earn substantial income as corpo- 
rate finance advisers and international investment 
bankers. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
overseas expansion has been an important component of 
the overall strategy of many major UK merchant ranks 
as they seek to transplant local financial/banking 
skills universally and to foster the development of 
international banking where they possess a competitive 
edge, The overall strategy of the independent mer- 
cüant banks has focussed fundamentally on J major 
geographical markets: 
I) USA 
Morgan Grenf ell, Laü rds, Schrade?. Wagg, 
, 
N111 Samuel, Rothhschulds and ºNIarburg 
2) The Middle-East 
Barings, An air. Gibbs, and Robert Fiem: i. rgF 
3) Asia/Paci_iic 
;: 7 ein' ort Benson, Arbuthnot Lachau. cNlor- 
gan Grenfeil; Robert Fleming, Rothschilds, 
Schroder Wagg and Barings. 
1) United Stute "cif America 
Of the 3 worldwide markets listed, the 
USA, owing to her size and economy is considered by 
many banks to be a major overseas market for expd.. 1r"- 
sion. The abolition of exchange controls and the 
strength of the Starling against the dollar provided 
great impetus for ac piis1 t. i. Vý''LEK oomapanies 
Thomas Tilling, Grand Netpop'J3,53. tan and Hanson Trust 
i, o expand ail diversify across the 1`_tlautic (see 
Table 
"72. i ý ýý 
.. ýý. g on 
.. 
ý 
t1ý 
ýe rý. 7x , vfi pa; -ý. ). 
. 
i'ro 
tethe 
ea.. se 
... 
(ýi f0 
Table 12.13: Selective UK Acquisitions of U. S. Corporations 
1 q7A-R1 
_ 
if < BU -EIR U., S. GOR ORAT'IOIv 
Hid?! -, ai  Bank Crocker National Corp. 
Imý, crial Group Howard Johnson 
Grand Motr. opoli t; an ' Liggett Group 
Barclays Bank Beneficial Corp. 
Barclcys Bank Aetna Business Credit 
. 
Hanson Trust i"IcDonough Company 
GEG Picker 
Consolidated Gold Fields I; ewmont Mining 
Cavenham Diamond International 
Holding Sears Zale Corporation's (footwear group) 
t, awlzer Siddeley Fasco Industries Incorp. 
: or kern roods Bluebird Inc. 
Consolidated Gold Fields King Oil Tools Inc. 
Laird Group N. York Twist Drill Corp. 
Lex Services Group Schweber Electronics Corp. 
iIc- north Cera:, ic Uld s Western Plastics Corp, 
Charterhouse Group PRF Corporation 
GýýC Scriptomatic Inc. 
Thomas Tilling Hin KJ. eys ; Sevenoaks Brickworks 
Tunnel lde-s Alcolac Inc. 
northern Engineering Extel Corporation 
Tho: i as Tilling Electrical Supplies Di stributin; Co. 
Thom., as Tilling U Step 'ly Co 
Hudson "? ver re ýa. tes Inc. 
Scýý ri -htvon Calvert Fire Insurance Co. 
United Biscuits Ready Crust 
_ xt o Digital , Micro Systems 
: +'h o., 
-Pas Tilling Spindtetop Electrical Distribution Cc 
Source: compiled frort "Financial Timest ('1979-81) 
Table 12.14: Selective Merger and Bid Attempts Effected By U. S. Cortorations in the TWK_1A?. q_R1_ 
U. S. BUYER UK ACQUISITION 
Merck Alginate 
Rockwell International , ilmot Breeden 
AI1ec-teeny Ludluºn 1,1ilkinson Match 
Sea ram G. S. Sandeman 
Hiram `, talker Highland Distilleries 
F. ýI, ia'iooI orLh B 1::. 
Q Retail 
Cambridge Royalty Corp. Cambridge Petroleum Royalty 
Rockv, ell Serck - 
zbsw. c h. 
- 
Da Ctirp 
Georgia Pacific lnvoresk 
First ennsylvannia Ts-tl. Anglo i etropoli-tant' 
Dana Corp. Brown Broth& 
: sou C^: iDld: ' 
"- 
ýý'i 
-- 
studies and additional empirical evidence froi, i inter- 
views, we noted that American companies and their 
American financial advisers in the City retained the 
services of UK merchant banking houses to jointly 
structure. and complete domestic mergers and takeoversm' 
The reverse happens when American investment banks 
complement UK iner_ chant banking advisers in their ac- 
quisition activities in the USA on behalf of their. 
British corporate clients. 
Araon ; st the UK merchant banning 
multinationals, Warburgs is by far the most established 
i r, corpora-: L-, e finance business in the American market, 
operating through Warburg Paribas Becke^ (a joint ven- 
ture with A,, G. Becker and the trench f'inr:. ncial conglo-- 
merato, Paribas). In view of the potential o- she 
American corporate sector-, : Morgan Gren. fe11 in April., 
1981 started its Nei: ' 'York merchant banking subs d : 3. ry 
to prov! dC ti ocia1 ist c'dvi ce on i_r_ter af: lnl_c:. f: n_i'r; ý37'ate 
" 
`i 
-, 
hi- grove by y- oT°ý, - G*. erl-- mergers and , acquisitions, " ý, :.
fell clearly reflects the rationa? e that fee based 
income is acommon aim that unites commercial banks, 
investment banks and merchant banns as different forces 
drive them all towards this objective from different 
directions. ý`- 
Nonetheless, the level of trans-- 
atlantic takeover in the future is difficult to deter- 
mine but there exists a possibility of resurgence in 
view of the current acquisition trend under? ined by 
American oil and no))-oil conglomerates diversifying 
into other fields. Advising companies of this size 
is highly. profitable as a successful deal can earn a 
merchant or indes tment bank an advisory fees of several 
rri 11ý. r)n dc 11 ».,. 
-IC; : i?. lus trated"_ n Table 1 re 1 page 
and also Lpppe. zdix Table 0. II 
T" 
. 
c"4 _i Ql. s J8 v. , s. ,. 10. Sec Ta=> ý. e i. 2 14 UCthe. 11. The , 'i invncia L //ý"I2. 
Sea 
f, cc; ui4 itio-(is. transacted 
, 
r"j_; os 
o (1981 )I 
- 
'192 
, 
ADVISERS RE`1AI'NED BY k'S BIDDERS TARGET CESS 
'I: I- 
LURE 
Credit Su Marathon 1. Iýiobi Oil. 2 t l Marathon x'17. ", m, 2ý Or First Boston 
. 
US S ee 
Credit Suisse Du Pont 1. Du Pont Conoco 'tu. Om n/a First Boston 2. Seagram 
Morgan Stanley ) Belricade Shell Belridge 1$14.6m n/a International 
Goldiran US Steel 1. Mobil Oil Marathon j. ý'IO. Om 
I 
n/a 
1 
Sachs 2. US Steel 
, -_ 
Table i2.15 : Corporate. Advisory Fees Charged by Some 
Major Wall Street Investment Banks for 
Conglomerate Takeover Transactions. 
Sources: Compiled from the "Financial. Times, " (25/11/81) 
and the 
. 
"internnational Hc: räl. ci 'ý'r?. une, " (25/11/81) 
. 
In the context. of corpo: 'uto financial 
advice in the UK, Table 12.16 below shows the scale of 
1 nt: ]. 'oclli(+ tý. i ýT 
. 
tnCtP. S ehscharged by i OPC ýt Ahe 1 ndu triK: i & 
Commercial Finance Corporation) o 
13 
TRANSACTION AYABLE 
On the first £'250,0001 4% 
On the next £250,0001 5% 
On the next '250,000+ 2N 
On the r'cmair: de-f 
Table 12.16 : Advisory Fees Charged by A London- 
Based Merchant Bank On Merger Tran- 
saction. 
Source: `°ICFC Special Brochure)(undated) 
2) The Middle-East 
With the formation of the OPEC (Orga. ni. sa. 
tion of Oil Exporting Countrie3) cartel and the flow of 
funds to the Middle-East, Azrah investors too constitute 
13 As this is only a specific il us' ration of one mer-- 
chant banker's scale of fees, It should not be re; -; ^ rd. -- 
ed as the' standard for;:. at char ,'d by UK houees t: -:! i - 
ccr' o _tc '" ý"_`'C v fee's !, f i r1_`. L0, o= regards to h storical and. w ill )_' reason;.,,, 
Cho not n11!: 1 ish th e'i r Scale Of fees but 
Sear -l' `ovi ed' r or '__' ,sv? 'ýý 
-ý? 93- 
a poý, werfu'. source of ä ec 
-eý_ri in , activities but t%1c: "; 
are inclined to adopt a low prof,: le rogairdin their 
investment activities in the UK and elsewhere. The 
takeover of the Proprietor of Hay's Wharf (PHW), a 
large UK property company by the Kuwaiti Investment, 
Office, the investment agency of the Kuwaiti Govern- 
ment gives us an-idea of the substantive financial 
power and business potential of -I-, he Middle-East , arkct o 
However, because of the Jewish origin. of many of till 
leading UK independent' merchant banks, man, ), of them 
are constrained from expand 
. 
ng into this lucrative 
market. 
3) Asia/Pacific Rogion 
The post-war r ecovery of japan and her 
economic 'miracle* together with other poltrica? and 
socio-economic factors provided a stimulus for other 
Asian countries like So th Korea, Hong Kona, Tai an, 
Malaysia and Singapore to seek national economic deve-- 
1opr oý7ýt. Of these newly indus vria? ised countries or 
NICs, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore were perceived 
by many B -itish merchant banks to be the main growth 
area for expansion for the following reasons: 
a) With the exception of Hong Kong which is 
still a crown colony, both i; alaysia and ein- 
gapore were former territories of thci Bri-- 
tish Empire aiid because of their natural 
resources attracted heavy British i eves üw 
rents; 
b) The ; ire: once of an economically poi"rcrful 
Chinese c'oIw nufti y in thase foreign sc^ýi'ýCc, 45 
and the trans1'orI atioz of some of their bus i°- 
noc 
, 
'3 ä into region--l ! fl tinationa1S 
tocL. 
- 
a =i t: ur ti ai: 1-;. l ct ofl t0 : 3riti S}l : fit 
antis to pI o fir, . he: Ll' advi c! '}' 
'19 
-. r; 
c) The commitment of these new]., y industri=iUseci 
countries to economic developnent and the 
heavy involvement of their governments in 
businesses via the growing number of multiple 
functional public e: iterprisec; 
d) The adoption of 
- 
the flew Economic Policy (NIP) 
by the Malaysian Government to retain a subsa- 
tantial share of the non. 
-Malay business in 
the corporate sector. As a result of this 
policy: 
14 
t' he corporate advisory bucsi. nescs in 
Malaysia is potentR ally the most lucrative in Asia. 
Unlike Hong Kong where most consulting is already 
tied, Malaysian business is a function of good Lt r ie 
-- 
roan. In addition, the New Economic Policy's local 
ownership and control requirements produce much coyr-- 
porate 
.r e--structuring work transferring corporate headquarters and registration fror: London to P1alaysia. 
Another by-product is the splitting of Pan-Malaya 
operations into their separate Singapore and Malaysian 
co- ponei4bs... the successful completion often in; ro'ly{-. 
. 
a public offering and potential underwriting fee: e.. 
As other foreign investors comply with the NEP local 
ownership, the amount and availability of such i cork 
should increase. " 
e) The presence of many British multinationals 
and other A uerican and Japanese husin< ss 
corporations make it imperative for the 
London merchant banks to service 'their 
clients in these markets as well as to get 
new businesses from non-Briti. sh corpora- 
tions. 
Notably, over the last few years, some 
Asian business conglomerates have become sig, if'icant 
international investors in Europe especially in t: _e T 
and the number of c, a. jor LakeoveJ" bids by some of these 
Asian corporations ae disc ernible 
-in Table i2'}7 on 
the next page. 
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Tab1t, 12.1? UK Investments by Investors From Hong Kongo;, 
M`ý Malaysia & Singapore. 
Direct foreign i rrrrostment is regulated 
in Japan,: Sirnilariyý acquisition of Japanese cou parries is 
difficult because it is fro''mned. upon al-ja effec tivel. v curbed 
by the Japanese -aus1ncos community and regulatory bodies 
In ý"oresGa eabJ. e £utuie, then is pot il, ial ; co e io the 
development of fee-e,. rni_ng bush ,e in Japan by UK multina-- 
tional merchant banks mainly due to the phenomenal growth 
of the Japanese economy and the expansion of her corporate 
sector over the last two decades as well as the increased 
listings of high technology Japanese corporations on. the 
London Stock Exchange.. 
From these overseas expansionary acti- 
vities especially those among the leading Accepting Houso s, 
we can discern that many UK merchant banks have been active- 
ly propagating corporate finance worldwide to countez` 
against the increasing competition from the bigger American 
lih? Gr investment Danks as we L. l as domestic, CO:? L1er a? banks 
also operate in these geographical l ar_º_ets The real cihul-" 
lenge, t ough, lies in the dvb'E; 1iopm =lý of an intern. at4 one ä'. l 
s1 ý-C. GLZYýe supJr-1ý. lQseC: on adapted-1, ` qk f_ 'F; -" aýiýL. iý. ý. vý... _ý? e 
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ý-- 
TI onto as -Well as business s tructrure , 
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Table 'i 1; atýJ, ýe t °;? erat? ON o L"== ': ýý ý. E Ü'.: j ýi S, ' 
` , 'rt: n: Ilj% fii] i atc 
rccl2t? vei. y wen, for instance, u' ? reline Fierni n in ! -ion'' 
r: onß (a joint banking venture between Robert Fleming 
and Jardine Matheson), Bumiputra Merchant Bank Berhaä. 
(a joint venture between Rothschilds and Bank Buiniputra 
of Malaysia) and Morgan (4renf ell' s wholly owned mer- 
chant; banking operation in. Singapore (, Morgan Grenf oil 
Asia Ltd) (see Table 12.18 on the previous page), 
I 
=ýý:, 
6TT3L'T, ITITX A 
(GROUP ONE CASE STUDIES) 
This Appendix covers the array of 
opposed strategies (both bidding and defence) used in the 
Group 1 Case Studies. The main box at the top of tie 
beginning of each case study encompassed the 11 defensive 
strategies selected for testing. The ticks against the 
side boxes denote the application of these appropriate 
strategies j, n the individual case study selected for thils 
research, 
At the bottom half of itn page, the 
right hand column depicts that besides these 11 defensive 
strategies, the defender also utilised these various coup- 
:. 
' +CJ 
to support 1. ' fr a: 3 
for 
In essence, the two columns (the one on the left depi c-, 
tin- bidding strategies) illustrate the whole array o. 
opposing strategies used in the context; of individual 
case study. 
The factors contributing to the suc- 
cess or failure as well as special features connected with 
individual case study are also highlighted. 
Fundamentally, the objectives of this 
chosen format are to provide the reader with an idea of 
the depth and extent of strategies used connected ,; itj. º 
contested takeovers in the I. 
-ý:, 
BURNS PHILP/ S. HO FN NG &: CO. 
Pr. operz r 
_reva:! uation__ 
... - 
-Salc.. _. o as. sei: may-befor%fi erthe_bid)-_-_. . 
-Capital_ reconstruction---__-... 
_.. 
. 
Dividend__in_creas_e 
Profits_ 7 orecast_ý. 
__` 
...... 
actin 
App. eaU±n_s_h aho ] ýlers! 
__loyalty -------=- 
. _U_ncleßtak_e_en_v; cgttis_i. _tion-(befor. e/af ter)_ Acquire. bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed 
-in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ ARGUMENTS 
i) Commercial logic 
- 
geo- 
graphical spread of both 
companies are complemen- 
t ary 
.. 
Financial advantages for 
both classes of capital (increases in ca-oital va- 
lue. of 8% and 46% for 
ordinary and preference 
equity). 
3). Entitlement of Hoffnung 
for interim dividends. 
4) The offer was in excess of 
20 times earnings. 
5) Opportunities for Hoff- 
nung's overseas invest- 
ments were limited. 
6) The abolition oz the in- 
vestment currency pool 
remove 
-the possibility 
of windfall profits in 
the event of do. d. cý_le 
trans er of Hoffnung 
from the U. K. to Aus- 
tralia. 
DEFENDING STRATEGIES 9RGU'IF. TNNTS 
1) Itvzas an ii: equate bid (8 Sp gier-- 
sus 125 n. a. v. ) 
2) The bidder vas hoping to acquire 
Holfrnang cheaply before the bene- 
. its from business expansion 
reflected in the company's pro-' fits 
3) The cash released from the sale 
and closure of the wholesale 
division would be mailable to 
earn a good return. 
4) The market value of Hoffnung's 
ordinary shares continued to be 
higher than the bid price. 
5) A personal note from the retir- 
ing chairman regarding the suc-' 
cessful fending off of the 1970 
offer by "Slater Walker" and 
Hoffnung's continued independence 
resulted in a growth phase for 
the group. 
6) The revised bid was a derisory 
premium for control. 
7) 
The ol'f er wa. s genes Jus in 
vies, of the bi ddee' s 1i. 
- 
8) 
sas-t? 'cus T)rof i record. 
No assurances given by B. F. 
Hof Jung's employees. 
The bidder'=:, proposal gor he 
con`r erti ale : 'ln an sto, 
'P's 
--las 
accep-Lahle. 
8ý -t pre- 
u! I (? -32. re ct ; gib 
_- 
vious Gp vi. mis-ldc forecast G) B. P. so-o-t. 
_. 
60 
- 
had not been borne out by 
events. 
g) The offer ensured the value 
for Hoffnung' s equity which 
could not be justified in 10) 
the foreseeable future in 
the absence of a bid. 
10) B. P. attempted to undermine 
the Hoffnung's shareholders' 
confidence regarding tax ii- 
abilities and effects on as- 
set value arising from the 
transfer of domicile from 
the U. K. to Australia. 
11) Possible default of trust 
deeds relating to unsecured 
loan stock if sale of Hoff- 
nung's wholesale operations 
resulted in change of use 
and B. P. accuse the biddee's 
chairman of having been eva- 
sive on this `point. 
12) Irrevocable acceptances of 
9.4% from investment trust 
ran by "PViurray Johnstone". 
holders' ati eni icn to 
alarmist conjectures and 
to st_c c-germ considera- 
tions. 
The transfer of domicile 
to Australia had been in- 
terrupted by B. P. 's take- 
over bid and the transfer 
process would" not incur any 
material exit tax charge. 
11) The outlook for Hoffnung's 
subsidiary "G&M, Power" was 
brighter (11m. firm orders 
had been received). 
12) Option open for shareholders 
to withdraw acceptances. 
13) The bid had a low acceptance 
level of only 5.5; 0. 
-- 
14j There was 'good economic pros--* 
- 
pects for recovery in Aus- 
tra? ia. 
15) Support of employees for 
. 
independence. 
t 13) The. revised bid is s the final 16) Tv. ajor management changes 
offer. had been instituted to 
improve the company's 
performance. 
SUCCESS FAILURE 
The timing of Burns Philp's offer caught the 
biddee in a weak position, coinciding with a drop in the 
company's interim profits as well as the closure of its 
major loss making Australian wholesale operation. Perhaps, 
another contributory factor for Hoffnung's loss of indepen- 
dence could be ascribed to the fact that most of the com- 
pany's shpxes were held by institutions which are more dis- 
posed to financial arguments than non-financial arguments. 
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7 QTLý TT 
Prcýperi reg älväti-6- 
.. ±t Sale oiasse s (t e care aer.. the bid) 
C s" apital--r_econsitruction___-. 
-. __ _ Dividend. 
--increase---... Bonus/scrip issue/share--. split-_ 
Prof týs__forECas =--__. 
_. I, egal.. 
_action--- Appeal- to shareholders' 
_ 
loyalty 
Placing 
___. ----. - 
Und eY. take_an_acq. u? s. ii on. 
_(bef. orei ar ter) Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES DEFENDING STRATEGIES ARGU1 NTS 
1) Logic for merger since 1) Bestobell' s reshuffled ? ana e- 
1973 had not diminished. went gras geared to growth. 
. 
2) Stressed on BTR's phi lo- 2) The bid vas not a constructive 
soppy to nurture and sty. 
- 
move for British indus1 ry. 
mulate growth. 3) It did not reflect current or 
3) BTR's contrasted its profits re-- potential value of Bes tobe"-I. 
cordw_it; Y i ýl, ý_: cs.. Lestobell eoý 
over the last six years. 4) BTR's bid vas opportunistic (the bid coincides with the 
Financial advantages turning point in Bestobell's 
arising from the bid performance and fdrtune). 
(Offer price was higher 
than the n. a. v. even be- 5) Bestobell v. ss a sensible and 
fore discounting Zimbabwe progressive employer. 
& Zambian assets). 6) 'Bestobell's case for independ-" 
5) The offer was higher than dente waas supported by its 'Li- 
share value (Bes Üobell) in nancial advisers, customers, 
the six years prior to an-- suppliers, trade unicn offi- 
nouncement of BTR's ap 
- 
cials, Members of Parlia: lent, 
proach. shareholders, the Australian foreign Investment Review 
6) A chance for Bestobell's board, Bestobell's management, 
shareholders to exchange and employees worldwide. 
different earnings for 
BTR's equity with an an- 7) The bid represented a2 ow. ý-/1.: 
nual compound growth rate multi. ple (it v, ý"s inadequate 
in earnings and dividends rating gor such a company as 
of 43/,, and 37 respectively. Bestobell) . 
7) Without the su-c-oor G of QTR' s C) r ec a st had boe:: No prop'. - fo 
the sal 
_n 
Pesobe S 'IAade by' 
share r ce ! 
--ý g: 1 t be drastic. 1. ý 
- 
3Q2. 
8) Tt y' s relevant for share- 9) it ; ý? as easier to -ro &t n. 
holders to note that capi- faster rate from a b, -,,,, 1-16 the tal gains in a tax year size of 13estobell than tha ý.; 
of up to £1,000 ;: Ore exempt of BTR. 
from CGT and the next £4,000 
of gains, bear tax at only 10) Bestobell was a resilient com- 
15%. fully able to handle tight 
trading conditions. 
9) The 200p offer for the or- 
dinary equity represent 11) Limited prospects for share- 
a P/E 12 fully taxed. holders to reinvest in simi- 
lar equities to Bestobell 
10) It was not prudent for whose dividend yield i%, as above 
Bestobell to pay a divi; 
- 
the Financial Times sector 
dend if its profits fore- average: 
cast was not attained. 
12) BTR's shares had fluctuated 
11) It highligtited the dispari- by over 10% within the last 
ty in gross dividend ins few weeks before the bid. 
crease of 12.4% and profits 
forecast increase of 30%. 13) Prescribed medium term stra- 
tegy and way ahead for pro- 
12) BTR's ordinary offer and fits. 
cash option provide for 
increases in income by 14) Interim figures tihcw¬ti. a 
40% and 59% respectively. increase. 
13) Contrasted irangement record 
. 
15) Support from Britannic As- 
and quer Bien. the ability surance, the largest share- 
of Bestobell' s reshuffled holder r. ega r cl 
_n¬- 
i_ncipFt, ý;. en- 
management. ce. 
14) BTR expressed scepticism 16) Due to it acquisitive policy 
about thebiddee' s profits BTRw s suffering from ' indi- 
forecast. gestion' 
15) It cornp? ained to the Take- 
over Pane]. about the way 
in which Bestobell words 
its final defence circular. 
1 7) Regional press support for 
independence of Bestorbell. 
18) Substantial sums invested 
in future development should 
accrue to Bestobell's share- 
holders. 
19) BT_R lacks expertise in high- 
er technology. 
20) International merchantint; 
notiv ork which contributed 
32 of the 1-978 sales was 
the prime target 
_For BR. 
_ý 
-- 
303 
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Sli CCE S/F" I 1; 1JRE 
f. BTR ended up with 45.1'/-'., of Bes1 oben' s erui 
. 
It failed in its attempt to acquire Bestobel1 p, inc=-pal ý: 
i 
-6O% of the because of strong nstitutional support (55 
company's equity are held by institutions) especially 
Britannic Assurance's 10% shareholding. BTR is currently 
the largest shareholder in Bestobell and the threat of a 
second. takeover bid is still a strong probab. ili. ty. 
ý-r a 
O'ý 
CA', ' BRIDGE ROYALTY IýUi Jr tlli j 1--l-, 3 ," iýET! ' i !MR iti LT 1i` %JY 
Property ne- aluati on. 
-_- Sale of assets (beforejafter. the bid) 
Capital 
-_reqonstruc Dividend 
-- 
increase 
Bonus/scrip issue/share split. --. 
Profits forecast. 
Legalaction 
Appeal: to shareholders.:... 
-loyalty-. -------. _-------- Placing 
IJnd. ertake-- dn_acquisi tion. 
---(bef or. e/ai't Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in the 
research 
. 
questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS 'DEFENDING STRATEGIES/ARG J1 ENTS 
1) Recommendation of the bid 1) Itwäs. an indequate bid (asset 
by CPR independent direc 
. 
value had been es -U. i_mated by a 
tors who hold 5% of the stockbroking firm as between 
. 
equity. 350p and 1*50p 
. 
2) Industrial lo--ic: the 2) The Brae Field royalty i n- 
takeoverw. culd. enable terests (i. e. CPR's main as-- 
CPR's shareholder. s to set and lucrative Profits con-- 
broaden the scope of tributor) worth to CPK eves much 
their investment with a higher than attributed by the 
consequent, spreading of bidder. 
risks. Also, to avoid con- 
flicts, of interest due to 3) The ccmpanyv, 
_s more valet. b;.. e increasing geographical with its own British identity 
area open to investment, and listing. 
both companies have had 
to agree amongst them- 4) The deal valued CPR below its 
selves certain restraints current market value. 
and priorities in the ac- 
quisition of worldwide. 5) The takeover would result in 
royalties. the dilution of U. K. assets. 
3) Job assurances and un- 6) CPR remi.. nded its shareholders 
dertakings to continue of the probabi i ity of a more 
the business of CPR. suitable counter bidder ("Pre- 
mier Conso]. ida teci") I: S'_ing a 
4) The control position of bid. 
CRC (it already had a 
holding of 12.5% in CPR) 7) Owing to high i ns ti i; uti on: al 
holdings CPR's main defensive 
5) The merger would improve strategy -tinge 
mana Bement links between irsti t "t 1t icna -objp c ýýý-- 
the the U. K. and i Am: eri 
-- 
th` hid and ti e _.. s ý. ,uc> Via 
. 
can of; era tior (the " o- the :. 
_. 
ce C. :.. 
vision of I ü71ý3Üeil: i nt ex- 
pertise by CRC to GPR in the 1(. j 2 
: 3pJ 
- 
advisory c: "ro' iron i: ). 
61 i%ttompt to re-assure 
CPR's shareholders that 
despite the merger, they 
would end up owning 44f 
of the enlarged group. 
7) In order to overcome 
strong institutional 
resistance, the manag- 
ing director of CRC 
arranged a meeting with 
most of the major share- 
holders to persuade them 
to vote in favour of the 
bid. 
i 
SUCCESS FAILURE 
In view of the support for the bid given. by 
some directors of CPR, the bidder resorted to the scheme of 
arrangement device to. take control of the company. However, 
for this legal device to suceed, CRC needc, t a 75% ma. jority. 
Strong U. K. institutional objections (see shareholding 
structure below) and dissension by other sharehclders re- 
"he the merger attempt not going through. T main ob- jection to the bid rested on the-substantial undervaluation 
of 
. 
CPR's assets 
.' 
This view-,, 
-. as also shared by the media. 
Institutional Ownership of CPR 
Schroder 'Nagg 10% 
Robert Fleming 7% 
Prudential Assurance '6% 
London Nominees (Stanlife) 5% 
Edinburgh. Securities 5% 
Scottish American Inv. Tst. 5% 
Scottish United 2% 
OTHER FEATURES 
During the bid, CRC received an offer which 
it rejected from"Premier Consolidated Oilfields" to acquire 
all the existing half a million share 
., 
5;. 
_, 
am -CPR owned by CRC 
and-the 1 million new ordinary shares ;n CPR which CRC 
would o'ým fol c; ing the exorcise of its. share option in 
the Company. The fail re to merge with CPR influenced CRC 
to se). l of its equity to various 1 nvestmen Ii ns Li lUl ?. ons 
for J- 
. 
-- 
)L_D 
-- 
(Defensive strategies listed in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES ARGUMENTS 
1) It countered Ewer's accu- 
sations of not holding 
pro-bid negotiation by 
declaring that it had 
discussed merger possi'"- 
bility with Ewer's depu- 
ty chairman on 229/6/78 
and repeated ity intention 
on 21V8/79. 
2)=Its pre-bid stake of 29.9% (it intended to further. exer-' 
eise its option to acquire 
701,000 shares in Ewer thus 
increasing its. control posi- 
tion to 33.96 ö) 
. 
3) Foie-'bed at to Ewer's shareholäers 
that there were circumstances 
under which the acquisition 
of Eastern Tractors would 
not tare place (if it fell 
short of the gOlVo stipulation). 
4) It tried to undermine Ewer's 
shareholders' confidence by 
stating that the Stock Ex- 
change might not grant a 
listing for the new 2.6 
million Ewer's share to be 
issued for }astern Tractors 
ssiar"eholdei s' approval 
needed for this transaction). 
r ýý "ors 
v "1e b'! 
-d 1. Gi 
Eastern Tractors 5Jtt 
ý:: too hi. - -i and will rc uc e 
H"m 
Property revaluation 
Sale-.. 
---of assets 
(before/a. i'ter the bid) 
Capital. reconstruction 
Dividend increase 
i3onus/scrip issue/share 
. 
split 
Profits. for ecas. t.. 
_--.. _. - Legal. action 
Appeal 
- o. 
-. 
sha_reholders. '__loyalty. 
Placing_... 
Under_i; ake_. an- acgU. zss tion_.. ý_o. efore/after) 
Acquire bidders equity 
DEFENDING STRATEGIES/ARGUP. IENTS 
1) Cowie did not approach Ewer 
with regards to its bid in- 
tentione 
2) Cowie's lb-I'd represented a 
derisory premium as the 
offer reflected *a discount 
on the price of 55P, -the 
value o' Ewer's equity 
within the laÜt three months 
before the bid. 
3) Press comment sugges red b_d 
price should be 60p or 6.5p. 
The offer price represented a 
P/E 6 times 1979 earn_ngs (only marginally higher 
than the FT-Actuaries Indus 
trial Group Sub-Index) 
5) Attempt of bidder to buy 
assets for less than their 
real worth. 
6) The attempt by Cowie to at- 
tribute a lower notional 
price to Ewer's equity ;, as 
based on a false premise (use of FT-Actuaries I-Ictors 
w Distributors Sub-Index) 
as jýsy 0. ": wler' s prof? ILS 
:. s c1 =? Ved from coaching 
and yr ^. ý: eI. 
 
f; ý. (? 1. 
_I_ 
J_21 E': r f'2 S 01 
- '()7. 
- 
J 
Eactern Tractors vas a loss 
making concern and there- 
fore Ewer's shareholders 
had to shoulder Eastern 
Tractors' borroy; ings. 
?) The acquisition of Eastern 
Tractors was an attempt by 
Ewer to dilute the percent- 
age ownership of Ewer's 
shareholders in the company. 
8) Early acceptances of Cowie's 
bid would indicate to the 
Ewer's board that Eastern 
Tractors'w-, as a poor invest- 
ment. 
g) Shareholders would rece5. e 
an additional. 21/2p per 
share. if they vote against 
Ewer's acquisition (proposed) 
of Eastern Tractors. - 
10) The offer represented a 10.1 
P/E against the FT-Actuaries 
Industrial Group Sub--index 
of 6.3 times. 
1 .) By accepting thEj bid Ewer' s 
shareholders' income would 
increase by 38%"' 
12) Contrast performance of 
the shares of both com- 
panies. 
13) It ýPs a fair and reasonable 
offer. 
14) The rejection of the bid 
could result in a marked 
decline in the market 
value. 
1.5) Cowie's bid was an oppc tu- 
ni ty for Ewer's shareholders 
to participate in a company 
with a proven record. 
16) Assurances to maintain and 
develop Ewer's business 
and no significant redun- 
dancies were en salted. 
17) Incorporation of rpre s corn- 
T: rcn Ls endorsing Cow e's 
V ew 
a: -o or cl). o tcd 
. 
.. 
nvs one motor trüdiý: - 
sector. 
8) The strength of Ewer ',: as 
enhanced by its balanced 
business activities. 
9) Ewer's profits after 
tax aeremore than 5 times 
that of the 1975 figure. 
10) Eastern Tractors leisure 
activity would fit in 
well with EN. er' s plan 
to develop its ov., n lei- 
sure business, a sector 
of recognised growth 
potential. 
11) Contrast interim erfor-- 
mance of both companies. 
12) The bid was not in the 
long term interest of 
the company, shareholders, 
and employees. 
13) Support for independence 
from other s3hare hider`: 
owning ! 4-3% of Ewer' 
equity. 
14) The location of Cowie's 
business vs mostly in the 
adverse unempioy'_: ien t and 
recession area in the 
North of England. 
15) Failure of Cowie in its 
early attempt to acquire 
Coln--ore Investment. 
16) Ewer's chairman resorted 
to a novel defensive 
move by inviting share- 
holders to contact hire 
on reverse charges Ue1 - 
phone) to explain the 
case for independence. 
17) Portrayed Cowie as an o-ý-por-- 
tun1s is bidder 
is`': oin to be he :f ear 
ý`"C. 
- ý: 5: 5 of ýih buyer. 
-re 
-oin c oa p" 
- 
Dos 
- 
SUCCESS/FAILURE?. 
Despite strong resistance put up by the 
Ewer's board and its merchant banking advisor, Cowie mana- 
ged to takeover Ewer. Its success may be largely attributa- 
ble to the fact that. it had a substantial pre-bid stake of 
29'io and this shareholding was increased to 34% when it exer- 
cised its option to acquire more equity in the biddee. 
OTHER FEATURES 
When Cowie Look a 29.9% stake in Ewer, the 
latter resorted to undertake defensive measure to fend off 
the bid by doing a takeover of Eastern Tractors, an unlist- 
ed company. Cowie then immediately bade for Eier of a dual 
price basis (55p without Eastern Tractors and 52.5p with) 
and simultaneously taking up an option which made it manda- 
tory for Cowie to put in a formal bid for the company=. It 
followed up its victory by dismissing three directors without 
notice or compensation and witheld the payment (whic was 
deposited into a special designated account) due to the. di- 
rectors involved. who assented to the offer. This high-hand- 
ed action 
-resulted in High Court litigation. It also Invol: - 
ved. the Panel which rules, that it is illegal to -vdthold. 
payment to thyse who assented to a bid. 
__ý; 
ýg 
., 
Dig LGE Y/SP i 
,, 
"T S 
---------- --- 
--- propc uy__r V-. ý'a1 u vi on--- - 
Sale_o?. 
_as_se_ts(before/after -the-bid) Capital reconstruc-tion-__-_-_-- 
_ _--- 
_ __- -_- 
Dividend_ 
.'- 
cr_eas e___. ___--___ 
ßonus/scr p 
-issue/shar_e. -split_ -_-_ - Froý. i J.. oryýasz 
^----------------- L_egal_- ac t? on 
Appea", 
_-to-sharehold ers' -1eyalty --- P_12. Ging_-----. 
_____. _---------------- 
------ 
----ý, Undertake-_-an_acqui, s Lion-__( . e±'pi o/aster) 
kcqui re bidder's equity 
(Defe nsive strategies listed 
in the research questionnaire) 
BIDDING- STRATEGIES/ARGUih1ENTS DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS 
1), Emphasised the commercial 1) Dalgety's proposal was... 
_a logic of the merger. takeover and not a merger. 
2) Higher capital and income 2) Underlined the strong asset 
value for accepting share- base of Spillers. 
holders. 
. 
3 )- Exploited the- failure of the 
3) The bid will provide long bidder to provide a profits 
term advantages by enabling . forecast. 
Sr ll erg' shareholders v. - th 
the opper tuni ty to partici-- 4) poin'[ed out to shareholders 
pate in the future growth that the reshuffled manage- 
'of the enlarged group. " meat of Spillers was competent 
to reverse the losses of the 
4) Assurances to maintain and group. 
develop the businesses of 
Spillers. 5) The bid ti-, a discount of 25% 
on the rye t tangible assets 
5) The bid will provide better of 
'Spillers. 
employment security within 
a larger and financially 6) Criticised the fact that 
stronger group. Dalgety' s bid conditions V, Ie e 
drawn on very aide terms for 
6) Underlined the strong manage- mple 
, 
condition e:. -a (v ) allows 
ment team of Dalgety. it to-abandon the bid even. 
though unconditional as to 
7) The bid vas based on fair and acceptances. 
reasonable terms. 
7) Emphasised on the loyalty of 
8) Po5n-ý d out to shareholders Spill ers shareholders " includ- 
that the biddee lost market ing some leading institutions. 
shares in milling, arli real 
feeds and major branded pro- 8) Highlig :s the 1'acttthat Dalgety 
ducts. ti'_S : J. 
9) Capit 
. 
li sed on the failure 9) Or_" : ; a' ed sh _i ehoi. d. ý. - ý, 1o i?:, ale;. ant of Spille, st 
- 
its ob eci, ve T7 ` 0-ter and et ' r' I's 
e1'p 4; iGý 
. 
ý? o ßr14 
riueri c-d -r- Lol, lrcc 3 O_i. r.. 1) Vif) 1"(_`.. 1 
", 
._ý.. ý: '_,..,. 'C'. ý 1,7 ccir t_ 
.. 
_J 
ex O_n(; i-ý _!: re. 
7)1 ý. ý; 
10) Exploited the fact that 7.0) `Th, (_, prefercnce offer 
the biddee had suffered "rýa inadequate. 
a decline in its profits (It lost about w50rn in 11) Orientated shareholder: ' 
bread baking). attention to Dalgety's 
problem on its Australian 
11) Underlined the fact pnpe ty development pro- 
that there ,, gas no basis ject, falling Canadian 
for Dalgety to revise lumber profits as well 
its offer in view of other adverse business 
the continuing poor pressures in the U. S. A. 
performance of Spillers. 
12) Underlined the fact that 
12) Highlighted the fact that Dalgety's overstretched 
Spillers had a poor finan- management"l,, as a result 
cial standing; As a result of too many acquisitions. 
. 
of a rescue operation 
mounted in 1978 by a syn- 13) Por Wed Dalgety as an 
dicate of bankers, the asset--stripper (there wTs 
board faced stringent re- a danger that the bidder 
strictions regarding its might sell off major 
business operations. parts of Spillers' busi- 
ness).. 
13) Indicated to shareholders 
that the company had a 14) Spillers had activated 
growing overseas business plans to reshape the (hence, a wider spread of Group. 
investment risk). 
15) No cash alternative to 
14) Cited the compaany' s quali- Dalgety' s equity wh3-Cn 
ty performance as reflected 
. -. 
could fall if the bid 
by a 29% increase in Dalgety's succeeded. 
profitability as well as 16o% 
increase in dividends since 16) Highligh-t2d the fact that 
1975. the company's retained 
profits will be sufficient 
15) Incorporated media's com- to finance its proposed 
ment on the takeover in capital expenditure pro- 
its bid circular. 
_ 
gramme. 
17) Spillers' shareholders 
should reap the benefits 
O -P the company's heavy 
investment in research 
and development. 
18) Vis-a-vis the bidder, 
Spillers had a rider range 
of branded products with 
household names like 
"Homepride" 
, 
"Uinal ot" 
, 
"Spratts" 
, 
etc. 
19) Cri t ci sed L ý. ard s role 
in 
-tic ta'. -, cover (ques- 
siC1S the Cf±'cct on 
-ý ýj 
chant oa u -O. -- sold its 13; v hold- 
InD of Spillers in the ma-l etj. 
20) Exploited Dalgety' s split board 
regarding its takeover attempt 
of Spillers. 
21) Underlined the fact that Spillers' 
board`was united in its quest for 
independence: 
' 
22) Capitalised on the widespread 
opposition to the bid from 
Dalgety's own shareholders. 
23) The bidwas bad for shareholders, 
e_iployees 
,! arnd customers of the 
company. 
2k) Resorted to a novel defence tactic 
by commissioning a bid poll (mar-- 
ket research) designed -to gav.. Üe 
its shareholders' reaction to 
the unwelcome bid by Dalgety. 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
The1 tak eoverbf'h! 7 (] t meted 
in na Lure o "Ti ng to the -aj_n bi gýui_ ties surr. oonding the takeover 
rationale. This problem vvas further e; aerbated by the fact 
that some of Dalgety's ; major institutional shareholders were 
not convinced by its acquisition objectives while the press 
in ger_eral, fa . to be swayed by the arguments projected by 
Daigety f i. al -1 both sides. Despite all these complications, naii 
succeeded in taking over Spillers because of its ability to 
purchase more than 3.4 million ordinary shares of the bi ddee 
which gave it a holding of 51%, thus enabling Dalguty to 
assume strat©gic 
-control of 
Spillers. 
OTHER MATURES 
This long drawn con tested bid was marked by 
various distinct features viz: 
a) The adoption of a novel defence sera. -tegy by Spillers in 
commissioning a market research during the ý'i d io LUaLg''e 
its mm shareholders' reaction to she t41 kecver bid 
from Dale i'y. 
b) Heavy advertising by böth par ties in the main media. This 
f" R 'ý r over-sa aura Lion in public relations rested in the 
_ý..:. e Parse 1i i2Qaior ýl 'or all ctÜVor Ti rC 'S 
t. o Suture sari covers to its pr. _or sa 
.c Lion. 
c) ! azar d Da ty'S iileCCý: ý' ".. n' ýý iýý'ii;:: L; 1cß_` % ý`v ?. ` C'"' 1 lýu. 
_v; 
C ý.. 7. '- T 
(J, J_Ct «f' : 11 ['ý"'(, 
ý 
ý "ý ht: Ü... 1L ýý J_11 i 
. _Li C1 "J 1_1c t: /ýý 
AL-T `"- 
s i. 
_"s 
C_'_in s xn its ""ýýr. 'O'IFr e fcrt ý; _ ý''ýiU: 
i E2 1 ý.. 
__., 
"'C)ý'_c , 5: i ; ll: iý. L )_. 
_J: iýe y ,: C.:. IC: 
ý; )e ý: i_. '_". ýC : 1r.. 
- 
j1ý 
'aC ýs ý! ' 
Soll ler s equity in the market during ui: 9 takeover 
period). 
4 
-ý:, 
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DAVID DIXON '& SON w-n T, `I'lT `1-r-i (k Tjvi-T,. I C. 'T" c1 
Property_ rc7YI-a Sale- of assets (before/a-'ter the bid) 
Capital- reconstruction 
Dividend increase - 
Bonus/scrip issue/share split 
Profits forecast 
Legal. action--. 
- -- Appeal to_sh, nr-eholc. ers. '_-loyalty }'lacing----. 
-'-. 
_. 
------- ----_. _. _----- Ündertake__an-acoui sition___(before/after) 
, Acquire bidder's equity 
J__ ___ 
(Defensive strategies listed in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES ARGUMENTS" 
1) As a combined force 
it could consoli-. 
date and improve 
David Dixon' s share of 
the domestic market es- 
pecially in the hosiery 
sector. 
DEFENDING STRATEGIES ARGUMENTS 
2) David Dixon's good perfor- 
mance record. 
3) The offer, partly in Dixon's' 
shares would allow sharehold- 
ers to participate in the 
enlarged group which would 
have considerable poten- 
tial. 
4) Its control position (10.9% 
pre-bid stake). 
5) Shareholders 
-were assured of 
14.2% increase in capital 
value (above the price of 
Monfort's ordinary shares 
before the Dixon's approach). 
6) By accepting the offer share- 
holders : %Guld benefit from 
an increase in income of 17.3%. 
7) The bid provided shareho'll-ders 
with a valuable oDportuni ty 
of realisintheir invest- C> 
eni, in Mlonfor t at a pr ý, l: ý. jzrý 
at a. `: then val_Uf, in l, h'. 
1) By accepting the offer 
shareholders would suffer 
a fall in income. ' 
2). The bidder ;, as trying to 
buy assets at well below 
their real value. 
3. ) Focused Shareholders atten- 
tion on Dixon's erratic 
profit performance. 
4j The price offered by Ditto the 
less than the average 
P/E multiple of the textiles 
sector. 
5) Monfort had a record net 
tangible asset backing per 
ordinary share of 123p. 
6) The revised offer undervalued 
assets by 335 per ordinary 
share. 
7) Pointed out to sharehoydcts 
Dixon's volatile share per- 
formance (it 
. 
had fal en 
from 1B0p to 1i4p) 
. 
c>> (1 t1 U/ ücä'? +'C2ý'd he :? ];; if'tcgttiF'nt. - 
Lit: ors' car abi- ± i; y of 
CQ?? Sis i rýi 07? i 
acco-of, ant's 
-, 
--nd an 
fort 
rr 
_ - 
sA. derably (fo1cvzing Dix on `_ 
offer and the suspension of 
P, rionfort's shares, the Finan- 
cial Times-Actuaries Textiles 
Index ha fallen by 8. ). 
8 The merger of the two companies 
,; as in the interest of. their 
businesses, customers, and com- 
panies. 
g) A number of Monfor 'd shareholders 
had indicated to Dixon that 
they would like to receive a 
bid for their preference shares. 
ort' s shareholders shot? d have 10) Mani 
asked fora profit forecast to 
be published immediately and 
question the reason for the 
delay. ' 
11) Shareholders should have asked 
Monf orks boar. d 
.. 
to explain why 
its dividend policy was apparent- 
ly dictated by external events 
such as Dixon's offer rather 
than by long term interest of 
shareholders and business. 
4 
ýj CG l' 
10) The high-handed action of' 
Dixon in threatening 0o_ý- 
fort, with a takeover if it 
does not exceed to its mer- 
ger proposal. 
11) Exploiter the. low acceptances 
level (0.3i is one of the 
lowest levels of acceptances 
in any public oller in 10,79), 
- 
12) R ebut-i 4 Dixon' s claim that 
the actions of Palma have 
served to frustrate its 
takeover bid. 
13) The bid did' not have the 
support of Mon? ort' s board. 
14) Received strong suprort for 
independence from over half 
of its shareholders. 
12) Shareholders should ask the 
Monfort's board to state precise- 
ly what support they receive 
from their ordinary sharehold- 
ers with regards to the revised 
. 
offer. 
13) Shareholders should have ignored 
the intervention by Palma. 
14) In the absence of Dixon's in- 
creased offer and in the depress- 
ed stock market conditions there 
wry little prospects for achiev- 
ing a price of 90p in the fore- 
seeable future. 
5 
'1.5 
SUCCEtý-/_'AIJ J 
Dixon IaLýCd to a i1L'ire 1ý: C) ? ice? :?? C use i 
lack. 
'd the recommendation of the board and kuy supporters as 
well as the crucial intervention of a pi-]_': at ýl J' 
ces't er company the Palma Textile ýGrou {) i1 _ T1 the pros CAS 
of the : takeover it acquired a 171 stake in T. Ionfor t thereby 
effectively. blocking Dixon's takeover attempt. As a conse: 
quence of Palma's action, Dixon complained to the Takeover 
Panel about Palma's unethical behäviour. 
._ 
j"jýý 
_ 
FRAl"CSS 1NDUSTRTES/EVERFD ; CO HOLDINGS 
[Property reva uaiJon 
Sale of assets (before/aft: er. 
_ 
the bid) 
Capital reconstruction 
Dividend increase 
Bonus/sc rip ssue/share split_. 
____. _-__ Profits forecast 
Legal ac tion 
--- ---- Appeal_ t o shareholders'.... loyalty 
Placing 
- -- -- 
=-- 
Undertak 
uire Ac 
e an acquisition (before/after)' 
bidder's it I q y equ 
(D efensive strategies listed in 
t he research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGtTh ENTS DEFENDING STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS 
1) The bi d ti. 'as conditional 1) It did not fully reflect the 
upon the auditors of asset value or long term pros- 
Francis's Industries pect of Evered. 
being sta"isfied that 
Evered" share capital 2) Its defensive strategy ? 
_nclu-? 
and reserves (book. va- des holding talks with-other 
lue) y;, e in excess of "white knights" 
. 12.2m and "v s further 
conditional upon recom. r 3) Francis Industries should i n- 
mendation by the biddee's crease its bid price to a more 
,s direc toi sko ; than Kir. reasonable level. 
Saunders, the chairman of 
both corn anies) in writing 4) Evered shareholders and Fran- 
by 12/1.70. cis Industries should benefit 
from the recent corpora-e re- 
2) Time the bid to coincide organisation effected in the 
with the publication of company. poor interim results (Evered suffered a loss of 5) Zahi d Industries representing 
£2k6, 
"000) on 21/9/80 as the major sha2'eholders, i. e. 
well as further deteriori- the Saudis, could expand 
ration of trading results.. Evered's business andre- 
duce its reliance on the de- 
3) Francis Industries accused pressed British economy only 
Evered of not paying any if the company stayed i. r_d. epen- 
dividend to its share- dent. 
holders for two out of 
the last five years and 6) Mr. Sandy Saunders, -the chair. 
-- 
also for. the current finan- man of Evered by i. ncr. "easin, 
cial year. his shareholding in Ever-(4d 
had demonstrated his con'iden- 
4) 
. 
The preference offer corn-" cc in the company. 
pared favourably, iri th the 
FT Actuaries Index of Com- 7) The SaücI. i. s during the process 
mercia: l and Industrial ý pre- ice- .. -'. '^ 
i- 
of tht ' ý? = ... d f; creaseü 1, ' ei :. 
Terence equity. snare' c ý. -i ;nr.; 7E_- u1 r_: 
12 to Pr ; ces 
... 
rc. e 
5) The ordinilry offer repro- Pr an,,.:! ? ,s 
__n 
L' L 
---`: , _. 
rL 
sen-'L a p--'emit m of 3r 55 
-ed re\TC: "t"i LI ; iv !_ : '1. Y' fi'r... (ririor Lu Lc bid aJ'Ir'ic'u31- ýýil jý---`i'_ 1: i ; i" : ,. 
- 
Cement. 
6) The bid o1 °eýred shareholders 
the chance to reinvest in a 
security more likely to T: ro- 
duce a regular income and an 
improved yield. 
7) Financial support from Francis 
Industries would enable a re- 
turn to profitability for Eve- 
red. 
8) Assurances regarding Evered. 's 
employees. 
g) The bid had the recoinmenda- 
tion of some of'Evered's di- 
rectors representing 4.2% of 
the company's. shareholding. 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
Due to adverse trading conditions and bleak 
prospects for recovery Evered. found it difficult. to mount a 
credible defense against an un elco_; e bid from Francis In-- 
dustr i es. However, Evered's dissident ma ox- shareholders 
i. e. Zahid Industries & Investments and Mohamed 111ahmood of 
Panama, representing some Saudi businessmen, contested the 
bid by acquiring large blocks of shares in the market and 
further increasing their investments in Evered to 29.9iß. 
The Saudi interest toge-}rier with that of the Astra Industri- 
al Group who . vere both against the attempted takeover bid by 
Francis Industries1during the process of the bid decided to 
increase their investments in Evered. Their combined share- 
holding of 54% was instrumental in causing the bidder to 
abandon its takeover effort-. 
OTHER FEATURES 
Due to the inability to mount a credible de- 
fence, the board's initial recommendation ý, i qualified as 
Evered stated that it did not consider the terms of the 
ordinary offer to fully reflect the asset value or long 
term prospects of the ýcn, 
-. 
n@ y. It should be noted that in 
this particular takeover, bidder ; gis advised by a stock 
broker and not by a merchant bank. 
__ý 
-'ý1 g 
GRAND +IETROFOLITAI' LTD. LILiGETT GROUP 
. 
(i? C 
Property reval. uati. on 
_. 
J 
Sale-_of assets 
, -(before/after the bid). . Capital. reconstruction 
Dividend_increase 
Bonus/scrip issue/share split. 
-_. __ Profits- forecast-. 
----, 
-Legal _a ctt or. App_ea1_-zo shareholders' loyalty__-__ Placing. 
- - tindertake an acquisition (before /after) 
Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in 
the research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS DEFENDING STRATEGIES ARGUiý1ENTS 
1) GM had, a long standing 1) The bid could be seriously 
relationship with Liggett detrimental to. employees, 
in spirits and wines customers and suppliers. 
businesses (franchise 
-- 
given to Paddington, 
-. 
a 2) To f end off the unwelcome 
subsidiary of Liggett bid from GM Liggett instructed 
for 'J &B Scotch Whis- its investment bankers to ' 
ky') look at options which inclu- 
de "the possible sale as go- 
2) No agreement had resulted ing concern of all or part 
, from merger negotation in- of Liggett". 
itiated since 1977. } 3) Applied to the North Carolina 
3) GM's acquisition of a 9.5% Superior Court for a temporary 
stake in the biddeewas a restraining all the (under the 
result of takeover rumours Tender Offer Disclosure Act) 
and also to protect its in- effective for ten days re- 
terest of 'J &B Rare' which straining GrI from buying more 
was being sold through Pad- of Li. ggett'. s equity. 
dington. 
4) Obiair_ed a cease-and-desist 
4) Commercial logic (pro- order from South Carolina 
viding a base in the Uni- temporarily blocking GM's 
ted States fdr the Group bid (alleges that GIY1' s bid 
and benefit from each come under South Carolina's 
other's experience and jurisdiction because a Liggett 
expertise). subsidiary, the Atlantic Bot- 
tling Company had been incor- 
5) The acquisition and philo: 
- 
porated in the state). 
sophy of GM was to preserve 
the autonomy of management 5) It portrayed GIPM as a predator. 
and separate identity of 
each of its operating di- 6) 
x, It tried=~to discredit GI. 1 by 
V1 ý`. ý i 7n. 1ý 
. 
IS -1_ocu S11 c' 
- 
'? ]_t.: 5 
_rb 
ntez"e-; i,. 
6) Any dis-, oral of LiE_-, p et -t' s 
U. 'iui l. o. any 
-; iJ 
_. 
effected only after full subsidiary of Liggett' s) 
consideration of the in- to Pernod Riear"d, the 
terest of employees and French drinks group in or- 
the company as a whole. der to frustrate the hos- 
tile bid from GM. 
7) It: saaght exemption in 
North Carolina courts 8) It accused GM of breaching 
from a statutory'thLrty its fiduciary duty to Lig- 
day waiting period for gett shareholders by buy- bid offers. ing the company's equity 
with the benefit of con- 
Applied to the Delaware fidential and inside in- 
court for a restraining formation. 
order regarding the sale 
of Austin Nichols by Lig- 9) GM intended to liquidate 
gett to Pernod Ricard. most, 'if not all of Lig- 
gett's nor-liquor assets 
9) The rationale for GM's re- to pay for the-acquisition 
vised offerwas due to the of Liggett's drink interest 
special relevance it ate alone. 
taches to spirits and 
wines * business of Liggett 10) Enlistment of a 'white kni. ghi; ' 
to GM's American subsidi- i. e the Standard Brands Com- 
ary 
, 
International Dis- pang to make a cash tender 
tillers & Vinters Ltd. offer of US 365 per share 
for 45% of the outstanding 
10) Threatened to; end. Liggett' s common stock of Liggett. 
franchise rights for GM's 
wines and spirits if Lig- 11) GM's offer for the company* 
. 
gett proceeded with its dis- v. as grossly inadequate. 
posal of Austin4Nichols. 
11) The sale of Austin Nichols 
and the possible disposal 
of Paddington would'expose 
Liggett to enormous busi- 
ness risk. 
12) It obtained a temporary or- 
der from a New York court 
barring Liggett from 
disclosing confidential 
information regarding 
'J &B Rare Scotch'. 
13) It accused Liggett's 
board of asset stripping 
against their shareholders' 
interests. 
14) It launched its bid to co- 
incide with a good interim 
performance of the company. 
,'0 
SuCC7SS/F TITRE; 
, This con tos-tcd bid was c`" 
.? r ., ^. 
i. eris ,. 1 rýc`J: f 
litigation instituted by both 
-parties including the sale 
of assets by Liggett during the bid (not allowed in the 
U. K. ) to frustrate the offer. GM finally-managed to acquire 
Liggett and won the recommendation of its board of directors. 
when it improved its offer to US 569.00 per share versus 
Standard Brands' s US 365-00-per share offer. 
OTHER FEATURES 
As a result of GMs successful acquisition of 
the company, eight non-management board members of Liggett, 
resigned. Both - financi al advisers (Warburgs & Morgan Stan- 
ley) would each earn US S1.2ri plus expenses for success- 
fully concluding the bid (failure would reduce the fees to 
US 3100 
, 
000 and US S100,000 for both merchant ban, ts respoc 
- 
tiveld. 
ý. 
- 
3p-: i 
yQ 
TProDor ty-re-ý aluat; on ?S le_ý `assets-(o fore_a. ff. er Kapital. reconstructior. 
Dividend increase-_. 
_-- Bonus; scrý_ti issue_share s 
ý.. 
_iProfitsoeczst. - ._-- -- ! 
Appeal to shareholders'_--1 oyalty__- 
__j Placln 
Under tare an acquisition Ä _(before/after), ýýcquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in 
the research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS DEFENSIVE, STRATEGIES/ARGU, N PITS 
1) Approach made on 30/11/78 
to initiate bid negotiation 
and Avery's management met 
GEC's management. 
(gym ýe 
2) GEC,,, he services Averys 
offer to4Scustomers. Ad- 
ditionally, lve-y' s sup- 
. pliers and employees would 
benefit from the merger. 
3) 
_Undertaking 
to preserve the 
. 
trading name of Av erys 
. 
4) No enforced redundancy ex- 
cept Tames Bridge Foundary 
where Averys itself was 'un- 
certain about the future. 
5) The bid m as 44% above 170p, 
_ the value prior to the No- 
vember 1.70 takeover bid. 
6) Averys all time high market 
price of 197p was attained 
on 18/9/78, since then the 
FT Actuaries IMechanical En- gineering Index. has fallen 
by 21%. 
7) The loan notes option would 
increase income by 142 and 
enable shareholders to defer 
real is Lion of their present 
Averys ýr.: tres l. liýf; nt. 
Qdditionfa?. 
- 
ly loan notes 
. 
qc-Lr- redeemable 
at Dar read 
1) GEC ; would be equally well 
served by an independent 
. 
verys. 
2} livery s management. and en: 
_. 
ployees wý; rre united in 
strongly opposing the bid. 
3) It y;, -as a totaliy inadequate 
11d. 
4) GEC fai 
-d. -to make a case for a merger. 
5) Averys was the world's tech- 
nological leader in its 
field. 
6) The financial strength of 
Averys provided a sound 
base for growth. 
7) Averys had a low level of 
gearing. 
E) Support from i:. Ps for 
_i_n- 
dependence. 
9) CGT liability for accepting 
case 
. 
10)) I; C 
-1(7a I" ro es did not offer income' growth or -.; ho same 
oppo ti;.: =ii L for Ca N, -I -1 J-- 
yt r ý: c_ý t on a__ü d' no a, ýsi. in (Iil-_J CCT cut or_ / Lo 
dcfer it 
_"or 
a G: 'ý, 
.., 
J2 2 
-- 
tJ 
Pre-tax Ür ofl liJ vi L}. "L a 
much truer measure of 
a company's performance 
than alter Lax earnings 
than 5 years. 
ii) AverysLeas a well managed 
international company o= 
250 years standing. 
9) The increase in Averys 
after tax earnings per 
share uas derived not from 
higher operating profits 
but following a clasge " in the basis of accounting 
for tax mainly from leas- 
ing 
. 
to third parties (this 
iEs highly questionable as 
profits were small from 
. such leasing contracts). 
10) Cash consideration 
would 'rESalt in an annual 
income of 41%% for Averys 
shareholder:. 
12) By its own admission to 
the M. M. C. 
, 
GEC conceded 
that it had "little de- 
tailed knowledge of Ave- 
rys business" 
. 
13) Low acceptances level. of 
9.5% (even after 6 weeks 
of the bid). 
14) GEC's outlets in the U. S. A. 
gras inappropriate for the 
marketing of Averys's pro- 
ducts. 
15) GEC's subscribed co t: he 
11) GEC approached Averys for same rejected arguments 
merger negotiation before as before. 
the engineering dispute. 
16) Opportunistic attempt to 
12) Ava"ys-" Gras increasingly vul- -takeover Averys cheaply 
able to competition from by exploiting the 
e'ectronic based companies. ing dispute and fall in 
stock market. 
13) Accessibility to GEC's tech- 
nology would keep Averys 17) Reliability and consistency 
product up to date. of Averys's growth profits 
are reflected in the Group's 
14) Cited evidence from M. M. C. balance sheet. 
and the Department of In- 
dustry regarding the in- :. 18) GEC had acknowledged the in-- 
ability of Averys to hold inadequacy of its first offer 
on to present position by slightly revising it. 
and expected competition 
from Japan and the U. S. A. 19) Irrelevance of the comparison 
of Averys's performance to 
15) Without GEC's bid it vias the Mechanical Engineering 
difficult for Averys's Index (it was more appropriate 
shares to hold on to the to use the Instrument Index 
present level or it will which has increased by 17 
fall. versus the 23 decline in 
the Mechanical Engineering 
16) GEC increased offer of Index). 
265p was 55% higher than 
the price of 170p prior 20) Withdrawal option open to 
to approach. those shareholders who had 
- accep fed "EC's bid. 
17) The Avy e Js dividend ws 
imr i. dent. 2J. 
) CEC' s 4,. d undervalued the 
- streng ths, future r^ pcct. 
, li 
-a-re--full 
timing of the 
^- sy. o es 
_ 
sa of loan notes ?. e ee l, r e a. I. 0-V C C-1 XT: C', 1, 
- 1,4) '" 
cu ]l to take adiv ,, i; tae 
of the anno 1l ex-ei--mt ion 
from (_GT on gains up to 
£1,000 and could provide 
tax advantages accord- 
ing to individual circum- 
stances. 
19) It wes the duty of the 
Averys's board to give 
its shareholders all the 
irnforma tion it could to 
enable them to decide 
whether it is in their 
interest to accept-GEC's 
offer. 
n_ 
22) By mer I ng v., ith l TES. Av 
1`] 
rys 
. 
J. :. en I, 
- 
would be 
subsumed in a? ar _c. con 
glorie<a to 
.v 
23) The merger would not bene- 
fit industry, e_. 1p oyees, 
suppliers or customers. 
21k) Incorporate press comments 
endorsing Averys's case 
gor independence. 
25) The future prosperity of 
Averys belongs to its own 
shareholders. 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
GEC's. first bid for Averys was referred to the 
M. Pv:. C. and after 61earance by the Commission to proceed sub- 
sequently returned with a second takeover bid of 2L5p'J_or 
the company. Averys (advised. by Schroder Wagg, the establish- 
ed merchant bank) then put up a strong resistance but the 
weak- market particularly in the engineering, . sector- graatly 
Handicapped the defenders which had a hard task of persuad- 
ing its own shareholders not to be swayed by short tern con- 
si dera 
. 
-I V31ý7 " lý 
EV managed to acquire CiV C: 
_f ýt ti 
. 
ý". )_ i.. y 
pite the strong defences put up by the biddce when it im- 
proved it offer by another 20p giving it control over ac- 
ceptances of more than 55.8% of Averys share capital. 
OTHER FEATURES 
Its two largest institutional shareholders. 
i. e. Britannic Assurance (85 of the equity) and the Kuwaiti 
Investment Office (7j of the equity) held contrasting pos- 
tures during the bid. Britannic Assurance remained loyal to 
the board and described the takeover as "ludicrous" while 
the KIO adopted the typical 'wait-and-see' stance of U. K. 
institutions in bid situations. 
-: ý, 
GEC/RACAL ELEC1_'RONICS/ llECCA 
roper uy__r.. evalua Lion_ 
Sale of assets. (b. eiore/after-_the- bid) 
Capital reconstruction 
t, 7- Dividend increase 
Bonus/scrip issue/share 
_ 
Prof i is 
. 
forecast 
. --Legal action vf-tAppeal to shareholders' 1-oyalty 
Placing 
'Undertake, an acauisi-tion. 
_(_befoLe/after) jAcquire bidder's equity 
_ v__..... __. 
(Defensive strategies listed in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRA`T'EGIES ARGUE ENTS DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES/ARCUit1. ENTS 
Racal 
1) When combined with the con- 
siderable resources of the 
Racal Group, Decca's advanced 
technology in the areas of 
professional electronics 
would create a 'powerful base 
for the development of future 
business and for the profits 
growth of the enlarged Racal 
Group. 
2) Assurances on jobs (however, 
in the long. term interest. of 
the businesses, some reorgani- 
sation might be necessary). 
3) Upon the bid becorang uncondi- 
tional, the chairman of Decca 
w6uld be invited to join Racal's 
board. 
4) Medium term borrowing facilities 
had been arranged to enable 
Racal to satisfy in full any 
elections by Decca's shareholers 
for the cash alternative.. 
5) The intention of Racal was to ex- 
pand and develop the busi. nesses 
of mecca and to continue the use 
of the "DECCF_" narre and trade- 
mý_rks 
. 
This was a contested bid with 
a marked difference. because 
of its continued dismal 
financial perfor_: 1arce, 
did not object to being 
taken over, as such, the basis 
for contesting 
. 
the rid rested 
on ice rather than inde- 
pendence. Although Racal's 
initial bid had the approval 
of Decca's board, the entry 
of GEC as a rival co mipe titor 
enabled Decca to fulfill its 
price objective by ex tra. c tins 
a higher value for the com- 
pany. Equally interesting 
wu the fact that no formal 
defensive documents had been 
issued, rather it issued a 
series of press statements 
regarding the board's v; ew 
of the takeover attempt o1' 
the company by both Racal 
and GEC. 
6) Racal ;. mss an established l. caü 'r 
in radio and data coi imuriicat. i i ons 
and Group profits ending blal'ch 
- 
3? 5 
1979 is £61.6m. 
The bid en titlec) share- 
holders to receive Racal's 
final. dividend vi. s-a-vifnil 
dividend for Decca. 
8) Racal already owned 9% of 
Decca's ordinary shares as 
well as 13.5% of its 'A' 
shares. 
9) The bid had the support of 
Sir Edward Lewis, the found-- 
in;:; 
- chairman of Decca. 
10) Decca timed it takeover bid 
to coincide with the depress- 
ed results of Decca. 
11) Racal had already received 
irrevocable. acceptances by 
the whole board of Decca, 
other individuals and in- 
stitutions and together 
they accounted for 29.9% 
of the ordinary shares 
and 11.3% of the non- 
vdting 
. 
'A' shares. ' 
G-El c 4 
1) It could make more out of the 
. 
acquisition than Racal be- 
cause of the close associa- 
tion that existed between 
GEC--P4arconi and Decca. 
2) Categoric assurances on 
safeguard of Jobs. 
3) Expressed it willingness 
to increase its offer price. 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
The outcome of the contested bid for Decca 
between GEC and Racal was finally decided in favour of the 
latter bidder for the Following reasons: 
a. Price 
b. Anti-GEC ? eelin_gs of Decca's employees 
c. Key institutional support. for with Racal 
d. Support of Sir Edward Lewis 
e. The merger '. "; y i; h Racal received the tacit support, from 
the Minis ; -ry of Do fence and the Departnent of Trade 
f. The press in `enera_L ; w, as sympathetic to Racal 
i ýss risk of a rc nce ýo Uý"cca igo U 
; yi i11 fýCLI! at1C. ? u'' I Jl'ý haCi reo: o: t red 
-ir-CC 
that rýcalci gene s takeover bid e en it; s re 
-i L (erred. 
h. "not preoccupied the last penny but best u Lure for 
the company and industry" (statement by the chairman of 
Decca). 
OTHER FEATURES 
The takeover for Decca had long been a subject 
of speculation in the "City" even before Racal and GEC initiated 
their formal takeover bid for the company. The contri- 
butory factor to Racal's success'cväs' centred on the dominant, 
shareholding of Sir Edward Lewis, the founding chairman, 
who died suddenly in the middle of the-bid (but not before 
he committed his support of 17.20 shareholding to Racal). 
It should also be emphasised that Decca had-an obsolete 
capital structure with 60of its issued capital being vote- 
less.; And, it could be argued, that without-this protective met- 
chanism and boardroom voting power, Decca would have been 
taken over much sooner. 
ý. 
t` a 
- 
JI-NSO TRRL'ST/T iý Tý'DUSTRIAL T1'vni 
(CA IiO)%ýC1: 1 
° Property revaluation 
Sale.. of- assets__(. before/after the bid) 
Cap 
-i tat r-c onstruct . on-.. 
t- Dividend 
-increase Bonus/scrip-.. issue/share. split 
P-r. ofits_ 
LegaLac±ion 
_.. 
-_- 
--- Appea' L. 0--shareholder-s' loyalty_. 
_-_--- 
-Placing (_IJnder ta'r; e-an--. aüquisi ti on__(before/af_ter ) Äcquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed 
in the research questionnaire) 
jRGIT IENTS BIDDING STRATEGIESZA 
Hanson Trust 
Pre-bid stake of 13.3'o 
. 
2) Capiia]. ised on CNT's 
adverse financial per- 
formance as reflected 
by a £7. lin trading loss, 
nil final. dividend and 
decrease 111 v1i i ehoidW 
-'ü 
funds by 30fo. 
3) Pointed but to shareholders 
.. 
that the resignation of CMT's 
previous chairman and his 
brother from the board was an 
indicator of poor management. 
The merger could provide 
CMT with accessibility to 
the 
. 
greater financial re- 
sources of HT. 
5) Highlighted the good per- 
formance of HT (profits, 
earnings per share and 
dividends had increased 
every year since 1964). 
6) It was a fair and reasona- 
ble offer. 
7) Questic-ned the ability 
in providing it's f1 T 
hol . ders with another 
div 
. 
dend. 
e-nd a cash option 
rIm'r- not "11ýJS ing to 
HT. he shares of 
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES/ARGUT; s_-ITS 
l) Pbin-IVd. out to shareholders 
thät'; the benefits from she 
company's management reorg ni-- 
sa-tion and other major changes 
were not reflected in the Offer. 
2). Underlined the important point 
that as a result of a streng-, 
-bhened management, improvement 
of financial reporting and 
control, reduction 
. 
in over- 
heads and borrowings, disposal 
of surplus assets and actions 
on activities with -boor re- 
turns (implemented in conjt; nc-- 
tion with CM" T's new merchant 
banking advisor, Robert Flemir., g) 
the company výa now better con 
-trolled and operated more of 'i 
-- 
ci entl y. 
3) It was 
-ý to tally inadequate 
price for the company. 
k) HT's 'cash option ß. 2s below 
CMT's latest nubli shed net 
asses value (78.6p per ordi- 
nary share). 
5) Forecasted substantial recosrerý; 
or in prof-4tabiiity as we-_ as 
share- reduc ,i 0n in borrc: w, `.,. r&- (dc"fn: 
sub- I_ii ý9rn vo <<. i 
. 
!4). 
6) 
o jec O? ß 'ý;! c c 
for cash by 
t ke dent 
P-p- 
... 
ý`, 
`ý 
9) Emphasised ,. T' s commit rent 
to Ci,! T `s dcvolopmerit as ýe-- 
flected by the presence of 
two non-executive directors 
of HT on the board of CMT. 
14) Assurances on the employment 
of cr4T` s employees, 
ii) The offer would not be increas- 
ed(designed to accelerate ac- 
ceptances from doubtful share- 
holders). 
Ca-Par o 
1) Stressed its substantial 49.9% 
control position of CMT (Gaparo 
increased its holding 
of the biddee from l5.31o to 21.5% 
when HT bade for CIM; it in- 
creased this shareholding fur- 
ther when it managed to acquire 
the large block of shares i. e 
13.3% from HT). 
7) Orientated sharehoid 
_ to the fact that HT' s 
nominees, Messrs 
. 
_. 
". u. 
Alexander and P. D. 
s-, ere not responsible for 
the management changes 
and recovery of CIV1T 
rather, it eras attribu- 
table to its acting 
chairman, R. L. Lewis 
and another senior direc- 
tor, Mr M. Hale. 
8) Shareholders w-cw'd incur 
CGT liability it they 
accept cash for their 
equity. 
g) Accepting shareholders 
v. culd forsake the bene- 
fits from CMT's recove_- 
. 
2) Underlined the commercial log c 
of the merger. 
3) Appointment of '1hrea CMT' s direc- 
tors to the board of IJJI (68.8 
subsidiary company of Caparo) 
if the bid vas successful. 
Opportunities for CMT direc- 
tors and employees to partici- 
pate in the share participation 
scheme of Caparo. 
5) Pointed out to shareholders 
that Caparo's cash offer vies 
12% above that of its counter 
bidder i. e. HT. 
b) Cited the fact that accepting 
shareholders will enjoy higher 
capital and income values. 
SUCCESS/EA_ILLURE 
In spite of its late er! try-into the bid, Caparo ma aged to successfully de ea cis rival co ;; pe ,' cý i 
acquisition of Cr, iT because of: 
a) Sound Lac ica i Jnan, oeuvres 
. 
h) It snbstatia1 prchi ikc"3f 22 ri: J'urud 1» u: ii: 
>> 
ýllt Ch7 Ss in the marke t: . vI,, J_ch 
. 
`. ufl: ýF? llt: nrl +: `y' Cti? C"'; i `:.:, 
Conirol position CC)n id:: rably. 
C) The relucl ante o E' HP TO improve lt of er (ITT' an ac- 
si x? ve company but adoppi da prudent ac üi : mal ýýon T)y is iL! r 
policy as shown in many of its previous bids, for example, 
Lincustries). 
d) The procurement of a single large block of shares (13.3) ' 
from HT when it withdr=w from the contested bid. 
OTHER FEATURES 
HT had to bid for CIVIT sooner than planned due 
to the rapid build-up by Caparo (15.3yß before the 'bid). 
Caparo's inexactitude to launch a counter bid resulted in the 
Takeover Panel's imposition of an acquisition deadline for 
Caparo. Owing to its non-listed status, Caparo then initiated 
is taý: eover for CMT through its quoted subsidiary, a, from 
a position of considerable J trehgth. Faced with its fad-- ac 
comm? , "AMT then accepted Caparo' s higher bid but its recoým- 
mendation to its shareholderswos qualified on the grounds 
that "The cash value of the offers-represents a discount of, 
30% to C_ I'11" s latest published net assets value" 
.Tt is -_in- teresting to note that HT sold its stake to Caparo at a 
loss of 309 per share (it acquired this holding of CMT at 
an average-price of 85p per share). -' 
==ý:, 
jjý 
HANSON' TPUST/L-' iii ! S? RTES 
Property 
--revalua 
ticn 
Sale of assets (before/a--F'ter the bid) 
Capital reconstruction 
_ Dividend increase 
Bonus/scrip issue/share split 
_... 
- Profits forecast 
Legal acticn 
Appeal to shareholders 'l oyalty... " 
Placing. 
-. Undertake an acquisition_. (before/after) 
Eicguire 
-bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS 
1) Exploited biddee's admission 
of poor performance by quot- 
ing the remarks made by Lin: ' 
dustries's retiring chairman 
during the 1979 AGIvI ("Due to 
particularly difficult trad- 
ing conditions 
... 
profits for 
the current yea% Inay show a 
reduction compared with 
those of the last year"). 
2) Exploited the adverse reaction 
of Lir_dus tries stock market. 
performance as a consequence 
of the chairman's gloomy 
statement made at the com-- 
pany's AGM. This had the ef- 
fect of depressing Lindus- 
tries's share price to its 
lowest level at 115p since 
1977. 
3) Conkns e ulne three year per- 
formance record of both corn- 
. 
pani es. 
4) The offer entitled 
. 
holders to receive 
final dividend. 
5) Questir, ra Ä prudence 
tries for maintain 
dividend level. 
share- 
the '. 
of L. ndi; s- 
ing its 
': c :ýö. it and rc, asonübie 
offer.. 
r 
.. 
i L"_i. it:. v id 
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES/. t"-, R GUj+LENTS 
1) The bid was derisorily low (it represented a P/E multi- 
ple of only 
.1 as against the FT-Actuaries multi- le 
of 7. 
--")). 
2. ) It eras an opportunistic hid. 
3) The offer represented a 32% 
discount on the average P; E 
ratio of U. K industrial 
equities. 
4) Accepting shareholders would 
have limited reinvestment 
option due to the restricted 
range of equity investments. 
with tJ"e quality and yield 
of Lindustries (the FT-Actua- 
ries gross dividend yield of 
494 U. K. industrial companies 
in 19.79 va. s only 5.9%) 
5) The offer represents no in- 
crease on the weighted ave- 
rage middle market quotation 
of ordinary shares. 
6) The assets of Lindustries 
underline its financial 
strength. 
7) Fmphas ? red the stre. -ath of 
the com, any' s balance- beet 
L'he i_o of i:., C; 
is a 2. '?... ýe 
.. 
j_ L 
... 
! '_ 
>: )'ý 
Lindusl ries' s shares would 
have fallen 1'i, rther. 
g) HT had no intention of in- 
creasing the bid. 
9) The selling of 
shares by some 
directors did 
with the claim 
board geared fexpansion. 
the company's 
of Lindustries's 
not reconcile 
of. a confident 
or profitable 
o) Option : gor reinvestment of 
cash for Lindustries's share- 
holde-rs in other higher. yield- 
ing companies. 
8) iindustries possessed the 
necessary rnanagemen 
and financial strengths 
to implement plans for 
future expansion. 
9) Lindustries would maintain 
its dividend. 
10) Lindustries-'s growth 
sectors (vehicle compo- 
nents, high technology, 
rubber products, etc. ) 
accounted for 50% of 
" 
the 1978 sales and its 
management ,. as fully capable 
of exploiting other oppor- 
tunities as they ar se. 
11) Pointed out to shareholders 
that Lindustries had to write Z1) 
15p per share off the company's 
assets to cover Cowlishaw's 
losses amounting to £2,8m. 
12) Exploited Lindustr: ies poor 
acquisition record regard- 
ing companies such as Wil-- 
li am Warne, Covilishaw 
Vlalker, Whiteley Lang & 
Neill. 
13) Haison's resources and 
proven management will 
restore T i. ndus fti. es' s 
adverse performance. 
14) Emphasise the well known 
operating philosophy of 
the company in giving 
its subsidiaries maxi- 
mum autonomy compatible 
with proper financial 
support and disciplines. 
15) It, argued that assets 
were only viable when 
they ie used to earn 
profits. 
16) Questioned the direction of 
Li ndustries' s future growth. 
13) HT's bid for Lindustries 
1dced industrial logic 
as the only area of over- 
lap in both their busi- 
nesses lay in their trade 
industries whichý%as margi- 
nal to the bidder's opera- 
tion. 
14) "Every reason wily Hanson 
wants Lindustries is a 
reason why shareholders 
should keep their shares". - 
17) Holders of 3.5rnillion 
shares had alreacy sold =- 
, to HT 
Lindustr, ies 7,400 employees 
identi d wi ih their own 
individual companies with- 
in the Group and 
favour of independence. 
12) Highlighted the possibiii-t. -y- 
of HT selling off Lin- 
dustries prime property. 
i. e. Trevor House, to 
reduce the cash cost of 
its acquisition. 
-. 
3J2 
SUVCE3 / A1. RE 
Hanson Trust's failure in 1977 to acquire Lin- 
dusttri es migtht be attributable to ' the lack of reconmc'n_ 
dati on by the board of Lindestries. Lindustries' s subser. tue: nt 
poor financial performance and depressed stock market rat- 
ing aggravated further by persistent losses in its Co. vli- 
shavw operation enabled Hanson Trust to successfully 'ac-- 
quire the company in the second takeover attempt with a 
"one sho;, "offer. 
- 
OTHER FEATURES 
The value of Hanson Trust's second successful 
takeover attempt for Lindus-tri. es in 1979 duplicated the 
same 135p offer value made during the abortive 1977 acqui- 
sition attempt. 
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=ýi J revaluation 
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lSale o" eZs (D: ý, - ' 
Capital reconstruction 
Dividend increase . 
-ýB-onus/scrip issue/share split 
Profits forecast 
Legal action 
....... Appeal to shareholders' loyalty 
i Placing 
Undertake an acquisition (before/after). 
Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS DEFENSIVE-STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS 
1) it breache(T"the tightly 1) The proposed bid does not 
held company by driving full reflect. the present 
a wedge between the two -value of the group's assets 
families' who held the or its poter: tial. 
majority of the equity 
and gaining the support 2) The bid did not have the 
of the Slotovers. '. 
- 
recommendation of Hardy; 
.s 
chairman, Mr. E. L. Datnow, 
%) Irreirocabl9 ? ccep lances nor 
family lTl_te res i ho 
from, two directors (R. S: jointly hold 44.8% of the 
Slotover and 
-R. T. E. Slot- voting equity (45.5% or. - 
. 
over) representing 41.1% dinary and 22.6% of the 
of the voting equity 'A' shares). (40.4; of the ordinary 
shares and 15.1% of the 3) Sought assurances on the 
'A' share). 
-This together employment of 
its employees 
; 'ritte shares already owned before consenting to reco: r_- 
by Harris Queensway repre- mend the offer to its share-- 
sent 
-47.9% of the voting 
holders. 
capital. 
3) Offered chairman of-Hardy 
a seat on the board of 
- 
Harris Queensway. 
4) Hardy had not earned any 
its significant prof 
since 1976 despite possess- 
ing prime retail positions 
in High Street. 
5) The acquisition of Hardy 
will brovide Harris Queens- 
way With the opportunity 
to expand its existing car- 
pet shops and home improve- 
- ment store chains. 
?L 
Ü In Cyr cI !" to gain apr nova 
1'rcrn ý1 e other major family 
share holder i, e. the 
Datnc %s 
, 
Harris Quoens, 
": eIfT 
revised its original bid 
terms by including a 
cash alternative. 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
The chairman and members of the Datnow 
family who opposed the bid could not mount any strong defen- 
ce against the unwelcome bid from Harris Queensway due to 
the large stake (4l. l%) pledged 
-by the Slotover family to the bidder. Moreover, the interim accounts for the twenty eight 
weeks ending in October 1978 showed a loss before tax of 
£240,000 on a turnover of £20m. In view of these circum- 
stances, Hardy' s main defence rest 
.i mainly on assets re- 
valuation. 
OTHER FEATURES 
It ; gras interesting to note that besides re tain- 
ing the services of. Barclays Merchant Bank as financial 
advisor, both fam i ]1- also retained independent financial 
advice of two other leading merchant banks, viz Klei. nwo t' 
Benson (Datnow) and Rothschilds (Slotover). Titus it was 
qui te. a novel-jy for a. takeover of this size ( 28m) to in- 
volve the services of four prime merchant banks. 
`=ý:, 
-- 
335 
-- 
T` ^ l: T K lý' l LTa 1 0. T, 1'^ *T("VT ý" SR Lr 
1: IAPýý ý. . dýI-, ýr: ? -: 
_ý;:. ý: A:: D DISTILLERS 
Property- 
. 
revaluation 
Cale_oi. assets-.. (before/after__. the_bid) 
, 
.. _1 
Capital reconstruction 
Dividend increase___-. 
_... _. 
' 
Bonus/scrip issue/share 
------------ Pro t'-s forecaS Pro 
Legal action 
-- 
:---_- 
, 
/. Appeal to shareholders'_ loyalty 
.. Placing. 
_---------. Undertake an_. acauisition (be: fore/a ter. 
__). 
__j 
Acquire bidder's equity 
-- 
-- 
(Defensive strategies listed in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES ARGUMENTS 
1) The offer price of 130p re- 1) Launched an advertising 
presented a P/E ratio of 17. campaign calling for 
rejection of further 
2) H. W. underlined the fact that foreign intrusion into 
in the Scotch 'whisky industry Scotland's "heritage'-' 
. 
as in other industries, the 
value of assets was a function 2) Decling number of inde- 
of what they would contribute pendent di st`i llers i=, was 
to future earnings. a strong rationale 
1 for keeping H. D. in exist- 3) /2 The offer represents 2 ing hands and if 
-the -take-- 
: 
times the book value of over succeeds it would. be 
HI 's net tangible assets. difficult for investors 
to invest in the Scotch 
"') Highland got only 50% of its vhhisky industry. 
benefits of its wholly owned 
subsidiary's (R & B) sales of 3) H. D. 's shareholders 
the "Famous Grouse" brand 
- 
should reap the benefits 
which it owned- from the growing and 
increasing momentum of 
5) Highland could determine- the "Famous Grouse" 
the level of dividend nor brand 
- 
the prime tar- 
had it any effective rights get of H. W. 
in the assets of R&B. (whichvas a subsidiary of 4) The poor performance of 
another company, Edrington "Ballantines" ( the main 
Holdings) and the 35.4; ß H. W. brand of whisky) 
holdingwas simply a diiýi d- vas a sharp contrast- to 
end yielding investment in the rapid expansion of 
a private company. the "ramous Grouse 
. 
6) There wre negative factors 5) The substantial resources 
to be accounted n assessing of -v, &B was available to 
the 'true value on Highland H. D: 
. 
for the conti nui 
Dis tiller ies stake in R& B de"t- elc ümm: e_n t of 
for ex artsolo 
, 
there was a spe- 
cia]. clause designed to 
prob i h; 
_ 
.: fore? n sharehold- 6) it could no t -ha 
the takeover ý: Tas success- 
±'u7_, H. W. would divest 
H, B. 's shareholding in R&B. 
Highland was witholding two 
significant facts relating 
to R&B from H. W. 
9). Mr. MacPhail, chairman of 
H. D. was also the managing 
director of R&B and its 
parent company and it . vas- 
difficult to justify High-- 
land taking credit for 
35.4% of the undistributed 
earnings of R&B. 
0) Highland's rejection docu-". 
ment, "does not provide suf- 
ficient evidence, facts and 
opinions (in particular, 
about assets, prospective 
profits and dividends) for 
you to form a judgement 
as-to the merits of the 
offer". 
'1? ) ? 
-i. G', j, 's ovin extens4i. e, marke t- 
ing örganisation would assist 
the "Famous Grouse" to rea- 
lise its full potential out- 
side the U. Y. 
12) 1I. D. might impose upon its 
shareholders for more capiý 
tai 
-due to rapid expansion. 
she long s i; anding relation- 
between ýi 
, 
h' and and Reber 
son and Baxter (R & B) 
would continue if cont-rol 
of H. D. were to ch m e. 
7)'In connection with R& B, the 
directors's intentions were 
to give "to shareholders as 
much information as possibe 
without disclosing to com- 
petitors information that 
could be damaging to High- 
land's trading activities". 
8) The profits of R&B attri- 
butable to H. D. was already 
reflected in its published 
accounts and obviously its 
directors could not advise 
its shareholders to ignore 
highland's 35.4jß sharehold- 
ing in R&B. 
9) 0.1% acceptances was an in- 
dication that the majority 
shareholders. agreed with the 
-board's view of, maintaining its i ýZdepender_ce 
. 
10) Seagram had been appointed 
as the distributor of the 
"Famous Grouse"' in the 
U. S. A. while H. D. 's other 
brand, "Gutty Sark" had a 
powerful export potential. 
11) The control of H. W. 's Scotch 
" whisky business resided 
firmly in Canada. 
12) H. D. would only resort to 
a rights issue i. ' the com- 
par1y' s rate of growth was 
so fast that it could rte;, be 
self-financed or satisfac- 
torily be funded by other 
means. 
13) The market price of the 
companyT had increased by 
500% over the last give 
years ý.. 
14) 
-On a combined bas-is 
(ti. D. 
and R &r-B) H., 
.,, 
I. s of for 
" 'r 
'Id d' r ..., ! 
-' of 
1.7 to a mu1. t i. i; i e of 12. 
-- 
i ;% 
-_ 
The no: ?r 
`GI1:. 
l. " 
1U) It ;i abioIui, o ý` file 
-Üjt` 
stage in Highlands s economic 
cycle to even contemplate 
recommending this bid. 
17) Despite what H. W. said - in 
its latest circular the 
board consic1 ed that High- 
land's shareholders were in 
a position to form a jude- 
ment on the merits of The 
offer. ' 
18) The support of the Glasgow 
M. P. 
, 
I, "ir. Donald Dewar for 
the independence of H. D. to 
a large extent influenced the 
Trade Secretary four the hid 
to be r. eferr"3d to the (January 1980). 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
Gn 'i he Coiumi sinn blocked 'rcý. i'iergev 
on the grounds that such a merger ; could lead to a 
efficiency, affecting the streng Uh of competition t of fared 
in the. U. K market. The other reason given for the rejection 
of. the merger. was that a takeover by Hiram Walker of High- 
land Distilleries would mean a further concentration of 
distillery ownership in Scotland. The Director-General of 
Fair Trading in ensuring the compliance of * the Commissi on's 
ruling w-xild seek -formal assurance from that it <<: ýuld 
not attempt to proceed with the' takeover. 
OTHER FEATURES 
- 
Hiram Walker's main acquisition strategy re- 
volve around the disclosure of the true worth of Robertson 
and Baxter (as a subsidiary of Edrington, R&B merely ap- 
peared in Highland's accounts at a cost price of £:, 81,000). 
Due to this style of accounting, the question_ arose as to 
the extent to which a listed company should lines itself into 
trading contracts with a private company ran essentially by 
the same management and the rights of shareholders in a 
publ? c company to information needed 
_s) assess . he value of j. e their i rev es"tr: reýi t. In retros-oect, i ý, co-012t ýbseen that deIensz ve t_-. c tics focuE' r'orce o' ;_c oti Ciä_ iat. iona 
-i 
T? 
sound fi : 1% ncia_ arguments, I _n., ýA"_ eÜ-`' 
_rg 
ýU note t; 2 ., 
_ 
as a result c. ý the Commission' 3 vlir_, a.! 
_n: ý }. ý ý'ý thdra; v fror. the takeover 'ellth" a £1", p :r 
on the other h2nd, ;:, D. rourreci £JT. 5,000 in cos-.:, ;: o ". i: j 
s'"_ ' 
.ý hi 
`"J: Tý`" 
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_e 
of assets (before/after_ the bid 
Capital reconstruction 
Divdendincrease 
Bonus/scrip issue/share split 
Profits forecast 
Legal action 
Appeal to__snareholders'... loyalty 
placing 
Undertake an acquisition--(before/after! Acquirebidder's equity { 
(Defensive strategies listed in 
the research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGUVIENTS DEFENDING STRATEGIE ARGUI; NTS 
ý) The logic of the bid vas to 1) The bid undervalued assets. 
facilitate the development 
of a prosperous ship manage- 2) Possibility of a ri val_- b? d 
ment company based on Tynside. (Turnbull Scott) emerging. 
2) In the absence of a bid it was 3) S gag Line Nýus a recover- s"i i. ua- 
- 
unlikely for the biddee's Lion. 
share price to ruse to 277P 1) I jic; ýo Lia"ted i LU'ap rIo Le (the market price prior to option for some of its, : ihar. "e- 
the announcement of the of- holders in order to mitigate 
fer). CGT liability. 
3) Assurances on employees and 5) The basis of Stag Line's 
no redundancies envisaged. defence hinged largely tin 
the revaluation of its 
4) The operation of Stag Lire shipping f? eels and the 
with a fleet of only two current market value of 
deep sea vessels, without its quoted investments. 
a merger-would make manage- 
ment overheads uneconomically 6) The bidders should take 
high, into account the long term 
prospects of the biddee's 
5) Benefits arising from merging employees. 
the two comparatively small 
fleets into a single larger 
unit. 
6) Hunting Gibson's revised 
offer vas 30p above its 
rival bidder (430p versus 
400p) and had the recommen- 
dation of the board. of direc- 
tors of Stag Line. 
7) Irrevocable acceptances' D]. US 
Shares owned b Hun ý_ý_ng Cr, Son 
I. W. (slit- ýidia1 ^virl' In r' (11- 
J ý. 
s al'(? 
-' 
dy r<T)L e:. '? ý'1_'C', 2d a Pl%i. ýL). Gr?:? 
r 
for Ci 11 ýý? 'Q I. 
SUCCESS/ FAILURE 
Turnbull'Scott's withdrawal from the contest- 
ed takeover vas a result of the irrevocable undertaking to 
accept the bid given by Ropner Holdings (the largest single 
shareholder with 29% of Stag Line's shareholdirng) and the 
fact that it failed to secure the recommendation from Stag's 
board who hald the other vital 29 0 of the company's equity. 
The basis for Stag Line's contention of the takeover bid 
for the company itself rested mainly on price rather than 
independence. Its willingness to recommend the offer at 
the later stage of the takeover was mainly attributable 
to shipping economics (owing to the rapid escalation in. 
ship building cost replacing the aging assets of the company 
would impose a severe strain on Stag Line's financial re- 
sources). 
OTHER FEATURES 
Hunting's bid for Stag- Lin 1e followef discussion 
on management cooperation between the two companies for some 
time but with little result. Abnormal movement in the share 
0 
.L.. ý Line . LI,. 1. "1 , L. .; "2. prices, of 
w, Laic Q.. tLU7 l. IIe 
.L 
. Ct' of po nibble rival LULL-. iU 
self galvanised Hunting Gibson to launch its bid for Stag 
Line sooner than planned. 
- 
JIr CI 
°' 
LTD. 
- 
: ýV 
Prone-itj ice-valuation 
Sale ofý rise U _--(bc=f cr /a wer ý: he bid) 
Capital reconstruction 
-Dividend 
increase. 
- i3onus/scrip_-issue/share 
_ 
split Profits-- 
Appeal-_ to shareholders'loyalty 
Undertake an acquisition (bet ore/after) 
Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in 
the research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIE S/ARGUbTNTS 
1) The increased offer of 195P (1979) was in excoss of the 
previous old share offer 
of 13Op (1978)" 
2) The new offer contained 
a significant cash ele- 
ment. 
?- ^rr-a ., t_ _ývý_s'hi. ... ii -'- e l. cai-Y-. 
a: d-dovelop. all the major 
activities of SUITS and 
to continue to emphasise 
its Scottish identity. 
'! rough Lonhro the share- 
holder will retain and 
investrr! e: n i: in SUITS while 
benefitting from Lonhro's 
international range of acti- 
vities. 
Lonhro's association had al- 
ready been of great benefit 
to SUITS 
- 
in one instance; 
a proven advantage of £9m. 
6) By accepting the revised 
offer, shareholders ýroUld 
receive increases in capi-tal 
value (25%) 
, 
income 
and earnings (197%). 
7) Lonhro., mindful of the past 
acou. sit on ecord of SU! '! 'S 
had assisted the con any in 
a°1oiding high risk investments 
in Atz ica. gor exainp)_e, the 
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS 
Declared that SUITS had a 
prosperous future as an 
independent company. 
2) The bidwa not in Sco-t- 
- 
land's economic interest. 
3) ! 
-Iv- grossly undervalued 
SUITS. 
4) Recent offers had been 
- 
made both for whisky and 
for publishing companies- 
ýfaluing the earnings of 
such companies on substan- 
tial premium to these mar- 
ket indicies i. e. the FT- 
Actuaries '+_ndicies for 1.1: i. nes 
and Spirits and for News- 
rapers & Publishing. 
5) The value of SUITS and its. 
shareholding in the House 
of Fraser (£50.9to) exceeded 
It he Lonhro `s bid (£39.9n) 
by £11m. 
b) SUITS' stake in the HoF and. 
its whisky interest a1_3n-, -ie
could be worth more than 
Lonhro's offer. 
7) Iýonh 
. 
A, ' s takeover of SUITS 
vas ha W ed on the ulterior 
moti"Y e : of securing SU! '! E 
CIhC 
, he IioF. 
- 
1,11 
abandoning of a publish i I? 
investment in Nigeria due 
to remittabili ty problem). 
g) Lonhro would "fit beautiful- 
ly" with a whisky, printing, 
and engineering interest of 
SUITS. 
g) Uni standard accounting 
practice the earnings o. f the 
Hoy' could not be treated 
as part of SUITS profits 
but shareholders should now 
that they would benefit in 
this way because of Lonhro'"s 
shareholding in the HoF. 
10) "The entrepreneurial drive 
of Lonhro and i -fis wider 
industrial and commercial 
experience 
... 
could be of 
benefit to SUITS and in the 
long term, to the, prospects 
of employment in Scotland". (The report of the M. M. C. 
"' 
quoted by Lonhro in its bid 
circular of 11/4/79). 
1i` 
t1 
c c. 
ý 
'i-Iý. as ur Cy, arc-. 
av.. aymp ý tiý. JiLc. u_ 
holders that Lonhro's n. er- 
; er with the HoF would not 
operate against public in- 
terests by quoting on the 
Zvi. Ivi 
. 
C. 's report ; 15/3/79). 
12) Highlighted the intentions 
o'L the. tr_ untres o. 1 the 
Fraser Trusts (8.94% of 
HoF's) to accept the bid. 
13) The bid had the support 
of Sir Hugh Fraser (Deputy 
Chairman) and Mr. j. Goss-- 
pan, a director of the HoF. 
14) Pointed out to shareholders 
that three. directors out 
of the board of eight direc- 
tors, vi Z. rir T_. aughland (Chief Executil e) and itlessrs. 
Anderson and Cowan i. e. the 
opposing directors were re- 
cent appointees snd only 
hold marginal shareholdings 
in SUITS itself. 
15) The figures put. 
-Lor,. %, ard 
by 
Lrie Uppo-,? ing SUITS directors 
8) Emphasise_? SUITS good'pe 
- iormance. 
9) T onhro t-,, -as a controversial 
group which operated in 
many areas of political 
and economic risks (in 
1977, Africa contributed 
73% to Lonhro's pre-tax. 
profits). 
10) The bid served to reduce 
Lonhro's high gearing by 
acquiring SUITS which 
had a low debt ratio and 
a strong balance sheet. 
11) Exploited T onhro' s failure 
to mention. current trading 
and prospects. 
12) As a general rule, companies 
with dividend yields in 
double figures (1L a for 
Lonhro were regarded by 
the market as involving 
" above--average risks 
. 
13) If Lonhro tiwanted control of SUIT: 
__ 
vÜ.. tpäy 
-ý-I- --- --,, -'- ýý N iit c, l! Cý_. bll ý 
price. 
14) The M. IVI. C. 's Report rein- 
force SUITS's view that 
It did not need Lonhro ("... the acquisition of 
SUITS would increase Lonhrc's 
direct shareholding in the 
HoF and the influence which 
Lonhro v as able to exert on 
HOF. 
.... 
it a plain fact 
that Lonhro has in recent 
years been involved in con- 
troversy and it was impossi- 
ble to say that it would not be involved in controversy; 
again"). 
15) Pointed out to shareholders 
that ionhro' s share were 
not attractive and additional 
ly the bid had no cash alter- 
nativ;., 
. 
16) "1t coui not e; :e Lon o' 
shar e, -, prop 
knowing ýh curreý. r -.. 
0'. its debt. 
- 
342 
(regarding SUITS' s s' ake 
in the Hio'IF and its whisky 
into est could be worth 
the value put on SUITS's 
by Lonhro's bid) were in- 
adequately based. 
16) Question d the ability of 
the three opposing direc- 
tors to run SUITS" with- 
out Lonhro. 
17) Exploited the fact that 
on the 2k/2/77 the SUITS's 
board including the three 
opposing directors were 
in favour of a proposal 
to sell SUITS's valuable 
holding (10%) in the HoF. 
18) SUITTS's shareholders 19) 
should exercise their 
. own commercial jlzdgement 
regarding the merits' of the oar. 
19) Stressed I, onhro''s finm- 
ciai. record ovep she past 
17 years and the quality 
of its assets. 
? 
_0) I, onhro `. s proven growth 
record. 
21) The right of shareholders 
- 
to receive Lonhro's in- 
terim dividends. 
22) If the offer lapsed, SUITS's 
share price vas likely to 
fall substantially.. 
23) SUITS's headquarters 
should remain in Glasgow. 
17) 
. 
SUITS was , deally placed 
to mare substaxi tial p_". 
- 
gress under its new 
ment team (the excellent 
performance of the common- y 
in 1977 and 1978 vas largely 
attributable to I,. Ir. Laugh- 
land the new Chief Ex_ecu- 
tivej 
18) The market view of Lonhro's 
shares according to Data- 
Stream statistics indicate 
that i-is 
. 
P/ multiple with 
. 
only three exceptionsras 
lower than that of any 
listed company with a mar- 
ket capitalisation of 
more than £25m; in 1978. 
SUITS's shares with a 
P/E of 6.4 (including 
dividends from HoF) com- 
pared favourably with the 
P/E of 7.9 sho-vin by the 
FT-Actuaries Share index 
in 1978. 
20) Lonhro's 1979 offer re-ore- 
sent¬. d a discount of 6Cn 
per share cra18.7m. 
21) If against advice, share- 
holders had accepted 
the original offer, 
they would had exchanged 
each share in SUITS now 
worth 195p for a holdirg 
in Lonhro. v hichý"only worth 
143p. 
22) SUITS's shares at their 
--current value of 195p 
stand higher than the 
offer value. 
23) The decision to. sell SUI'-: 's 
stake in the HoF as based 
on the need to concentrate 
on the industrial trading 
strength of SUIT rather 
than on its inves amen t 
. zior tifolio 
. 
24) This : policy heil the ar rc-- 
- 
va. l c' both Sir 'ugh =--d 
'%ii j. Goss--an. v 
25) r. 
-Iyid  ia 
3rS, -, 
SUI'-, 'S : '. a? lecl to ?. nform the- 
board of the Con `tont :) Of 
the ie., ter by a iar o in:, 
ti tu-tional sharehoJ. Cic-- sog- 
-ges-tin, -, at least one addi-" 
tion to the board. 
26) Exps'ited. the low acceptance 
level of 8.25% (excluding 
the. Fraser Trusts). 
27) In order to induce Lonhro 
to improve its offer Char- 
terhouse organised a syn- 
dicate of eight institu- 
tional investors in making 
a counter bid for the 9 
holding of the Fraser's 
Trusts. 
SUCCESS FAILURE 
Lonhro's success (the bid had been revised-. 
several times) in gaining control of SUITS might be at tri buta"- 
ble to its large controlling stake, - the support given by. 
Sir Hugh Fraser and the final revised premium of 20p which 
induced many major shareholders to-sell out (this premium 
level as derived by discrete probings ea", lo. ýg some share- 
holders by Lonhro' s broke-rs).. 
OTHER FEATURES 
Charterhouse Japhet resorted to a novel riefen-- 
ce tactic by orga_nisi ng a consortium of institutions to bid 
200o for Sir Hugh's family trust to induce Lonhro to pay a 
higher price for its client (SUITS). In addition, Charter- 
house also held talks with larburgs, the HoF's merchant 
bank regarding a possible counter bid by the HoF for- SUITS. 
It-vr interesting to note that Lonhro's takeover policy 
fated to receive the support of. its dominant shareholder 
.. 
e. 
Gulf Fisheries which had a holding of 21%. in Lonhro. in the 
final analysis, Lonhro's victory might be attributable to its 
skilful. 
- 
takeover strategy fortified by its ability to split 
the SUITS board of directors and undermine its shareholders's 
confidence in the company. F urThermore, it could be observed 
that Robert Flemming, SUITS' s former merchant banker resi=gned 
as advisers to the company when Si, 
-?, Hugh sold his vital 2Lo holding in SUITS to Lonhro. This holding provided Lonhro 
with a Sizeable platform to final ly gain c; pt ool of SUITS 
, 
ýý 4_ 
T. I Tr 
Proper - revaluation Sale 
_ 
of__ as 
- 
-L, 
--(. bef ore/,. 
'after the bid) 
Capital reconstruction 
Dividend 
_i ncrease_.. B_onus/scrip issue/share split 
Profits forecast. 
--_ Legal 
ac tzars 
Appeal. 
- 
, 
o-shareholder-s'_-. ]. oyalty_... 
__. Placinrz 
Undertake e-n acquisition (before/after) 
Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in 
the research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGUßIENTS 
1) Pi&Sv7 requested. Bowrixig not to 
±'rustrate the merger. 
- 
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES/ArGUME TS 
2) It promised to preserve 
Bowring as an independent 
entity in order to get the 
OFT' s approval for the Take 
over.. 
3) Its major acquis'i'tion strate- 
gy. in circumventing Lloyd. ' s 
20 per cent ruling" was to äg"ee 
to transfer 75% oft' Bowring's 
insurance broking business to 
another owner acceptable to 
Lloyd's (it should be noted. 
that Lloyd's waiver of its 
20% rul! ngw. s influenced by 
the fact that thirty per cent' 
of its business came from 
the' U. S. A. ). 
1) Instituted legal actions 
in the U. K. and the U. S. A. 
to Vrard off the hostile 
bid from T+rI&rI. 
2) It disputed the contents 
o. i iv1&: I °s prospectus. filed 
with the SEC (a classical 
delaying 
employed by biddee com- 
- 
panies in the USA. ). 
3) Bowririg had the support 
of it employees for inde- 
pendence. 
Cited the fact the 
had no experience 
chanting, banking 
, finance, shipping 
trading. 
tr. i&1 
in r; er-" 
cred? t 
and 
4) To abide by the Bank of Eng-' 5) Highlighted the danger that 
land's wishes, it also agreed the takeover would result 
to the disposal of Singer & in a "Domino effect" in 
Friedlander, Bowring's merchant the U. K. insurance indus"- 
banking subsidiary to a third try. 
party (under the Bank of "Eng-. 
land's ruling no foreigner aas o) Focussed the shareholders' 
allowed to on more than 15% attention to the possible 
of a British merchant bank). danger of the bidder in 
diverting valuable U. K. 5) The revised offer al iovwedthe "ande :: ritin g experience 
shareholders of Doviriný to to 
receive a final dividend (this dividend rig=, excluded 7) r_: ý-{ri: l_ 
in the original offer). record 
6). It undertook-, not to di pose 
>. L. J 
of other ass e-1-1,; o buä1- 
nC' ses of Bo,, vri-, ý; with 
the E'Xc p,, xon of 1T1su- 
rance bro ing and met 
- 
bar 
._ 
ng 
. 
cha: it 
7) Preservation of Bow- 
ring board structure 
and an election of 
four BoYrring' s repre- 
sentatives to the 
board of M& MI if the 
merger succeeded 
8) Assurances given to 
employees regarding 
employment. 
9) The bid was conditional 
upon Bowring' s withdrawal 
of litigation against M&ýI. 
B) The )idl would proves--{; 
Bow-ring 
from onto r 
i. n« 
t1. ß. insurance market. 
The bid :; o d a_j S'ec1, he u;. 
insurance relationship with 
the EEC. 
10) It a: ctemp-zd to get the bid 
referred to the TruilC. 
11) It charge. TVI&TJ of breaching 
its fiduciary duty to its 
shareholders by she use of 
confidential information to 
launch a bid for BoFring. 
12) It main. defensive strategy 
is underpinned by the Lloyds 
20%% ruling (no outside inte- 
rest may hold more. than 200 ö 
of the equity of a Lloyds' 
broker). 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
Bov. wri ng' s key defence against the hostile bid 
from iß, 
-YM hinged on the crucial Lloyds' 20% ruling. Once Lloyds had 1. ß. i'4 ed this artificial barrier designed to prof f ct 
its :; cnc tituent members, from foreign takeovers and augmented 
by an improved offer, the 3ovrring's board dropped. its resistance 
to the takeover and. decided to recommend the merger to its 
shareholders. This-factor greatly enhanced i/ &Tii' s chance in 
finally gaining control of the company. 
OTHER FEATURES 
This contestedbid was characterised by heavy 
litigation reflected in the exchange of acrimonious letters (used as exhibits in court) between both parties. I'I&M's 
decision to takeover C. T. Bowringwas influenced by difficulty 
posed in its own home environment in taking over 'an American 
insurance broker due to anti-trust implications. As such, 
Bowring constitute a-' '. back door entry" for i{&M into Lloyds 
and hence, U. K. insurance markei:, lt was interesting to note 
that the post-acquisition period Evas marked by a significantly 
high number of resignations from Bowring's senior management. 
ý, 
r. L. -. b - 
T TNING SUF'PT IES 'Ur ! SCE SCOTT 
Property re"ý aluation 
Sale of assets (before/artier the bid) 
Capital-recons. truotion_ 
-__---- Div-idend- increase.. 
--- 
-Bonus/scrip- 
issue/shaý7e split 
Profits fore-cast. 
. Legal act on 
---= Appeal to shareholders' loyalty 
Placing 
. Undertake an acquisition. (before/after)_; 
Acquire bidder's equity 
- L-- --ý (De±"ensive strategies listed 
in the research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGU1\IENTS 
l) Emphasised the commercial 
logic of the merger (ra- 
tionalisation of micropro- 
cessor equipment). 
2) Highlighted the fact that 
it had an excellent indus- 
trial relation (only lý'/2 
viorkl. YZ days lost since the 
company was established in 
1960). 
3) The offer represented a pre- 
mium of 51ý 
. 
Contrasted performance of 
both companies. 
5) No major changes in biddee' s 
businesses or assets if the 
merger went through. 
6) Shareholders should regard 
the recent asset revalua- 
tion by Laurence Scott 
as a mere "window dressing" 
. 
7) Mining Supplies exploited 
Laurence Scott's weals posi- 
tion by using a"one shot" 7) 
strategy for its acquisition 
of the company. 
8) By accepting the offer share- 
holders 
.: afld r"ecei veahi gher income and capita. ' Aalurs for 
-their investmueni;. 
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES/ARGT hINTS 
1) It expressed reservation 
on the bidder's intention 
as the chairman declined 
to discuss the bid with 
the company. 
2) Mining supp1ios failed to 
provide current and future 
trad 
_ng i nfor;;? ation. 
3,1- C"ited the fact that the 
company was trading from 
a substantial asset base. 
4) Owing to internal manage-- 
ment nc ganisation and the 
availability of surplus 
assets the company tias con- 
fident that it was able ' to 
reverse losses. 
5) The bid undervalued assets. 
The company had the support 
of some of it 1oýTai cus- 
tomers who were in favour 
of Laurence Scott's iride- 
pen_pence. 
It compla1: ed to the Takeover 
Partei That the bidder ha 
infringed Rule 23 (1) ;: hi ch 
-0t"b rthe withdrawal of 
an of r without l! da-, Ts 
;, o tire, 
8) it any: ov : cd a : it=a ýrý 
_ 
:7- 
UJ "i advi ; oCri 511ati'C't1i? ldc 
- ;; 'k. r, 
rcjcc ' the share 
oý cc_ýý ideraý ia.: -term' 
ýýýr+ d the cash as 
fair. 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
The success of alining Supplies in acquiring 
Laurence Scott mj ht be attributable to the extremely weak 
performance of the biddee in view of the fact that it had. 
sustained continued losses for two years. This adverse situ- 
-he ation was further compounded by" an engineering strike in 
company. Furthermore, Mining Supplies position was enhanced 
by its substantial control position (27f) of Laurence. Scott, 
a holding which it manage. to build up just before the 
acquisition. 
OTHER FEATURES 
The media described the takeoier as bitter in 
nature. The decision by seining Supplies to bid earlier-than 
planned teas influenced by the fact that Laurence Scott had 
become vulnerable and hence the ' possibility of a compe titer"- 
coming in. During the* closing stage of the contested offer, 
Laurence SCOT. 
-!:, managed to influence the Takeover P= l ie -to 
force the bidder to extend both cash offer as weil as share 
alternative. As a result of the 
. 
merger, Laurence Scott and 
its subsidiary, PPD Engineering-. sued Hambros Bank and 
two of its former directors (PPD) in conspiring to weaken 
PPD Engineering in order to force Laurence Scott to sell it 
cheaply to' a rival company. 
`ýý, 
?:. 
i iýJar 1!: 1; j. 
, 
Tý 1. ý; U L i)i1 
- 
ýý/J 
fs J-! I; r JiiY 
"t Off? :L '_ý' ea 1_i, 'ß i 
_ior! Sale of asc, e-ts (before/af lle-`- 
Capi La]. t econ iru ; 
Div iäe ld 
-increase Bonus/scrip issue/share split 
Profits forecast 
Legal action 
the bid) 
Appeal to 
.. 
shareholders' loyalty 
Placing 
i 
' ºUndertake an acquisition' (before/ after). ' 
Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS DEF NSTVE STRATEGIES /ARGUMENTS 
1) Itwas a pair and reasonable 1) St. George's Laundry beli- 
ozfer (53p represented the. eved in a strong local 
highest price ever placed presence than a wide geo- 
on St. George's shares). graphical spread. 
2) The bid represented an 85% 
increase in capital value. 
j) The terms for consideration 
put a P/E of 21.6 on St. 
George's Laundry. 
4 
Li) 
-Emphasised on the indus- 
trial Logic of the merger. 
5) It aim-ad to provide a more 
comprehensive service in 
a wider geographical area. 
6) Con t: ast- return on assets 
employed of both companies. 
7) Assurances regarding busi- 
nesses and employees. 
8) If neither offers (partial 
and full) succeeded the 
biddee's share price was 
likely to fall drastically. 
2) The commercial strategies 
of both companies 
__were diametrically opposed. 
3) The bid represented a dis= 
count of 36c5' on the net, 
asset value of the company. 
- 
1) The bid diluted dividend 
income by 37 
The shareholders of he 
company should be able to 
reap the financial benefits 
of thei investrimen-, s due 
to the reorganisation 
effected in the company. 
6) As a result of the failure 
of the bidder to- acquire 
the company the directors 
of St. George's Laundry 
- 
resor-i t to share place; en t 
of some of the' company' s- 
equities in friendly hands. 
: s} a 
-- 
jý, 
"ý 
In order ;o Split -the uni_ t eCx and 1 :;; " 
Sei rong family control o theA com; ipany, Prop l Lý. undries 
attempted to circumvent these impediments via an unique 
partial and general takeover bid launched simultaneously. 
However, the clear wish of the family controlled business 
to retain i°ýs independence was the contributory factor to- 
., ards the failure of Provincial Laundries to acquire St. 
George's Laundry. Provincial Laundries 'ende: l up with only 1_6% 
of the Group's equity. 
OTHER FEATURES 
Soon after the abortive takeover attempt by 
Provincial Laundries for the company, the Armstrong family 
who held more than 50% of the shareholding of St. George's 
placed a substantial block of shares in friendly hands viz 
26.7% with P. Dellar and P. Dobson, 18.7% with Simon & 
Coates while fully retaining 26% in its own hands. After its 
failure to acquire St. George's Laundry Provincial. Laundries 
then disposed its 16% holding in the company and. made a 
net profit of £40,000. In January 1981, St. George's L 
. 
uli- 
dry made a reverse takeover for the laundry business of 
Provincial Laundries. 
..: 
=, 
4* f\ 
-- 
EETl ; ` : `I^I7ýT'ý1't Tjtrj"i ; ýj`jj1J'Tý)i : ýiT. ýt": -. j 
- 
i; jiT ; `'i "'T'; l 0OR, POR T. 0111 
r01?. i '_ may- cvdt 'ý j on 
- Sale of asse ts (beL ore/after_ the bid) 
Capital. reconstruction 
Di vi den d-. inc re as. e--------Bonus/scrip 
-. 
issue/shar. e. 
- 
split---. 
Profits. 
_forecas 
t. 
_. __. _ 
--- Legal action-.. 
-- -i Appeal- to. shai e: ýo_lders'_. loyalty-.:.... 
. 
Placing, 
_ _.. 
. _.: - -- ... - Undertake an acquisition.. (befor_e/after). 
Acquire bidders equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in 
the research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES ARGUMENTS DEFENSIVE STRATEGIE S/ARGUMENTS 
Emphasised on its pre-bid 
controlling position. 
2) It iýa. s a fair and reasona- 
ble offer. 
3) Criticised the bad. acqui-- 
sition record of VJEC 
. 
l+) The profit is f or c: "ast assu. 
__. -. 
tioris of ' ETC were meaning- 
less (it exp'oited the fact 
that the bidee 5n a Ja: ter s tage 
of the takeover bid 'had to 
revise its forecast-figures). 
5} The offer represented a 17% 
premium on the net asset 
value of WEC. 
1) It received support for 
independence from both- 
its employees and union. 
2) 
-The offer price was below 
the company's net tangible 
.. 
asset value per share. 
3) CGT liability from accept- 
cash offer. 
t) 
. 
Omission from final di: Ti- 
end for. accepting share- 
holders. 
5) By accepting the bid from 
PJfl's shareholders would be 
deprived of the benefits 
accruing Trogt the IHBI) 
acquisi Lion (KHIwas a poor 
option to TBHD). 6) Criticised the weak balance 
sheet of titrEC as reflected 
by a fall in-the company's 6) 
liquid resources. 
7) Cited the fact that in two 
out of the three years, the 
biddee's dividends have 
not been covered by profits. 
8) The thaz^e price of WEC will 
fall sharply if the offer 
lapsed. 
9) Highlig)nted the fact that 
Wc failed to pro-. ride in--- infor- 
mation on current tracing 
ar_d ff ture prospects. 
Ques cz. l RHI 's desire to 
hold discussions with 
General Electric (the 
Amer 
_csa1 parent company 
of IBI D) in the ev-ent of 
a successful takeover of 
W'EC as, i: HI had already in- 
dicated that it will t;; ith- 
draw the bid -i--F t 
-he 
tad- 
-e-over of ! H'I Vs. to proceed. 
7) mlie acsi io of i3 ,L 
coVoref7 ! )ter s' 
1: 's L 
10) Pointed out that the share- 
holders of : EEC should have 
the opportunity to consider 
and evaluate the alterna- 
tive offer for the company. 
11) Insubstantial defences put 
up by UEC. 
12) The offer represented an 
exit P/E of 14.3... 
, 
13) Emphasised the acquisition 
policy of RHI in giving 
freedom to operating units. 
14) The off_zr. vez conditional on 
the IBHD deal not going 
through. 
15) Queried the source of funds 
for the takeover of IBI D 
by t'dEC. 
lb) Questioned the commercial 
logic of 
NTIEC' 
s proposed ac- 
quisition of IBI-ID 
17) By. acquiring 
. 
be i ncurrj-n6 
9%. 
TBHD, \JEC would 
ae ar nö 0 
3.8) Pointed out to shareholders 
that TLAB had an erratic 
profits record. 
19) Highlighted the fact that 
General Electric had not 
warranted for the future 
prod 
,s of IBHD. 
20) No difficulty 
ing cash for 
shareholders. 
SUCCESS FAILURE 
in reinvest- 
accepting 
i]. vl. rc, was no ich ee, 
tho. n the paymen `: wo u.! d 
be reduced by a 21/4m). 
8} By acquiring IBHD, WLC 
would be incurring a 
gearing ratio of 72% 
and not 95% as stated 
by the bidder. 
9) Indicated to shareholders 
that the pre-tax losses 
of IBID har( been includ- 
ed in the-results and 
anticipated That future 
losses would be small.. 
10) Probability of redundancies 
if the takeover succeeded. 
11) Cited. the fact that WEC' s 
borrowings had been 
effected at reasonable 
rates of interest. 
12. E The company's fluctuation 
in cash resources v; as back 
to noririal due to the 
recent 
-of overdue pay-- 
m eri s iii om J-1- ree over- 
seas contracts. 
13) Capitalised on the low 
level of acceptances (14.4; ) 
. 
The offer by RHI for WEC lapsed as share- holders of T, JEC voted in favour of the IBHD acquisition. 
Additionally, RH1's Eiure ini yht be attributable to she lack. 
Of institutional support from three main ing situ tional sh_are- 
holders 
:nne ly, Prudential Assurance, Pearl t'ssurance and 
the National Ccal Board Pension Fund. it was in teres to 
note that some institutions dt seribrd RI's otening bid 'Jr _ce 
as being "a fraction 
. 
on the mea, n side" 
. 
_. 
3.2 
-. 
OTHER FE\TUPTS 
Tile takeover of IBHD by tf I' J= s ica i l: jr a 
defc-nuive merger as the company F'udeavourcd to ward of th, 
_. 
un': Ie]. come takeover from ht11. the a bor iive aLi. e: tp'u 
acquire [PLC, RHI disposed its shareholdings in the company 
and mý-e a profit of £2.21. It should be noted that RHI 
revised its offer by 5p to 70a day before the offer closed. (in normal circumstances, the-offer would not have been 
raised until the. closing date but RHI received the panel' s 
approval for this move because the shareholders of J%TEC 
had to vote for the IBHD acquisition on the closing day 
of the RHI's takeover bid). 
f 
. sý a 
- 
3C3 
'I {i RUVtn , -""L R /ý tit i" T sa_r,,., D,.,, _ý; ý/(; LT j: }ý. tzýý cýt. t: c,.. ýýý__ort 
Property revaluation- 
Sale- of assets (before/after the 
Capital reconstruct tion... 
. 
Bonus/scrip issue/share split 
Profits. forecast 
__. __. tLegai action 
bid) 
(Appeal to share. o? ders'_ loyalty 
'Placing 
---- 
----- -- _ _-- 
'- undertake än acquisition (before/after), 
Acquire bidder's equity. 
(Defensive strategies listed in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGUMENTS DEFENDING STRATEGIES ARGU NT'S 
1) It belittled Guthrie' s 
share performance. 
2) It denigraded Guthrie's 
management record. 
'I) It rstio-^. -f r_r_°r (, t hr i a'ti 
. 
unsuccessful attempt at 
diver-s iication. 
. 
prospect, of a rival bid- L) No 
der. 
Sirne Darby had a good mana- 
gement record and is a good 
employer. 
6) Strengths and performance 
of Sims. 
7. ) Questioned. Guthrie' s objec- 
tive with regards to. the 
deployment of its cash 
from Malaysianisation. 
8) Obligation of Guthrie to 
dispose of 40of his as- 
sets progressively by 1.990 
to the Malaysians. 
9) Plantation earnings were 
cyclical. 
1C) 0-0por.. un?. ty to attain 535, p 
: v' ore ore 
.. 
1; bi r3. ý_ n- hß 
1) The bid was 
. 
not in sharehold- 
er's interest. 
2) Investment currency prci: iium 
and*CGT implications. 
3) It denigraded. Sine's manage- 
ment record (since 197'3, it 
had four chairmen, and five 
chief executives). 
4) Rubber and palm oil prices 
were showing the upward -trends, 
5) Guthrie was a' recovery sý. tua 
Lion. 
6) Commitments os Guthrie to 
Malaysianisation. 
7) The market price of Guthrie's 
sharewas standing at a pre-- 
mium to bid price. 
8) 5ime' s bid would jeopardise 
the security and welfare of 
employees. 
9) Rejection by the board hold- 
ing 7.6 of the equity. 
10). Byecepting= 
, 
s, iarelolders 
; cud; be selling ov Cnce 
- 
and for all a 
Ü. o1 C: J La l. C 
. 
and, at 
- 
rat: er 9.. han at a 
- 
!. 'ý' 
"- 
11) Orpor_ ; unity for Guthrie premium. 
sharen? olders 1.1o red Ivest its cash. ý_1) h r.: i? c? 
_clcýs had- a 
cut alternative ternaluive: accept 
12) The bid represented an exit cash offer -%-with a 50 di_s- 
P/F, 17. count (in relation to the 
opening bid price of -25p) 
13) Maintainability of dividend thus forfeiting any con- 
'was imprudent as it will re- tinuing interest in Guth- 
sult in the fall of EPS and rie 
. 
aid let S ime reaped all. 
dividend cover. the future rewards or, re- 
tain investment in a viable 
14) The revised price of 535p plantation conglomerate- 
constitute the final offer. 
12) Right of withdrawal option 
15) Sime complained to the Take- open to shareholders who 
over Panel that M&G, Hogg had accepted. 
& Anderson-Trustees were 
working in concert (implied* 13) Sime la6ked the expertise 
that they had seen the re- to manage operationsout- jection document before its side the'Far East. 
despatch). 
111) The bid bore no re-Tation 
16) Sime' s control position dur- to the intrinsic value of 
ing the bid (it managed to Gl? thrie. 
acquire 24% 'of Guthrie's 
_ equity in just a few days). 1.5) A number of important com., 
panier for which. Guthrie 
1.7) Inclusion of share option acted as agents had given 
to alleviate CGT problems no rice of their in'11 -en L to 
P ,.. i1 /7 1 ýJý . C7: 11C 
. 
ý11Q1. "e111V-ÜLý 
... 
II 
tcrl \l netc - ag c"/ sin 
ßt1., rý vt: ý"taih ýa.. i ý. 7 
for those interested in re- ti? c event o ` C aS me" take- 
taming an investment in a over. 
plantation sector (it also 
offered full underwriting 16) Guthrie' s management in 
, cash alternative if. share- Singapore had been re- 
holders did not wish to ac- shuffled to reverse losses. 
cept the share offer). 
17) Undue weight had been 
18) It questioned Guthr"ie's pro- given by Sime regarding 
fit forecast credibility in support by a small number 
view of fluctuating comodi- of shareholders. 
ty prices. 
18) The offer for preference 
19. ) Guthr_ ie' s assets revalua- " share was inadequate being 
tion was unrealistic because: below recent comparable 
- 
its value of S4,000 per o? fers. 
acre was far above the value 
of Sime's estate land which 19) It capitalised on the low 
was recently revalued ate, acceptances level. 
M 53,000 per acre. 
- 
land values vere determined 20) Issue a five year corporate 
by the Malaysian Capital Is- plan 'The Future of Gu 
. 
hrie' 
sue Investment Committee u-1 
- 
to,., convincc shareholders o1 
Lima iely and their assessment the: 'rcmpany' s vii ,? i. li ter 
. 
ti: as generally lower than ti. c; e 
of independent valuers. 21) Simes bi_dv. es c or"ýunis is 
- 
assets ý. enp worth on cor, ti:: >>- (i c 
.;. S cI '1 17i L", ir1L va'uati_on basis only on a sha e 
.. 
ý,..,.. : ý= 
): 
," 
i' 
what they can earn. 
20) `ihe cash offer 
. 
of x. 12 Sin was 
a rarity. 
main 1 eco i'y :Iý. S taue t 
1V is Often. 1 reciso]" 
moment that a takeover 
made. 
2) Entitlement for accepting 22) 
. 
shareholders-to retain the 
final dividend of Guthrie. 
22) CGT problems ; vom greatly 
exaggerated as considerable 
refs were available to 23) 
small shareholders. 
23) A Guthrie shareholder who 
acceptedthe part share and 
part cash offer-could fi- 
nance the payment of invest- 
- 
ment currency premium (Sime 
i-as regarded as an overseas 
- 
company) by using part of 
its cash proceeds thereby 
retaining. an interest in 
Sime which would include 
Guthrie. 
SUCCESS/FA LURE 
Sirre' s revaluation was done 
by the same y aluer retained 
by Guthrie and it vas unprece-- 
dented for a valuer to be 
questioned in such a manner. 
Incorporate? the basis of 
ill & G's rejections: 
there are few pig tation 
. 
companýi es 
left registered in the U. K. 
thus Guthrie hach an irreplace- 
able and scarcity value 
Guthrie had a good dividend 
record 
its 8% yield was higher than 
the only comparable company 
i. e. Harrisons and Crosfie; 
_d 
experience of Barings (Guth-- 
tie's financial advisor) in 
advising various, other-. planta- 
tion, companies in P+ alays: ia. 
. 
Sirre Darby's bid of £154m for the. Guthrie Cor- 
poration (one of the biggest transnational corporate takeovers 
in the U. K. in 1979) failed due to its low 'sighting shot' (neutralised by a strong market) as well as strong institu-: 
tional support given by M&G (11.5 % stake increased to 1.3.3%% 
during the contested bid. ). 'The. lack of support by the Ander- 
sons, the founding family also pia ed a crucial role in the defeat 
of Sirne. In the end, Sime ended up with 49% of the equity 
but has only 29.9% voting control of Guthrie Corporation. 
OTHER FEATURES 
As a result of the abortive attempt to takeover 
the Guthrie Corporation, Sime then appoin cd Rothschilds to re- 
place fleintiwrort Benson as its new merchant 11tankir-g advisor. 
In April 1980, Rothschilds then held secret talks with :, I & 
-G, 
Guthrie's biggest institutional shareholder but it rejected 
the revised offer of £9 per share. As Sine was still showing 
renewed interest, to takeover Guthrie essezriti ally the latter 
had three broad defensive options, vi:.: 
- 
seek a'white knight' 
- 
made itself less vu-Ineable 1. e. by under tc'"_1ng an acGU. l- 
sition 
-- 
diversify broadly to defeat the ic: Fj_ c cf 
first o rr_ 
. 
21 JL) 
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in : imes 
stake ý_'Oi 29.9; o' to 27.6 he S1[ie/Guihrie' ý1 eoveI 
rated much publicity both in the U. ,, -I. and in i'. ialaysia and 
both parties resorted to heavy press advertising. The bid 
cos ed ime £1n in underwriting and advertising expenses 
. 
On Dec. 15,1980, 
-Sirre Darby (which wcs itself 25% ovmed by the. 
-Malaysian Government) then transferred its 27.6; shareholding in Guthrie to PERNAS (the National 
Equity Corporation) which was the subsidiary of -she EumiputY a 
Investment Foundation. The foundation, created in 1978, was 
the main vehicle throigh which the Malaysian Government as-- 
pires to achieve its new economic policy of giving at least 
30 of the Malaysian corporate sector to the Malays by 1000. 
The final phase of the takeover of Guthrie 
by a leading ? Malaysian public corporation o, -3s characterised 
by controversy surrounding its takeover strategy which can 
be il uminated in this context. The initial strategy invol-. 
ved- Si? ne Darby making an outright- bid for Guthrie and as a 
result builded up a substantial stake. This stake was then 
- trans-erred to PERNAS. From a 27.6% platform PERNAS then 
swiftly gainai control of Guthrie through a t; ýo-prong ed 
market buying strategy. This-as done by Rothschilds acquir- 
ing a 12% stake in Guthrie from Southeast Asian. sharehold- 
ers and Rowe &. Pitman, the stockbrokers famous in the 'City'. 
for "da: vn raids" acquiring another 5%ý in London. ýW3ith 12% 
secured, the bidder then instituted a formal takeover bid 
for Guthrie at 901p. valuing the company at ä'282m ; the bid 
price constituted a rem, i. um- of 229p above the prebid price). 
On the same day, (`"f 9/81) in which. PERNAS activated its mar- 
ket operations, within a span of four hours, it managed to ac-- 
quire more than 50.1% of Guthrie's voting equity, thereby 
gaining the control of the biddee, 
The modus oierandi of the Gutbrie takeover, 
and two other recent ta.: eovers, involving law Land & Amal- 
gamated-Power, 
-in which 
the-target companies had little 
time to react, or mount their defences, had 
. 
resulted in the 
chairman of the Stock Exchange, requesting the CSI, to examine 
the implications of rapid takeover tactics as well as ex- 
pressing concern regarding institutional power(i. e,. the will- ingness of fund managers - 11o sell out for short term gains at 
a moment's notice). 
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_. -. _ Sale of.. assets_k-bez. oLe/af--Ler-the-bid). 
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P. lacin 
UZdertake_ar 
-ac. quisi-tion_(öeiore/ai er. )-- `Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive. strategies listed in 
the research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGt3MEN^1S DEFENSIVE/STR Ä TEEIES/ARGUi; 
. 
NTS 
1) It portrayed-a good image 
as an employer. 
2) To allay fears of Arab 
encroachment 'SMI re- 
assured shareholders that 
its porfolio investment 
in the U. K. Inas run by a 
mixture of Kuwaiti and 
British managers. 
-t. 
3) The offer provided share-- 
holdersý'; ý'`the chance of 
realising their invest- 
ment 'now without further 
risk or delay. 
. 
Highlighted the fact that 
it was beyond the financial 
capacity of PHtiI to develop 
the Tooley Street Estate 
(TSE). 
5) Commitment of the Kuwaiti 
Investment Office (the 
parent company of Sail) to 
develop TSB; from its own 
financial resources. 
6) The bid was in the best in- 
terests of the Southwark 
Community as well as the share- 
holders and employees of P1-fir!. 
1) : Tl: e; bid did: not reelect 
the underlying assets valve 
of P tr]. . 
2) failed to reflect the 
development-, prospects-o± 
the huge TSE project. 
3) Pointed out lt-, o shareholders 
that the board found it 
"impossible to recommend the merger due to the in- 
adequacy of the bid price. 
4) PHW's interim Tigures show- 
cd a- 32% increase over 
a comparable period in 
the previous year. 
5) I. scii it assurances on the 
future of the company's 
employees. 
6) Highlight¬d the fact that 
PHW failed to discuss 
future plans for the 
company although appli- 
cation for this matter 
had been made by the 
board of Pte:: trough i is finai-icial advisers (,, Ior- 
gan Grenf cl]. ) 
. 
7) C! tied the fact that he nct. l. Cnal 
value assigned by PH'. ] on its 
trading subsidiaa`, c _ irrele- 
vant because Klo ( he -J"uv. ai 
, 
i_ 
Investment Cif f ce) }dad no desire 
The `= y_v se d o_' 'er coincid- 
: 'i±h the ? tý- 
at: i c_. ~o.? i-i 
.re 
of Q_': ý ý" ý'ý U" L-- o 
. 
i-- 
ýiý >z 
u 
of bre=i'K tip i- 
ili: SSt.:;. 
8) The bid fully reflected 
Ui e value of trading ac- 
tivities as well as PR's 
investment and develop- 
ment properties. 
g) Pointed out to sharehol- 
ders that the bid repre- 
sented an increase of 547 
over PHI I's market capita- 
lisation as well as a 
P/E of 12.8 times full 
tax charges. 
10. ) Cited- the fact that the 
£13m deferred tax lia- 
bility of PH11 would eli- 
minate any increase in 
book value reflected in 
the balance sheet. 
lam) 
. 
No redundancies. 
12) Reassured shareholders 
that it was the. intention. 
of the bidder to retain 
the existing board of PHW 
as executives or consul- 
tants of the company. 
13) Its strong pre-bid plat- 
form of 32.7 . 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
KIO' s ability to acquire another 17.5 in 
the matket to supplement its 32.7% pre-bid stake effective- 
ly influenced the outcome of the contested bid. It should 
be noted that the revised price of 250p had the immediate 
impact of inducing institutional °sellou is even before the 
dispatch of the formal bid circular. These pre-emptive 
tactical manoeuvres by KIO-effectively denied PHW the oppor- 
tunity of negotiating with a counter bidder (";; hits knight") 
OTHER FEATURES 
The KIO`s 32 ý contro7lin position in the bidc? eo 
is a consequence of its successful act u 
_sition of 
S 
-(.. ; NIar-- 
tin`'s, Corporation in l971r but., orwin tö the controvc r SiCS 
surrounding the bid, the Takeover Panel imposed certain i -i', i"- 
ta ions on the ne'v'i o4'ýner. With the res tr_c ti ons ;, o. 7. twee ! 
1960, KIO then fully exnloi: ced. its strong cotýt7'ýall_ýI: po: 3 l1o. ' by making a full bid for PH: ýi through a. , holly owned ne corn 
w any, *% t. Iar t_Ii `v 1ildus trials. i ý? ls. 
-- 
i JL: 
- 
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erty re Tauau; ön__ Y 
_.. 
_ 
__ ., _... ... _I Sale of asse is---(before/after... the bid) 
Dividend. increase--_--- 
_ Bonus/scrip. 
-issue/-share.... split.. Profits__for. ecas-. 
_ 
---------. ----- Legal... 
Appeal.. to-sha_reholders' 
Ündertake__an. acquisi_uion 
_(_beiore/a f ter jAcquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STnA'1'EGIES/ARGUý ENTS I INTS DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES)/ 
Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) 
i) The merger had the recom- 
mendation of the board of 
the RBS. 
2) Linkage with SOB, 
-offices i_x"º 
60 countries) 
yioald provide more oppor-- 
tunities for expansion 
and-access to international 
capital markets. 
3) Stressed the good per- 
formance of SCB (as illus- 
trated by increase in its 
interim profits and. total 
dividends). 
Management of RBS would be 
decentralised 
5) RBS would operate as a sepa-- 
rate entity. 
6) The merger would create a 
powerful. force in British 
barking. 
7) Invitation to the RBS board 
to join the board of SCB. 
i eS t it Michael r"_ er. - 
.. 
he 
chairr,: L n of R, 
--, 
S) would beco :, e 
, 
he senior deputy chairman 
of , he enlarged group. 
The SCB's takeover bid had the 
recommendation of the board of 
directors of RBS but not that 
of the IT.. '-'. SB, the latter dhich 
after an abortive merger nego- 
tiation with the board of RBS 
decidcd to appeal straight to 
the shareholders. As KBS ' Pit ti 
cipated a possii le, r2f error l to 
the M. M. C., its de-fences revolved 
around the benefits arising 
from a merger with SCB. Undoubt-- 
cdly, its financial advisers, J. 
Henry Schroder Wagg was conserving 
the major defences for the second 
round of battle should the M. M. C. 
gave its official approval for 
the takeover when it arrived at 
a verdict at the end of 1981. 
ý, 
7 ,ý.. 
Ti' o rev" Oed 
that of its 
1. o. HKSB 
I innsC)VC! flC"_1t 
share ). 
Uf er Ina tc: '1cri 
11v a1 bidd. e'. ^  
inclusive o-F the 
of the r, ref cr <ence 
9) The disposal of 39.3iß in Lloyd's 
and Scottish to Lloyds Bang 
had the approval of RBS. 
10) It was a fair and reasonable 
Of-'Lei. 
Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank (r-, -. SB ) 
1) Raised funds before the acqui- 
sition'through a rights issue (£170m). 
2) Advantages for RBS to merge 
with HKSB which is the world's 
largest bank by market capita- 
lisation, £2.2 billion (800 
offices' in 45* countries) 
. 
3) Envisaged i, ha: t RBS would be. 
- 
come the "flagship" or HUSH 
in Europe. 
4) Its offer xceeded the SOB' s 
offer by 56%. 
5) Referred to the proposed take- 
over of RBS as a ", oartner- 
ship" 
. 
6) Assurances given to the 
Bank of England that RBS 
viovld conform and comply with 
Bri ish* banking regulations 
despite the merger. 
7) RBS would be allowed to re-- 
tain its identity and 
Scottish-based independence. 
8) invitation to RBS board to 
join HKSB's. board. 
9) Stressed on its good per- 
formance and track record 
over the past Live years. 
Between 1975 and 1980 the 
total bäzr 
.: assets had in- 
creased by 38%, earnings per 
share by. 34! %, and dividends 
. 
per share by 20'. 
-sr -- 
10 f. 
t. _? -. -: ces on m-r-i a ll, ' ? ;1 en 
and n... -, c s rodun- 
dancieSj. 
11) it attempted to assert its 
Britishness that despite 
the fact that although it 
was an international bank 
incorporated in Hong Kong 
(which ms aitside the juris- 
diction of the Bank of Eng- 
land) nevertheless, it was a 
"British bank under British 
control". 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
MKSB's rival bid and higher offer for the 
RBS galvanised by the SCB's proposed merger implied that 
the biddee would eventually receive a better value because 
of the intensity of rivalry existing between both the 
bidders. Hoy-river; before the contested bid escalated into 
a major takeover battle the Office of Fair Trading, at the 
request of the Bank of England intervened. to have the take. 
- 
over referred to the T7. M. C., partly due to the complexity 
of the whole affair and also long term implications regard- 
the independence of other U. K. cleaners in general should 
-ehe bid be allbwed to proceed. 
OTHER FEATURES 
The distinct features and implications invol-- 
_. 
_ved in the proposed takeover in the RBS might be summarised 
as: 
a) Although both bidders were British owned multinational 
overseas batiks and due to its colonial history, external 
registration and essentially non-U. K. operations both, are 
considered in this country as non-British b. -iii. 
b) The American banks-had express6d interest in acquiring 
leading British banks and if the Bank of England and the 
M. M. C. approva4the takeo: ter, then the barrier Erdas removed 
for the future acquisitions o British clearing banks by 
foreign banks. 
c) Lloyd's Bank had in fact in 1979 held secret talks with 
RBS and therefore constituted a possible third contender 
for RBS itself. 
d) rar. John Clay, the De-cuty Chairman o. 
. 
Hambros : gras als-) 
-a di ec ior of the Bank of -Eng-land and urrder this circum- 
stance there ;. as a potential conflict of roteres ts_. as 
hl mbros `las a joint advisor. (to title with Antoriy G: i"ti s) 
". '_n 
",. 
n__ in the i+_? tj? The Batik- Oý England when 
"i aced -n 
- 
jC3ý 
_ 
enigma to come to a balanced decis on, e er- ä 
pressure on to dissuade .lc! en i: to VYi. i! (, -zIv; 
but to no avail. 
e) The biddee, the RBS was the ? ages Scottish clearing bank domiciled in Edinburgh and as such the bid tranigres- 
sed on Scottish economic nationalism. 
f) Pressures v*xe acer-ied bj wilde szctiaal n t. erests ranging from 
Scottish members of Parliament to Trade Union Congress 
and even the Church of Scotland for aM JA 
.C. 's reference because of the foreign image. oä both bidders. 
g) The SCB had to placate Lloyd's Bank because. the latter 
was the largest shareholder (- 6.3 ý) in the RBS and thus it 
sanctioned the disposal of the ; BS's shareholding in 
Lloyds 
. 
and -Scöttish (which was jointly owned by the RBS 
and Lloyds- Bank) to Lloyds Bank in order to receive 
its support for the SCB merger t'iith'. the RBS. 
The Bank of England circumvented the afore- 
mentioned dilemmas by having the Office for Fair Trading* 
recommending to the Trade Secretary to have both bids re- 
ferred to the M. M. C. on the 115/81 based on asset criteria. 
The deliberation by the M. M. C. would normally take 'six 
months and therefore a verdict should be expected by the 
end of 1981. ?, Zeanti:; ýile, both bids had automatically lapsed 
,: because of the referral. 
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AT. 
Si; oclL r?, et Share Total Shzrehol -- ' 
IC0 
$ank Capitalisat? on pi? ce Assets dens Lund rasp 
t ;L +ýL"' 
(US; ý bilý) (US, `. ýil ý(US`>bi1.. 
w llj L 'L_ 
IKSB 
.-1 4.8 HK 
15 46.5 2.46 23 9.3 15 
Standard 1.35 86p 36.8 1.05 446.2 5.7 Chartered 
. 
RBS 0.56 126p 11.8 0.93 192;, 3 5.7s 
Market capitalisation of 4 leading UK clearing banks 
Barclays -- 
. 
US$2.46 bid.. 
Lloyds 1.47 bil. 
Midland 1.11 bil. 
Nat. gest. 1.86 bil. 
- 
Source: 'Far-Eastern Economic }ev? ew' (22/1/82) p62. 
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 Property revaluation 
Sale of assets (be-Core/ai tcL the bid) 
Capital reconstruction. 
Dividend increase 
Bonus/. scrip. 
__i ss? _e/shaxe split. .. Profits 
_ 
forecast 
Legal-action- 
_ lAppeal to shareholders' loyalty-.. 
Urder`aI_=e 
tz . cGt,, 
is-ticn-. (before/a±te'r): 
jAcquire bi. dde 's equity 
- 
-- - 
(Deäensive strategies listed in the 
research questionnaire) 
BIDDING S TR. ATEGIES/ARGUMENTS 
Starwest 
1) The offer fully reflected 
the biddee `s 
-values and 
trading record of the past 
five years. 
1) The bid undervalued assets 
2) The company into Ld. ed . to 
shift its business policy 
to that of industrial 
property investment from 
housin due to severe 
trading conditions encounter- 
ed in the pr? Vate housing 
sec tor. 
2) It had to see, more details be-- 
fore j? iStifying an improve- 
ment in its terms of offer. 
3) As a result of a strong 
. 
shareholding (29.5%)in 
the (Dilipary, Starwest solicit- 
ed for bcardroom repre- 
sentation. 
Allied London Properties 
1) Cited irrevocable under- 
takings to accept the 
offer from the directors. 
and families of Gough 
Cooper representing 21.8ö 
of the company's Equities. 
2) The offer price of 18.4%. 
higher than the marl, et value 
of 122.5p of Gough Cooy, er {the last dealing day before 
the suspension of the company s 
shares). 
1 the activities of both cor- 
pani es v: eie complementary. 
" rissurctY? ý'i:: ý± i ega ding mana e- 
mont of she h?. ddoo (the ch Jr- 
m an of Gooch Coopcr v; culd be 
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES ARGUirIENTS 
company desp to a purchase 
of a 29.5% stake in Gough 
Cooper. 
} It sought a defensive merger ("white knight") with 
. Allied London Properties 
in preference of Starwest! 
the brlginal bidder. 
3) Highiighrsd the fact that 
ivir.. Remo Dipr. e, the chair- 
man of Starwest con ra- 
dicts his assurances of 
not making an offer for she 
ý, 
- 
301ro. 
,od Lo join th, he ad 
o Allied London Fl-o2 o_- `. ies) 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
Gough Cooper and its merchant banking advi-- 
sers had great difficulty in putting up an effective defen- 
ce due to the poor trading performance experienced by Gough 
Cooper (the company had a loss of £65,000 and forecast a 
further loss of £350,000 for the calendar year). Other 
determinants which contributed to the loss of independence 
of Gough Cooper were the historically loa stock market 
rating of the company's shares as compared with the net 
asset backing, its contemporary adverse trading conditions 
and little prospects for the shares to attain 145p in the 
near future. 
OTHER FEATURES 
Starwest announced that it intends to with- 
draw Gough Cooper as a listed company if it succeed:, th its , 
- 
takeover. However, its anbitii was thwarted by Gough Cooper 
making a defensive merger with Allied London"Pr"operti-es. 
As a result of its }inabili cy,. to acquire 
rGough 
Cooper, Sta- 
- 
ýYes I:, tiiezi d výJos Jis ßt: ä1 hol 
_LA1ý, o %. o gh 
Coope to Its 
rival bidder, Allied London 
. 
Properties and made a -profit 
of £i. 2m. 
. 
1-' 
_"ýý5 _ 
lR111 /HA : 'J, '1ý 1? iý t; ; '. 7 "i :" 
.SIß 1- 
Properýy_... reý, a ration 
1_c bi. d) 
_Di-vidend--inc -case__--. -----. Bcnus/scriF_. issue/shar- e 
-split. _______ ... Profits, nrP('ýý 
_-- ------- 
--- 
App. el__ shareholders'__1oyalty.. 
_. _ _ 
Uýýýler ?e an acquis(before/2f per) 
_J. Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive'strategies listed 
in the research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/APGUIh. ZENTS DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES/ARGU14EN 'S 
1) Acquired a strong control- 1) Exploited the fact that Star- 
ling stake (35.3% of the west made no attempt to 
biddee) through a market discuss the merger with the 
raid. company. 
2) Spelt out its corporate 
. 
2) Cited the fact of the failure 
intentions towards Hawthorn of Starwest in afro 
. 
recent 
Leslie takeovers O'ridant Group 
. Printers in 1978 and Gough 
3) Capitalised on the disposal Cooper in 1980). 
by some non-exedutiv e direc-- 
tors of their Hawthorn Leslie 3) Starwest was an opportunistic 
shareholdings during the bid bidder because Hawthorn Lesl_i c 
as a sign of poor faith in has just completed a success- 
their own company. fbl investment. 
! r) No redundancies. 4) Stressed on the lack of indus-- 
trial logic for the merger 
5) Criticised the poor interim 
. 
(the only area of overlap 
results of the biddee. was in electrical components 
operation). 
6) The omission of profit fore- 
cast by the biddee in its 5) The terms of consideration 
defence circular. constituted no premium on 
the market value of the 
7) Assurances on continuation company's shares (since 
of Hawthorn Leslie's busi-" August 1980 the shares of 
ness. Gough Cooper had been trad- 
ing between a range of 1001 
8) 
. 
It r--, sa fair and reasonable and 1370). 
offer. 6) The preference offer was i -, ),,,., er 
9) 'The offer repr. esented a pre- than recent comparable offer 
mium of over. 64% on the not for prft er ence equity. 
assets of the biddee. 7) i -ed. lack. 0ý, 
-O) Choi 
,e 
of t e-in`: estmeent 
for th e c, 7-i ? a_n ' `_' e: 
.-,. 
op ion or accepting 
sha_e-h,.,. ers. 
Implica`ýtions for biddee ' s could a? 7Ecl the ill i 111 e 
share price if the offer ro C 
. 
1-L of Hawthorn T, es 
lapsecI. iic`s business. 
9) During the bid, to directors 
of the company increased their 
holdings in Hawthorn Leslie 
through market acquisition 
thereby strengthening the 
board's control of the com- 
pany (this strategy was also 
designed to drive up the 
market price of the target 
company in order to inhibit 
the bidder from purchasing 
more shares in the market). 
10) Highlighted the fact that the 
bid price -v Jess than the 
market price six weeks before 
the offer. 
I SUCCESS/FAIIIURE 
4 
As a result of a "put--through" (35.3/, stake 
acquired from G. T. Management & Gartmor- e Investment Manage- 
ment Groups) in accordance with the Te keoY el Code, Star lest 
had to eff ec l+ a formal. cash bid cr the r`.:: ': ai ^ring equ iy of anv 
Hawthorn Leslie's at the same price of` ? Sop. During he oiý_d", 
Starwest managed to increase its controlling posi ii cn of 
the biddee to 45; x. On the other hand, Hawthorn Leslie ha_ndi- 
capped by the strong headstart of the bidder appealed ib 
Starwest. to either increase or withdraw from the takeover 
bid. To acc ;: -nodate the biddee's wishes and to receive its 
recommendation for the takeover, Starwest then revised its 
takeover terms to 147p cash for the ordinary equity and 55p for each preference share (against the original terms of 
130p and LI5p respectively). 
ýTJER FEATURES 
The "put--thr6u gh"1, as conducted through the 
stockbroking firm of Walter WWýlalker, whose two associate directors Bat on the board of Hawthorn Leslie (one of them 
subsequently resigned during the bid) 
. 
he t; oard, lho had a holding of b% in the company before the takeover from Star- 
Wes t, increased i is shareholding in the company to 9`% during the bid by purchasing in the market and managed to : -: in the 
Support of Iy & G, its bý_ý_gges t insti tutional,;: 
_, 
sk, areholder in its initial rejection of the bid. ``'' 
- 
7; 7 
.. 
ýl'r i/'tUi'i 
x-oTpe-r. t r, e\'JiuTtlO l 
. 
T-. L i .. i iV bi d) 
Capital 
-reconstruction-_- 
. Bonus/scrip issue/share split.. 
- [Profits_ fore cast-_ ý Legal_ action_-_... (Appeal to__-shareholders'. loyalty--. 
_ -. 
' 
, 
ý'Undertake_anacquiBitionore/after) 
! Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies 'listed in 
the. research questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGITMENTS DEFENSIVE STR GTEGIES//RGUT, »TTS 
TDG 
1) It received support from Mr 
Maxwell Joseph (ex-chair- 
man of Giltspur) who had 
committed his 23% share- 
holding in Giltspur to 
TDG in the absence of a 
ma aerially. higher- bid. 
1) Contrasted profits record of 
both companies. 
'2) Highlighted the fact-that 
Giftspur. v, as in a strong 
financial position with 
over £5.5m in deposit. 
GJ1u empha: i 1s d tiil the commer- 
cial logic of the merger (two activities i. e. trans- 
port and exhibition are com- 
plementary). 
3) Cited the management philo- 
sophy of TDG in giving a 
considerable degree of in, 
dependence to operating 
companies. 
4) Highlighted the proven re- 
cord of TD (Transtort 
Development. Group). 
UNIGATE 
1) Cited the synergy to be de-- 
rived from the merger. 
2) Gilts-Dur ß; 1i ll continue to 
trade as a separate unit. 
3) No, redundancies. 
4) Commitmen_t to the growhh: 
and expansion of the bj-ddee. 
jj The id undervalued assets. 
ýF) roin ed to shareholder that 
the offer was not under- 
written (therefore, it had 
no guaranteed minimum cash 
value). 
5) lt cited the 'act that 33 
of Giltspur' s offer ititz in 
unconvertable loan stock. (therefore, it did not 
_provide shareholders 
with 
the right to participate 
in any increase in profits 
or assets of the company). 
Highlighted the fact that the 
borrowings of the company 
had been reduced from £? 3. jam 
to £3.6m. 
The bid failed to reflect the 
past. t Xecord of Giltspur. 
The substantial cash --Elow 
resources of Gilts-mir ';; Oi ld 
enable rr, anageiýent to 't eke 
advantages of new op; po? im l- 
-hý. Jý1 
The 13.5p cash offer vas a .. ies as they o: -csc. 
ubsc1 "iýizt"al ir; p(`ovýl. i_ mim, ýz ý e1 ý 
over the 11ip offer price 9) Provided an up TO dale revi. e 
of TDG. of the current perfor:. 
_, _. 
ce 
and activities of the coin-- 
6) It entitled shareholders piny in order to reinforce 
to retain the interim di- shareholders' commitment to 
vidends of the company the company. 
vis-a-vis nil interim for 
the TDG' s offer. 10) Pointed out to shareholders 
that TDG competed wwrith Gilt- 
7) Cited the fact that it spur in stand-äi tting busi- 
had received the approval ness, hence the bid posed a 
for the merger from the threat to the company°s suc- 
board of Giltspur (hold- cessful exhibition operation. 
ing "? 1r% of the equity). 
as well as that of its 11) The bid would reduce share- 
largest single shareholder holders' participation in 
i. e. Mr Maxwell Joseph the growth of the company. 
who had an egüi ty stake 
of 23jß * in_ Gii tspur. 12) The appointment of a new manna-- 
gemen t team in 1977 had resuit- 
ed in rationalisati on, cor. soli-- 
dation and recovery for the 
company. " 
13) Held merger negotiations 
with other counter bidders 
including Tnchcape, Hanson_ 
i Is 
-- 
Trust and 
. 
lt!:: EItLl_V! JAI 111Uc: l. 
to 'i nd. a "white knight" 
. 
ýJCCESS/FAILURE 
Despite an excellent interim performance, Giltspur's defence had been considerably undermined in-view 
Of the intended disposal by its o-; m non-executive director, 
irir Maxwell Joseph of his strategically large shareholding (235', ). As Giltspur deemed TDG as an unsuitable bidder, it 
finally merged with UNIGATE which received both the approval 
of the board and its largest single shareholder. 
OTHER r A. TURES 
TDG managed to negotiate quietly with DAr IMax: w; e1i Joseph over a period of four. months, without the kno wrledge of 
the rest of the Gi. ltspur_ 's board regarding the commitment of his large single block of shares to the coat ny ( DG) 
. 
ý. ; ib 
ý 
r. 
Troi'ýi: 'ýS . ': ý`. RD ý, `ý'7/ `i'i ,; yý? L tiolýDIi, GS LTD. 
Property rr-. a1uai-ion---- 
Sale-of assets 
. 
(before/aster the bid)_ 
Capital reconstruct oor_. 
-__ --__-... -_. - 
. 
Dividend 
-rofi tsfore-ca=- 
-Legal_act.? App-zal_ to_sharrholders_'_ 
` 
lard, gt 
. 
I? ý? dextane a. nýc ý_ý, ý. sý, ti, 9rý_jýýTorelazter)' 
Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in 
the research' questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES/ARGUIiENTS 
Stressed on long relation- 
ship with THL since 1929. 
2) Pre-bid stake, of 25.8% (this shareholding had 
29.9% voting rights of 
THL). 
- 
3) Emphasised the industrial 
logic of the m_er`er (con-- 
binati on of cement activi- 
ties of the two companies 
veld result in signifi-" 
cant additional : profits 
which neither companycculd 
achieve on its ovrn). 
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES/ARGUNIE,; TS 
1) The merger between T, '1'V^Y and 
Tunnel lacked commercial 
logic and would lead to a 
lower growth rate gor. TH-L 
alone. 
2) The bid was misconceived an 
failed to reflect existing 
. 
or potential value of TIL. 
j) ýiighlighccd the fact that 
following a three year perl-- 
od of reorganisation and 
consolidation, the company 
has doubled its profits in 
the last two financial years. 
4) Gastod doubt, on Funnel' s 
diversification efforts (for example, the 1978 
acquisition of the Chemi- 
cal. company, Alcolac Inc. ) 
which had made losses 
and constituted a waste of 
management activities. 
5) Orientate shareholders' 
attention to the good 
track record of the corn- 
pany (between 1976 and 1980, 
it en joyad a 94% increase in 
profits before tax, 6(': ),,,, 
in dividends and redu- 
ces borrowings by 84 ö) 
. 
Reinforced shareholders' 
-Path in ý. iýi, J fly asserting 
that it 
": rJ-ll continue to 
de-, e cp he cEi-ieii bu. 's1- 
f. ess of the enlarged FrouT 
. 
4) Tunnel had broaden its pro_. 
duct base and invested over- 
seas to reduce its deDen-- 
dence on the U. K. construe-- 
-t? on centre. 
-5) Cited the fact that T T'i' s 
non-construction operations 
had fallen by 33% 
6) Indicated. to shareholders 
that Tunnel 's management 
philosophy of concentrating 
on efficiency rather than 
size had been proved correct 
by resi; 
, 
ts. 
- 
I) Co r<'_35(J ma[nagemnent st 
o_ bo i. n p. arti es I\ ti! t cen ýr^c' - i 
: leads : sus dic ü"ýC a. ýý1. 
s Lyle oi- ar, 1 c -n- 
"cr«. 7_dýý»ni. ý 
r, } 
7) iio intent 
_on . of di sp osi n` 
8) A scerleri that the company 
or cl o si any bLusi. 
- 
had a strong financial. -, 
messes of Tunnel. 
Cited the fact. that in o 
g) Contrasted performance of to free itself of T! 1J' s 
both companies-. trictive presence, THL i 
had. previously contempla 
9) Made a. case for the mer- making a takeover for 
ger by focussing on the itself 
. 
underlying rationale 
which is cement (this 00) Orientated shareholders' 
product contributed to ti on to the fact that Vý`a 
86% of Till's profits and proposed expansion into 
70% of TI, W' s profits). South East, would imply in 
an entry into an area Wi 
0) The offer represented an excessive cement cauaci t 
increase in capital value and had the further effe (28%) and income value of making it the most fi. (125%) 
. 
competitive market in Er. 
11) The bid price of 417pwas 1-1) The plan to deliver 250, 
or clo sig any buss. 
- 
had a strong financial na. se. 
rder 
", ' re- 
n fact 
ted 
t'lard 
atten- 
Lion , -ard' s 
the 
?, making 
with. 
p ty 
cts 
ercely 
. ngland. 
1.13; 
'1, p was 
doubled the net asset 
value per share (3013180 
balance sheet). 
The bid represented and 
exit P/E multiple of 
15 times on the basis of 
full tax at 52%. 
t 
If the bid lapsed, s-hc. r e- 
-holders can expect a mall 
in the value of their in- 
--vestments. 
Ii4) 
I15) 
She revised terms of offer (446p per Tunnel ordinary 
share) represent a gain 
of 1t1p per share over the 
market price of 325p (prior to the announcemnt 
of the formal bid). 
Entitlement to receive 
ard' s interim dividends 
for accepting shareholders. 
16) Highlighted the fact that 
TMW already c:, r d 41% of 
Tunnel `s votes and there 
was no other counter bidder 
for THL. 
1 7) Iildici:: ted to shareholders 
l; nat tL iý ýCý1rý fle'feat RT1: ' S 
attempt -o _Y i7ýZ ate e 
rr! erg-car by acccp Ling 
Of er. 
ii)  
, 
000 
onr, es into the South East 
market would meal a vastly 
increased dis tri. ruzion cost 
and no price competition. 
12) Discredit T 
-T `s marketing plan! (" selling on the ril, argi n" pro-- 
pos: i. ion,; that old inefficient ll- 
p ý, n; ý ti'ýc:? d be u ýil. ised to 
sere ce a distant market ap 
to assume that customers could be 
shuffled around to suit i-ndivi-- 
d. ual maker. 
13) TEL hacl completed the ra. tiona-li-- 
sation of its own cement opera- 
-ti-on and h; -, the flexibility 
to exploit favourable economic 
conditions 'as they arose. 
1_L) Reasserted that the company's 
diversificaticns were well 
founded and the benefits were 
beginning to emerge. 
15) Pointed out to shareholders 
that in the event of a change 
of control, namely the acqui- 
sition of 5O7 or more of ` i- L, 
various pre-eii1T)tion and other 
rights detrimental to the 
eri. s ting:.. busines s of Ti-ft would 
conic into effect, for ns týn-ice, -,... pi 7o rnst,:! . cc, 
1e:. S of (ULifIt l rig 
-ý 
.h! 
T) and J(ý. 1.. ý". 
- 
ý. 
_""c 
ail o!:; 1 
Y11 
18) Provided a loan note 1b) The takeover 
, 
would affect 
out ion for shareholders the motivation of "-r-IL' s 
wishing to mitigate CGT management and employees. 
liability. 
17) Capitalised on the absence- 
19) Reassured shareholders of profits forecast by the 
that the company's bidder. 
. 
balance sheet and cash 
flow ww: ou'd support the 18) Contrasted historic perfor- 
borrowings which will mance of both companies. 
arise both from the im- 
plementation of the take- 19) Cited the fact that the 
over for THL and capital market price of THL had 
expenditure at Ketton and been re: --rated due to im- 
Ribblestadle and elsewhere. proved interim results 
and intrinsic value of 
20) Cement customers in London the company. 
and the South East will 
welcome a stronger third 20) Ward's share value'was illu- 
supplier. sory (currently supported 
by the value of its-invest- 
21) Criticised the unquar_ti 
- 
: ment in THL and was at1' inse-- 
fied profits forecast of cure investment). 
THL. 
21) The timing of T1rI s take-- 
: 22) Pored out to shareholders over \". as opportunistic 
that Stablex, TH_T's subsi- coinciding with the speed 
diary 
-gas a loss making busi- of growth and recovery of. 
ness. THL. 
2 3) If War ýa 
. 
plcd.., lurlinGl, s 
shares would fail. 
24) The share and cash-elec- 
tion- ivc-Lld not be availa- 
ble after 8/6/81 (closing 
date) and the offers vrou? d 
not be increased (this 
tactic was designed to pres- 
surise doubtful. sharehol- 
ders to accept). 
25) The bid was generous. 
26) The bid provided accept- 
ing shag eholder: with a 
wider choice of conside- 
ration. 
21) Ward had greater roten-- 
t? al for recovery. 
22) Highlighted 
, 
he potential 
- 
problems arising from 
forced merger of two dif- 
fering management, entities. 
23) The merger was not based on 
cement as THL had restruc- 
tured its business and over- 
seas investment. 
24) Over the past three years 
Tunnel's share -price had 
often outperformed the 
building material sector. 
25) The cash value of T1,1W's 
offer represerited"a multi- 
ple of only 10.3 times 
attributable earnings. 
26) Indicated to shareholders 
that TM might have to sei]. 
substantial assets or re- 
sort t; 
"a rights issue to 
finance; is acquisition. 
27) I-Ie acciI; isi. t`1CiI i J', co 
.c 
an, LC L'ýiDI f LI_i. cd '1__s S 
0 
ýf, ý 
specialty chemical field. 
28) Tncorpora ved favourable press 
comments wer independe : ce. 
29) Citei the independent support 
given by RTZ which acquired. 
3-75 of THL's capital during 
the bid. 
30) Shareholders should retain 
their investment in IL as 
there is short, medium and 
long term growth to be do-rived 
prom cement specialty chemicals, 
Stablex and metal. 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
Ward's failure to acquire THL might be at tr i 1>u fade 
to the following factors: 
a) Entry of RTZ during the bid in buying 3.7% voting control 
of Tunnel itself. This tactical ploy hay, the effect of 
casting doubts on the biddee sh? reholders' minds of an 
alternative bidder to TtQZy 
. 
F`urthermore 
, 
RTZ' s procurements 
of THIS' s equity, at a higher price he4 the additional 
effect of 
. 
accelerating the market price of the biddee and. 
hence preventing Tt°W from further purchases in the markei. 
b) Strong case for independence by the board of Tom. 
c) Lack of media's endorsement for TWTiI' s takeover attempt. 
d) Presence of Sir Charles Ball, ex-chairman of Barclafs 
Merchant Bank ("The great, defender") on Tunnel ýs bard 
TLN4 ended Lip with 41.8% of TH L. 
OT}}IER FEATURES 
S. G. Warburg,, T , RI's merchant banking. advisor 
assisted its client in its takeover of orts by procuring 
1-751, n "B" shares of Tunnel (Warburg received the Takeover 
panel's approval to acquire the seshares independently on 
the grounds that it would then either accept the cash offer 
or sell the shares back to its client at he price which they 
had been acquired. In addition, ; 'larburgs also charged.. the 
full interest rates for the I:, cne deployed i'tj, such ac yui si"- 
1021 rna io uv eS) After the abortive tempt' Ward ? ncre=sot 
1vn "' ". F. c= s 1 by 1r2 
. 
25 ýhroL, vh rcarr: e i ý: . r. cI s 1I old in cý, 5-n NH L 
er 
fa ti 
J oder }: e ýý }ýccvcr Code, i. 
, 
-as en tß UU_oct `c I t'-; C r". _:. ( in, '` 
r 
during the year after its offer la-, -,,:.: cd) _. - 
an. Tf asc. ", i is eni. j. l. ty st, iIcc in )NTH J'ý"'C'.! il ? 17 -H iR 
. 
i' i 
. 
^. 
"O C3? ' (-; a "t al. From these act-ons t. }a'. I I_J'` rýf 
.... 
':.. 
it lt l, r: ; '!: nVE: i c1 vlt? ii 
ti 
.. ý . 
rf 
"DI 
Nn.. 'c, +. 1 T, r. r. r ý. Ii ri nT 7. nr Oll ýý ýIlOl O ý_: ý:: s, rE F, ItýG 
_ý 
ýPrcrert;, 
"- -. "eýTaiuation`----.. 
_-_---------- 
--- --ý 
_ Sale 'of assets (before/a±'ter the bid) 
---- - -- - ------ - Capital recors 'ruction 
Tf Lon1 /- xip aau_e- hare split 
-_ -l Pzoii sf czp rat_ 
-------ý __ )49g 
-_ac -ti on- =---- __ 
-__-. 
Appý'a7 tD haLreholders-'_ loyal tY 
Pacing 
---- tind_ertalýe_aý_ýýcquisitiön_(_bei-orE/af ter)_. 
! Acquire bidder's equity 
(Defensive strategies listed in 
the research questionnaire) 
BIDDING S'T'RATEGIES/ARGWENTS. DEQNSIVE STRATEGIES/ARGUI. iENTS 
Cited 
. 
the fact that Maples 
refused to entertain serious 
major negotiation. 
2) S tressed the commercial advan- 
tages arising from the merger (especially in merchandising 
and warehousing). 
The e#'ý: e3, prC1JlN(j a minimum. 3. 
value of 30p v is-a--vis a net 
asset value of i4.4p as re-- 
°flected in the biddee's 1979 
accounts. 
14') Capitalised on the incrirnin- 
nating s ta. tement made by 
Maples regarding its asset 
value; the directors consi- 
der that the present market 
value of these properties 
are' in excess of book values 
by an amount which is not 
significant in relation to 
the total asset of the 'group" (1979 accounts). 
1. ) Shareholders should take 
into account the meine re- 
tail- name of Iviaplos and its 
long standing tradition. 
2) Maples wculd benefit 
W& G's closure of its. 
. 
Regent Street. store 
. 
f;; 
_ 
.: e 1: 1e fact -h . ate -. a . C. 4 
resul t of she Closure of 
W& G's Regent Street store 
the bidder's staff might be 
given employment at the 
expense of Maples ' employees. 
k) The bidwas too loa and placed 
an unacceptable value on 
the company's'equity, 
5) Highlighted the fact that 
recent furniture store* 
acquisitions had been 
of e-cted at a P/H of around 
12 to 18 times. 
6) Pointed out to shareholders 5) The offer for preference that the bidder failed to 
equity was 70% hiher than its provide assurances on sm- C-- 
recent market price. ploy, ent. 
6) The revised off er t,, as 75 above 7) 
the market price before tabs 
commenced. 
7) Porn ecý Out to shareholders 
that i aples acu, 
_d no 
t; : enei'? 
-Lroim 
Lhe c10 ur e of IV! &Gts 
Maples' earnings per share 
had risen by 48c". 
Underi 
. 
red the fact 
the benefits =rom i;, ex 
, ý-__ 
CL; 
should 
. 
a. ccr"i: e .. o Lý: e :: rc- 
-3 
1/4 
Regent St: t. -eet store as hho1ders Of Tilaples. 
she campany., cvýa con:; i- 
nue to trade in Central 9) l v] G's preference offer did 
London. not reflect voting rights. 
ß) No information on current 10) Inforr.:. d shareholders that the 
trading and prospects inclusion of fixtures and fit- 
given by Maples. tings. in the balance sheet (excluded due to open market 
9) HighlightE1 the fact that valuation ) would reflect a 
I1aples property revalua- 
" 
surplus of over the com- 
tion 
- 
omitted major tax pai. -iy `s book value. 
liabilities. 
11) Drew the attention of share-- 
10) Exploited the fact that holders to the availability 
the majority of T, laples of E2 
. 
4m tax relief which could 
properties were on short be set against trading profits 
lease which would means in future years, i. e. it was a 
increased depreciation valuable asset, 
and thus affected profita- 
bility. 12) Capitalised on the failure of 
the bidder in supplying in for-- 
11) Disputed Maples inclusion nation on recent perfo:, nna ce 
of fixtures and fittings (in fact, the profits of i°d P: Cr 
in its balance sheets had declined by 1.5%). 
on the grounds that it 
had no additional value -13) Asa result of recent acqul-- 
to the bidder as it had sitions in Nice and Cannes and 
already been included in -the opening of a new store iY, 
its accounts. Qatar, the company`s profit 
w 
, 
mod be i;: icreased by a further 
. 
12) Assurances to preserve £1/LIm. 
the fine retail nape of 
Maples. 
13) Irnpli. cati ons for shares 
of Maples if the bid 
lapsed. 
14) Entitlement to final 
dividends for accepting 
shareholders. 
15) Pointed out to shareholders 
that Maples` tax losses 
. 
cw. ld o71y be beneficial if 
profits ware substantial. 
16) Ori en ±a to d shareholders' 
. 
attention that properties 
retained for trading were 
only v orÜh what they can 
earn. 'ýý, 
- 
; Z, YZ 
1''j & (ý S successful acnuI. S? (]_(7n of 11 4: 01. (', i 
vas based on three 
.: 
fa. c i: ors, namely, an J-*, m)r'oved. '-)rice, 7)"r- 
chases in the marke-IL, arket and substantial acceptances in he Cý_OS- 
ing stage of she bid in nominees'. Ames. y 
OTHER FEATURES 
Great Universal Stores 
"; ds the largest share- 
holder (" 1% of W& G's ecuity) of U&G. Therefore 
, 
it may 
be deduced that W& G-' s takeover, of Maples may be construed 
as a possible strategic defensive move against a--I eventual 
takeover by Great Universal Stores ihr U&G. 
4 
1,. 
:.; 
t1nT. v . _., t 
'A 
- 11 
`, 
P opcrty_.. ý eire ? etion 
Sale of assets 
. 
(before/after the. 
-bid) Capital reconstruction 
Divi dend_in cr_eas e 
. ---.. -- j3onus/scriu issue/share split 
Profits forecast 
Legal action 
Appeal.. to 
. 
shareholders' loyalty 
Placing___ 
_____. ------- Undertake. 
_an_-acquisition 
(before/after-)- 
Acquire bidder's equity 
(De_i'ensive strategies listed in the 
research 
-questionnaire) 
BIDDING STRATEGIES%ARGUTVZENTS DEFENDING STRATEGIES`ARGU? ý i`1I'S 
Wereidhave 
1) Discussed bid with EPC over 
a six month period and ex- 
pressed its readiness to re- 
sume negotiation with EPC 
over its merger proposal. 
2) Shareholders of. 4EPC should 
be given the opportunity 
to assess the merits of 
T ldhave's offer. 
. 
1) Appealed to its shareholders 
to keep a vigorous U. { com- 
pany intact. 
2) Cited a 1826 quotation z iudll, g 
to Wer elc. havc' s rPea;, c--re offer ("In matters of corrrerce the 
fault of the Dutch is oz er- 
ing too little and asking too 
. 
much"). 
Accused EIPC of not dis- 
closing its liability incur- 
red in conjunction with the 
delay completion of an over-- 
seasýdevelopment project 
sited in Nice. 
Accused EP C of not reflecting 
a shortfall of £33m in its 
balance sheet relating to 
development properties in 
Belgium. 
Pointed out to shareholdets 
that the diminution of 
EPC's reserve amply re-J-3-p-c-ted 
the erosion of the company's 
riet asset base and also a 
substantial fall in net woz th. 
T enrJ ei_cy of EPC' s invE st*n ey t 
P-) 1icy c_, 1 eoý: c ißt ati; iý its (- ve! oj}! rent portj"oi? o in L 
3) Acceptances in ly selling o, 
,. 
i' 
at the. turning point in the 
company's fortune. 
4) EPC had a steadily improving 
share price. 
5) The bid-'did not have The 
approval of EPC's board. 
6) A fair price for Eagle S-Lar (EPC's largest institutional 
shareholder) did not reflect 
a fair -rrice for the ccmr nY' s 
shareholders (sta. lle-pen :; made 
in rebuttal of ['lerelc. ha 
. 
re' s 
claim of a lair price offered 
for the Earle Star's sh---are- 
holdi 1i 
. 
7) The °er. s ro; af i_ 1c "r 
c. ý-c to 
-3 47- - 
policy made EPC attrac- - 
to rrovide dc'<"ils of a 
tive to institutional in- -coopcrati on a rce, -i; on t he- 
vestors) 
. 
tween Wereidhave and 
Carena regarding the 
7) Cautioned shareholders to merger proposal. 
treat any property revalua- 9) Highlighted the bouyancy EPC with reserve tion, by (pointed out to shareholders of U. K. property market 
that in fact EPC had incurred in general by citing a 1978 EIU report that 
a loss of £16.8m from sales of 
its properties). - U. K. property values had increased over the 
ý. ) Pointed out to shareholders last £iftoen years at an annual rate of 13ä'o that the present board of EPC (for offices), 12% (for had been actively selling off 
' 
shops), and 11% (for s properties over the company industrial properties). the last few years. 
9) Tried to concentrate share- 10) EPC's development pro- 
holders' attention to the gramme in the U. K. and 
fact that-some of the com- 
' 
Europe was virtually 
completed (this had the s property valuations pany 
' 
effect of enhancing its s di- were made by the EPC investment portfolio of rectors. international properties): 
: Lo) . It was imprudent for EPC to 11) 
continue to, pay dividends It rebutted U, ereldhave's 
due to its poor financial accusation of conserva- 
performance. ti"ve accounting policies 
regarding the act of capi- 
i 1) Contrasted financial stremgths tali sing interests on de- 
of - both companies. T ýt endeavour- velopment 
ed' to direct shareholders' atten- stating that this prac" 
tion to its own strong balance tice was universally 
sheet, accessibility to long practised by the majority 
term funds and a favourable tax of the property companies 
status. in the U. K. 
i) EPC's profits We a result of 12) The bid was an oppor 1. -- 
, 
capitalisina on large amounts nistic attempt by Were. 1- 
of interest accruing to the dhave to acquire EPC's investment at book value company 
. due- to the recognition 
13, ) A rise of r1LR will worsen EPC's of the surplus arising from development ro- revenue deficit. p grammes in the U. S. and. 
jjF) EPC had high gearing. Canada (the open market 
value of the company's 
15) EPC did not own Trizec althigh development properties. 
it hold 50% of Trizec's equity. in fact exceeded book 
value by 7p per share). 
i) The bid had the support from 
Carona, Tri zec' s main share- 
holder. 
Highlighted the fact that the 
1a. rEer portion of EPC's invest- 
ment in Trizec, being in the 
form of a minority holdin>g in 
j private company (Ca. r(; na. ) 
I- 13) Highlighted L 
that the sale 
Nice property 
ar (N 
hc")% Vßi. 111, Oý' 
lie fact 
of EPC 
had added 
to ýe 
the co-- 
- 
3'l$ 
cannot readily be disposed 
of or uoed ao collateral 
for borrowings. 
13) EPC's ordinary share price 
had not recovered in line 
with other shares in the 
FT-Actuaries Property 
-Index'. 
10) Share price of EPC would con- 
- 
tinue to fall if the bid fails. 
14) The EPC's board hpd no 
respon:; ib3.1ii. y For the 
borrowings of Trizec 
which was an indepen-- 
den tly managed Canadian 
public company. 
15) The bid was an attempt 
by Wereldhave to under- 
mine the value of EPC's 
investment. 
20) For many years the market 
price of EPC had lagged behind 
its net asset' value per share. 
21) The accounting treatment of 
Trizec did not conform to 
SSAP 1Ll. 
22) Wereldhave had the support 
of EPC's principal shareholder 
i. e. Eagle Star regarding the 
merger. 
16) The level of capitalised 
development interest 
would be minimal after 
1980 due to the comple- 
tion of many develop-. 
ment projects1 
17) Reassured shareholders 
that the existing bor- 
rowings of the company 
have been effective at 
lo* rates of interest. 
23) The bid had been cleared by 1$) 
the. Office of Fair Trading as 
well as receiving the tacit 
approval of the Bata: of England. 
Zý) The bid by Olympia and York nerv- 
ed as a smoke screen to divert 
. 
shareholders' attention from 
the firm offer of W? retdhave. 
25)" VIereldhave' s cash offer was 
attractive to EPC's share- 
holders. 
Olympia & York 
1) The bid represented a 62% pre- 
mium over the market price of 
37p of EPC's shares. 
2) The merger had the support of 
EPC's main shareholders i. e. 
Eagle Star (27%) and the Royal 
Insurance Company (3. %) 
. 
Unanimous recommendation from 
the board of directors of FPC 
in favour of the merger with 
O1y-mpia & York. 
The prune interest of 
Wereld. havc in its, ta; ce- 
over attempt of EPC lay 
in its significant in- 
herent land values. of 
the company. 
19) By accepting the bid 
shareholders 
-would face 
a loss of final dividend. 
I 
4 
6 
I,. 
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tiS: iUic"1. i1Ci:: i given on i3iaij)ZCyoi: s 
01. y' PC 
. 
et en ýicn o i; FC' s : ýäe1i Li ty 
within Olympia w York. 
6} Unlike Wereldhave, Olympia & 
York's bid for EPC vas not 
conditional upon the con- 
sent of the Canadian Foreign 
Investment Review Agency. 
7) Olympia & York va in control 
of E 22% of CPC's equity. 
SUCCESS FAILURE 
The failure of Wereldhave to acquire EPC might 
be attributed to three main factors- 
a) The emergence of Olympia :. York as a counter-bidder. 
b) Being a Dutch property company involved in a complex 
transnational. takeover of EPC, whose main assets, Tri zec 
which ; eras located in Canada (hence the entry of the Cana- 
dians into the bid) Wereldhave found it difficult to 
explain the complicated deal to its Dutch shareholders. 
c) Wereldhave's major Dutch institutional shareholde were 
reluctant to let the company be involved in an intensely 
"comipeti v! vL 
takeýov e in a creigu onv 1 onr e. hick could 
to be too expensive for Vlereldhave itself, 
OTHER FEATURES 
The bid for EPC started out as a normal over- 
seas acquisition of a U. K. property company but because of 
Trizec, EPC's Hain Canadian investment it soon assumed a 
different dimension by reflecting a power struggle between 
two leading Canadian business families; the Bronffman (who 
had an interest in Trizec via Carena and therefore the -- 
reason f or preventing Olympia & York from gaining control 
of EPC and hence Trizec) and the Reichmann (Olympia & York). 
The chart on the next page illustrated. the o nership struc-- 
ture of Trizec and would provide a better understanding of 
the source for the power struggle between the two families. 
In addition, the role and perceptions of 
some U. K institutions ( PC' S shareholders) in this conteste j 
takeover de-sex-veto be men oned as it illustrated their growing 
power to determine the outcome of a company's independence 
in a takeover situation. In conjunction with the success-- 
ful acquisition of EPC by Olympia & York certain pens on 
funds led by the Electric l. ty Supply In: u. stry Superannuation 
Scree ie were unhappy . 'i-th the offer for the i%ýa conýrý. r-'i De 
loan stocks S and they e;: G? G'? SE: them' pow er by 
~z: 
etoinn. - oJ 
proposal for a tax-saving scr. Lps issue in connection -will-_ 
the of-er for the EPC's ordinary equity. ' The iatinnal A so- 
jýp 
ciation of pension F). nds 1o ar C'ýd the bid in adverse i'J i=t " 
and abhorred the c ....; ay "- t1. a7o bid ' was : C. Lt. - r ý .ý on 
to : rams tas ink" 
Owing to its late entry into the bid and 
a strong comp&i on provided by L; ereldha, re, Ol ympia w Yore; 
had co revive its terms of offer in order to win the sue- 
port of the key institutional shareholder i. e. Eagle Star, 
as well as that of the board of EPC. The seventh price 
revision finally decided the. outcome of the deal in favour 
of Olympia & York. This merger ti+, 3s perhaps the most protract- 
ed takeover in U. K. history with the highest number of 
price revisions. 
EPC Li mites 
100 
Star Ge'BoOverseas 
Holdings Ltd 
-100% 
Star 3Propo rt,; L +td 
Convent Canada Corp. Ltd 
Edper Investments. Ltd. 
825 
Carona Bancofp Ines 
0 an ad? an Arena Ltd 
49.9% 
-- 
CAR EFTA PROPERTIES IPNC 
--- 
50.01; 
58.6? 
21.5; x- TRI7EC CORPORATION LTD 24.5; x- Directors pof Trý. ý. acý 
Ownership Structure of Trizec Qorp; ration. 
Source: The "Financial Tii es 0/8, /78) 
.- 
X81 
- 
t* ý? Cfn, 
A1,. 
LUý 
Property rev-aliat_ 
Sale of-assets (before/after the bid) 
Capital reconstruction 
Dividend. increase. 
- _. -.. Bonus/scrip, issue/share split 
_. Prof s1. ores_sý--- 
ZegaLaction 
-- --_. Appeal-to sh. areholders. ' 
_loyalty_- 
Under ak-e acqui} 1 tion. 
_ 
(befor. e/ai . her), 
Acquire 
"bi dder' s equity 
(Defensive strategies iis"i; ed in 
the res ear ch questionnaire) 
ARGi7Ir1ENTS BIDDING STRATEGIES DEFENDING STRA. FGIF. S%!? RGTJMEnTS 
1) It emphasised its pre-bid 1) Rever. tex pointed out to 
holding of 29.5%. its 'shareholders them" in 
the event of the bic suc- 
2) Focused on the commercial ceeding Hoechst could ex- 
logic of -she merger (tra-" cercise its cp ion r(_'gard- dition links between Ehe ing Harco is the deý: ri ? en" two, companies in l clay is 
_ 
of the ongoing inteýrnation 
where Revertex processes business of Revertýe: t c- _d 
Yule Catto' s rubber crop). ' its employees. 
3) Previous merger 'negotia- 2) Yule Catto failed to bold 
tions with Revertex board substantive discussion 
proved inconclusive. on these matters (the 
agreements existiý_g b;: i:: een U 4 It endeavoured to reach salis- Revertex. and its Various factory agreement with international joint van-_ 
Hoechst to abandon its ture par ýners) despite 
rights of acquiring 50%. of request by Reverte_s. for a 
Harlow Chemical Company meeting. (Harco) if control of Rever- 
tex passed on to another 3) The bid waas inadequate. 
company. 
5) The bid 
premium 
the day 
of the 
6) The bid 
. 
226%. 
represented a 65.5% 
of the market price 
be-Lore the purchase 
pre-bid stake. 
improved incorne by 
7) Undertakings to ccntinue 
to develop Re : vertex and 
the retention of its 
trading name. 
8) Yule Ca--to sa-4, (, guard 
t11( i Y? -i eres of ReVer i: efT s 
4) Revertex sought to ensure 
the continuation o' its 
business as presently 
constituted. 
5) it sough: to share for its 
shareholders i. Err s wh?. ch 
could be recoTni-vended to 
them as pair and. reason- 
able. 
'=ý, 
h. Q 
f 
.. ýy(... 
ii The 21 (: c!? ' ýý' L G1! 2"1 of Rov 2- 
tý 
. 
': ý tib'ý "Y'iý into ß: 1C Yule 
Call-Lo' o board of direr ors 
i 
-t. he bid succeeded. 
10) The bid was conditional on 
no changes occurring in 
any business agreements 
. 
of Revertex. 
SUCCESS/FAILURE 
The key to Revertex's defence revolved 
around its special business agreement with Hoechst regard- 
ing their joint venture in Ha_rco. However, Hoechst reserved. 
its position on the matter 'until the bid outcome. Yule Catto's 
success vtias attri butable 
- 
to a higher revised offer and various 
assurances given toi the biddee regarding its trading activi- 
ties, employees, and the status quo of the Revertex board. 
OTHER FEATURES 
One month e±ori: the b' d Jeýiý. m i nc ind. L l. 
__Oii 
1, 
Revertex modified its profits forecast because of the fall 
envisaged in its original forecast. Futhermore, Revertex had 
given an undertaking to Yule Cat-to that even if the bid lapsed 
it woul-1 tit l Invite three Yule Catto` s . representati. ves to join its board of directors. 
'ýý=, 
-ý ý8: ý "- 
t_P? EciDIX B 
(GROUP `_1'1'10 CASE STUDIES) 
The decision to use a second category 
of case studies was influenced by the results of the Survey 
of the merchant banks. One of the main findings which 
ei: ierged from this study was that while there are general 
principles guiding the various aspects of bids, for a tran-- 
saction to be successful, it is crucial for it to be ana- 
lysed, structured, devised and fully exploit the circums- 
tances prevailing. As we have observed in the various 
sections of this study, a takeover bid cannot be approached 
in a mechanical play as it is interlinked with a muiti. tude 
of leE al 
, 
quasi-legal, financial, market and industrial 
considerations. Moreover, takeover behaviour and prac-- 
'ices are ci rp ur; scribed by the City sel{'-re gulatory System. 
Consequently, the approach adopted in 
this section differs soruteaihat from the approach adopted for 
Group I case studies. Rather than taking a comprehensive 
evaluation of all relevant facts of the various case studies, 
here ; re focus on the creativity, uniqueness and special 
aspects of contested bid situations. 
__ý, 
-- / r. 
CASE STUDIES GROUP 2 
ThU;; iT HOUS FORT: 
, 
-'T, i ' )/T ýEj S. W OY GROUP 
(Case Study xo. 1) 
THF, one of U. K. 's largest hotel and leisure conglom- 
erate on 18i3/8i instituted a takeover bid for the Savoy 
Group, the hotel business chain which operates leading 
hotel names like, "The Savoy" 
, 
"Claridges" 
, 
and "The Berke-- 
ley". To understand the takeover strategies employed, it 
is essential to grasp the main factors which influenced the 
approach adopted by THE and its merchant banking advisor, 
Warburgs. 
Because of its heritage, valuable assets and world- 
wide appeal, the Savoy Group has always been vulnerable to 
takeover attempts, the earliest dated back to l953, "Iiarold 
Samuel (later Lord) and Sir. Charles Clore acquired 1/3 of 
Savoy's equity. The Savoy directors, including Sir Hugh 
Wontner, the current chairman reacted by designing strong 
counter-measures to reduce Savoy's vulnerability to bid. 
The first defensive move entailed the transfer of valuable 
SavoyY assets, the "Berkeley" to a new company (the Worces- 
ter Buildings Scheme) the voting control which was vested 
in the Savoy's staff benevolent trusts. This defensive de- 
sign was widely condemned in the City as an abuse of cor- 
porate power 
. 
The second defensive move involved the re-- 
structuring of Savoy's capital structure through the orea-; 
tion of more high voting 'B' sl-ares thus conferring on the 
board more effective control of the company. 
In the mid-196o' s, Trafalgar House managed to acquire 
a 10% stake in the 'A' capital of Savoy and it later improv- 
ed its holding to 15%. After its abortive attempt to acquire 
the Savoy, Trafalgar House then disposed of 
. 
this block of 
shares to Grand Metropolitaut in 1978. In 1979, Rothschild 
Investment Trust managed to purchase this shareholding from 
Grand Metropolitan and then subsequently sold it to the 
Kuwaiti Investment Office (KIO). KIO then improved its newly 
acquired stake in Savoy to 34% (22% of the vote). Based on 
the availability of this block of shares and the commitment 
of KIO to THF's acquisition aim, the poor performance of the 
biddee company (Savoy suffered a loss of £1.8m in 1980) and 
a reduction in tourism, THE then decided to proceed with a 
bid for the Savoy. 
The line of approach adopted by Warburgs to surmount 
the near bid-proof defences of the Savoy Group was based on 
a two-pronged strategy: 
- 
i) The legal strategy designed to circumvent the two 
classes of capital with flexibility to fall back on, 
A conventional 'takeover attcmp 
, 
if the fi st device 
fails 
ý- ýö; - 
Through an ingenious application of company law (Scheme of Arrangement), THE proposed that each class of 
capital be voted separately. Under this interpretation, a 
75% "majority of "A" shares would give THE control of all 
the shares in this category, representing 51.44% of the total 
votes and thus, effective corporate control. So the key to 
winning control of the Savoy rested on gaining adequate 
support from "A" shareholders. However, this legal attempt 
was aborted by the High Court. 
Having failed with-the legal strategy, Warburgs then 
resorted to a more conventional takeover bid for the biddee 
by offering 201p for the "A" shares and 1,005p for the "B" 
equity with cash option (valuing the Group at £58r, ). Essen- 
tially, Warburgs dual priced strategy has the underlying 
rationale in mind: 
a) A reasonably devised 'sighting shot` with the fol- 
lowing aims; namely, to extract vital information 
regarding the true value of the Savoy, to split 
the support of the trustees arid possibly to flush 
out some private trustees who controlled the key 
shareholdings of the high voting "B" shares (THF 
could only identify 30% of the shareholdings). 
b) Portray good performance of THE and its ability 
to provide qualitative management and worldwide 
marketing expertise for the Savoy. 
c) A tte-Tritt to di scredi t the, management of the Savoy 
for poor performance. 
d) Voice objection to the sale of certain assets by 
the biddee. 
e) A revised offer of £ 11.22 which was a substantial 
premium for the "B" shares and. way above the net 
asset value (140p as a result of property revalu- 
ation). in order to entice shareholders' support. 
To counter this unwelcome bid, Barings, the Savoy's 
__. 
_merchant banking advisor mounted the following defences; 
1) Financial Strategy 
a) As property constituted the pivotal defence, the 
company has always reflected a low book value in 
its balance sheet (£l8m in December 1980). 
b) The revaluation generated a surplus of £62.7m which 
resulted in a revised offer from THE 
c) Sale of assets to raise £7m an: (to reduce interest 
charges. 
d) Reassured shareholders that the financial set gack 
was only temporary. 
g1 
- 
2) Emotive Strategy 
a) Stressed on the tradition and standard of the 
Savoy. 
b) Encouraged petitions by staff and loyal customers (especially highlighted in its defence circular) 
3) Commercial. Logic: questioned the suitability of THE to 
run the 
,. 
Savoy. in view of its involvement in motorway 
Cafe business. 
Overseas Expansion: 
- envisaged a programme of expansion 
in the hotel sector in the USA. 
5) "White Knight": held talks with other more suitable bid- 
ders amongst which included. Grand Metropolitan 
", 
its 
former shareholder. 
6) Independence: 
The takeover for Savoy inevitably generated wide 
media publicity and because the basis for contention 
hinged on independence rather than price, it assumed a 
bitterly contested posture-with both parties exchanging 
insults. 
When the first bid dateline ended, acceptance from 
both classes of shareholders were very low (3.20 of "A" 
and 0.14% for' 'rs ). At this juncture, it should be noted 
that although TH. ý' held 59. )4% of the equity, 
.` 
Lt only pos- 
sessed 37.20 of the votes as illustrated by TABLE B. 1 
below; 
Table B. 1: Trust House Forte's Control Position at the 
End of the First Bid Dateline. 
"A" 
Number 
Shares 
Source of Acquisition] 
9,600,000 34.6 commitment from the KIo 6,200,000 22.7 market purchases 
. 
8622000 3.2 acceptances received 
"B" Shares 
95,600 7.3 
1 
KIO 
62,950 ßk. 8 market purchases U. 846 0.4 acceptances received 
j-v>, }yo 1G. !. 1 
Source: constructed from 'Financial Ti$ ,, 'and une ýT)a 
Tei egranh 1981. 
- 
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Despite an extended closing date, in view of the 
strong, loyalty of the Savoy shareholders to the company, 
THE ended up finally with 63.1% ("A") and 12.6% of 
both classes of equity giving it 61.9% of the total shares 
but with only 38.6% of the votes. 
The Savoy ease study is a classic case in point illus- 
trating that although a high price in most acquisition at- 
tempts constitute the critical factor which influenced the 
bid outcome, in this context, despite the stupendous pre- 
mium (700% in the revised offer) price played a secondary 
role. 
In retrospect, the Savoy, due to its rich cultural 
heritage, its worldwide reputation, its 
-unequal capi- tal structure (designed to. fend off successive bidders) 
and the deep loyalty of its shareholders will remain diffi- 
cult for bidders to acquire it. Another interesting factor 
according to Sir Hugh which greatly assisted the defence 
effort was the fact that a substantial number of share- 
holders were women who are wwre inclined to be -'u? ed. 
by sentimentality rather than financial consideration. 
On its part, Savoy is not yet totally bid proof as 
THE has publicly stated that it intends to return in 1982 
for a second takeover attempt. The bid has enabled THE to 
become the biggest shareholder in the company and if it 
initiates a second takeover in 1982, it will probably be 
starting from 'a platform of nearly 4.0% of the-- he voting con- 
trol for after the bid has lapsed, - THE continues to expand 
its shareholding in the company. However, under the City 
Code, it cannot acquire more than 12% in the 12 months 
from the date its offer lapsed. 
This particular ease study is a good amplification of 
the-hypothesis that flexibility is the essence of contested 
bids and also each case has to be approached with all its 
special factors taken into 'account. It is alsoi nteresting 
to note that in this bitterly contested bid, the two mer- 
chant banks involved are leading accepting houses with 
formidable reputes Lions in this field thus reinforcing an- 
other finding of this study, i. e. contested takeovers in 
the UK are inclined to be conducted by the few established 
traditional merchant banks. 
1,. 
-- 
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DJNHILL-LOGIDA/ASPREY & COMPANY 
(Case Study No. 2) 
This is a case study of Asprey, the famous Bond 
Street jeweller, whose independence was severely threaten- 
ed in 1980 by a bid from DunhiII-Logida, the joint company (owned by Alfred Dunhill Group and Sheik Al-Tajir of 
Dubai) formed to effect the takeover. This unquoted family 
controlled company managed to ward off the unwelcome bid 
but in the process brought in Sears Holdings as a minority 
shareholder as well as leaving one side of the Aspreys in 
control of the business *after the dissident family members 
had decided to dispose of their shares in the company.:. 
Asprey became vulnerable when Algernon and Harry, tha 
sons of Kenneth Asprey were removed as two of Aspreys four 
managing directors in 1971 due to boardroom disagreement. 
Both former directors then sold their 7% stakes-to Amal- 
gamated Investment & Property and over the passage of, time, 
this peripatetic block of shares finally ended up under the 
control of Dunhill in January 1977. Soon after this, Dun- 
hill managed to acquire another 23% from '14r. Philip Asprey (see Diagrams A&3, 'pp329--393)and then another small block of 
6.8% in May 1980 at_the price of £28.50 per share. The ac- 
quisition of this last block-of equity subsequently trigger- 
ed off Rule 34 and Dunhill-Logida then effected a formal 
offer for the rest of. Asprey at this price. 
Mr. John Asprey, the current chairman of the company (he was the successor to this post after his father, Eric 
retired from being its chairman (1972-79)) theii resisted 
this takeover attempt on the grounds of price and independ- 
ence. 
. 
As a result of the formal offer, the trustees of the 
Philip 
. 
-Aspi'ey trusts sought' direction from the High 
Court on the 12/5/80 as to whether, in respect of such 
holdings, the bid of £28 1/2 made by Dunhill-Logida should 
be accepted (in the absence-of a rival bid, there was a 
strong possibility of the High Court directing a sale of 
the 19% holding to Dunhill-Lögida, thus, enabling it-to 
improve its control position from 36.8% to 53%). 
Morgan Grenfell, the merchant banking advisor to Mr. 
John Asprey then devised a scheme which enabled him to 
retain full control of the company as well as providing 
dissident family holders with the opportunity to liquidate 
their holdings at an attractive price (£37 per share versus 
£28 1/2 by original bidder). Consequently, the plan also 
allowed Dunhill-Logida to depart with a huge profit of £1m, 
therefore, basically satisfying the objectives of three 
sectional interests. In order to execute this strategy' 
successfully, Morgan Grenfell had to commit £7m of its ovum 
money first to buy the 52.8% holding o ::, Dunhill-Logida and 
the Philip Asprey family; trusts. After 'A.. share placing by 
Morgan Grenfell and stockbrokers, De Zoete & Bevan, John 
Asprey and related trusts managed to retain 50.4% control 
of the company while Sears Holdings had 20% and the rest 
; QC. 
_ 
SKAREHOLDING STRUCTURE OF ASH? Y& CO. 
-WANY DURING 
TIlE A. Kk'OVER ATT-: 
-, 
PT BY DU, i! iILI. 
-LUGIDÄ 114 HAY 1980 
(Appendix Di. ag, rdia A) 
William Asproy (1780) 
Kenneth Asprey (World tsar 1) 
{arry Asprey-J AlCernon Asprey Philip Asprey Eric Asprey 
(son) 1 (son) (half-brother) (-half-brother) 
Ni. D. M. D. M. D. M. D. 
f.: na gamated lný"astrrert ,! aurice Asprey John Asorey" 
Property (son) (son) 
7-5 
-- 
ruia Family Yjitl. ip Asprey öhn Aspreyý 
Foundation i'a 41y Ts t, (Liechtenstein) 
3 
3rove,: ocd Securities (Eaz; le StaÄ) 
- 
II'.. -ý ASPRLY & 
CO. 
Dunhill Dunhill-Lor; ida 
iothýan lnternritional (Dunhill Q Sheikh 
nl x'ajii ) 
Prebid Stake 6.84 
Combined Prebid 
Control 
= 
36.81.; 
Fie oeca: ^e chairman in 1979 
hereditary line 
ssle of equity 
-----y controlling interests 
formal takeover bid in 1980 
Sourc(-: F. T' 
7'J)ai1'i '1'elet_rnph7;, c''P}](? r, 'i, y; "$ý 
198`0. 
ýjýp 
COY, POSITIO;; OF THE SITAREHOLDING ST UCTURE OF ASPREY K CONPANY 
A? ''r1R TAE Fn1LU1t: OF Td-: TAA OVýR ATPL iI'`P 
(App©ndix'Diagraci B) 
John Asprey & Family Philip Asprey Family 
Trusts Trusts (16'') 
Prebid Control 47.24 Dunhill-Logida (36.8y) 
Combined Stake- 
_ 
52.89' 
so. 4% \\ 52.8 
3.2 
20,9 Sears 
ASPREY 
CO. j or n 'Grenfell c 21.4Co. (,:, enchant banker) 
Private' 29 De "ý'oeto & Bevan 29.65 4 .. (mtockbroker-") 
- -- 
Institutional 
--^ Investors 
Legend 
sale of shares 
----ý placing 
____ý controlling interests 
µ, 
J :ý 'i 
Was placed in the hands of 30p 'J va to shýý. r ehoi (iC1. 's, 
should be pointed out at this juncture that LLir. John 
Asprey and trustees representing their interests entered 
into an agreement with Sears, provided that each party has 
the right of first refusal if the other chose to sell an,,, 
shares and that each must offer a proportionate share to 
the other of any shares in Aspreys it acquired from a third 
party. 
In retrospect, it can be discerned that internal dis- 
sension within the Aspreys provided the bidder with the 
chance to exploit the situation. Ho,: ever, Morgan GrenfeU 
acting with Mr. John Asprey pre-empted the takeover inten- 
tion of Dunhill-Logida by making a counterbid for the vital 
16% of the Philip Asprey family trusts, 
-the key to the out- 
come of the battle. The* reluctance of the original bidder 
to improve its bid price contributed-greatly to the victory 
of Morgan Grenfell and its client. The victory also allowed 
representatives of Morgan Grenfell and Sears-Holdings to be 
incorporated into the current board of Aspre; rs. In brief, 
this 
- 
takeover is characterised by three main f eatures- 
i) The role of the merchant banking advisor acting 
as ; principal in counter-bidding for the equity 
of A. spreys. 
ii) In a transaction of this nature where financial 
power comes into the forefront, and here, a 
reputable merchant bank like Morgan Grenfell 
has tiieIu ldüuS edge over other financial advisers, 
for instance, stockbrokers Lf they were to advise 
and implement this particular scheme. 
iii) Legal action as manifested in High Court action. 
GASCO/ST. PIRAN 
(Case Study 3) 
The acquisition of St. Piran, the Cornish tin mining 
group by Gasco, the master company of Mr. J. J. Raper is 
perhaps the most controversial takeover in UK corporate his- 
tory. Fundamentally, the debate revolved around around the 
questionable takeover techniques employed by Jim Raper which 
had rendered vulnerable, the system of self-regulation as 
practised in the City. 
Mr. Raper' s involvement with St. Piran dated back to 
1974 ruhen 
. 
'rye acaui. red 3-"; 'o of the equity,,. 
-of 
the company 
through his Far Eastern company, "Faber fii! eriin" 
. 
The Take- 
over r änel at that time decl a that 
_ ..,,. 
red o he : iscd '. C`t bid 7 or 
_ the rest of St. Piran if he reduced his shareho. ldif r, br :o 
30%. However, instead o-j;: divesting himself of 1_he extra 
"392- 
shares, Raper who was the ex-chairman of St. Piran carried 
out a series of deals with specially created companies in 
Liberia, Panama, Luxembourg and Hong Kong which left the 
final 37% shareholding still- firmly under his control as 
shown in the following TABLE B. 2. 
Company_ Shares % 
Gasco 
. 
3, L50,000 
H 
29. 
Ruffec 1470,000 
Aerolinas Cordoba 400,000 
3.9 
3.5 
J. J. Raper 100,000 0.01 
Total J 4,320,000 37.01 
Table B. 2Nominee Holdings of St. Piran Associated with 
J. Raper. 
Source: "Financial Time ", Daily 1"el_ egr, y and Panel `s 
Report 
As a result of Mr. Raper' s subsequent covert share 
dealings in November 1979, the Takeover Panel instituted 
an investigation as to v nether Mr. Raper had formed a 
"concert party" with other St. Pisan shareholders whereby 
he would have control over 30% of St. Piran's equity capi- 
tal (this would breach Rule 34 of -the Code which requires 
a holder of over 3ü of a company's equity to make a bid 
for the outstanding equity) : Owing- to the gravity of the 
situation compounded by the fact that Jim Raper was resid- 
ing overseas and the institutions used by him were all 
foreign nominees, the DoT*also appointed Inspectors under Section 165 (b) which gave them power to examine every 
aspect of the company and under Section 172 which related 
specifically to controversy over the true control of shares. 
On 1st. April 1980, the Panel ruled that strong cir- 
cumstantial evidence indicated that shareholdings roughly 
amounting to 370 of St. Piran and registered in the names 
of 8 overseas companies were actually controlled by Jim 
Raper. As such, he incurred an obligation to make a manda- 
tory bid for St. Piran at 85p (the highest price paid in 
the market by Gasco). However, Jim Raper resisted this 
notion to bid on the grounds that he did not act in con-_ 
cert or was ever in breach of Rule 34. The Panel then in- 
voked its strongest sanction against him by describing his 
conduct as "deplorable" and also declared that he was 
"unfit to be a director of a public company" following the 
failure of Gasco Investments, the Hong Kong registered 
company to mount a full bid for St. Piran. The Stock Ex- 
change in a parallel move forbade its 
, embers to deal in 
any business for Mr. Raper. It follower-: up this action by 
suspending the shares c St, Per at 65p on 20 th i. ay 1980. 
During the following month, the Stock 
-Exchange extended 
this suspension 
_ý Gasco, '5h= ti,, as t. er company 
''k Department of T:;. dcf 
Jý 
.. 
a. ) Promised not to use its voting power in St. Piran, 
or 
b) Mount a takeover, or 
c) Disposed a large part of its shareholdings in St, 
. 
Piran. 
He appealed against the publication of the Panel's 
views. In spite of that, the Panel's Appeal Committee 
decided that their findings should be published. In Decem- 
ber, the DoT published its interim report on St. Piran. 
The report traced Mr. Raper's influence through a complex 
interlocking of nominee companies and share transactions. 
In the final analysis, the inspectors concluded that these 
holdings were all associated with one company, Bachgate, a 
nominee company in Bermuda and the ultimate parent of Gasco. 
At one stage, in 1976, according to the Report, combined 
with holdings controlled by a Cayman Island company called 
Clermont, Jim Raper effectively controlled 48.5% of St. 
Piran itself. By 3.980, the shares held or controlled by 
Bathgate and Clermont had fallen to 29.7i. 
On 11th April 1981, after a period of protracted dis- 
pute with the various City watchdog bodies, Gasco then 
launched a 50p per share cash bid for St.. Piran (whose 
shares were previously suspended at 65p in May 1980). In 
this takeover, it should be emphasised that the bidder was 
advised by Financial Network Guaranty, an unkown licensed 
deal e- in secuiiiiies arid not one of the City's merchant 
banks. By bidding for St, Piran at well below the price 
laid down by the Takeover Panel and even below the suspen¬ 
sion price, Jim Raper was again directly defying the Panel 
and the Stock Exchange. Three days after the bid announce-"- 
ment, the DoT published its full report of its investigation. 
The DoT concluded that the Secretary of State should consi- 
der a petition to the Court under Section 135 (1) of the 
Companies Act 1967 to wind up the company. But 
, 
Mr. Regi- 
nald Eyre, the Parliamentary Under Secretary df State con- 
sidered this recourse inappropriate and preferred to leave 
it to the shareholders themselves to bring such an action 
if they wish. The Inspectors also made it clear than, the board of St. Piran was controlled by Mr. Raper and Gasco 
Investments. Referring to the position of Mr. Malcolm Stone, 
the chairman of St. Piran and also the managing director of 
Gasco, the Inspectors declared that he faced potentially a 
most severe conflict of interest. 
Events then moved swiftly and on the 18th April 1981, 
Burma Mines headed by Mr. Tom Scrase, the senior partner in Gittins, the stockbrokers announced that it intended to 
launch a rival 60p per share bid for St. Piran (Burma Mines 
had a small 11". 37% stake in St. Piran any' its clients con- 
trol? ed a further 13%) but found itself :: possible victim 
company to a takeover from Ga ; co ! 
e; 9"r 
... 
 
On 28th April 19Q1, Gasco claimed control of St. 
Piran (it received acceptances which raised its holding 
up to 50.13!; and dropped its bid for Burma Mines. Once 
this strategic control element was attained, ihr. Raper 
then approached Mr. Scrase to solicit for the equity under 
the Burma-Gitt, 's umbrella. He successfully gained the support 
he wanted when he agreed to revise the Gasco's offer to 60p, 
the same cash offer made by Burma Mines. 
As a result of the transfer of control of St. Pig an 
into Gasco Investment (Netherlands N. V. ), the Stock Ex- 
change then reacted by suspending the listings of South 
Crofty and Milbury (58.5% and 86% owned subsidiaries of the 
St. Piran Group) on the grounds that it. was "... undesirable 
that a company having listed on the Stock Exchange should 
be under the ultimate legal control. of Gasco and Mr. Raper". * 
Following the Stock Exchange's drastic action, Gencor Group, 
South Africa's sec6nd largest mining company. and owner of 
just under 1% of St. Piran's equity then announced that it 
had instructed its solicitors to wind up St. Piran as it 
alleged that the company had been conducted in a way that 
was prejudicial to minority shareholders and that it was just and equitable that the company should be liquidated. 
Gencor intended to use Section 209 (2) of the Companies 
Act to require Gasco to buy its shares at a more equitable 
price than the 60p per share offered by Gasco. Nevertheless, 
three months later, in a suprise decision without any expla- 
tion, Gencor abandoned its legal. attempt to wind up St. 
Piran as less Than 10% of the equity capitol remained in 
the hands of independent minority shareholder. 
On 19th August 1981, 
, 
Casco announced that following 
the closure of its-601) per share bid, it had received ac- 
ceptances representing 9t of St. Piran and therefore, 
would resort to implementing Section 209 (1) of the 1948 
Companies Act to compulsorily acquire the rest. Mr. Raper 
then accused the Takeover Panel of deliberately blackening 
his name and having callous disregard for the. shareholders 
of St. Piran and its subsidiaries. 
As can be seen, this takeover is characterised by 
the skilful use of foreign nominees acting in concert. This 
then constituted the pivot of Mr. Raper's acquisition by 
stealth by acquiring less than a majority holding and then 
putting his own nominees on the board (the original. direc- 
tors of St. Piran all resigned when Piran acquired his ini- 
tial holding in the company in 1974). It should be under- 
lined that Gasco NCtherlands (the subsidiary of Gasco in- 
vestments) was advised in its takeover attempt by a small 
. 
The "Fý'irianci a? Ti L es ' ('l2/5/81) 
- 
g, 
- 
unl. cwn licenced dealer, -Financial Network Guaranty who is 
not a member of the Licenced Dealers Association. Through 
this action, it can be inferred that owing to the contro- 
versy surrounding the case, none of the accepting houses 
nor issuing houses would assent to act for the bidder for 
fear of damage to their reputations. 
We have seen that in counteracting to a direct chal- 
lenge to its authority, the Panel with the assistance of 
the Stock Exchange imposed on Mr. Raper, the most severe 
sanction it could by suspending the listing of St. Piran's 
shares in May 1980. With hindsight, it can be argued that 
this measure backfired because. the shareholders could not 
dispose of their shares in normal dealings for a year, or 
indeed to ascertain the market value of their investment. 
As such, when the takeover was ultimately initiated for 
the company, despite the vastly discounted cash bid, the 
shareholders were unwilling to support their, board for fear 
of being burdened with unrealisable assets. In gaining con- 
trol'of St. Piran, Mr. Raper profited at the expense of 
independent investors as he only paid £'7m for a group with 
assets worth about £11m. - 
In the course of their investigations into St. Piran, 
the Inspectors raised issues far wider that). those confront- 
-he self-regulation and are concerned with h the standards of 
behaviour regarding, the management of a public company. The 
Inspectors alleged that Mr. Raper adopted a cavalier atti- 
tude towards coiýpailies in which he held effective control. 
, and one of his own companies had a management agreement 
which permitted it to control St. Piran's Far Eastern assets 
at a substantial fee. More important still, the Inspectors 
were scathing about the control exercised over St. Pirat? 's 
to the detriment of minority shareholders by Gasco and re- 
lated interests instead of the St. Piran's board. In view 
of the gravity of the situation, they recommended that Si:. 
Piran'shouid be liquidated so that shareholders would have 
the opportunity of investing directly in Milbtiry and South 
Crofty. They argued that both these companies were quite 
capable of independent survival and by such an action, I+Ir. 
Raper's control in these companies would be considerably 
reduced. Moreover, the possibility existed for a rival com- 
pany to effect an independent acquisition for these assets. 
Nevertheless, Mr. John Biffen, the Trade Minister decided 
against the adoption of such drastic action and stated that 
the 1980 Companies Act allows investors to resolve the -ýýro- 
blems themselves through court. 
Essentially, St. Piran consists of three main assets; 
an öVo holding in the property developer, lnuzy" 
,a 
64c1, 
holding in "South Craf. y" 
, 
and assorte d-. Anyes tments in the 
Far 'last. 
- 
j96 
- 
The Panel also atter, itea to resolve the t 
Piran's enigma by calling for a i,; VIC reference. However, the 
Office of Fair Trading's reluctance to act may be attributable 
to its lack of authority or flexibility to demand that the 
takeover merited a reference. As Gasco is a 'sheireompany 
none of its traditional reference criteria is applicable. * 
This is further constrained-by the fact that the Fair Trading 
Act does not cater for abnormality. But difficult and com- 
plex though the position now is, the issue could potentially 
shift from self--regulation to legal recourse; the 1980 Compa- 
nies Act has provisions which provide for the disenfranchiso- 
ment of shares, forced sale of shares, access to courts to 
endeavour to prove conduct prejudicial to shareholders inter- 
ests*4and even regulation by the court of a company's affairs. 
Alternatively, St. Piran's 2,500 shareholders could take direct 
action to protect themselves against Gasco's questionable 
intentions. Perhaps the afore-mentioned pzovi de the possible 
remedies available. 
To summarise, Mr. Raper acquired an inter- 
-ast in St. Piran through his control of a Thai company; Faber 
Merlin which commenced buying St. Piran's shares since-1973. 
By 1974, Faber Merlin managed to retain ', =45 control in the 
company and Jim Raper became chairman.. Although he resigned 
from the board at the end of 1976, in the opinion of the suc- 
cessive official investigations the transfer of St. Piranrs 
holdings to a long Kong Company endowed haper with effete i; ive 
control often exercised through his no_-: i nee director e When 
the extent of the outside control became apparent, the City 
self-regulatory bodies then acted but the complex web of no- 
minee companies resident overseas proved an impediment to the 
City authorities. 
Equally i npor a. nt J 
.s 
the fact that Char-- 
'terhouse Japhet, the merchant bank adopted by three indepen- 
dent St. Piran directors to evaluate the bid, found it hard to 
put up a credible defence owing to the complicated circuos-- 
tance: around the takeover which was further coMpunded by ; he 
fact that shareholders of its client company remained locked 
in by the suspension imposed by the Stock Exchange. in its 
defensive circular (14th May, 1981) it pointed ot that: 
* irithin the traditional guidelines, i. e. whether it creates 
a monopoly situati-on, tirhe then: it is against public inter-- 
ests, employee-, interests, etc. 
** Under UK company law, companies can require nominee share- 
holders to disclose their beneficial ot; ner ship but this 
legal requirement is easily con! pl : ed and abuse by a mere 
declaration :,: sich does not revca the ultimate ownership in 
a 
complex series o i1Q:! 1Z_1ee o, 
da. Inii), Ls pec. iall over-. 
seas nominees. 
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"we do not believe that it ýý, oui ä be in t ,e 
interests of shareholders to remain as minority sh-irehold'ý 
in a company controlled by Gaseo.... shareholders could expect 
to receive more than 60p per share in a liquidation if it 
takes place, but the shareholders must take their own decision 
about accepting the offer or awaiting the outcome of the litt. 
-- 
getion, which may be protracted and the result of which is 
uncertain. " 
. 
On balance, the defence could only succeed 
if the minority shareholders held out but the speed in which 
Gasco obtained full ownership of StWiran suggested that the 
shareholder: preferred a swif ter solution. 
This case study has demonstrated that a 
determined and resourceful mars can gain control of a UK coý! 
- 
pany using controversial tactics and flouting self-. regulation: 
mo be fair, the City bodies have done everythin. they possibly 
could under the circumstances prescribed. Crit 
.. 
cisms, ho"º; 
-- 
ever, should be levelled at the Department of Trade for igno- 
ring its inspectors' advice and those of the City bodies o, 
_u the grounds that in the public interest, the Department could 
not justify such a prohibitive litigation. The f --lure ox 
the Department of Trade to act during the course of eiva., ngis 
emboldened the bidder which exploited the situation fully to 
its own advantage 
_at 
the expense of small "i nvestors as wol_ý. 
as rende'. r vulnCrabl o the country's self-regulatory system. 
The City Takeover Code as has been repeatedly emphasised 
throughout this study has no leg : force. Its viability rests 
mainly. on the moral weight of the Panel in the closely inter- 
woven City community. These rules have been spurned La 
few other instances (Kangra Internat- onal/Renwick and Be Beers/ 
Beers/Consolidated Cold. Fields case studies) by equally 
adroit bidders in their acquisition or would be acquisition 
attempts of UK companies. 
Whether the main incident and other unrela- 
ted incidences highlighted here could be. repeated by other 
bidders remain to be seen. If self-regulation and protection 
of the interests of shareholders are to remain credible, they 
would require the full support of the government 
. 
Prosa time to 
time. 
`ýý, 
-ý3 .r 
CHURCHBURY/LAM LAND 
(Case-Study 4) 
This is a reverse takeover in which a smal- 
ler company with a market capitalisation of only £11.6, ßm 
nanaged to acquire a much larger company capitalised at. 
almost three times ( 144,7m) its size. 
Prior to the bid, ChurchburZ managed to pro- 
cure the support of four key institutional shareholders, vi. Z., 
the Royal Insurance, the Kuwaiti Investment Office (Klo), 
Globe Investment Trust and the National Water Council Super-- 
annuation Fund representing 11: 75% of their combines: h. olakn: '-; s 
as as 16.21- support from other shareholders. With the trelý. 
support of the-four previously mentioned shareholders and 
- along with its own holdiücj in Law Land, Chu7rchbury effect; : 7o lv initiated the bid from a very strong leverage position 
of 39.43%. In addition, M&G Investment Management which 
managed funds owning 2.73% of the biddee had also declared 
its intention to accept. 
Six days of tei- the initiation of ii 
rt 
ioTiT. 
-, 
takeover bid' (21st May, 1981), Churchbury thea revised its 
bid price and. claimed it already had the support of 40i, )' of 
the shareholderse 
_ 
Due to the speed of the takeover, the hasti- 
ly mounted defences were based on the lines below: 
a) Criticised the vulnerability cf"Churchbury's 
share offer 
b) Produced a profit forecast of £1.2m for 1981 
c) 33% increase in dividends 
d) Underlined the value of its revalued assets (l63p 
versus bid price of 121p) 
e) To deny Churchbury from acquiring more shares in 
the market, Lloyds Merchant Bank, the biddee' s 
financial advisers acquired 50,000 shares of its 
client (Law Land) in the market. 
On 24th Jul-, 1982, f; iýýo days of 
. 
-er the 
appearance of Law Land's defence circulars, the bidder then 
announced the takeover to be unconditional as it already 
revoivea' Iaore than 50'Y of the ui ddee' share capital. fa 
pity the odds ran ed against tho oor, pa: y, Law Lard 
_re-asse _ri; sd that the bid was still inadeat:, ai: e and t; uk the üiconventioina1. 
move of. adv: [s ng its shareholdera to remain as l?. IEC), __t. +`", ) 
in. 
-: estors. On 2nd October 1081, Sir Henry i- arnc: ; hm 
chairman of Law Land res? gned in order to ident-L-Py v"itb other 
. i( - Id 
Chi ssentiont inority shar,:, hclderS ropri 1company's 
equity capital. 
Churchbury's rapid takeover of Law Land suc-- 
ceeded because of strong institutional backing, poor financial 
performance of its target company and the good management 
record of Mr, Oliver Narr? ot, the chief executive of Churchbury. 
However, the modus operandi of 'the takeover in which the tar-- 
get company was suddenly presented with a fait accompli attrac- 
ted cri desprcad critics si s in the press. TH e boar o the 
biddee company strongly denounced the institutional holders 
of "undue haste and behaviour 
- 
contrary to City practice 
and the interests of Shareholders as a whole =". 
This particular takeover to-ether with to eo 
other similar acquisitions i 
.ea Nor ehern ! Engi neeri ng/ma' ©a-- 
mated Poser Engineering and. PER AS/Guthrio) iri which the 
target companies and small investors had very little time to 
respond effectively resulted in the CST (Council for ehe Se-- 
curitios Industry) imposition of a pur chase nor. atoriuu period 
of 7 days to furnish the biddee with more time to mount its 
defence. 
Blcc ýIGGS & HILL 
(Case Study 5) 
In July (20/7/80), BICC, the electrical and 
engineering group pledged itself to bid for Higgs & gill (contractors) provided that an independent audit of :: pork in 
progress airounting to _; 00in and the value of the biddee's 
. 
11 
net tangible assets were setisfsctorf.. The bidder assured 
the target company that its r roposed approach to this matter 
would be a hi h'; y flexible one; it would not expect an inde- 
pendent appraisal to reflect the sane figures as in thhe 
audited accountsf 'tided to J '_'11Q 
. 
-ssl 'ý1 `1ý, ýe/ý' }-F , i/ý/ýce 
that 
Si 
w, 
ýt 
J 
.. 
i 
the 
ý... lw 
it, : 40uld not object to the figu es ..; 
-f 
hey are not ma eri 1 ý.; ý 
d' F- eri. t. But, 
. 
ý. f 
Proceed with 
As part of its preconditions. `i.! CL 3i; en tý d to ? 
Coopers & Lybrand to gis less the : 
"idar 
`S Conl"r'c cts in I` ,,:: ý ess 
--! ýCýý- 
which amounted to 24ß'; m in the corpany' balance sheet . 
This move was influenced. by the rE: tionale timt, the detail 
JI'cvü>>C'own of work in progress on such a scale 
to a group like Highs which had a marret capitalisation of 
ý£6.8ra. 
. 
BICC had in fact held pre-bid discussion 
with the biddee'for 3 months prior to the bid announcement 
but the negotiation broke don because of the bidder's 
exceptional demands. 1ICC then switched tactic and decided 
to appeal directly to shareholders (155 of the biddee is in 
family control, 50% with the institutions and the rest with 
independent shareholders) with the hope that the main insti- 
tutional holders would pressurise Highs to comply with its 
demands. 
Lazards, merchant banker to the bic_dee 
then defended its client through a mixture of defensive 
measures and arguments based on: 
a) the audit exercise would take a long time. 
b) it would not be good for the morale of-straff 
and sub--contractors 
c) any valuation by outside accountants would be 
inclined to be 'ultra cautious. 
d) the investigation would not be able to meet 
the strict, time table imposed b3 
Uli k¬ 
ov GL" 
Panel and would put directors in a posit. con of 
exceptional personal liability if the accoun- 
tants insisted on letters of representation 
from theme 
e) instituted a property revaluation. 
Six weeks after attempting to acquire 
the bi ddee through its novel but heavy-handed acquisition 
strategy, 3IC0 then re-formulated its tactics-by committing 
itself to bid at a price of 110p a share. This tactic was 
partly adopted in order to pressurise institutional inves- 
tors and partly to comply with the Panel's insistence for 
the company to effect a formal takeover bid or withdraw 
within the dateline (12th October, 1981) imposed by the 
Panel. 
As an integral part of its takeover stra- 
tegy, Morgan Grenfell and Hoare Govett (financi c. 1 advisers to 
BICC) actively lobbied the biddee's leading institutional 
shareholders including the Prudential Company (altar the 
Higgs family, it was the next largest shareholder) to enlist 
their support. This lobbying job i -., ht havo inv o? ved C ze ýo nove, stockbrokers to 
. 
Moran Grenfe1 rund BJ: CC but -, Win- C3 to its wide clientele list and possib1 err. 
- 
or rotereits 
t ok. Cazerxove was therefore ineligible or this 
- 
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BICC finally conceded defeat on the clod: 
`ý date when 1 is prebid co, divions ;; 'erc not f 
. 
lfilled 
board of directors of Higgs & Hill, who tiroughout the 
whole affair, put up a very determined resistance. 
In retrospect, one should question the 
bidder's creative but rather assertive takeover strategy 
on the following grounds. Central to the debate are the 
recurrent provisions which big contractors have to provide 
from time to time spanning several years. For example, 
when MIOC acquired `i*ersons in 1970, it discovered belatedly 
that it had to provide nearly £14m against contract lo sese 
It should also be pointed out that the biddee made a si milaw 
loss provision amounting to S, '2.5m for a big road contract 
in Trinidad. BICC further-argued that the construction 
industry was by nature-very uncertain and 1; ha. t the bi ddee' s 
own erratic profits record illustrated this very point. 
On. the other hand, Higgs was justified in believing, that 
such an independent audit could be disruptive and iaiaht in- 
timidate potential clients to the detriment of the company; 's 
future profits. 
In the final analysis, BICC's t`kcov-e. r 
strategy albeit novel in approach lacked flexibility and 
glas self-defeating. The biddee company by merely refusing 
to comply with BICC' a preconditions effecti : Tel defeated ý: he 
(: C1L`. G LJ C^. ý G: /utmptva 
share hol d ern inclination to oxert pressure on the bi 
. 
<<_: ÜL,. 
_ 
pang. It could have well succeeded if it had been prepared 
to make a formal conditional takeover because the appraisal 
task it demanded-could not have been executed within the 
normal time limits. 
AVANA/ROBERT SO1 
(Case Study 6) 
The acquisition of Robertson oods, the food 
manufacturer by vana has been incorporated as one of the 
case studies because of the creative approach devised by 
Avana. On 28th January, 1981 
, 
t_vazsi, when it announces 
takeover at-tempt f of Robertson s L'ýult neon i declared i 't 
may decide to dispose one or all of i. t cl, ' e'tu Ly pica 7 
in Robertson! Etvana h 
-_-A 
to see : i. iio Cj'i sp s i:; ' on i the 
Takeover Panel for this unusual ::; o`: c and ::; t)' 
quentJ. y incorporated. ameý1_ i ienta to the L'a_: eovew' Col e 
-- 
k02 
- 
requiring that 24 hours notice be given by an offeror in th 
rare event that it may contemplate the sale of shares a. n ti i 
target company. 
An unique strategy like this inevitably 
generated more questions than anscwaers: 
a) A possible supposition is that the bidder was 
not confident enough that it would win the 
battle for Robertson and as such, it did not 
want to be left with a minority stake in a 
family controlled business and thus was ex-- 
ploitinö the chance to realise its holding 
while its price was inflated by the bide. 
b) Alternatively, through the disposal of Rohertson_° s 
shares in the market for cash, Avana could then 
re-purchase these shares back under its own hid 
terms (a sort of reverse rights issue). 
c) Or possibly, a more likely explanation ; ": a: a tha - 
Avana intended to retain sufficient flexibility 
. 
for manoeuvre during the -rapidly evolvi n ev,: nt:, 
that charactorised a typical contosted offer. 
r On the 5th 'February, 1981, just before the 
despatch of its bid circulars, Avana then disposed of its 
holding of 705,000 shares in Robertson for at 
. 
07n. In its 
offer document issued subsequently, the bidder stressed on 
its good performance and profits record. It also unCier-lined 
the fact that its experiences and skills will be complemen- 
tary to the Robertson activities in Jam marmalade and minced-- 
neat. Additionally, its technology and work practices in 
its factories can be introduced to improve Robe: tson's 
manufac urine; operation. 
The target company then rebutted the unwel- 
come bid by adhering to the following defensive measures: 
a) instituting a profit forecast. 
b) claitied support for independence from 29a of 
the shareholders. 
c) criticised the speculative nature of Avana's 
share Dri cep 
d) disputed the industrial logic of the , Tmerger. 
e) criticised the bid as being opportunistic as 
Under i: 'r! c; Stock Exclý. ar. ýýe nth corn r Irincw p. e, 'n, "se 
irart_ets ; must not be creaýe, ed a d. when a takeover. i. ._i 
progress, t! i may be avoided by r; ijzn , 2=l hour 1,101-_ce; 
to trio Stock L' i. c ä. ^ß.. n o of suclÄ 
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the takeover was effected before shareholders 
can get an opportunity to reap the census 
of the re-organisation of the preserves divi- 
sion. 
f} informed the Takeover Panel that the bidder 
failed to comply with certain aspects of the 
Code, for example, the Mission of the direc- 
tors' responsibility statement in its documen- 
tation (required under Rule 14 of the Takeovoxr 
Code)'. 
By 31st March, 1981, Avana received 
acceptances amounting to 51.6% (6 million shares) of Robert- 
son's equity and the bid became unconditional. As a result 
of this event, the biddee's board advised. shareholders to 
accept the bid or dispose their shares in-the market for it 
would not be appropriate for them to remain as minority 
shareholders in the company. 
Robertson failed to retain its indc- 
pendence because of its poor performance and poor marke t 
rating. Six months earlier 9 it had to dispose of solle 
assets to reduce borrowings and its 1980 prof? is were don 
from. £1ý. 1m to £750,000. 
A few months after gainiriö eo i of A. Robertson, Sir Julian Hodge, the cha? rLfan of Avana com pax, y 
and four other directors signed an option agreement with 
Northern Foods to sell his 2.75 million shares at 2551,0p pev 
share during, November 1981 (if the options-were exercised, 
Sir Julian and his fellow directors would then retire from 
vivaria). This new transaction had been cleared by the Panel 
because under the now, rules announced5;!, by the CSI, no one iay 
acquire : tit shin a period of one weekk of the voting capital 
of a company other than from a single shareholder if the 
purchase would take the buyer's stake to 15% or over. The 
deal had been sanctioned by the Panel because the bulk of 
the shareholding acquired (8. ? ;, ) came from a single share-- 
holder i. e. Sir Julian. This move would increase Northern 
Food's holding in Avana from 8.95:, to 17.95%. It should 
be stressbd that durin the takeover by Avana for nobertso-zn, 
Northern Food held a cross--holding of shares (8.2 in Avana 
and 4.9, %,, in Robertson) in both companies but supportod 
Avana in its acquisition programme. 
In conclusion, this case study again 
reinforced the underpinning principle that s t: 'ateg ies have, 
to be created and innovatedg ? nether interesting factor 
to be noted is that the trans aC Lion v., fAs handled by the 
ýI2=: es sb ti Sf e T'ý; idon Corinercial Bank of Wales and no by 
me chant bank. Probably. 4 his r a- Ce' ýttriC? ' tah ý'. ;o the 
l*ac4 thal" Avana is a ':: o sh coürýpany and I3J. Julian 
_,; i a so 
the chief executive of }+e harr-, It J 
seen whether a Would lýOi't. iý_Fä_ýi 
. 
r. 
ývC3: 
x L". = C_se 
. 
'.. 
f;:. 
--ran- 
l 1t1tTit . 1_T! 1vO; iemnbCr Ijc7.. "i thus 
U. Ö1L 
_. 
rurther in Avana m. nd then bid for. the coL, nany. Or, 
Foöd m iy be protecting ] is intß rest in the co; pai]y 
against an e e-Tit: ual bid by a rival. bidder by retaining a 
substantial defensive block of equity in kvana. 
NEWS INTERNATIONAL/WILLIAM COLLINS & S014S 
(Case Study ?) 
The takeover bid by News International 
Limited (NIL) for William Collins, UK largest independent 
commercial publisher arose owing to the disposal bJ the 
biddea's chairran, Mr. Ian Collins and family trusts of 28ý-' 
of the voting equity of the company on 12th May, 1931. Sub- 
sequently, NIL, the British subsidiary of the Australian 
own d. at .ýý-.., n News iUý"ý)U i3. 'i; 3v3ý 22t: ß; 1=. d Cl! L'y 1'. ý. o:: upc:. ` v iü_'i! Lz. 
a cash takeover hid £or the company (200p for the ordinary 
equity and 15()P for the non-voting "A" --ha-ras). I"Ir Ian 
Collins then relinquished his stewardship of the company and 
was in turn succeeded by f"Ir. Ian Chapman. t'" 1r. Ian Collins 
and related interests' decision to dispose of their shares 
in the company stemmed chiefly frone internal disagreei. ie;. t 
in the predotdinantly family-controlled business. 
To complicate this issue further, Mr. 
Rbbert Maxwell, the chairman of Pergamon Press and a rival 
business competitor of Mr. Murdoch had over the period of 
several months accumulated a 9.45 holding in the company 
through two nominees, vi. z, Norman Nominees and Down Nominees. 
In its initial bid circular, NIL informed 
shareholders that with Collins' share price above the 'bid 
price, the company (NIL) may not receive adequate acce ances 
gor the tskcover to bocome unconditional. In that event-., 
it would ne prepared to consent to be the biddee's big, -es 
shareholder if the tareo; er failed. However, at the sane 
time, NIL remained non--co mi Ltal about the possibility of an 
improved rid. 
the de_ eri-ce adopted b. 'r v:. '. 
biddee and its i rchanü yank ±> VotF! d on fo-: I 
l: ea^tl.. '. es j1YT. 1, ` ß", it f ore aste de dQ11C11i1. i1- of ro, ) 
. 
1. -- c 2' 
-- 
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1931 and on this basis, the directors will recommend inciroas ;d 
st' 
-- 
divide ds iro:;; 3p to 7.5p, ß Born. dl 
it dro its 
ders' attention to the fact that the disruption caused by the 
takeover would jeopardise the company's continued recovery. 
To support this contention, the new chairman revealed that 
negotiation had already stopped one very important contract 
because of uncertainty surrounding Collins'. future as an inde- 
pendent company. The third major defens_ve'neasure involved 
the enlistment of 9 leading authors including Jack Higgins, 
Alistair Naelean and Hammond Brines to lend their support for 
the company's case for independence. In the later stage of 
the takeover, the media speculated that one of the auf hors 
was even involved in the procurement of some voting shares in 
in the market, undoubtedly to assist; in the defence of the 
company. * 
Then on the 26th June, "19811, in a surprise 
move, Mr. Murdoch managed to win over Nr. Naxwel `s support--* 
when he agreed. to revise his ordinary offer from 200p to 225p: " NIL settled the deal with Mr 
. 
Robert Maxwell at a. si p eciai 
meeting which also resolved a severe commercial dispute be-- 
tween NIL and British Printing Corporation, a subsidiary of 
Pergamon Press. Additionally, they also agreed to the. 
Bemrose merger, an important, printing operation of the two 
groups. Schroder Wagg (Collins'merchaut banker) then alleged 
that the shares held by Perg; ammýon Press had been sold to ; Is., 
in con junction wits. the se tt omeni; of on unrelated dispute 
between News and BPCO As a result of these allegations, the. 
Panel then convened its full executive to examine the civ ujm: s- 
tances behind the sale of the Collins' shares by Nr. IN, axwe_li 
and also the disparity in the offers between the ordinary and 
non-voting shares. After a week of deliberation (3rd July, 
I981); the Panel finally decided to reject the biddee' s alle- 
gations that there was a link between=the sale of shares in 
the company by Pergamon Press to NIL and the settlement of an 
unrelated dispute between the two parties. Schroder Wag, g 
then decided to re-appeal against the decision but a few days 
later, the Panel dismissed the appeal. However, the biddee 
managed to win a major concession when NIL after consultation 
with the Panel, revised its bid for the "A" shares from 1501 
to l63p. 
On 20th July 
, 
1981, NIL then abandoned its bid 
for William Collins but possessed 42.3' of the votes and 18.2; 
of the aggregate share capital (whereas in the Savoy's case, 
THE ended up with 62'7 of the total equity but only 39°r of the 
voting power). ý. ____ý.. ý.. w... ý. 
* The "Lail Tele raph`' (8/rj/81) 
The two entrepreneurs in 1969 were involved in a vigorously 
contested acquisition over the ' NNev 
, 
of the ; 'lc2-ld' and in 
1980, their business interests alai =converged the 
'; 'ho; ýscri 0rgani atic r. docide: to sell . 'The Ti es In 
t to his business s(ýv& r- v" aý v ýý both oases, it Roller'` i7a"welý. l lovesx 
s ry. 
týpý, 
_ 
The contributory factors behind the 
failure to acquire Collins inay be attributed to the bidder's 
inability to win over two other key shareholders i. e. Cross- 
burn Trusts and Wigan (a listed investment trust) which held 
the other vital 8.2505 of Collin's equity. Equally irupor- 
tant was the fact that the defending company managed to 
successfully keep the market price above the bid price thus 
effectively inhibiting NIL from further market purchases. 
Moreover, NIL was also constrained by the fact that even if 
it intended to improve its bid premium further for the voting, 
shares (so that it can gain control at a minimum outlay), 
the Panel had already asserted that adherence to the concept 
of 'comparability' was crucial. This implied that the 
ratio between voting and non-voting equity cannot differ 
vary much from the historical level set in the market. 
From this case study, we note i that 
by means of skilful opportunistic deals with the dissident 
major family shareholder and possibly even trade off between 
two business rivals, NIL had managed to acquire 42 l of Col. 
- 
lins but owing to the long term view taken by its major 
shareholders and determined resistance by the board and the. 
defending merchant bank, it failed to attain the cri tic al 50% control threshold. 
This takeover, again involved the 
Panel over certain contentious issues. One of the main 
features of this aborted acquisition attempts was the abili- 
ty of the target company to rally its key employ oes(z.. c. 
the famous authors) support for independence. This case 
study again shows that events surrounding a bid evolved very 
swiftly and strict adherence to acquisition principles could 
be detrimental to ultimate success. 
BRITISH SUGAR CMUORATION/RANK HOVIS 14eDOUGA L, 
(Case Study 8) 
This contested offer is unique in the 
sense that it is a triangular battle involving three com- 
panies of near equivalent; si e; namely, Berisford (w191z ), 
British Sugar corporation (7'1214m) an-.: , dank Hovis McDou al_1 
0_n the 20th October. i981. BSG denied :s -rr: e t 
rumours that i-: i pten 
. 
ed to bi f --)r_ Rj "i but on ß;. 1c 2= 
1. t: Venber, 
90 11 B"C' in a 
.?. 
'ü"....! jý: i_ý 7 
of RH 's share caui aQ It then issued a con:: ili atoi- 11 
-- 
40! 
- 
statement saying that it believed Ltiat RHii would provide the 
diversification away from conipiete reliance on the sugar beet 
industry, its main source of ousiness and as such, it was 
still evaluating as to whether it should proceed with a for- 
mal takeover. 
we can surmise that BSC `s action was basi- 
cally a classic defensive ploy designed to ward off Beris- 
2orci'. ri 
"ý. iyeovex' aýt; Upt". ý; S-ie? 
i as to dilute 1. ts control ofi 
the company. To recbuilt L; ri ofl y, Berisford' e; attempt to 
acquire 3SC had been -characterised by market raids, impas- 
sioned defences and a Monopolies reference.. The government 
which held a 24; stake in BSC, during the bid, assumed a 
neutral posture and to a large extent was contributory to 
Berisford's defeat in June, 1981. A month lator, the 
government then sold off i 4s ' large block of shares. lith 
the disposal of ibis holding which hitherto " impeded 
. 
BSC fr, on 
embarking on its a : quisi t. o: l Lýr cgre. uý,: ýe, it then turned. its 
full at'ten'tion to RHM. It is Interest In. to note that for 
tact--; ca, -,. roaco n, BSC had to camouflage its bid intention 
from its largest shareholder i. e. Berisfc? rd. Once Berisford 
was alerted by BSO's subtle corporate diversification design, 
it responded by stating that it would give its approval only 
after full appraisal of BSC's investment proposition in RH Mit 
To ºýre-eriipý BSC's takeover design on the 
s 
-l-hi+ hln; rn, nhnr+ 
li tl>t ýl 
. -(ýý,. yen .i ý"i nný ýr n-rn i+tt$"ný ý".. a ze" : "r"v... a. y rý e .. r.. u...... v. ý. a.. ý.. ýý v... vv.. v.. a riOlü'ýýüasýi püii 
All 9ß-h'' 
ý. .: r"iSed and 
"a, 
c catýiM: rv tor, ý"eti manoeuvre 
by vi 
,ý a very wß.. t11 dýý ýý 
acquiring 6.3 million BSC' s equity capital representing 'i4.5%; 
of the company's share capital. The significance of such 
a bold pre-emptive move by R M' added new dimensions and 
balance of poWar in the design of the three parties. From 
the tactical point of view, such a counter move had-indeed 
rendered BSC more vulnerable than before because; 
i) Under Steck Exchange rules, a deal of this 
size required. the approval o shareholders. 
With 5'iß, ' of its equity now in unfriendly 
hands, both major shareholders i. e. Berlsford 
and RHHN could block the approval for the 
takeover. 
- 
ii) Should Berisford be released from the 2ianda-. 
tort' 12 month abstention period (the º-'anel 
could waive this requirement if Berisford 
could. demonstrate a strong case for protec- 
ting its shajýehoiding interests, or, if a 
new, group of shareholders emerged in the 
manifestation of a, proposed merger between 
BSG and i1t) and mount a full bid, control 
could easily be transferred to Beri sford1 
phis scenario was only_, tenable if JHM sold 
stake (/. tO, 2s ;) in BSCO 
1iß) t. nother pccsible perl utation ; 'ms for : RT; i`i to 
f^ount i takeover bid for B310 
_tsel 
f 
- 
408 
- 
It may be recalled that the merchant 
banking respondents unanimously rejected this defensive stra- 
tegy i. e. buying shares of the bidder company, when this notion 
was suggested during the interview but in this very special 
case study, we had noted its utilisation as a pre-emptive 
technique designed to deny BSC the chance of mounting a full 
formal takeover for the company itself (RUM). This clearly 
showed that the merchant banks do monitor overseas acquisition 
practices for its adaptation to the domestic environment. 
Finally, it was evident that merchant banking reputation for 
takeover transactions hinged on their non-absolute compliance 
to fixed acquisition principles and their ability to structure 
financial deals creatively within institutional framework 
prescribing bid behaviour. This in turn, would greatly con- 
tribute to their level of success and indirectly to their 
merchant banking reputation in the City and worldwide. 
LONHRO/IIOUSE OF IRA SER 
(Case"Study 9) 
The 150pß cash bid for the house of Fraser (HoP) was a controversial takeover attempt skilfully devised 
by Lonhro and its financial advisers (Standard Chartered 
Merchant Bank). The genesis of Lonhro's association with 
the HoF may be traced to the sale of SUITS (an industrial 
holding company founded by Sir Hugh Fraser's father) of 21.3 
million shares (17.5% of the equity capital) of the HOF to 
Carter Hawley Hale Stores in 1974. Subsequently, in 1977, 
Lonhro bought a 25Z equity stake in SUITS and Mr. Tiny Ro: wlana, 
became chairman. Later in the year, Louhro managed to ac- 
quire another 23.55 million shares (19.4315) in the HoP from 
Carter Hawley Hale and Mr. kowland then became a non-executive 
deputy chairman of the HoF while Lord Duncan-; 3andy (Lonhro's 
chairman) also took a seat on the Fraser's board. 
This strategic build-up gathered momentum 
when Lonhro initiated a takeover hid for the rest of the c'quity 
of SUITS in April, 1978 but in the fo2: io'rin-; the bic 
was referred to the Monopolies Commission. In Its suý. ai 3io 
40 9 
-- 
to the Commission, Lonhro argued that the I. h1C should have 
taken into account that there was no evidence of any en ipa- 
vour to exercise material influence or control on the HoF's 
policy since it took an equity stake in the company and had 
no desire of doing so in the future. However, this view 
was not endorsed by the HoF which strongly believed that 
"Lonhro was able, directly or indirectly, materially to 
influence and to exercise a measure of control over the 
policy of the HoF. " The Monopolies Commission in reaching 
a verdict based on the 
-prevailing circumstances and arrange- 
ments cleared the bid but with some misgivings due to the 
fact that "Much of the evidence given to us assumed implicit- 
ly or even explicitly, that Lonhro would seek eventually to 
acquire control of the HoF or to promote other mergers invol- 
ving HoF and Lonhro and would effectually diminish the 
existing autonomy of the Hoi. " 
(Monopolies & Mergers Cominissi on, "j onhro. 
SUITS & the Ho£, " HMSO, IMiarch, 'larlý3 
In 1979, Lonhro proceeded with its 
successful takeover of SUITS which then gave it a strategic 
29.9 % (this is 0 1% short of Rule 3r!. which r-ecuires ä for: ý: al 
bid) in the HoF. 
Table ý. : Lonhro IG Strategic St. dke in the Mause of' Fra er. in 1979 According to Evidence Given by the Ir111: 0. 
Holder Holding 
Lonhro 19. '1 
SUITS 10.1 
Carter Hawley Hale 1.1 
Fraser Far, 
-, 
i, y Trusts 2.4 
Bank of England Nominees 2.6 
Institutional Holders 22.4 
Source: Monopolies Commission! `tihid.., "p46. 
Table B. 4: Lonhro tS Shareholding in the House of 
. 
J? 'racer 
1981 Aecordi np to "The Times ý. 11 
T0 3 r" er Lonhro 29 J9 
Fraser Trusts 3"`4 
National Coal Board Pension Fund 2. ?c 
British Rail w post Off-ice Pension Funds 3oä5 
Legal & General Assurance and Prudential Corp. 2.4? 
Midland Bank Trust 1.51 
Robert Fl. enninEf ýlor: ýs. r: ees ?ý Clydesdale &omirees 
Source 
_ 
'`I'rre Ti, ne- (28/1/"l) 
-- 
4ä-0 
- 
In vie:,., of the fact that the bid for. 
SUITS was strongly resistod by the biddee, the close rela- 
tionship between SUITS and the HoF and the location of 
Harrods, the prestigious international departmental store 
within the HoF, Lonhro would have to resort to a controver- 
sial-publicly contested takeover bid rather than an agreed 
one. However, the "weak" Fraser's board, the wide economic 
recession and the downturn'in the retail sector in general 
were countervailing. forces which worked in Lonhro's favour 
and it skilfully exploited these situations. As such, 
Lonhro and its financial advisers adapted their strategies 
to fit the prevailing and anticipated circumstances. Funda- 
mentally, the bidder's acquisition strategies could be 
deduced as-follows: 
a) to weaken and. undermine the HoF board in which 
Lonhro has board representationC, 
b) create doubts in the shareholders' minds about 
the quality of Fraser's management, 
c) to destroy the anticipated defensive plank (di- 
vidend increase) of the of in the event: of 
Lonhro making a takeover bid, 
d) to depress the marker, 
. 
prase of the HoF, finally 
e) to camouflage Lonhro's real intention. 
The prime- strategy underp 
. 
nriii g all 
these tactical moves was the utilisation of proxy battle to 
gain management control, a takeover ploy co. mon in the 
United States but quite a novelty to the UK business envi- 
ronment. 
In April, I ABC, Lori hro commenced its 
tactical campaign by attempting to compel the HoF to raise 
its dividend from 4p net per share to 6p net per share and 
to put four of its own nominees to replace four of the HoF's 
directors at the AGN (if Lonhro succeeded in this endeavour 
it could nominate three more directors in the next election 
thus shifting the boardroom balance of power to its favour*). 
The rationale behind -this pre-emptive move was to under. -mine 
and split. the Fraser's board and destroy its defensive sap&- 
bility as well as dislocating the equilibrium of boardroom 
power. However, the, HoF advised by S. G. Warburg, one os' the 
City's leading : merchant banking houses, skilfully counter-- 
acted Lonhro' s design and with the support of institutional 
shareholders, defeated Lonhro' s special resolutions (Lonhro 
lost the dividend vote by 71 million to 50 million and direr-- 
tors' election by 73 million to `18 m&l lion votes) at the ; G? 1 
in June, 1930. The following mont'La to ready itself foýthe 
eventual takeover of the : aoF, "J onhrc äubi; ly r-: sor: td to 
a 1--5 rights issue 
- 
rais'inc 
. 
34.4-m and also extended its 
' The full Fraser board ;G made up of 15 director,. 
- 
14- 11 -- 
borrowing limits. 
To forestall Lonhro's acquisition intention 
and to cushion against the impact of the adverse interim 
results due in September as well as to overcome the vulnerabi- 
lity of its client, Warburgs then swiftly instituted the 
following organisational and defensive measures 
1) the recruitment of Prof. -Roland Smith to take the 
post of the executive deputy chairman at the iloP 
in order to upgrade its management quality, 
2) the commissioning of a leading property valuation 
company, Conrad tiblat, to do a comprehens ve asset 
revaluation of the Group, 
3) the formation of an executive committee which ex- 
cluded both the Lonhro's board representatives ands 
4) the implementation of an efficiency audit to reduce 
uneconomical store 
. 
r-pace and convert th to more 
profitable use. . 
The Hoe`s i me rim results which were publ-J-shed 
on the 2nd September, 1980 showed a drastic reduce 
. 
on 
- 
i. n_ its 
profits from 7 8m to W1 x. 02 , 
(see Table B. --- ýDe? c. je 
Table B. 5: The House of Fraser's Interim Results 
--- - (1980). 
Performance 1980 WOOO) 
UK 
COD, - 
Turnover 285,588 276,612 
Trading profit 11,880 '15,640 
Profit before tax 1,020 71835 
Profit after tax 490 3,761 
Preference dividend 16 16 
'Attributed to ordin_ar, y shareholders ': 7': i5 (EPS 
Der ordinary share (25 0ý 32rß= 2. 5n 
* Based on 149,725,689 shatres in issue (versus 148,554,628 
shares in 1979 
-- 
adjusted for., The 1: 5 scrips issue). 
As an integral part of its corporate re- 
organisation strategy, in early November, 1980, the neig 
directors at the HoF announced that it was rai sind 
, 
V', 
--01M I 
proposing two sale-and-leasebaci: property transaction 
. 
(D4R" 
Evans in Oxford Street for £29iri wrwit hj year rent review and 
Rackman Store in Birmingham for 211m) with Legal & General 
Assurance. * The funds raised would be used to complete 2. n- 
vestment in computerised equipment, rationalising existinu, 
stores and the possible opening ei S1S.; 4 't ores overseas. 'yýhis 
proposed deal. presented Lonhro with yet . another v'ý, L'el! ent. 
* Other stores ý ike U! JT, T"esco, Dohen-rlat? s 
also resorted t4 uT? 
, 
device 
-i t 080 ICJVa 
'D :- 
chance to apply further boardroom pressures and disruptive 
tactics to discredit the management of the target Coiýwarl J. 
At the second LGN which was convened in 
less than seven months at the behest of Lonhro, the Fraser's 
board together with their merchant banking advisers, Y, a- 
burgs, managed to marshal 71.5 million votes (against 51.9 
million) to defeat Lonhro's resolution. 
-However, although Lonhro failed to block the deal, its crafty tactics succeed- 
ed in splitting the board of Fraser and confusing both the 
private and institutional shareholders (as a result of un- 
certainty surrounding the Lonhro's influence in the ioF's 
corporate policies, the institutional shareholders swiftly 
reacted to this situation by forming an ad Iloc "case commit- 
tee"). The aftermath of the EGM was followed by a bitter 
exchange of 'Letters between the two chief executives with 
Mr. 
-Rowland predicting 
that "... I would lay 10 to, `i that Sir 
Hugh Fraser would not be chairman by the-end of the year. " 
This calculated statement underpinned by Lonhro'a relentless 
harassment cum divide and rule tactic resulted unexpectedly 
in a dramatic reconciliation between the' two pr. o tagonis ü 
on 22nd January, 1981 shortly after the second abortive EGIit 
, 
Sir Hugh's turnaround could be ascribed to the fear of his 
removal by his own board and his inability to get along 
with his o, r=n merchant banking advisor, ; -arburgs (he later 
revealed that Warburgs attempted to remove hing in July; : 11980 
after the dividend proxy battle). The sudden switch In the 
boardroom balance of power afforded Lonhro the chance to 
at . emfipt to remove the main impediment to its takeover design 
i. e. Wrlarburu s which had earlier acted but resigned as Lonh- 
ro' s merchant- banker in the 10.70's. In a public statement 
Nr. Ro w]. and proclaimed that, "arburgs seem to be t =. ki ng 
control of the company without owning a single share. it 
is not for a merchant bank to tell us what to do. Tret's 
run the HoF without Warburgs. I imagine they would want to 
resign and their appointee to go as well". ("The Times". 25/1/ 
811). As a. result of this public statement, bota -; arburgs 
and Oazenove convened a private meeting with Sir Hugh to 
clarify their status. Quo as financial advisers. 
Events finally reached a climax on the 28th 
January, 1981. ! fit : the board meeting of the HoF; by a vote 
of 12 to 
. 
2, Professor R. Smith suddenly replaced Sir Huh as 
chairman. Lonhro exploited this dramatic event by putting 
in a 150p cash bid for the HoF valuing the company at . 211m 
vis--a--vi s its own market capitalisation at ý252ýi. 
From an analysis o? C the e : rents and circumstar?.. 
ces surrounding the bid, it could be surmised that the bi. d-- 
d. ee' s defenýý +; ei? ne of action would possibly inc' ude some 
or a mixture os `counter-measures listed helo,: i 
' µa 1) get the bid ref'errmi to 'ta'fle 
2) present HoF a; 
- 
an un:. 
i. 
veid front and a. 
strengthened 
Jý asset and riovelation of 
inform tion, 
- 
11 'i-J 
- 
It) emphasise the lack of industrial logic, 
5) e1 Dhasise the di scounti ni; of assets, 
6) enlist the assistance of Lonhro's biggest 
shareholder i. e. Gulf Fisheries (which owns 
15d of Lonhro) to veto the takeover attempt, 
7) appeal for-loyalty, 
8) seek the assistance of a "white knight" and 
9) keep the market price above 150p to prevent 
Lonhro from further purchases in the market. 
Lonhro's interest in the HoF and its con- 
troversial bidding strategies vividly illustrated the 
complexities and controversies normally surrounding con- 
glomerate takeovers the world over. Due to the near 
similar size of its victim and other factors mentioned in 
this particular study, Lonhro decided to adopt covert 
tactics to acquire the HoF (Mr. Rowland had in fact pro. 
- 
claimed that Lonhro's '. '.. et ctics seem unexpected and 
unpredictable to those who do not have imagination") by 
undermining and -splitting the board of the target compazry. 
The tactics used were highly flexible and adroitly adapted 
to optimally exploit the opportunistic circumstances as 
they arose and at the same time, erode shareholders' 
confidence and cunningly camouflage its takeover tuning 
with the consequence that "... shageholdors both large and 
small are confused, angry and perhaps susceptible to an 
o f'fer of an apparently aui Cam: and easy b" ay Quit. 
A. A. H. LTD/KANGRA INTERNATIONAL/RENWICK 
(Case Study 10) 
This particular case study illustrated 
certain issues related to contested bj-ds highlighted in 
this empirical study and indicated that an agreed bid or 
recommended merger could sometimes fail. 
In. October,, 1980, ots. H. Limitc-d (AAH), 
the fuel distribution and road hauiaE; e group ; saut: an ac--reed 
The "Financial Tinies" (29/1//31 
- 
takeover at 65p per share (valuing the company at ., 5. m) for 
Ronwick, the motor cruiser manufacturer 
, 
Nevertheless, on 
23rd December, 1980, an unknown offshore 'shell' company, 
Kangra International Holdings based in Hong Kong staged a 
market raid and acquired 14.99% of Renwick's shares at U ", p 
through the London stockbroker, A. J. Bekhor. At the same 
time, just before Christmas, Bekhor bought another 22.5N 
stake for six nominees of Uto Bank of Switzerland. The ac- 
quisition of these large blocks of shares effectively day-i,; ed 
AAH chance of success and it decided to abandon the bid a. zter 
receiving only 2'1. '1f acceptances and also the fact that its 
merchant banking advisers, County Bane k, could not discover 
the identity of its counter bidder. On 13th January, 1981, 
Kangra further increased its shareholding in Renwick to 
22.4ga-I and subsequently, Renwick requested an investigation 
by the Stock: Exchange and the Takeover Panel. Both bodies 
were informed by the stockbroking firm that its nominees 
were unrelated clients and did not constitute a concert 
party. 
To get a better perspective of this coy-apl i. 
cated case study, it should be pointed out that at the point 
in time, Renwick shareholding was basically fragmented iato 
six equity components, viz, an 11% holding by the unsuccoss- 
tul. original, bidder, AAH, a 22.5y; holding by Kangra. 22., 5 1% 
by Ute Bank of Zurich, 7.5% holding among board mombers/ fami- 
1y, 11% holding by shareholders' who accepted the A 
. 
i' bid and 
finally, 23% ti, y shareholders oi' Rer_w. icr who did not accept 
ý: aal ýý; ý. the AAH offer. Strenuous attempt., were s made ýý 1y °U "-c, ý. +Ut` - 
gu, Renwick's financial advisers to uncover the ultimate 
beneficiaries behind the nominees but they eventually conceded 
that they have 
. 
"... reached a brickwall as gar a. s Kangw is 
concerned. " ("Financial Times, " '14/1/81) 
In late January, Renwick was presented 
with a fait accompli when Mr. Graharn Beek, a wealthy South 
African businessman (the real owner of Kangra International) 
announced that he held 50.9% of 
. 
Renwick voting shares (Kaug ra 
had effectively purchased the 22.5, E stake in Renwick from Uto 
Bank) and was making a Formal bid at 85p per share for the 
remaining equity of the company. 
In this particular case study, we , noticed 
that the control of a local company passed to a forsign bidder 
in such an unusual fashion that both the victim and its ad.: i-- 
sers were unable to put up any resistance due to the fact 
that the bid was dexter ou` ly executed involving such bid de-- 
vices as fnarket raid, covert nominee shareholdings and za Hong Kong 'shell' company resuscitated for. this particular 
acquisition purpose (it was formed in pri. 13 1980 and c h2.: 1", ed. 
its name in Au; ust the same year): P3 
. 
nLing; at the in 
w IZ 'lie t e-ý. ý was ed and 
.. 
L. r7L1 ý ttE. ! Zd ý... 1 ýnn. i.. -> 
>v1c. 
r 11. L li ýQk Cýý`ýýý+ýrlýýiýý! r 
.vý.. 
ions, "The Tires" ý. 'uef ll;; o cJ. ý : ý.... cti 
Panel furthermore faced. 'with these =_n: ný. r; e sh.. reholä. in .; c ri; 
- 
Lý J 
to have been less effective... the fact that Renwick, was never 
in a position to mount a defence until it was too late and 
that other Renwick shareholders were unclear to this day 
about the exact circumstances in which their company was taken 
over is hardly a satisfactory state of affairs. "* 
. 
e 
* "Th© Times" "2/2/81" 
it G- 
Appendix CA: Questionnaire (Merchant 
. 
Banking Survey) 
µ, 
t. 
_ 
g 
c. 
ýte h iý L, 't [6 5ýý^'ä, rr ý.: r e. 6rÄ 5_.. `t 
4 I-1O\ILL DENNY HOUSE 23 GOS1,. 'EI. L ROAD. LONDON I: (I'I ? PP 01-2-53 1199 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL: CUESTIONNAIRE ON CORPORATE FINANCE 
ADVISORY SERVICES RELATING TO CONTESTED BIDS RENDERED BY 
UK MERCHANT BANKS 
(A) MERCHANT BANKING BACKGROUND (, S TRliC` URE/FI7i7CTZ0i"IS ) 
`i) When was your merchant bay k established? 
2) is your merchant bank: 
A1 prinei pay. /i ndepen_deliL unit 
bA 
. 
sub. -u'± di. arr 
3) '1f You are -a subsidi ay who is your parent company? 
4) What advanta es do you believe a merchant bank may derive 
from being subsidiary of a lar6er financial or; anisa ti c :e 
5) What disadvantages do you parcel : *e merchant banks sVfer 
wn"» other e... r1_jpýaP7 ýii. ýt1. tl(. 7nn ttt sýrsr t.. ý. la. uýý.... 
1 
6) Do you have 
a) an organisational chart? Yes/No 
b) a corporate prospectus? Yes/No 
c) could you supply us with both? Xes/No 
7) What particular unit/division within your merchant hank 
deals with corporate mergers and takeovers? 
8) When was this unit/division created? 
9) What are its main functions? 
10) That is the title of the head of this unit/division 
11) Whom does he report to? 
12) ; ghat specialist, do you 
ýAccoi. mtaiiý 
ave sta: ät: 
_n 
this unit 
; t; s ;. u. 7iness gx-ac±ua ; cis 
J Oth:. °2's (r 1_eß St-" sý)r? C. 1 "j- 
.. 
l. t., 
" 
13) Do your spDc iaý... sts i: or"- 
dý I«. '. ý7 Y'idu 11J Cr r ", ýnr^ 1 vli 1l 1_ "ý _ V. % - 1. 
cial advice? 
Individually/In Teams 
b) If both, under what circumstances do they work individual- 
ly and what, in teams? 
14) In giving advice to your client, do you deal with: 
the company chair pan (chief 
- 
executive. )) 
the managing director 
Elie z`inancial director 
the corporate planner 
o hers (please speciiyý 
_ý __----- 
15) Under what of rcunwtances, if any, would you undertake a 
preliminary businesz negotiation for an anonymous client 
represented by a third party? 
16) Before you commit yoursolf as -a financial advisor to a new 
client, what screening process do you adopt? 
4 N, 
(B) BIDDING STRATEGIES 
1) Who is responsible or the formulation of the acquisition 
idea? 
2) In executing an acquisition study and evaluation for your 
corporate client, do you undertake the following activiOes ? 
History of the company 
Capabilities of the board 
(Market analysis 
Financial appraisal using 
Computer simulationn 
Others (please specify) 
of directors 
extracted/extrapolated data 
3) Do you have: 
a) A specinen errs-a checklist? Yes /! to b) Could we have a ;.: ^ ' Yes/i 0 
-- 
4:: g 
4) Do you sometimes provide loans to facilitate an acquisi- 
tion ? 
5) What factors influence the timinx of the offer? 
(Q: Do you subscribe to the 'sighting shot' strategy? )* 
6) In making a bid, what factors influence the terms of con- 
sideration or acquisition financing? 
(Q: Do you favour building up a pre-bid stake in the target 
company? ) 
7) What faetors influence the premium pricinG f 
$} What. yercentaae level of premium pricing over the merket 
price would you pitch your bid price;,, 
below 2O 
,. 
abcve ýý; 
l} what factors determine the advice you ' 
. 
vt. subsequeitl 
on increases in the bid price? 
10) Do, you favour securing the agreement of the board of the 
biddee company before announcement of the bid? YeslNo 
11) Do you make an offort to access the key shareholders of 
the target company before announcoment of the bid? 
12) Who, within your merchant bank draws up the offer docu lent? 
(Q: Could you please describe and elaborate on the main 
features of draft meetings? ) 
13) that factors influence the choice of prime emphasie_ in the 
bid circular" 
jam''' Ste' not es question asked during the second merchant yanking 
Survey. / 
n( 
14) What are the most inportant factors in deterninii tnor 
a bid is successful or not? 
I- 
(C) DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES 
1) How do you. go about devising your defensive s t: r'a tvp., ies f 
2) Listed below are some ba 
ble beforo or during the 
advocated by the various 
Please kindly mark those 
r ivia 
n 
1 
sic defensive : tr"atcgie. (<oplica- 
currency of a takeover bid) 
literature of corporate finance. 
that you foal ae practical and 
asset revaluation 
sale of corporate 'assets (before/after) 
I 
capital- reconstruction 
increase dividend 
bonus issue 
profit forecast 
instituting legal action 
appeal for shareholders' loyalty 
share placing 
undertake an acquisition (before/aftor) 
acquire shares in the bidder 
others (please specify) 
3} In dev elping your defensive s trategies, how do you take 
into account: 
a) Equity held by the board of directors or family? 
b) Equity held by ins-IL-institutional shareholders? 
'Equity held by ineiabe so thc:., enezäl auh 1: ß. c. ? 
- 
4.1 
-- 
4) t, 'hat factors bear upon the choice of defensive strategy? 
(Q: How important is the in tii es of conto-st-cd 
Overs ?) 
5) What salient information or line of em hasis do you normal- 
ly incorporate and stress in your defence documentation? 
6) What factors do you take into account in advising your 
client's board to accept the 'terms offered? 
R the shareholders interest 
the interest of the hoard 1 th e interest of the employees 
--the 
interest of the local community 
your own banking reputation in the City 
national interest e. g. effects on imports/exports 
7) What other conditions, apart; from price would you advise 
a corporate client to take into account when deciding whe. 
- 
ther or not to accept an initial or final offer? 
4 
8) Do you feel that a. profi Ü forecast ii l:. greatly influence 
the shareholders' opinion i: accepting or rejecting. a oid? 
If yes, why? 
9) What difficulties do you perceive assoc äted with the re-- 
view of your client's profit forecast? 
10) In reviewing your client's forecast, are you confronted 
with problems such as: 
limited market data 
insufficient time for analysis 
extent of confidentiality required 
the nature of the business 
tonreliable forecastin methods 
unreliable accounting methods 
11) 
-Do you monitor the results of the'. 
, 
rofi v foreea h si' o 
12) What ha. 
'Jpens if you find there is ca; J. eviatiof1 i'rof: eile 
LorCcast ? 
- 
g2 
- 
(D" ROLL AS TAKEOVER SPECIALISTS 
1) As a professional corporate entity, how dc you see your- 
self vis-a-vis other professionals like stockbrokers 
_or corporate lawyers who also provide comparable advisory 
services to. the corporate sector? 
2) What factors give J ou the distinctive advantages as r er-- 
ger and takeover specialists 'in the TJX? 
(How closely do you work with the Takeover Panel and do 
you favour self-regulation? ) 
3) Flow do you perceive the tenure of your relationship with 
your client? 
ýooe4. e....... ýýspcndvnt's Name- (pleas print) 
"e"o""r"oo"acý Bankirig Tide 
.............. 
Division attached 
"o"""s""ee"wca 
Nam e of 1`aýo ý'is? ant Bank 
We wish to record our formal gratitude 
and appreciation for your kind assistance and co- 
operation. 
Thank. You. 
Yours faithfully, 
ROBERT GUI! 
'. 
Do tora1 student 
City 7n <i-e s -ncr Sc týj is ý., e ý.. .ir: t 
... 
ý 
,. +,...... 
Lo ndon. 
Proi'«euer H. Gri. nyer, 
ýI'Jfi? LF?? rte? I'Üc^: l"l: 'Tl Pr o£. 
Invest- 
St A Andre z. 
1. ß'i :. ) 
Appendix 02: Questionnaire (Stock- 
broking Survey) 
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ý_ § 
LIONEL DENNY HOUSE, 23 GOS\VELL ROAD, LONDON ECM 71111 01-253 4399 
COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL: CORPORATE FINANCE QUESTIONNAIRE 
FOR UK STOCKBROKERS 
1) Do you have a corporate finance advisory department/unit 
within your stockbroking firm? 
Yes/No 
2) What is the full name of this department/u_ßß. t? 
3) What are the main functions of this d partmcnt, /unit 
c: e a tý=f. ': '? ý; %? ir? Y? 4) il at is the title of the head ei' this 
j) Who are the species is ;; s staffing this department/unit ? 
6) Do your corporate finance specialists work individually 
or in teams when giving corporate advice 
Individually. /! n tears 
How closely do you work with merchant banks in providing 
corpor. ate financial advisory services 
not closely closely- quite closely very closely (1) (2) (3) (4) 
8) How involved are you in corporate acquisition activities? 
not at all involved quite involved vezy involved (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q) Please kindly describe the nature of your ä... lvolvemo ß u'. 
10) Before you commit yourself as a financial advisor to a 
new client, what Green 71? prose ", do you adopt 
t' hei; il F' f' Li ý_ CQl: loaia7 is financially sours 
naci: raun 
. 
i'-T 
cr n 3. Z i on iiany 
y major confl± c ;. ithin the co::.; a. 
1who eher it is 
-a '-"; cr ii:::? !@ usir c 
__. ý 
qual :i icy to !.. ^, ý ^ r. " : >; 
ýliý 
_ 
u. ýýý, 
._ 
_ý J 
'i1} Which method o 
. 
aýc 
-uý- 
-. Lt ion fi_ný. ncin do -you o ;:, a11, \ 
advise. your c iel l 
l; 
xCZ'? 
12) In executing an acquisition study and evaluation for 
your client do you underýake an anal y sis of. 
History of the company 
Capabilities of the board of directors 
Market analysis 
Financial appraisal 
Computer Simulation 
Others (please specify) 
13) Listed below are some basic defensive strategies (ap- 
plicable before or during the currency of a ,; a. eoýe. t" 
bid) advocated by the various literature of corporate 
finance. Please kindly mark those that you reel art!,, 
practical and viabl. 
Rasset revaluation 
sale of corporate asseto 
capital reconstruction 
increase dividend 
] bonuys issue 
vý p3ýofi 
t forecast 
instituting legal action 
appeal for shareholders' 
shore placing 
(before/after) 
loyalty 
undertaking an acquisition (before/after) 
acquire shares in the bidder company 
14) What are the distinctive factors that favour you as 
corporate financial advisers vis-a-vis merchant banks? 
r" 00 4er. "" r-o r o"f e" 
(LEASE PRINT) 
""" o"" ecoe af o e" r 
Hama Title 
"a""ee"ee"""a..., "e. g ""sacee e" at e" 4 
Name of Firm Division Attached 
We wish to record our gra itude and 
appreciation for your assistance and J 'id co-ope. r t:. of 
Yours fs:. uhf ý L. 
-) 
ROBERT CHID 
City University 
r; ': G 
- 
endix Table 0.3: Merchant Bankers' Bid Inclination: 
"One-Shot" Offer Versus the 
"Sighting-Shot" Approach. 
Bid Bid %1 of Total Bid ; 'ailure (C) as % 
Approach Noe 
-(n = 30) ( rate No 
.ý of (a) 
h ff r t 7 23% 3 43% e one s o o 
sighting shot 23 77% 6 26 
Total 1 30 100%% i9 
Statistical. Results: 
Chi-Square 
= 
5.. 673; critical value = 3.. 8'1-, dl' 
significant, at 5% 
4 
_ 
ýý, ý ý- 
Ap endix 0.4: Specimens of Bid Documentation 
. 
Guthrie Corporation 
. 
British Sugar Corporation 
. 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
. 
'] 
.W . Ward 
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J. G. Hogrq 
E. G. Lewis. 
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Sir Erliest Wo draore 
To the Crcliniry Sharcho! dors and, fer information only, the Preference Shareholders. 
Dear Shareholders, 
Registered Office: 
PüO i3uiidir y, 
122 Le3ühr"hf fl Street, 
London, EC3V 4PU. 
8th September, 1981. 
PROPOSED OFFER BY PERMODALAN MASIONAL BERRHAD 
I am writing to advise you that the following announcement was made yesterday: 
- 
"The Guthrie Corporation Limited acknowledges the announcement 
made today by Perrnodalan Nasional. Berhad that it no.,,., owns 50.41 % of 
the issued ordinary share capital of Guthrie and that it intends to make an 
offer for the remainder of the ordinary share capital. 
The Sc rd of Guthrie, together with its advisers, Baring Brothers Pi 
Co., Limit' d. is co 1 ideri g the t ropo: sed offer and advise shar&. o! de: s 
in due course. " 
Yours sincerely. 
- 
Carl Openshavw 
Secretary. 
I 
ý, 
{ 
' 
ý. 
ýL Cu. rpo: c pr,, p'ýnt.: dh7WI'.; mslý". iSLenýýn . 7^4y 
46 
ZZ, 
C ha rm an 
4ý19 
FA P" 
BRITISH SUGAR CCRPC AT! ON LL`, SiTED 
PO Box 26 Oundle Road 
Pelerborou. ti Pct 9QU 
Telephone F'et? rbo: ough (0733) &3171 
Telex 326 67 
2nd July, 1981 
Letter to Shareholders 
from Sir Gerald Thorley, TD, Chairman 
Dear Shareholder, 
T am delighted to be able to tell you that the bid from Berisford has no*W lapsed. 
Net acceptances of the bid amounted to only 2 per cent. 
-- 
the vast majority of 
Berisford's 38 per cent. shareholding having been acquired through the market raid. 
The prolonged period of uncertainty is now over. We are once again 
cdiicentrating on developing British Subar as an independent Company. 
I would like to thank all shareholders for your staunch support. You will not 
regret it. 
Yours sincerely, 
Gerald Thorley 
Chairman. 
ý, 
-4; 0- 
1 'R. if lJZr LýlAi. li: Ä 
36 St Andrew Square 
Edinburgh El-I2 2YB 
telephone: 03 1-556 8555 
18th February 1982 
Dear Shareholder, 
I am sure-that you will be aware that on 15th January, 1982 the Secretary of State for Trade 
announced that the Monopolies and Mergers Commission had concluded by a majority that the 
proposed merger between The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Limited and Standard Chartered 
Bank Limited and the proposed take-over of The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Limit=ed by The 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation might be expected to operate against the public 
interest and recommended that they should not be allowed to proceed. In accordance with the 
advice of the Director General of Fair Trading, the Secretary of State accepted the Commission's 
majority recommendations. 
Naturally your Board, which recommended the merger with Standard Chartered, is most 
disappointed at this outcome. In our view a valuable and unique opportunity. has been lost. 
However, your Board will follow its alternative strategy for the future development of our domestic 
and international business. This strategy is based primarily on the acceleration of the expansion 
programmes which both the Royal Bank of Scotland and Williams & Glyn's Bank are already 
undertaking. 
In order to provide for the development of the Group's strategy and for the direction and 
co-ordination of its activities, the Group Board has created a new post of full-time Group Chief 
Executive. Mr. S. Procter, at present Chief Executive of Williams & Glyn's Bank, has been appointed 
to this position and will he supported by a small compact planning team. Mr. Procter will operate 
from the Group's Head Office at 36 St Andrew Square and from its London Office, which will move 
to 24 Lombard Street when those premises are completed later this year. He. will cease to be Chief 
Executive of Williams & Glyn's. 
To allow me to devote more time to Group affairs, Mr. J. B. Burke has been appointed full-time 
Deputy Chairman of the Royal Bank of Scotland. In taking on this new and important role, Mr. Burke 
will relinquish his positions as Managing Director of both the Royal Bank and of the Group, but will 
remain on the Group Board. 
Mr. C. M. Winter, at present Deputy. Managing Director of the Royal Bank, will succeed Mr. 
Burke as Managing Director ofthe Bank. 
Mr. M. H. Davenport, at present Ein Executive Director of Williams &: Glyn's Bank, has beer. 
appointed Managing Director in place of Mr. Procter. The change of title from Chief Executive is to 
achieve uniformity. 
Mr. W. J. A. Dacombe, who is already a Director of the Group, will assume responsibility for Group planning and development, and w lt relinquish his post as Assistant Chief Executive of Williams & Glyn's. The lmpo: to noe oI these iur; c lens is refieiic: ý iii t[J[ jlj-time appioftitrnent. 
All these ire et ný on Iý ct A,, rýri lI9 app.,; nt mens w; It take ýI t. 
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benefits from 
cio5e r co-o^e: ation now dnd in te 
future 
Your Bo arci Inas no doubt that we have the determination arid the h nan and financial 
resources to continue to grow and prosper and we shall pursue these objectives vigorously in your 
interests as well as those of our staff and customers. 
Yours sincerely, 
MICHAEL HERRIES 
CHAIRMAN 
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Appendix Table C. 6: Financial Advisers Connected with the 
Group 2 Case Studies. 
BIDDER ADVISOR BIDDEE ADVISOR 
Kangra A. J. Bekhor'1' Renwick S. Montagu 
News Intl. G. Mahon Wm. Collins S. Wac- 
Dunhill-. Logida Gresham Tst A. sprey Morgan Grenf ei] 
Churchbury R. Floming Law Land LBI 
Avana C. B. (Wales3 Robertson Hill Samuel 
Gasco G. Network3 St. Pira. n Chtr. Japhet 
BICD M. Grenf ell Higss & Hill n/a 
BSC Schroder W. RHM Morgan Grenfell 
Lonhro SCif]B HoF Warburgs 
THE Warburgs Savoy Baring; 
'l 
¬ 
stockbroker 
2 Commercial Bank of Wales (non-merchant bank) 
3. not a licensed dealer nor. rileschant bank 
f.. ) .. -t J 
Appendix Table C"`7: "Dawn RRai. dt" and heir Suosequentt; 
Developments. 
- 
, 
GaiQ Raldar Targst -"'.. ' Pee-raid -Raid, Current h vclopmonts 
price price price 
4 
16 JUiy 
1fi Jrfy 
Prov! rtctlt 
Perrama; 1 Pro 
rnrcn.: ru : ýnrce, 
3P & Co. ý it 
cc 
1S} 
2_> July St. ýrv: cs: .. Gough Cco. ef 
. 
76 
23 July rroo c Bond 6! aIlirscn"Denny 621 
25 July ,,, CC Energy Petrocon 30 
21 Oct. Ward Vlt, lle }: Shoa3 48 
1.4 Nov. ; 'Davin Du*apipo. InlL f 19 
4 Dec. Cecpcr Ind"UstrIcs F. H. Lloyd ' 29 
9 Dec. Mcleod Aussen London Shop Profi. L3 
23 Decc Kangra Intl.. 
" 
{ir-nxick 
.. 
73. 
2U 
6 Feb. Cfmnnd ! nds. r -- - Howard M c! ilnCry " 
12 Feb. Ltardscy 
- 
F. Pratt (Eng) "" 70 
24 Feb. J. Granvraoý Gsskeli Broadloom 45 
Y Junal I A! li-inx Eacle Star -23336 27 6 July CRA Chtorida 
6 July Mills c. faleit Loirasel 87 
iC Duty f; zitse t lr: a! nercc 
-. 
` 
"' P d l d I- ` 
t4 
to JuSy 0 Beazer ; r- uc esibil - ". 
Y4 July 5ta ': c-s 
" 
''. Sraby Leslie 3a 
ý5 July HEI Amal. Po". or Eng. ", 1C? .. 
t7 Ju!; F ieid'j: oud ürahurn MRIcr 12 
22 July 1. Wivi e&A cc. Sanders . 70 
24 July Dennison M; c;: U! rcx Group 
.. _=' 
122 
7 Aug. Gallagher 
." 
Oirux Group 164" 
20 Aug. Gaparo Industries Ductiiu S! -, ols 63 
' 25 Aug t Perccmon 
. 
Solicitors Law 
- 
24 . 
22 P., jo, 5sselle Letras :" 120 
7 Sep. Permodalam" Gt. r`!; r! e 662} 
10 Sep. 
13 Sep 
C; jyjiV4E' 
Weilen Plantat! Ctt ý 
Ls.... rn ý Mo ll. c. 
-r CIBri t 
25 
134  
21 Sep. BTa 5crck 
... 
35 
24 Sop. Sccl6t6 06n6ra! e 
' 
Tanks. Cons. In-!. 31-5 
23 Sep. ', '.?. Kent Federated Land 8. 
30 Sop. McLeod Russell Warren Plantalior. s 190 
5 Oct. General Tire Hallitc Holdings. i63 ". 
. 29 Oct. Pcrn: cdalan A mal, Metal Corp. 410- 
2 Nov. TV', 'W 
-Enterprises ACC ... 
- 
46 
(Bell Group) . 
3 Nov. British Sitg?. r fHM ý" 
. 6bß 
5 Nov. AH1.1 British Sugar- 316 " 
{23 I: ov. RTZ T. W. "lard 14.1 
24 Nov. Darb & Portland iyrai'arn Miller. ; 61 
18 Dec. Leans investment LOF's 
. 
ý 
41 
i'17 nee. ttt Alton House ilcntvs 
. 
05 
nJ 
'60 36 
60 
" 
25 
. 
30 
112. 
C5. 
_"25 
'. 
E4} 
63} 
2e0 
32- 
105 
5S 
75 
55 
140 
10 
130 
170 
"78 
20 
'I 140 
eo1 
15s} 
40 
X30 21: 
2GO 
550 
s27. 
6& 
385} 
1C, 0 
33 
so 
125 
33 
6B 
40 
118 
&4 
23 
62 
44 
380 
32 
5E' 
ti "_ 
hR 
46 
is-0 
: So 
- 121 
27 
SnG 
, 
4, S2 
-753 
203 
. SC, 13 
105 
G1} 
420 
22 05 
24 
S2 
. 
110: 
"7B' 91 
17E-- 
171 
21 
Allied London h! d 145p Nov. 'iii?. 
Brooke Bond bid 3:. 1p Jan. '61. 
April 1901 UCC sold at 32p. 
C. £. J. Clark bid at 90p Jan. '81. 
Giynwed 35p bid Oct. '51. 
Stare ýubý"er, ueatty t"iken to 25.5°h:. ýt Jc : eilt to iecseiýcaDit.. 
00 Gfoup no4; holds 26.9%. 
Allianz holds 25.15 of E_K! o Lt. 
tnvestmcnt. -. [ss? tto bid 140p CO. '21... 
. aid 4 Scp-t::,, suýi Trist 1 ;ic: 33 F, - 
sty so;, 5. P Investricnt. May buy more, 
.: -. 
51c: 140p rccorrmstmondcd by A. P. E. 
. 
f 
°i: 
--tms es-Iul. . 17.4% bnught Juiv 'Cl. 
Ge!! a her 1SGp bid lmcunc; it? anat. 
Cäpara las 207a.. 
Holding c-f 25%. 
Subs cquar. t: y obi:! 11'Cp. 
Bid 901;. ß. See tc. -. t. 
PJd ai 401! rich, 
acr,: tlred. 5CJ lai r. E 
Bid at Cüp a schare. 
Built up to 51.5°lä Strike. 
Eid et 142; biar. '82 
214p bid uncondi: lonul MY. '81. 
200p bid failed Jan. '52. 
Perrtodatan bid 550p. 
Dawn raid at 6Op ! 1ov. 81.... 
14.7%'a cr, ulrcd. 
Sought 10.5%. Gen=ford h? s ;! rar. '0 
RTZ 225p hid unconditional. 
14.9%'o acquired. Than fu;. hctr 15%. 
Picked up 3.5% stai: e tfo: v 17O/ 
. Less than 50, 'o 
-acquired. 
70p, hie 18psod Mar. '52. 
103p laid rcfetred. 
Holdings 
la Dec. Surrnah 0)I 
.-` 
Croria 1nL' 431' 
23 Dec. Rowntrce Huntley & Palmer5 fio 
jar, 
!n Jan. Ir. io nai: PO1ni A. Holden 107 
20 Jan. In, zst tniet; igenco L. & Pron. Trust 145 
8 Mar. G. V. I. Garnen! David Scott 1B 
. 
70 
ISO 
150 
22 
"Ue": istlo! 
source: "The Observer, " (2/3/82) 
rRl 
Eatt: n wUh LC. L 
Near ib°/o staks. 
-i: i 
BIDDER FAIYIILY/FNTREPRE - EURIAL 
INTERESTS 
Grand- I-Iletropolitain 
Hanson Trust 
Harris Queensway 
Ca part, 
Lonhro 
Trust House Fore 
Avana 
Gasco 
News International 
BIDDEE 
Decca 
Stag sine 
HaVy 
Scottish & Universal 
Investment Trusts 
House of Fraser 
St, GeorSe 
Gough 
. 
Coo;; er 
Guthrie Corporation 
Savoy Group 
William Collins 
Sir Maxwell Joseph 
James Hanson 
Philip 
-Harris Paul Swarad 
Tiny Rowland 
Sir Charles Forte 
Sir Julian Hode 
Jim Raney 
Rupert ? Murdoch 
Sir Edward Lewis 
N. Robintion 
Dartnow; Sloto Y er Tamil 
Sir Hugh ý'rc1. ti7? L' 
Sir Hugh Fraser 
Armstrong family 
John Boardman 
Andorson family 
Dt Oyly Carte 
Collins family- 
pendix Table G. 8 : Bidder and Bi_ddee Companies Exhibiting 
Founding Family/Entrepreneurial Iniluen- 
ces on their Boards as Reflected in the 
Case Studies. 
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Appendix Table 0.10: Merger Trend in the USA 
1975-1981. 
Number of Number of Total amount 
transactions transactions paid for all Year 
at ;, 100m at $500rn transactions] 
or more or More (in 1; on) 
19? 5 14 1 1118 
1976 39 4 20.0 
1977 41 ? 21.9 
1978 80 5 34.2 
1979 83 14 43 05 11980 9L1- 15 44.3 
l 9gß 55 12 
. ý_ _ . __-__35.7 _ýý 
Source : The "Fin racial Times, " (15/ 1/8; ') 
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Appendix Table C. 11: Acquisitions Handled by a"Leading. 1JS. 
Investment Bank, Credit Suisse First 
Boston, 1981. 
AC. UIRING 
i Oi IF AN LE'S 
AGQUIRED OR DIVESTING 
COillplf NIES 
BID 
VALUE 
f 
1. Du' pon-t de Tm. iours & Oo. Vonoco Inc. 0ni 
2. U.. S. S feel Corporation Marathon Oil Co. 6,2641iß 
3. Fluor Corp. St. Joe M_inerp is Corp. 2,733m 
4, Freeport-MIclNIoran Corp. Freeport I" iner. als Co. 2,540ra 
5. Kuwait Pe troleuni Corp. Santa Fe International 2,537m 
6. Union Pacific Corp. Missouri Pacific Corp. 'i, 000m 
7. Ensource Inc. Oil & Gas Interests 625m 
8. CSR Limited Delhi International Oil 610a: 
90 International Sunbeam Corp. 5'15m 
10 ul_, otro Ltd St. Joe inerais Corp. 
"11 
. 
Prudential Insurance Bache Group Inc. 3J'. m 
12. Du Pont de Nomours & Co. N 
. 
England Nuclear Corp, 34-8m 
13. Prudent 
. 
ai inVturance CGMRI 340r: 1 114-. Allied. Corp. 11'J sher Scientific Co. 32Cm 
15. Consolidated Gold Fields New mont 1ýining Corp. 309rmi 
16. Chemical Ne,: York Corp. National Banks of Flor 
. 
da 29'1Jä 
Commerce N. 1 1 n. o nciül Gen., rý. ßun. 
7,. Bankshares 24 
8J 
_-. 
i. 
... ý . '^Pott USh Inc .. r scot-'-, er 
CO. 
1! 5m 27 
19 C'1I1I Holdings ,d ASARCO Inc:.. 7 98rn 
0ý ; Bucyrus--E! Jrie Co. Western Gear Corp. 1 75m 
Source: adapted from, "Financial Times, " (27/1/82) 
ý, 
_. 
4ý ý 
-- 
B BL. L tOiý'R r, `-lH (QUER AL) 
Accepting Houses Committee (1977), "Evidence to theCom- 
mitee to Review the Functioning of Financial lnstitutions. ý 
London: Roman Wall House. 
"Accepting Hauses", The Bankei,, June, 1980, pp. 16-17. 
"A British Upheaval in Merchant Banking" 
, 
Business 40, Teek 
June, 23,1980, PP. 3i-32. 
"A Case Study: Takeovers (1980) ; 'Prepared for the Financial 
Times. Conducted by NOP Market Research Ltd. London: Finan- 
cial Times. 
Annual Reports of the 30 Merchant Banks Chosen for Field 
z- Survey (1979-80). 
Accountants International Study Group (1974). Published Prc'- 
fit Forecasts: Current Practices in Canada, the United 
4i K-. ngdomand the United States. London: ICAO 
`fAcquisitions and Mergers of Industrial and Commercial. Corn- 
panics, " Four tit Quarter 1979) B siness Monitor. Quarte ry 
Statjstics. London: HMSO. 
Alberts, "The Short-Term Earnings for Evaluating Per 
Share Standard Perspective Acquisitions. Merzers 6 Aco isi_ 
lions, Winter, 1978, pp. 4-18. 
Alberts, W. W. & Segall, Eds. (1966), "The Corporate i. i;. r er , Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 
Allen, G. C. (1968), "Monopoly and Restrictive Practices", 
London: Allen & Urnein. 
Anderson, O. D. (1980), "Forecasting : Proceedings of the In- 
stitute of Statisticians 
_Annäal 
Conference, Cambr%cý e ly ýö 
." Ux ord : North-Tolland 
. 
Andrews, M. & Rook, A. (1978). 11dezging for Profit: How to 
Win in a Takeover Game" Surrey, Financial Techniqu es-L 
. 
Angermueller, H. H. and Taylor, M. A. "Comýmýerc i al vs invest- 
ment Bankers, " Harvard Business Review, Sept. 
-Oc 
., 
1977, 
PP. 132-144. 
-Ansoff, H. I. "Strategies for Diverse fication" 
, 
HarVa. rdtivs; 
_- 
ness Review, Sept. 
-Oct., 1957, PP. 113-124. 
Annual Review 1980. Investors Chronicle. 
ý, Anson, I. I. et a! «T ý. ": e ý,,, ýý `'ears of Acrüisl. -L-icr. "aahavionr in America, 1945.6)" 
, 
Associated Buc nes3 . 'rograimme$ 
_i 
cn- 
don; 1972. 
- 
4f4 
r Apple yard, A. R. et al. "The Relationship Bet;. een Tarp eA : ve. 
_ Activity z Share valuaiion", Jojrnal of Finance, Dec. : 1975, 
v. 30, nc. 5, pr. 1? 39. 
-12!; 9. 
Arden, Tr, and Eccles, G. W. Toilejr's Companies Act 1280:. 
An Explanatory Guide, Croydon, England: Tolley. 
Aris, S. (1973). "The Jews in Business", Middlesex; Penguin 
Books. 
Arnett, H. E. Arnett, H. E. "APB "Opinion No. 29 Applied: 
Case Studies in Liquidation, Reorganisation, and Recission'", 
Mergers & Acquisitions. Fall 1980, PP. 5-14. 
Arnfield, R. V. Company Mergers and Acquisitions. Proceedings 
of a National Conference Organised by the University of 
Strathclyde in Co-operation with the Financial Times. Baird 
Hall, Glasgow, Mar. 20th-21st 1967. 
Arthur Anderson & Co 
. 
(1980), "Guide to the Companies Act 
. 
1.280'-' London: Graham & Trotman. 
Ashton, D. and Simister, L. Eds. (1970) . "The Role of Fore- 
casting in Cornoz ate Plannir. London : Staples 
. 
Austin, D. V. "Tender Offer Statistics: New Strategies are 
Paying Off", Mergers & Acquisitions, Fall, 1975, pp. 9-18. 
Austin, Dr D. V. "Tender Of f'er Update : 1978-19 a" i'Jiarcrrýl__ 
& 
. 
Acguisi Lions+, Summer 1980, pp. 13-32. -ý 
Austin, D. V. "Tender Offers, Public Disclosure and the SEC", 
Financial Executive, Feb. 1977, pp. L6-53. 
A-1rdon, C. (197Ö), "? o::! to Finance Your Comp. aniy" London, Busi- 
ness Books. 
Baehr. ing 
, 
B. "International Merchant Banking-. a Survey", 
The Banker, 1976,126, no. 605, pp. 809-817. 
Ball, Sir C. "Free to Compete",. The Bankers' Magazine, 
v. CCXXI, no. 1596, pp. 9-10. 
Balog, J. `! Why the Stock Market Reacts the Way it Does to 
Announcements of Mergers and Acquisitions'.. Financial 
Analysts Journal Jan. 
-Feb. 1975, pp. 24-26 
Barnea, A. et al. "Afraid of Publishing Forecasts? " Finan- 
cial Executive, Nov. 1977, pp. 52-57. 
Barnes, P. "The Effect of a Merger on the Share Price of 
the Attacker", Ac_countina and Business Research, Summer 
1978, pp. - 162-1ý 
. 
Barnes, P 
. 
A. "The Purely Financia]. Case " for Takeovers", 
: +i@_uiaý'"ement Accounting, Dec. 1976, v-54, rio. 11, pp.! 4 4. .. j6. 
- 
4, ý,, 5
- 
Dauer, E 
. 
E. 
von. "t,; eaningfUi RAN and Return Criteria for 
Strategic : Investment Decisions ". Mergers & Acauisi Lions, 
Winter 1981; D. 5-17. 
Baumer, W. H. and Northart, L. J. (1971) "BUY. Sell, r4erge: 
How to Do it". London, Prentice Hall. 
Ba nes, T. A. M. (196-(). "The Innocent Shareholder and the 
Value of His Shares", UK' 
Bean, D. G. (1975). "Financial Stra-te in the Acquisition 
Decision", (Epping, Essex: Gower Press 
Belkaoni, A. "Financial Ratios as Predictions of Canadian 
Takeovers", Journal of-Business Finance & Accounting ; 2.978, 
v. 5, no. 1978, PP"93-107. 
Berman, H. D. (1973). "The Stock Exchange" 
, 
Bristol: Pitman. 
Betterley, D. "Inheriting Risk in Acquisition or Merger", 
Financial Executive, Sept. 1978, PP. 32-35" 
Bexley, J. B,. (1978). "Banking Manag ement", Texas, gulf, 
Bierman, H., Jr. "Valuing an Acquisition", Financial Exe- 
cutive, July 1980, pp. 20-23. 
Bing.,, G. (1980). "Corporate Acquisitions", Texas, Gulf. 
Birley, S. "Acquisition Strategy or Acquisition Anarchy", 
Journal of General Management, Spring 1976, v. 3, no 
. 
3, 
pp. 67-73. 
Birley, S. (1976) " 
don, Univers unpub. 
." 
thesis). 
Blume, M. E. and Friend, I. (1978) 
. the Individual Investor: a Twentie 
Chichester, Wiley. 
11Th Role 
ce- 
Lön- 
s 
Boltz, G 
. 
E. "Corporate Director's Responsibilities", I'i. nan- 
cial Executive, Jan. 1977, pp. 12"-14". 
Bond, G. D. (197 
") "Corporate Finance for Management", 
London, Butterworth. 
Bradley, J. W. and Korn, D. H. "Acquisition and merger Trends 
Affecting the Portfolio Manager", Financial. Analysts Jour- 
na7.. N`oy. 
--Dec. 1977, pý. 615-'70. 
Bradley, j. -W. et al. "Bargains in Va_LuatJ.: on Disparities: 
Corporate Acquirer Voi' 
. 
1s Passive investor" 
, 
Sloan i'ici: l2_': er,; -F1t 
Review, Winter 1979. ppp " 5i-611. 
I "'c- 
- 
Bra, ndon, B. and BZ ov-no, S. J. "ii Study of Large l, lergeers" , 
Mergers & Acyu-i sitions, Fa11 1975, pp. 30-j9. 
Brealey, R. A. and Myers, S. (1981). "Principles of Col'-, )O:: 
rate Finance" 
, 
New York, McGraw-Hill. 
Brigham, E. F. and Ricks, R. B. (1968). "Readings in Essen'- 
tials of Managerial Finance". London, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston. 
Briston, R. J. (1970). "The 'Stock Exchange & investment 
Analysis", London, Allen & Unwin. 
Briston, R. J. et al. "Dividend Policy, Shareholder Satisfac-- 
tion and the Valuation of Shares", Journal of Business 
Finance, Winter 1970, v. 2, no. 1, pp. 1. 
Briston, R. J. et al. "Financial Institutions and the Stock 
Market", Management Bibliographies & Review; 3.975,9, v. 4, 
PP. 171-191. 
Briston, R. J. et al. "Problems in the Analyses of Statis-- 
tics Relating to Takeovers and Mergers", in J. M. Samuels (ed. ) "Readings on Mergers and Takeovers". London, Paul__ 
Elek, 1972, pp. 77-9 
Briston, J. R. and Dobbins, R. (1978). "The Growth 
-and Im- 
-pact of Institutional Investors".; London, ICAEW. ýýý 
Briston, R. J. ünd Liver sidge, J. (1979). "A Practical A-p- 
2roacrl_to Business Investment Decisions", London, IiacVlillan 
Press. 
"Britain Looks for Rules to Foil Fast Takeovers", Business 
Week, June 16,1980, pp. 63. 
"British Issuing Houses", London, British Issuing Houses 
Association, (undated). 
A Reaort on the Pro- osed Merger", London, HMSO. 
Brockington, R. (1978). "Financial ? /Tan_aaaement : An Instruc- 
tional Manual for Business and Accountancy Students" 
, 
Hare- 
stock, Winchester, Hants, D. P. Publications. 
Brooks, D. and Smith, R. (1966). "The Human Effects of Mer- 
gers:. The Impact on Shotifloor", LU11don, ý. cton Soc]TT. jr'1PU8 
., 
Brooke, M. Z. and Remmers, H. L. (1978). "International Mana -e- 
men t and Business Polic" 
, 
London, Hough won i{Iifflin. 
Brooks, D. et al. (1966). "The HumicLn E L: L C-41- Of ME'I` rse' 
London, The Acton Society Trust. 
Bucki ey, 
. 
A. "A Blueprint gor Acquisition Strategy" 
, 
Account- 
ELn, c 
, 
Sept- 1979. 
4 /1 
- 
Buckley, A. "Gr`o5tith by Acc uisi ion" , Loni Rar- c týý ü211 1s 
Aug. 197.5, PP. 53-60. - ý~ 
Buckley, A. "A Profile of Industrial Acquisitions in 1971", 
Accountancy and Business Research, Autumn 1972, pp. 243-252. 
Buckley, A. "The Takeover in the Context of Capital Budget- 
ing Framework", journal of Business Finance, Sum- 
mer 1972, v. 4, no. 2, PP. 3 
Burton, H. and Corner, D. C. (1968) "Investment and Unit 
Trusts in Britain and America", London, Elek. 
Cahill, B. "Company Failure and the Vigilant Account", 
Accov. nt: ancy, Sept. 1980, pp. 63-65. 
Cameron, D. "Appraising Companies for Acquisition". Long 
Range Planning, Aug. 1977, v. 10, pp. 21-28. 
Camillus, J. C. 
-"Six Approaches to Preventive Manage-Went 
Control",. Financial Executive, Dec. 1980, pp. 28-31. 
Cao,, A. D. "Foreign Acquisition in the U. S.: A Neoraercan- 
ti ? ist Challenge" 
, 
California 1%lanagement Review, Summer 
1980, v. 22, -no. 4, pp. 7-55. 
Carter, W. G. K. and Morland, 
and Reports Guidelines for 
Reporting for the Purpose o 
Prospecises'° 
, 
London, Inst 
in England and Wales. 
Carosso, (i 979) 11 eves rasen 
New York, 
D. P. (1978). "Investigations 
Accountants Investigating__nd 
Acouisiti ons, Disposals and 
tute of Chartered Accountants 
Castle, J. K. (1971). "How to Succe6d where Others have Fail- 
ed", in M. Strage, edL, "A: ctuisition and Merger Negotiating 
Strate r", New York, Presidents. 
Cares, R. (1967). "American Industry: Structure, Conduct, 
Pericrmance", New Jersey, Prentice-Hall. 
"Challenge in Reverse", The Economist, 25 Oct. 1980, pp. 
3-2k. 
Chand_le-r, Dr A. D. (1966) "Strategy and Structure", U. S., 
Anchor Books. 
Chanuiori, D. F. (1977). ". British Banning trate; 'ýy and the In---Sx 
tern-ational Chal ena e" , -t See (-, hp: t. 4,1 TT: e Threatened 
World of Ner chant" Banking"), London, MacM ill an, pp. 62-88. 
Carosso, V. P. (1979). "Investment Banking in America: A 
History" 
, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press. 
i; 'ý g 
Channon, D. F. "Corporate Stirn tegy a. nd Organization St ue- 
tire in British Industry" 
, 
Journal of Business Police. 
1973, v. 3, no. 1, pp. 6C-72. _rý-ý_ ý. 
Channon, D. F. (1975). "Slater W lker Securities (A) and (B), " 
in D. F. Channon et al. "British Business Policy: A Case 
book", London, MacMillan. 
Channon, D. F. (1973). "The Strategy and Structure of Bri- 
tish Enter- prise", Mass., Harvard Business School., Division 
of Research. 
Channon, D. F. and Jalland, M. (1979) 
. 
"Multinational Stra- 
te 7_C Plaruzing 
, 
(see chpt 8, "Planning in terna final liler- 
gers and Acquisitions", 
. 
p_p. 207-2-)"), London, Mac vIillan. 
Chappell, P. "The Merchants and the Clearers Keep Off the 
Brass? ", The Bankers' Magazine, Mar. 1977, PP. 7--9 
Cheney, R. E. "What's New on the Corporate Takeover Scene", 
Financial Executive, April 1972, pp. 18-21. 
Chesham Amalgamations & Investments. "The Attitudes of Pri- 
vateSharehl. older s to Tiergers and Acquisitions", London, 
Occasional Paper No5 7.977; -- 
Chown, J. and Edwardes-Ker, M. (i974) 
. Asses, Companies and Real Estate in Be 
mazy, the T"; etlier 
Times. 
Uni te. K 
-L (z ýcr, " 
City Capital Markets Committee. "' 
"The Acgu si t, 
-ion of igiu: n, France, up-r- 
Týotýý on 
. 
'' nanc i a, i 
isi. on os the Securi-- 
ined in the Inquiry 
Clarke, W. M. (1967). "The City in'the World Economy", Mid- 
dlesex, Penguin Books. 
Clarke, W. M. 11979). "Inside the City: A Guide to London as 
a Financial Centre", London, Allen & Unwin. 
Cohen, M. F. "Takeover Bids: How Target Companies Fight Back", 
Financial Analysts Journal, Jan. 
-. 
Feb 1970, v. 26, nQ. 2, pp. 100-103. 
Committee on Financial Markets (1976). "OECD Minimum Dis- 
closure Rules Applicable to All Publiciv Offered Securities", 
Paris, OECD. 
Committee to Review the Functioning o ;. 
-Financial Institu- ti oris (1980) (Wilson Report) London, iES0. 
"The City Code on Take-overs and Ter. 
., 
4th. ed., London, 
Issued on the Authority of the City Working Party, 1976. 
-- _. 
;;. l;. 0 
"Company Accounting and Disclosure: A Consultative-Docu- 
ment", Sept., 1979, London; HiISO. 
"Company Law: Hurrying Through the Next Reforms", Inves- 
tors Chronicle, Aug., 22,1980, pp. 556. 
Confederation of British Industry (1973). "The_Responsibili- 
ties of the British Public CompanLondon, CBI. 
Confederation of British Industry (19-11) 
. 
"US Anti Trust 
Guide for international 'Operations" 
, 
London, CBI. 
"Consortium Banks", Financial Times Survey, July, 16,1980. 
Copeman, G. "How to Buy out the Unhappy Minority", Chief 
Executive, June 1978, pp. 39-40. 
"Corporate Finance", Financial Times Survey, 15/1/79, 
12/3/80,9/3/81. 
"Council for the Securities Industry, " Barm- of England Quar- 
ter! y, Mar. 1978, pp. 395-397. 
"Corporate investment & Acquisitions by Foreign Companies 
in-the U. S. A.: The Proceedings of a Conference Held on 
January 31/Feb. 1,1980, " London, Graham & Trotmon, 
Council for the Securities Indus try (1980). "Ruies Govern-" 
iyý 
a 
Substvtnu'rt 
J. tn 
. 
al li 1. t 
j' /ýl"V/ýu1s ý+ -FiVSiL` ^yý r of 
S 1ý T^ Th. Sto k 
yll a v. V 1J S1CLi ýJ , 1: VSZ lL tj, ýjýv 5= "%ýývr 
Exchange, CSI 
Cowling, K. (1972). "Market Structure and Corporate Behaa_ 
viour: Theory and Empirical Analysis of the Firm", Tondon, 
Gray-ii111s. 
Craig, M. (1976). "F. F. I. A Cast but no Role? " The Bankers' 
Magazina, CCX::, pp. 36-39. - 
Craig, M. (1976). "Grindlays and Bear It", The Bankors' 
Magazine, CCXX, no. 1591, pp. 13-16. 
Craig, M. (1976). "Ten Top International: Barclays Bank", 
The Bankers' Magazine, CCXX, pp. 39-40. 
"The Crocker Bid Stirs New Fear of Invasion", Business 
Week, July 28,1980, pp. 45, o 48. 
Crosse, H. & Hempel, G. H. (1980). "Management Policies for 
Commercial Banks", New Jersey, Prentice Hall. 
Crowther, John F. 
-point Acquisition Prices", Ngr. - 
vard. Business Review, Sept. 
-Oct. 1969, pp. 58--62. 
CSI revised (1981) 
. 
The City Code on `Tal: eovcrs c. 
LonAon, 
iý 
... 
4f,, ß 
CSI, 
. 
1980) 
. 
"Code oL conduct. for Dealers in Securi- 
T, oiidon, CSI. 
CSI, j o? () and 1980. "The Council for the Securities I: Zdust 
Annual Rebort", London, CSI. 
CSI. "DoT Inspections & Prosecutions", London, CSI, Dec. 
-19 79 . 
CSI, Various. Press Statements 1979-81. 
Cunitz, J. A. "Valuing Potential Acquisitions", Financial 
Executive, Mar. 1971, v"39, no. 3, pp. 16-28. 
Dams, H. (1978). "The Holding Company & Corporate Con- 
Lrol", Leiden, Martin, Nijhoff Social Sciences Division. 
-Dailey, R. 
G. and Reuschling, T. E. "Human Resource Mangement 
in the Family Owned Ccraný" 
, 
Journal of General Management, 
Spring 1980, v. 5, no. 3, pp. 49-; 6. 
Davies, B. (1976) 
. 
"Business Finance and the City oz_Lon- 
don", London, Heinemann Educational Books. 
Davis, R. E. "Compatibility in Corporate Marriages", Harvard 
Business Review, July-Aug. 19 65, pp. 86-93. 
Davis, S. T. "International Bank Expansi o, Yn: Time for a Re- 
assessment? ", Banker, May 1981. pp. 6? -66. 
Davis, W. 1970) 
. 
"Mgr er Mdnia" 1 London, Constable. 
Day, J. G. and Jamieson, A. T. (1978). "Instituti-onal Invest- 
ment'; 
, 
vol. I II : Other Fixed Interest Securities" , London, 
Institute of A, _tuari es and the Faculty of Actuaries. 
Day, J. G. and Jamieson, A. T. (1978). "Institutional invest- 
ment, vol. IV: Equity Investment" 
, 
London, Institute of 
Actuaries and the Faculty of Actuaries. 
Dennet, L. (1979)" "The Charterhouse Group 1925-19 
: Hi. story" 
, 
London, Gentry Books. 
Dennis, G. J. J. 
, 
"The Current & Future Role of Stockbräkers", 
The Investment Analyst, Oct. 1981, no. 62, pp. 3-12. 
Dept. of Trade (1980). "Consolidated Gold Fields Limited: 
, 
±nvesti?; ation under Section 172 of the Companies Act 1()u8" 
London, }fl-JSÜ. ` 
Dept, of Trade. (1980). 
gation under 172 of the 
?, ondon HIIIS0. 
eY±. of' Trade (198ä' 
. 
"St Li r 
under S_r.,;;; zoi-I 16 (b) and Sect 
8. f rý m F. e ort" London, 
Holdings Limited: Investi- 
ies Act 1948. Interim Report", 
n Limited; 
on ! ý; 2 of t 
WISO. 
Investigation 
he Cornranies : cl, 
4G-1 
- 
Dev, S. & 4': ebb, M. "The Accuracy of Company Profits Fore- 
casts", Journal of Business Finance, Aug. 1972, v. 4, no. 3, 
pp. 26-39- 
Dickinson, G. M. and Lewis, J. E. eds. (1977). "Financial 
Management Handbook", London, Kluwer Harrap Handbooks. 
"Discussion Paper: Disclosures in Financial Statements of 
Banks", Issued for Discussion by the International Account- 
ing Standards Committee, Mar. 1980. 
Dobbins, R. "Institutional Shareholders in the Equity Mar- 
ket", Accounting & Business Research, Winter 1974,. pp. 9-17. 
Dobbins, R. "Market Shares & Eaui. ty Price Determination 
on the London Stock Exchange", The Investment Analyst, 
Summer 1981, no. 43, pp. 27-32. 
Dobbins, R. and Greenwood, rte. J 
.. 
(1974). "Institutional 
shareholders and Equity Market Stability", Journal of Busi- 
ness Finance& Accounting, v. 2, no. 2, pp, 257-268. 
Dobbins, R., et al. "The Future Pattern of UK Share Owner- 
sip", Long Range Planning, Aug. 1975, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 
-_53- 60. 
Doctoroff, M. (1972). "Comfy Mergers & Takeovers", Tviel- 
bourne, Gower Press. 
"Dc Directors 'Know Their Duties? ", Investors Chronicle, 
June 20,1981, pp. 945 
"Don't Keep Shareholders in Suspense", Investors' Chroni- 
cle, Feb. 8,1980, PP-332--333- 
Drayton, C. I. et al. (1965). "Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Planning and Action", London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Drury', J. and Bougen, P. "UK Gearing Levels: An Investiga- 
tion", Accountancy, July 1980, pp. 103-106. 
Dunham, R. 
-'Acquisitions is the Name of the Game", Accoun=- tansy, Feb. 1980, pp. 42-116. 
"Duty before Relaxation for Directors", Investors' Chroni. 
-- 
cle, Oct. 26,1979. 
Ebeid, F. J. "Tender Offers: Characteristics Affecting their 
Success", Mergers & Acquisitions, Fall 1976, pp. 21-30. 
Ehrbar, A. F. '"Bigness Becomes the Target of the Trustbus- 
ters" 
, 
Fortune, Mar. 26,1979, pp. 3L-L0" 
EIU Special R65port no.. 79. "Ten Years of ti, 7ultina. tS_oria. l. Busi- 
ne_ss : The Main Issues for and aoot? riu tina uionai hn u rpL° j_se 
plod r, 
'm jr 1.95 
. 
London, Economist Intelligence Uni LL "L6. 
- 
46 2- 
Ellinger, A. G. and Stewart, T. H. (1980). "A Post-VWar" His- 
tory of the Stock I'MTarket", Cambridge, Woodhead-Faulkner. 
Ely, B. "New Opportunities to Sell Companies on the Install- 
ment Basis", Mergers & Acquisitions. Spring 1981, pp. 6-13. 
Erritt, M. J. et al. (1977). "The Ownership of Company 
Shares: A Survey for 1975", London, HMSO. 
Eubank, A. A. Jr. "A Model for Selecting Portfolios of 
Low P/E Stocks with Superior Investment Potential" 
, 
Jour- 
nal of Economics'& Business, Summer 1977, v. 29, no-3 pp. 2 
215-220. 
Everitt, B. (1980). "Cluster Analysis" 2nd. ed. London, 
Heinemann Educational Books. 
"Fairer & Faster Company Probes", Investors' Chronicle, 
May 25,1980, pp. 206. 
Faith, Nick (1977) "Top Ten Internes tional: g: Nat; Lor: al !., Jest- 
minister Bank" 
, 
The Bankers' Maus. ziCCXXI, no. 1598, pp. 
33-36. 
Fama et al. "The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New informa- 
tion". International Economic Review, Feb. 1965, pp. i"-21. 
Farrar. D. E_. "Institutional Investors & Concentration of 
'Pyres 
c: 
ii_i .-1 {j ii ti ý'. r: 
B/ýerrls, & 
.. 
V. 
11, 
R-ans Re- 
UCLL 
U c"ý.. /ý tl 7,,. .} -P . I. y 'JL 
... 
.l1} UL'Lttll_ 
jna May 1981, v. 36, no. 2, PP. 369--38ý. 
Farrer, D. (1965). "The Warburgs"., London, Michael Joseph. 
Ferris, K". R. et al. "Cash Tender Offer Pricing; : An Emp7 riý- 
cal'Analysis'' Mergers & Acquisitions, Spring 1977, pp. 9-- 
14. - -- 
Ferris, K. R. "Profit Forecast Disclosure: The Effect on 
Management Behaviour", Accounting & Business Research, 
_ Spring 1975, v. 5, pp. 133-139. 
Ferris, P. (1968). "The City", Middlesex, Penguin Books. 
FFI (Aug. 1974) "History & Business of Finance for Indus-- 
tjby", London, FFI Ltd. 
Field, P. "Grindlay BrandUs, the First of the Small Len- 
ders", Euromoney, July 1977, pp. 50. 
Financial Techniques Limited Manual (1971). "Mergers and 
Acquisitions in Actions', Surrey, Financial Techniques Ltd. 
Firth, M. "The Disclosure of Informat_: nn by Cer:: pa los" 
, Oi', ýEGA. The international journal of i,, iai ge gent Science, v. `, ' , Yiö. 2; Pp" 129-133. 
4,; 3 
Firth, M. "An Empirical Ines tigation of the Impact of the 
Announcement of C-pitali sati on issues on Share 
-Prices" , Journal of Bu 
"iness Finance & Accountancy, Spring 1977, 
v. 4, no. 1. pp. 7- 0. 
Firth, M. "The Evaluation of Share Prices", Managerial 
Finance, v. 1, no. 1, pp. 60-70. 
Firth, M. (1977)'. "Forecasting Company Profits", in M. 
Firth, "The Valuation of Shares & the Efficient Markets 
Theory" 
, 
London, MacMillan. 
Firth, M. (1977). "Forecasting Methods in Business and 
Management", London, Arnold. 
Firth, M. "The Information Content of Large Investment 
Holdings", Journal of Finance, Dec. 1975, v. 30, no. 5, pp. 
1265-1231. 
Firth, M. "The Role of Forecasting in Business", Manage- 
rial Finance, 1975, v. 1, no. 2, pp. 97-108. 
Firth, M. (1976) "Share Prices snci cJer, 
_prs ;A Stl)& 0x 
. Stock Market Efficiency', Westmead, Saxon House/Lexington 
Books. 
Firth, M. "Takeovers: Benefit or Burden, " Investment AnaiLýst 
Oct. 1981, no. 62, pp. 29-36. 
Firth, ' M i: The Valuation of Si t es =ýr1Cý the ffi.. 
c ent4Jar kets'Theory" 
, 
London, MacMillan. 
Fishman, J. A. "Corporations In Conflict-The Tender Offe_^", 
Michigan, Masters 
-Press. 
Fleischer, A. "Corporate Disclosure/Insider Trading", TTar- 
vard Business Review, Jan, 
-Feb. 1967, Pp. 129-135. W-ý 
Fogelberg, G. "The Usefulness of Published Financial Data 
for Predicting Takeover Vulnerability", Working Paper 
Series No. 1.50, London; 
-Canada, Western Ontario Univ. 1975. 
Friedlance, S. (1966). "The Economics of Corporate Finance", 
New Jersey, Prentice Hall. 
Fry, R. "The Merchant Banking Year", The Banker, Dec. 1973, 
pp. 1lI. 87-1L94. 
"Forecasts for Plans and Decisions", Accountants Digest. 
Spring 1977, no. 48, 
Foster, G. "Stock Market Reaction to Estimates of Earnings 
per Share by Company Officials", Journal of Account= nil Re- 
search, Spring 1973, pp. 25-39. 
Fox, D. 6"] 
. 
"-Companies Purchasing their wn Shares" J ourna ]. 
of Business Law, July 1981, inn. 271-275. ' 
- 
Franks, J. R. and 
Profitability of 
of Finance, Dec. 
riecht, M. j. 
Mergers in 
1977, v. 32, 
"fin Indus try S Ludy of ;to 
the United Kingdom. Journal 
r_o. 5, p1P. 1513-1525. --- 
Franks, J. R. et. al. "A Review of Acquisition Models". Royal 
Economic Society: The Economic Journal, Dec. 1973: v. 83, no. 
332, Pp. 35-53. 
Franks, J. R. at al. "A_ Review of Acquisition 
-Valuation Models", Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, v. 1, no. 
1, Spring 197 
, 
pp. 35-59. 
Fraser, Donald R. at. äl. 'Share Repurchase: Your Best In-- 
vestment? " Financial Executive, Nov. 1980, 
Freeman, K. A. "Regulation of Takeovers a Mergers in the 
Seminar Presented in Gresham College, City Univ. 
Business School, May 30,1980. 
Freund, W. C. "The Historical Role of the Individual Inves- 
tor in the Corporate Equity Market", Journal of Contem- 
porary Business, Winter 1974, pp. 1-12. 
George, K. D. and Silberston, A. "The Causes and Effects 
of Mergers", Scottish Journal of Political Economy, June 
? 975, v. 22, no. 2, pp. 179-193. 
Gibbons, J. D. (1976). "Non-narame . r-lc Me tnocls gor- Quenlti 
- tative Analysis", New York, Holt, Poinhart & 'Winston. 
Gibbs, J. (1978). "A Practical A 
-giroach. to Financial Manage- 
ment, "London, Financial Training. 
Goudzwaard, M. B. "Conglomerate Mergers, Convertibles & Cash 
Dividends", Quarterly Review of Economics & Business, 
Spring 1968, v. 9, n. 2, PP-53-62. 
"The Great Takeover Binge". 
, 
Business Week, Nov. 14,1977, 
PP. 176-184. 
Green, E. "The Making of a Modern Banking Group: A Histo2 
of the Midland Bank Sincej9OO", London, St. George's Press. 
"The Cost of Equity Capital" 
, 
Journal of Busi- 
ness Finance, Winter 1972, v. L, no. 6, pp. 4i-52. 
Guenault, P. H. and Jackson, J. M. (1974). "The Control of 
Monoi; olyy in the United. Ki. r. -dorm 
, 
2nd ed. 
, 
London, Tan-man. 
"Guidelines to Insider Dealing", The investmeni, Ana st, 
_ Summer 1981, no. 43. pp. 33-35. 
Gumpert, D. E. "Selling Your Company_Ud 1 tional Pers pectives", 
Harvard Business; Review, T; ay- June l98O pp. 5L 
_66. 
_, 
lk 5 
-- 
Gunther, S. P. "The CPA's Role in Mergers & Acquisitions", 
Journal of Accountancy, Feb. 1979, pp. 47-56. 
Guth, Dr W. "International Banking: The Next Phase", The 
Banker, Oct. 1981, pp. 27-34. 
Guthmann,. H. G. and Dougall, H. E. (1962). "Corporate Finan- 
cial Policy", 14th. ed. Englewood- Cliffs, New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall. 
Hague 
, 
P. "Difficulties of a Forecaster", Industrial Mar- 
ketin Digest, Third Quarter; 1980, v. 5, no-3; pp. 163- 
169. 
Hall, W. K. "A Tale of Two Acquisitions", Business Review, 
May 1977, pp. 1-8. 
Hambro, J. "A Year-of Substantial All-Round Progress", 
Euro-money, Aug. 1979, pp. 12-13. 
Hamilton, J. D:, R; f'Stockbroking Today' 
. 
London, MacMillan. 
Handscombe, R. ed (1976). "Bankers' Management Handbook", 
London, McGraw-Hill. 
Handy, J. Z. "How to Face Be5. i¶ aker! Over" 
, 
'H rear Bus 
- 
nets. Nov. 
-Ded. 1969, pp 109-11.1. 
Hangen, R. A. et al. "An-Empirical Test for Synergism in 
Merger " Journal of Finance, Sept. 1975, pp. 1003-101L. 
Hannah, Z. ed., (1976) 
. 
", ý"Ianagement Strategy and Business 
Development: An Historical and Comparative Study", London, MacMillan. 
Hanson 
, 
D. G(ijjjService Banking London, Institute of Bankers. 
Harris, L. G. (1977).. "Shareholders' Right", London, Allen. 
Harvey, J. Z. ed. (1969). "Management Guides to Mergers & 
Acquisitions", New York, 1,11.1ey Inter-Science. 
Harris, M. "Ex-Take-over Panel Chief Sums it Up", Account- 
June 1977, pp. 42-44. 
Hawkins, D. F. (1977). "Corporate Financial ReDortin. f,,,: Text 
and Cases", Rev. Ed., Homewood; Illinois, Irvin. 
Hayes, R. H. and Hoag, G. H. "Post Acquisition Retention of 
Top Management: A Research Study", Mergers & Acquisitions. 
v. 9, no. 2, Summer, 1974, pp. 8-18. 
-- 
4f, 6- 
- 
Heyes, R. H. et al. "Post Acquisition Retention of Top 
Managemen i, " 
, 
Mergers & Acquisitions, Summer 1/74, v. 9, 
no. 2, pp. 8-18. 
Hayes, S. L. et al. "Are Cash Takeover Bids Unethical? " 
Financial Analysts Journal, Jan. 
-Feb. 1967, v. 23, no. 2, 
pp. 107-111. 
Hayes, S. L. et al. "Tactics of Cash 'takeover Bids; Harvard 
Business Review, Mar. 
-April, 107, pp. 135-148. 
Heath, J: Jr. "Valuation Factors and Techniques in Mergers 
and Acquisitions", Financial Executive, April 1972, pp. 34- 
44. 
Hennessy, J. H., Jr (1966). "Acquiring & Merging Business", 
New Jersey, Prentice Hall. 
Hepple, B. "Worker's Rights in Merger-s- & Takeovers: The 
EEC Proposals" 
, 
jn us 
. 
ri 1 1j" ag lrn?., Dec. 19'[76, pp. 197V- 
21.0. 
Herbert, P. J. A. "Corporate Strategy & Acquisitions Policy", 
Journal of General Management, Spring 1981, v. 6, no. 3, pp. 
18-30. 
Herbert, P. J. A. (1980). "Money & Capital Markets, 
UK & Europe", UK, Henley Administrative Staff College. 
Herrmann; A 
. 
L! "A Decision Model for Mergers and Acquisi- 
tions", Mergers & Acquisitions, Spring 1976, pp. A-21. 
Hilton, K. & Harris, A. "The Timing of Dividend Payments 
in Large Companies"., Journal of Business Finance, Spring 
1971, v. 3, no. l, 
_pp. 
4-il. 
Hodes, R. B. The Mergers Boom, "Journal of Business Finance, 
Autumn 1971, v. 3, no. 3, pp. 6-12. 
Hogarty, T. F. "The Profitability of Corporate Mergers", 
Journal of Business, July 1970, v. '43, no. 3, pp. 317-"326. 
Hollman, R. W. "Evaluation of the Corporate Complex", Ider- 
gern & Acquisitions, v. 3, no. l, pp. 60-80. 
Hood, N. and Young, S. (1975). "Growth, Performance and 
Strategy in 400 UK Holding Companies" 
, 
Management Decision, 
5.3, no. 5, pp. 30L-317. 
Hope, M. "Ov. Being Taken Over by Slater Walker" 
, 
journal 
of Industrial Economics, Mar. 1976, v. 24, no. 3, pp--U; 179. 
' 
Hovers, J 
. 
C: M. (1973). "Expansion thrcvh Ac uisition" 
, London, Business Books. 
- 
11. L") 7- 
"How to Fight the Hidden Nominee", Investors' Chronicle, 
Feb. 22,1980, pp. 166. 
Horne, J. V. and Helwig, R. C. (1966). "The Valuation of 
Small Bank Stocks" 
, 
Occasional 
. 
Paper.; East, Lgn, sing, 
Michigan, Michigan State Univity. 
Hull, J. "The Companies Act We Need", Accountancy 
, 
Aug. 
1979, PP- 113-115. 
Hussey, D. L. "The Corporate Appraisal: Assessing Company 
Strengths and Weaknesses", Long Range P la. nning 
, 
Dec. 1968, 
pp. 119-25. 
Hutchinson, G. S. (1965): "The Business of Acquisitions and 
Mergers", New York, Presidents Publishing House. 
ICFC. "Profit and Cash Flow Forecasting", London, ICFC 
Management Series, 1980. 
"Which Mer'chan Danks Do Companies Choose? " 
, 
Investors' 
Chronicle, Aug. 31-Sept. 6,1979, pp. 584--585s- 
Industrial and Commercial Finance Corp. Ltd. (undated).. 
Valuation of Investments_in Unquoted Companies. London, 
ICFC. 
"Industi 
tutionu". (ihi Wilson Cc 
British Industry, 1977 
. 
riallciai. I-- 
ed er&t i Ort of 
Instone, R. "The Duty of Directors", Journal of Business 
Law, 1979, pp. 221-249. 
"Institutional Shareholders", Management Decision, 1975, 
v, 13, no. 5, FP. 374-L08. 
"International Fund Management", Financial Times Survey, 
Oct. 10,1981. 
"Investment Trusts Should Review. their Cross--Holdings", 
Investors' Chronicle, Feb. 29-, ': 19$0, PP. 536. 
Irving, 5. (1981). T 
tutions that Make up 
London,. Andre Duetsc 
e City at TIork: A Guide 
the City of London and 
the insti- 
ir Roles, 
Izod, E. R. (Undated brochure). "Growth by Merger", London, 
Industrial Mergers Ltd. 
Jensen, M. C. "Risk, the Pricing of Capital Assets ý: their 
Evaluation of Investment Portfolios", urnal of Lusi ncss 
T 
___ . April 196Q, pp. 167-247- 
ervis, F. R. (1971) 
. 
"The Economics of I4er ers" 
, 
London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
- 
468 
Johnson, C. (1976) 
. 
. 
"Anatomy of UK Finance 1970-75" 
, London, Financial Times. 
Johnston, A. (1980). "The City Take-over Code", Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
Jones,. C.., 7. 
_ _(. 1980) . "Financial Planning and Control: A Survey of Practices by UK Companies" 
. 
An Occasional Paper. 
London, The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants. 
Jones, H. and Twiss, B. C. (1978). "Forecasting Technology 
for Planning Decisions", London, MacMillan. 
Jones, R. et al. (1970). "Anatomy of a Merger: A History 
of GEG AEI & English Electric", London, Cape. 
Jones, T. M. "Shareholders end the Corporations: A New Rela- 
tionship", Journal of Contemporary Business, 1979, v" 8, no" 1, 
pp. 93-102. 
Kadens, D. G. "PHC Conversion: The Best Strategy for the 
Sale of your Closely Held Corporation? " Mergers & Acquisi- 
tions, Winter 1981, pp. 18-31. ^ 
Kahl, A. et al. "Bank Annual Report Disclosure Adequacy 
Internationally", Accountin & Business Research, Summer 
1981, no. L3, pp. 189-19 
. 
Kastens. How Much is an Acnuý_si i. j on Wor ? 1` "; T cýýý 
Range P1annint, June 1973, v. 6, no. 2, pr. 52-57. 
Kay, M. "Company Mergers & the EEC", Journal of Business 
Law, London, 1975, 
- 
pp. 88-107. 
Keenan, D. "The Duties of Directors Novr", Accoun täncy, 
Nov. 1980, pp. 77-80. ' 
Keenan, D. "A Guide to the Companies Act 1980- Part 2 
Company Law", Accountancy, Aug. 1980. 
Kellett, R. (1967). "The Merchant Banking Arena", London, 
MacMillan. 
Kellog, D. E. "How to Buy a Small Manufacturing Business", 
Harvard Business Review, Sept. 
-Oct. 1973, PP. 92-102. 
Kelly, A. (1974). "The Stock Ex_cha' 
MacMillan. 
Kitching, J. (1973).. 
- . 
"Acquisitions 
Corporate Successes and Failures", 
national. 
Ki aching, J. "Why Acquisitions are Today, Nov. 1974, pp. 82-148. 
nge", Dublin, Gill grid 
in Europe: Causes of 
Geneva, Business Inter- 
. lbo1"iive" 
, 
Tangaement 
- 
If 
-- 
Kitchin 
. 
,, Why Do gier ers Miscarry? " Harvard Business 
Review, Nov. 
-Dec. 1967, pp. 86-101. 
Kitching, J. "Winning and Losing with European Acquisi- 
tions", Harvard Business Review, Mar. 
-April 1974, pp. 12)4- 
136. 
Knight, W. J. L. (. 1979) 
. 
"The Acquisition of Private Com- 
panies", London, Oyez. 
Kobrin, D. and North, J. "Restraining Majority Shareholders 
-the Courts and the DoT", Accountant,, May 1979. 
Korah, V. (1968). "Monopolies and Restrictive Practices", 
Harmondsworth; Middlesex, Penguin Books. 
Kuehn., D. (1975). "Takeovers and the Theory of the Firm: 
An Empirical Analysis for the UK 1957-69" 
, 
London, MacMil"- 
lan. 
Laing; & Cruickshank. "Accepting Houses: Annual Report" 
, 
June: 1979. 
"London, The Stock Exchange. (B. J. Lardner). 
Lardner, B. "Merchant Banks Rebuild their Image", The 
Banker, May 1978, pp. 145-14-6. 
Larson, K. D. et al. "Business Combinations: An Exchange 
Ratio Determination Model", The-Accounting Review, Oct. 
1969, v. 44, no. 4, pp. 720-728. 
Lathayn, Sir J. (1969). "Takeover: The Fact and Myths of 
the GEC/AEI Battle", London, Ilicliffe Books. 
Lee, M. M. Jr. "Tender Offer Defence: How to Slow Circuit 
the Corporate Raider", Mergers & Acquisitions, Fall 1975, 
pp. 4-8-. 
Lee, Y. H. (1980). "Mergers and Acquisitions: A Thorough Re- 
view -and a Close St; ýäy in the Electronics Industry", 
City University Business School, (unpub. D. Sc. Hons disser- 
tation). 
Leech, S. A. 
-et al. "Company Asset Revaluations and Inflation 
in Australia", Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
1978, v. 5, no. 4, pp. 353-362. 
Lester, T. "The Business ::. arriage Brokers" 
, 
Manage mer_4 Today, 
oct. 1969, pp. 53-60. 
Lester, T. "The Merchant Bank Turn Aga i" 
, 
Management Today, 
Aug. 1975, PF. 27-33 
Lester, T. "Merchant Banking Muddies Through" 
, 
Management 
Today, d-Eri. 1977, PP. 71-80. 
1{ 
-vO _. 
T': l of JJ Iý 1} Levin, R. I. (198 
,. 
SV, ti . Ics for Masia einont , New Jer. t ey, 
Prentice Hall. 
Levinson, H. "A Psychologist Diagnoses Merger Failures", 
in J. M. Samuels, ed. "Readings on I+Zer zers and Takeovers'', London, Elek, 1972, PP. 
Levy, H. & Sarnat, M. (1978). "Capital Inves tment and 
Finance Decisions", London, Prentice Hall International. 
Levy, H. & Sarnat,.. lei.. "Diversification, Portfolio Analysis 
and the Case. for Conglomerate Mergers; Journal of Finance, 
Sept. 1970, PP. 795-803. 
Lewellen, W. G. "Management & Ownership in the Large Firm", 
Journal of Finance, May 1961, v. 24, no. 2, pp. 299-321. 
Lewis, Vivian. "Lazard Freres- A Boutique in an Era of 
Supermarkets", The Banker, Nov. 1979,1979,. 'pp. 47-50. 
Lewis, V. "Paribas- The Strengths and Perils of Invest- 
ments Banking", The Banker, July 1979, PP. 45-47. 
Liberty, R. A. "To Merge or Not to Merge? Peer Advice for 
the Local CPA Firm", Journal of Accountancy, Jan. 1981-; 
Pp. 52-58. _ 
Liles, P. R. (1974). "New Business Ventures and the Entrepre- 
neur" 
, 
Sussex, Richard D. Irwin. 
Lintner, J. "The Cost of Capital and Optimal Financing of 
Corporate Growth", Journal of Finance, May 1963, pp. 292- 
310. 
Lintner, J. "Optimal Dividends and Corporate Growth Under 
Uncertainty", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb. 196", 
pp. k9-95. 
Lister, R. J. "Financing an Acquisition", Accöuntingand 
Business Research, Winter. 1972, pp. 62-69. 
Long, L. T. "Pressure on Fiduciary Holders in Premium Cash Offers", Mergers & Acquisitions, Winter 1979,.. FP. 4-11. 
Lorange, P. "Anatomy of a Complex Merger", Journal of Busi- 
ness Finance, Summer 1973, v. 5, no. 2, pp. 32-38. 
Lucey, T. (1973). "Investment Appraisal: Eval_uatiri Risk 
and Uncertainty, London, Institute of Cost & Management 
Accountants. 
Lynch, H. H. (1971). "Financial Performance of Conglomerates" 
Boston, Division of Research, arvarra; Gnlversity. 
Macrae, N. (1964). "ThP London Capital Market; Its Struc- 
ture. Strains and Management", London, Staples. 
- 
Makela, B. R. (1970). "Analysis o±: Potential Acquisitions", 
in "Financial Executive's }iandbook, ' pp. 334-348. Homewood, 
Illinois, Dow Irwin. 
Mallinson, A. N. "A Risk Analysis to Prosit Forecasts", 
Accounting & Business Research, Spring 1974, pp. 83-95. 
"Management Buy-Out, " Financial Times Survey Series, Oct. 
10,1981. 
Manne, H. G. "In Defence of Insider Dealing" 
, 
Harvard Busi- 
ness Review, Nov. /Dec. 1966, pp. 113-122. 
Marley, C. "The Case for a British SEC", Journal of Busi- 
ness Finance, Winter 1970, v. 2, no., pp. 7-13. 
Martin, J. (1978). "The Best Practice of Business: Vol. 
IV: Developing New Sources of Earnings, London, Martin. 
Mason, Sandra (1971). "Merchant Banking Today and in the 
Future", journal of Business F finance, v. 3, no. 4, pp. 4-28. 
Masteopasqua, S. (1978). "The Banking Systems in the Coun- 
tries of the EEC Institutional and Structural Aspects"-, 
Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff. 
Haycock, J. (1977). "European Banking: Structures and Pro- 
spects", London, Graham & Trotman. 
Maycock, J. and Gardner, C. (1976). "Sow-rces of Goroorate 
Finance in Western Europe", London, Grahw; i & Trotrnati, 
Mayer, M. (1977) 
. 
'The_ 
_Bznker, 
' New York, Ballantine Books. 
McCloskey, R. F. "Software Packages for Acquisition Evalu- 
ation", Mergers & Acquisitions, Spring 1981, pp. 16-28. 
McDougall, F. M. et al. "Shareholders and Share Exchange 
Takeover Offers", Abacus, Dec. 1975, v. 11, no. 2, pp. 1.22- 
135-- 
McIver and Naylor, G. (1980). "Marketing Financial Servi- 
ces", London, Institute of Bankers. 
McQueeney et', al. (1981). "Company Takeovers, Management 
Organisation and Industrial Relations", Manpower Paper No. 
16, UK. 
Meeks, G. (1977). "Disappointing Marriage: A Study of the 
Gains from Merger", Cambri ge, Cambridge University Press. 
Melicher,. R. W. and Harter, T. R. "5 tock.;. Price Movements of 
Firms Engaging in Large Acquis1 L. ons" 
, 
-.. 
ýJournai of Financial 
sa p! C -SyfýJý ____ý and QuanUt it'e Anä__yrssis. Mar. 19'/ , 
-ýý, 2_ 
Mendelsohn, M. S. (1976) 
. 
"British International Banking 
Late into the Key Centres", The Banker, 126, pp. 931- 935. 
"The Merchant Bank Connexion"., The Times, Sept. 11,1981. 
"Merchant Banks", The Banker, Nov. 1979, pp. 203. 
"Merchant Banking- A Survey", The Banker, 1976,126, rno. W, 
pp. 793-833. 
"Merchant Banking Renaissance", The Economist, Mar. 31, 
1979, pp. 50-68. 
"American Banks Mark Time Overseas", The Economist, Mar. 31, 
1979, pp. 28-40. 
"The Merchant Banks", in'"British Banking and other Finan- 
cial Institutions"; Prepared by Reference Division. Central 
Office of Information, London. 
"The Merger Aftermath", Management Today, Feb. 1975. 
"The Merger Boom Breeds More Insider Trading", Business 
Week, Nov. '5,1979, pp. 79-87. 
"Mergers: A Guide to the Procedures under the Fair Tradir , 
Act 11'; ? '"8 '. London, HMSO. 
, 
"Mergers on the Rebound", Dun's Review, May 197! 
, 
v. 109, 
no. 5, pp. 61-63. 
naus-try : ren 
The Institute of 
Economic 
Ivlerrett, A. J. (1970). "Valuation of Ordinary Shares", Lon- 
don, Gower. 
Merrett, A. J. "Cash Equivalent Per Share, Shire Valuation 
and the Illusion of Growth", The Investment Analyst, Summer 
1981, no. 43, pp. 4-11. 
Merrett, A. J. & Sykes, A. (1976). "The Finance and Analysis 
of Cani Vital Projects", (see chapts 12-14, "Analysis cf Com- 
pany Acquisitions I-III"), Hong Kong, Longman. 
Meynell, C. "The Rothschild Dilemma", Euromoney, Oct. 1,077, 
pp. 122-133. 
1iidgley, K. and Burns, R. (1977). "The Capital Market: Its 
Nature and Significance", London, MacMillan. 
Ptidgley,. 
-X.. 
_(1975) . "Companies and tl, 6ir Shareholders--The Uneasy Relatiorsrin" 
, 
Lonaon, The ins-Ui use oj: C ar'cered 
Secre=taries and administrators. 
- 
Midgley, K. "Ho. v Much Control do Shareholders Exercise? " 
, Lloyds Bank Review, Oct. 19'74, no. 14, pp. 2k-37. 
... 
Y1 ý, w 
LIinns, R. (1970). "Pension Funds and the Ownership of 
Shares in UK Companies", Research Series 27. London, 
Centre for Environmental Studies. 
Monopolies Commission 
Lloyds Bank Ltd. and 
Proposed Merger", Lon 
(1968). "Barclays Bank Ltd.,. 
artins Bank Ltd.: A Report on th 
on, f1iliou. 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1980). "Blue Circle 
Industries Limited and Armitage Shanks Group Limited: A 
Report on the Proposed Merger" 
, 
London, HMSO. 
Moffatt, C. "Checking the Growth of Corporate Power", Inves- 
tors' Chronicle, Sept. 21,1979, pp. 839-41. 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1974). "The Boots Comj 
Limited and House of Fraser Limited: A Report on thePro-- 
posed i4erger, " London, 1U1SO. 
T, Zonopolies and Mergers Commission (1974). "Eagle Star In-" 
surance Company Limited and Bernard Sunley Investment Tru-t 
Limited and Grovewdod Securities Limited: A Re-Dort on , 'he 
Proposed Merger", LOndon, HT4SO. 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1979) 
. 
"FDIC Corporation 
Merck & Co. Inc., Alginate Industries Limited: A Re-port 
on the Proposed Mexgers" 
, 
London, HL'SO. 
Monopolios tin: 3 :,; oz5'r'o CG,: missior (i i (i 
. 
'' 'he Fruehauf 
Corporation and Crane Fruehauf Limited N_ Rei)or t on -the 
Proposed Merger" 
, 
London, IThISO. 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1979). "Lonhro Ltd. and 
SUITS and House of Fraser" $ London, HMSO. 
Moon, R. W. 3rd. ed. (1968). "Business Mergers and Takeover 
Bids", London, Gee. 
Morgan, E. J. (1980). "Unit II: Growth, Diversification and 
Mergers", Milton Keynes, Open University Press. 
Morin, D. B. et al. (1970). "Acquisition and Mergers in 
Canada, Methuen. 
Morrell, J. "Forecasting the Economic and Business", Long 
Range Planning, Mar. 1972, pp" 52-55. 
Morrell, J. (1976). "n 'Short Guide to Business Forecasting", 
Occasional Paper No. 2, London, Henley Centre for Forecasting. 
Morton, F. "The Ro- 
Penguin Books. 
Mossi. n, J. "Merger 
tions", Journal of 
f; hschiids :A Family Portrait", Middlesex, 
Agreemen is : Some Theözýetic Considerations 
Businp-ss, Oct 1968:, pp. 460-471. 
'ý 64- 
Moyle, J. (1971). *'The Pattern of Providing Share 0 %, ne_- 
shi-c?. 1957-i 70" 
, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Mueller, D. C. (1977). "The Effects of Conglomerate Mergers: 
A Survey of the Empirical Evidence", Journal of Bankiny. and 
Finance, 2, pp. 315-347. 
Mueller, D. C. "A Theory of Conglomerate Merger", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Nov. 1969 
"Multi-Bank Consortia", Financial Times Survey, Mar. 30, 
1979. 
National Association of Accountants, "Takeovers: A'Survey 
of Corporate Defence Strategies", 1! 9erEers & Acauisiti_ons, 
Spring 1980, pp. 21-35. 
Nernniers, E. F. and Grunewald, A. E. (1975). "Basic Managerial 
Finance", 2nd. ed. St. Paul, West Publishing. 
"The New Game on Takeovers", Dun's Review. Aug, 1.975, pp. 
42-45. 
Newbould, G. O. "Management and Merger Activity", Liverpool, 
Guthstcaatd Ltd. 
, 
1970. 
Newbould., G. D. and Jackscn, A. S. "The Evaluation of Comb 
ponies for Take-over", Journal of General Manä ement, v. 1, 
no. '.. -op. 1.56-16 0. --- 
Neiybould, G. D. et al. "Shareholders' Interests and Acquisi- 
tion Activity", Accounting & Business Research, Summer 1976, 
v. 6, no. 23, pp. 201-215. 
Nicholls, J. R. "The Role of the Marketing Man in Internaý- 
tional Acquisitions", Journal of General Management, Spring 
1979, pp. 64-73. ýý. 
Nielsen, J. F. and Mslicher, R. W. "A Financial Analysis of 
Acquisition And Merger Premiums", Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, Mar. 1973, PP. 159-162. 
Office of Fair Trading (1978). "Mergers: A Guide to the 
Procedures 
. 
under the Fair Trading Act 1", London, HIASO. 
OFT, 1980. "Annual Report of the Director General of Fair 
Trading 1979" 
, 
London, }thISO. 
"The Oil Majors Bet on Coal", Business Week, Sept. 24,1979, 
pp. 104-IL-12. 
"The Origins and Growth of the Midland Bank Group", Midland 
Beak Review, Autumn 1979, pp. '20-25. 
radovan, j. "iiew Influences in Merchant' 
-. 
Banking' 
, cý our- 
nal of the institute of Bankers, Aug. 1977, pp. 126-127. 
Pale, A. C. e1 
-iie u. 1ation and Codes of Pro, ti-ce" , ci! >>; '"'- 
nal of Business La: r, London, Jan. 1980, pp. 2Y-31. 
Parker, J. M. "Equity Oriented Compensation Plans for Execu- 
tives", Financial Executives, June 1981, pp. 22-26. 
Pearson, B. "Acquisition Without Tears", Accountants 1faeky, 
May 1978 
, 
pp 
.- 
22-24. 
Peat. Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (1980). "Banking in London", 
London, Peat Marwick, Mitchell '& Co. 
"Pension Fund Investment", Financial Times Survey, Feb. 
2,1981, 
Personal Business Supplement., "How to Survive Your Com- 
pany's Merger", Business Week, Sept. 17,1979, pp. 146- 
148. 
Phillips, S. & Zecher, J. R. (1981). The SEC and Public 
Interest"; Mass., MIT Press. 
Pickering, J. F. (1979). "The Causes and Consequences of 
Abandoned Merger s" 
. 
Manchester, Dept. of Manage-wen" ; 
Sciences, University of ! Manchester, institute of Science 
and Technology, (Occasional Paper 9.906).. 
Pickering, J. F. (1980). "The Implementation of British Com- 
petition Policy on Mergers", Occasional Paper 8001, Man- 
chester, Dept. of Management Sciences, University of Man- 
chester, Institute of Science & Technology. 
Pickering, J. F. (1978). "The Abandonment of Major Mergers 
in the UK 1965-75", The Journal of industrial : Economics, 
v. 2'7, pp. 123-131. 
Pinches, G. E. "Financing with Convertible Preferred Stock 
1960-1967", Journal of Finance, 'Mar. 1970, v. 25, no. 3, pp. 53-63. 
Piper, T. R. "Is Your Stock Worth its Market Price? ", Har- 
vard Business Review, May-June 1981, pp. 124-132. 
Platt, C. J. "How Reliable. are Profit Forecasts? " Accouný, 
- 
anc 
, 
Aril ? 979, pp. 951-97- r 
Plender, P. "The Rise and Rise of the institutional Inves- 
tor", The Banker, Sept. 1980, pp. 41-48. 
Porezecan_0iiskir, 
iiüi 7ý GA. 
C. "The International :, ale of US Corr nercial Banks" pp. - 
,ü of Banking & ance, 
-!, v. 5, 
Prai. s, S. J. (1976). "Evolution of Giant Firr-11.1is in 
A Study o--F. the Growthof Cor.. cen tr. :. iö i 
_i 
n 
IQ ; '0; " . Cambri 
"! e 1`v "° Industry in i'J_ täin ý. ý%nt9 
I. lnjverj-t 7 dress. 
'v 
Pratt en, 1.3. F. "A Case Study of a Conýý! onýýera 4e i. Ierger" , 
Moorgate and Wall Street, Spring 1970, pp. 27-55 
Price Waterhouse (1980). "Acquiring a Company 
- 
An Informa- 
tion Checklist", London, Price Waterhouse & Co. 
"The Purchase by a Company of its Own Shares: A Consulta- 
tive Document"; Presented to Parliament by the. Secretary 
of State for Trade by Command of Her Majesty, June 1980. 
London, IFYISO. 
Pringle, R. (1973). "A Guide to Banning in Britain", Lon- 
don, Charles Knight. 
Radcliffe Report (1959). "Report o 
Working of the Monetary System" ; 
London, Cmnd 827, HMSO. 
Rappaport A. "Capital Budgeting App 
Shares Acquisitions" 
, 
Tr ers cs: Ac 
v. lo, " 110.3, ppa 27-29. 
the Conuaittee on the 
airman: Lord Radcl. ifj. e), 
to an E;. change Of 
oils, Fail 19 75 
, 
Rappaport A.: "Financial Analysis for. Mergers and Acquisi-- 
tions', Mergers & Acquisitions, Winter 1976, pp. 18-35... 
Rappapovt A. "Selecting Strategies that Create Shareholder 
Value ", Harvard Business Review, May-June 1981, pp. ? 39- 
- 
148. 
Reed, S. F. " ^indars and Brokers: A Spec 1rä. 1 Analysis" ,M r"- 
gers & Acquisitions, Spring 197k., v. 9, no. 2, pp. V 4-27. 
Reid, Sir B. J. (1963). "The Role of the Merchant Banks To- 
dýy" 
, 
London, Institute of Bankers, Presidential Ac3. iress. 
Reddaway, W. B. "An Analysis of Takeovers", Lloyds Bank Re- 
view, April 1972, no. 104, pp. 8-? 9. 
Reed, S. F. "Finders and Brokers: A Spectral Analysis, Part 
III: Performance and Self Analysis", Mergers & Acquisi- 
tions, Fall, 1975, v. 9, no-3, pp.. 22-28. 
Rees, R. D. "A Review of the Work of the T 
. 
M. C. " Paper Pre- 
pared for Regulation Conference, Oxford, University College, 
Max. 19-20,1980. 
"Regulation in the City and the Bank of England's Role" 
Bank of England Quarterly, One 1978, pp. 379-382. 
Reilly, F. K. "What Determines the Ratio of Exchange in Cor- 
porate Mergers? ", Financial Analysts Journal, Nov. 
-Dec. 1962, v. 18, no. 6, pp. 1775o. 
Reilly, R. F. "Pricing an Acquisition: A 15-Stet, HethodolcT", 
14er 
_A. 
CqU1s1'GlJ1S, 
. 
`viir±er 1 979, p. ý4"- Z. 
_ýýUrj 
Reunc, 1, 
.R. 2il al. 
"Cont f7geni, Payouts Cut Acquisition 
Risks" 
, 
Ha rvara Busiress Revi er: 
, 
Thar. 
-April 1970, " 48, 
no. 2, p-n. 8i-Q1. 
Revell,. J. (1975). "The British Financial System", London, 
MacMillan. 
Revell, J. ( 1973). "Financial Centres, Financial Institu- 
tions and Economic Change", Bangor, University College of 
North Wales. 
"Review of MonoDoli3s and Mergers Policy. A Consultative 
Document" 
, 
London, Cmnd, 7198, HLISQ. 
Rhys, D. G. "Anatomy of a Merger", Accounting and Business 
Research, Winter 1972, pp. 49-52.. 
Rider, B. A. K. "The Crime of Insider Trading", Journal of 
Business Law, London, 1978, pp. 19-29- 
Rider, B. A. KWI)T e Regulation of the British Securities 
Industries", London, Oyez. 
Robertson, J. (1974). "The Structure of British Financial 
Institutions in the 1980's", in Taylor B. et al. eds. -. 
"St ategic Planning for Financial institutions" 
, 
London, 
Godley Head & HFL Publishers, pp. I. 8-36. 
Robinson, D. "rat ? ye 
tT gndi St ructtlre of Some TAT? für Merchant 
Banks and 
. their Finüncý_a1 Performances", Manchester, 
Business School, (unpub. Master thesis). 
Roc.. t, z11, W. F. "How to Acquire a Company" 
, 
Harvard Business 
Review, Sept. 
-Oct. 1968, pp. 121-a32. r ýý 
Pose, H. B. and Nesbould, G. D. "The 1967 Take-over Boom", 
Moorgate and Wall Street, Autumn 
, 
1967, pp" 5--? `I'. 
Rosenbloom. A. H. and Howard, A. W. "Bootstrap Acquisitions 
and How to Value Them", Mergers & Acui. si tions, Winter 1977 
pp. 18-26. 
Rowley, C. K. (1966). "The British Monopolies Commission" 
London, Allen & Unwin. 
Salter, INI. S. and Wolf, A. W. " Choosing Compatible Acquisi- tions through a Tailor-Made Screening System, Companies 
can Find a Profitable Match" 
, 
Harvard Business Review, 
Jan. 
-Feb. 1981, pp. 117-127. 
Salter, M. S. and Weinhold, W. A. (1979). "Dive-rsifica, ion 
through Acquisition: Strate_ies for Qreatim:: Economic Value"; 
New York, ' Free Press. ýýl 
Samuels, J. M. and Tzoannos, J. "Takeovers and Share Price 
valuatlo. 
-I"' 
, 
Business Ratios, 
_1_970; !, Sue 2, pp. 12-16, 
4Ü8 
Samuels, J-1 
-i. and Wilkes, F. M. 3rd. ed. U971). "IJana: ýe-. 
ment of Company Finance", London, Nelson and Sons. 
Sawyer, M. et al. (1975). "Mergers, Growth and Concen tra- 
tion", Oxford, Oxford Economic Papers. 
Scharf, C. A. "A Technique of Buying, Selling and Merging 
Business", New Jersey 
, 
Prentice HaIJ.. 
Schmitthoff, C. M. "The Wholly Owned and the Controlled 
Subsidiary", Journal of Business Law, London, 1978, pp. 218- 
229. 
Schoeppler, 0. (1976). "Merchant Banking: The New Look", 
The Banker, ro126, pp. 953-955. 
SEC (1971). "Insti tutional Investor Study Report" 
, 
Washing- 
ton, D. C., Govt. Publishing Office. 
"The Secondary Banking Crisis and the Bank of Engla_nd's 
Support Operations", Bank of England Quarterly, April 1978, 
pp. 230-239. 
"Self-Regulation at Work in the City", Investors' Chronicle, 
July 24,1981, pp. 232. 
Shad, J. R. S. : 'The Financial Realities of Mergers" 
, 
Harvard 
Business 
-Review, Nov. -Dec. 1969, pp. ? 33-146. 
Shad, J. R. S. (1971: ) 
. 
"How to Make the 'Impossible Merger", 
in M. Strage, ed. "Acquisition and Merger Negotiating 
Strategy", New York, Presidents. 
Sharpe, I. "Asset Revaluations and Stock Market Prices 
", 
Journal of Accounting Research, 1975,1.13, r. *o"1, pp. 293- 
310. 
Shick, R. A. et al. "Merger Benefits to Shareholders of 
Acquiring Firms", Financial Management, Winter 19711, pp. k5-- 
53 
"Should Companies Pay Takeover Ransom? ", Dun's Review, May 
1981, v. 117, no. 5, 
Silberman, I. H. "A Note on Merger Valuation", Journal of 
Finance, June 1968, pp. 528-536. 
Singh, A. (1971) 
. 
"Takeovers" 
, 
Cambridge, Cambridge Univer_-- 
sity Press. 
Skerratt, L. C. Z. "Coin' . ible Loan Stocks-' 
c, our? ' of 
Business Finance', 1971, np. 28-42, 
-- 
409 
- 
Skully, M. T. (1980) 
. 
"bierchalit Banking in the Far East" 
, 
London, F. T. Financial Publishing Ltd. 
Smalter, D. J. and Lancey, R. C. "P/E Analysis in Acquisi- 
tion Strategy", Harvard Business Review, Nov. 
-Dec. 1966, 
pp. 85-95. 
Smidt, S. "The Changing Role of Individuals and Snstitu" 
Lions in the Stock Harket", Journal of Contemporary Busi- 
ness, Winter 1974, v. 3, no. 1, pp. 13-24. 
Smith, J. S. and Chamberlin, L. L. (1970). "Financial As- 
pects of Acquisitions and Mergers", in Financial Execu- 
tive's Handbook, pp. 917-935, Homewood, Illinois, Dow 
Jones-Irwin. 
Smith, K. V. et al. "A Portfolio Analysis of Conglomerate 
Diversification", Journal of Finance, June 1969, v. 2k, 
pp. 413-428. 
Spero, J. E. (1980). "The Failure of the Franklin National 
Bank", New York, Columbia University Press. 
Stacey, N. A. H. "Mergers and British Industry" 
, 
Long Ran_-, 
Planning, Sept. 1968, pp. 13-17. 
Stanton, T. C, and Maxwell, P. H. "Warrants: A Cost of Capi- 
tal Perspective", Financial Executive, Sept. 1980, pp. 27- 
3i. 4 
Stapleton, R. C. "The Acquisition recision as a Capital 
Budgeting Problem", Journal of Business Finance & Account- 
LnZ, y. 2, no. 2, pp. 187-201. 
Stern, L. W. "Mergers Under Scrutiny", Harvard Business 
Review, July-Aug. 1969, pp. 18-162. 
Stetson, C. P. Jr. "The Reshaping of Corporate Financial 
Services", Harvard Business Review, Sept. 
-Oct. 1980, pp. 
134-142. 
-"Stevens, D. L. "Financial Characteristics of Merged Firms: A 
Multi-variate Analysis", Journal of Financial and Quantita- 
tive Analysis, Mar. 1972, PP. 
.1 9-1 75 
Stock Exchange (various issues, 1970-1980). "Admission of 
Securities to Listing", London, Council of the Stock Ex- 
change. 
"The Stock Exchan. a: Evid 
the Functioning of Finalc 
Stock Exchange. 
Stock Exchange. "RctDort h 
E an ý o:: _ealin s in tih 
Fields Limited, " July 1980. 
e to the Comm ittee to Revue 
Institutions", London, The 
Snecia]. Committee of the a 
Shares o Consolidated Go!. 
-', 
-- 
4'1 Ü 
"The Stock Exchange Fact Book", Mar, 1980, London, Stock F -- 
change. ýyý 
"Stock Exchange Hastens to Repel Raiders", Investors' 
Chronicle, Aug.. 8,1980, pp. 410. 
"Stockbrokers' Services: A 
brokers' Services in Relati 
ing'', 1976, London, 1-IMSO. 
rt on the SuDply of Stoci- 
o Restrictions on Advertis- 
Stopford, J. N. et al. (1975). "British Business Policýi. " 
, London, MacMillan. 
Stopford, J. M. et al. (. 1980). "Cases in. Str"ategic Mana 
. 
e-- 
ment", Chichester, Wiley. 
Stotland, J. A. "Planning Acquisitions and. Tiergers", Long 
Range Planning, Feb. 1976, pp. 66-71. 
Stott, W. G. "The Changing Face of Corporate Finance" 
, 
Mo rt 
Guaranty Survey, Oct. 1967, pp. 3-8. ýý 
Strage, M. ed. (1971). "Acquisition and ivler er i`; e of at' o 
New York, Presidents. 
"Supervision of the Securities Markets:. Non--Statu Cory As- 
pects", Bank of Endland ý? uarter? ý, rune 1978, pp. 39O--394' 
. 
"A Surveil of Metge-rs_195ö--1968'It7o)A Paper PrepaM-red bfr the 
Staff of the Monopolies Commission, London, HMSO. 
"Survey: International Banking", Economist, Mar. 1-4,1981, 
pp. 11-44. 
Sutherland, A. (1969). "The Monopolies Commission in ac-, tion", Cambridge, Cambrige University Press. ý 
Sykes, S. G. "Property Valuations: A Rational jIodel", The 
Investment Analyst, Summer, 1981, no. 3, pp. 20-28. 
Synder, G. Z. "Take-over Tactic: Tender Offering for Options 
on the Conmon Stock: How to Take-over a Corporation with 
Minimum Investment and Risk", Financial Analysts Journal, 
July-Aug. 1973, pp. 30-32. 
Tabb, J. B. "Reasons for the Emergence of Contested company 
Takeover in the 1950's", Accounting & Business Researcr, 
Autumn 1981, v. 11, no. 44, pp. 323-330. 
Takeover Panel (1976). "The City Code on Takeovers arid, 
Mergers", London, Takeover Panel. 
Takeover Panel (1974-1-19M. "Annual Repdr t" 
, 
London, 
over Panel, various issues. 
-4ý1-_ 
Taylor, B. (1(, 80). "; The Bar. J, ing Revolution: Corporate 
Strategies arid Organisational Change in British Banking", 
in Livey, B. L. ed. "T, I na; eicent and Pecule in oainkinf 
London, Institute of Bankers. 
Taylor, F. W. "Anatomy of a Merger", Mergers & Acquisition; 
Nov. 
-Dec. 1970, pp. 1-9. 
Taylor, M. G. et äl. "A Guide to the Third Directive Mer- 
gers", Accountants Digest, Spring 1979, pp. 1-8. 
Temple, J. E. et al. "Strategic Growth through Merger and 
Acquisitions", Financial Executive, May 1981, pp. 23-26. 
Thackery, J. "The Saturday Night Takeover Fever", Manage- 
ment Today, June 1979, pp. 70-73. ' 
Thomas, D. "Marketing in Mergers;, Management Today, Oct. 
1969, pp. 121-126. 
Thomas, W. A. (1978). "The Finance of British Industry 1918- 
1976", London, Methuen. 
Thomson, M. "Management Buyouts: The Inside Story". Mergers 
& 
_Acquisitions, 
Summer 1976, pp. 7-14. 
Thomson, I4. "Management Buyouts: An Overview" 
, 
Mergers 
Acquisitions, Sumer 1976, v. 11, no. 2, pp. 4-6. 
Thompson Long, L. "Director Fi duciaries: Brotecting Share-- 
holder. Interests", Mergers & Acquisitions, Winter 1980, pp. 
4-9. 
"The Thoughts of John McGillicuddy", 
- 
Euromoney, May 1981, 
pp. 90-101. 
The Times (1981). The Largest Acquisitions and Mergers", 
in "The Times Top 1000 (1980/81)", London, Tunes Publisher. 
"Tracking the Lead Banks: Who's Competing Hardest? " Euro- 
money, Aug. X977, pp. 11-30. 
Trippi, R. R. et al. "An Analysis of Price Impacts of Large 
Block Transactions on the New York Stock Exchange", Journal 
of Economics & Business, Winter 1976, v. 28, no. 2, pp. 88-95. 
Troubb, R. S. "Purchased Affection: A Primer on Cash Tender Offers", Harvard-Business Review, July-- Aug. 1978 
Twentieth Century Fund Report (1980). "Abuse on Wall Street: Conflicts of interest in the Securities Markets", USA, 
Quorum Books. 
- 
Tzoannos, J. & Samuels, J. "Mergers and Takeovers: The 
Financial Characteristics of Companies involved", Journal 
of Business Finance. Autumn 1972, v. 4, no. 3, pp. 5-16. ýý 
- 
Lýrý ý. 
"UK Banking-", Financial Times Surve3/9//79,1/9/80, 
21/9/81. 
Utton, M. A. (1979). "Diversification and Competition", 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Utton, M. A. "On Measuring the Effects of Industrial Mer- 
gers", Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Feb. 1974, 
v. 21, no. 1, pp-_14Q8. 
_ 
Vance, J. O. "is Your Corpaiy a Takeover Target? " Harvard 
Business Review, May-June 1969, pp. 93-98. 
Vaughan, G. D. et al. (1977). "From Private to Public", 
Cambridge, Woodhead Faulkner. 
Vernon, J. R. "Ownership and Control Among'Large Member 
Banks", Journal of Finance, June 1970, v. 23, no. 2, pp. 
651-657. 
Vernon, RA. et al. (1973). "Who Owns the Blue Ch s? " 
Essex, Gower Press. ~ý~ 
Vesper, K. H. (1980). "New Venture Strategies", (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall. 
Vice, A. (1971). "Strategy of Takeove_ 
Hill. 
Vitias, D and Frazer, P. "Competition 
The Banker, Feb. 1980, pp. 47-51. 
Wain, K. and Bramsen, B. (1979). "The 
London, Michael Joseph. 
rs" London, McGraw 
in Retail Banking", 
Hambros 1779-1975 ", 
Walker, R. G. (1973).. "Takeover Bids and Financial. Dis- 
closure", Melbourne, Accountancy Research Foundation. 
Wallender III, H. W. "A Planned Approach to Divestment", 
Columbia Journal of World Business, Spring 1973, PP. 33-37. 
"Wall Street Rush to Beat the New Merger Rules" 
, 
Economist, 
Max. 17,1979, PP. 113-117. 
Waterman, M. H. (1958). "Investment Barkin Functions: 
Their Evolution and AdaDtation to Business Finance`, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan. 
Webb, M. (1974). "How to Acquire a Company", Epping, Gower 
Press. 
Wechsberg, J. (1966), "The Merchant Bakers' 
, 
London, 
Weidenfeld. Ni c.: olson. 
Weigand, R. E. "Buying into Market Control", Harvard ;; us :, e 
-s Review, 'Nov. 
-Dec. 1980, pp. 141-149. 
-- 
4'c 
- 
Weinborg et al. 4th ed. (1979) 
. 
"Takeover. Takeovers and blergers" 
London, Sweet & Maxwell. 
Weinberg, M. A. (1971). "Takeovers and Amalgamations" 
London, Sweet & Maxwell. 
Welham, P. (1975). "Investing Share Options, Warrants and 
Convertibles", Cambridge, Woodhead-Faulkner. 
Helles, C. "The Individual Investor and the Problem of 
Institutional Power", Journal of Contemporary Business, 
Winter 197! 4, v. 3, no. 1, pp. 73-89. 
Weston, J. F. "Diversification and Merger Trends", Business 
Economics, Jan. 1970, v. 5, pp. 50-57. 
Weston, J. F. " Reply to Silberman's A Note on Merger 
Valuation", Journal of Finance, June 1968, pp. 528-536. 
Weston, J. F. and. Brigham, F. F. (1975). "Managerial Finance", 
London, Holt, Rinehart 8a-Winston. 
Westwick, C. A. (1972). "The Accuracy of Profit Forecasts 
in Bid Situations", London, Institute of Chartered Account- 
ants in England and Wales. 
Weyer, D. V. (1980). "The Threats and Opportunities Facin 
British Banks; A Ten Year View", London, Institute of 
fI his on, T. ed. (lcj (9 
. 
"The Uses 
. 
and Abuses of Forecast-: 
in Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex; London, Maciulil- 
lan. 
White, R. and Maynes, 0'. (1978). "The Trading Company: 
Acquisitions, Amalgamations and Reconstructions", London, 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
Whittington, G. (1971), " 
and Other Studies of Busi. 
bridge University Press. 
e Prediction of Profitability 
ss Behaviour" 
, 
Cambridge, Cam- 
"Who are the -C'ompanies' Favourite Brokers", Investors' 
Chronicle, Sept. 9,1979, pp. 902. ' 
"Why the Baue Chips Bank on Morgan", Fortune, July 13,1981, 
pp" 37-L2" 
Williams, F. (1968). "Reasoning with Statistics", New York, 
Holt, Reinhart & Winston. 
Williams, J. G. (1980). "Acouisitions and Mergers", London, 
Institute of Chartered Accountants im. 
-England and 
: 3ales. 
Wilson Committee (Mar. 1978) vol. 5. "Evidence on the 
Financing of Industry or Trade" 
, 
(AHC, 'CT, CB & Bank of 
land London, }-HdSO. 
- 
4, 'LL 
- 
1". 1 i1 0. n COD, TO 
-4 
t t: 
,,. 
Jan 7e 19-9 1,1" tiE. L: v11oÜ 
S ClI"e Jvi ýyf ý111. a ý ii l, 1 
deice" 
, 
(Panel on Takeovers and Mergers), London, H! '. ISO. 
Wilson Committee (Feb. 1979) vol. 3 "Second Stage Evi- 
dence", (Committee of London Clearing Banks), London, HMSO. 
Wilson 
, 
Prof. J. S. G. "The Wilson Committee Report- Some 
Reflections", The Three Banks Review, June 1981, no. 130, 
pp. 23-39. 
Wilson, R. M. S. "An Overview of Financial Services Market- 
ing", Managerial Finance, vol. 5, no. 3, Pp. 32-293. 
"Wilson Ztiakes the Gentler Path", Investors' Chronicle, June 
27,1980, PP. 598. 
Wine, H. (1980). "Buying and Selling Private Companies and 
Businesses", London, Butterworth. 
Winesbury, R. "When Mergers Move" Management Today, Oct. 
1969, PP. 39-Lb. 
Wooldridge, F. "Some Defences to Takeover Bids", journal 
of Business Law; Londoffl, 1974, pp. 202-211. 
Wool, E. "The Companies Act 1980 Pity the Poor Auditor; " 
, Accountancy, Feb. 1981. 
"World Banking", Financial. Times Survey, May 27,1.980. 
Wosner, J. "Golden ýýa1ndshakes and the Tax Net" 
, 
Account- 
aric, Jan. 1981, pp. 69-71. 
Young, G. K. (1971) 
. 
"Merchant Banking: Practice and Pros- 
pect", London, Weidenfeld and Nicol-son. 
Ziade, J. P. "The Technique of Evaluation in Mergers and 
Acquisitions", Accountancy, July 1969, pp. 500,508. 
